

Archives internes de Daech

Les archives de l'État islamique sont maintenant disponibles dans leur quasi totalité pour les chercheurs intéressés soucieux de voir comment fonctionnait de l'intérieur cet État. Le journal New York Times va en publier de nouvelles en avril 2018. Voici quelques centaines de pages d'archives de cet État accompagnées de commentaires sur la guerre de Syrie et d'Irak permettant d'éclairer ces documents.

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The Isis papers: behind 'death cult' image lies a methodical bureaucracy

From control of oil and land to rules governing leisure, internal memos seen by the Guardian show how deliberate Isis's state-building exercise has been

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A worker is seen putting up a propaganda poster in a still from a recent Isis video.

John Kerry has branded its members psychopathic monsters, François Hollande calls them barbarians, and David Cameron describes them as a death cult. But Islamic State is much more than that.

As newly obtained documents demonstrate, Isis is also made up of bureaucrats, civil servants and jobsworths. Hundreds if not thousands of cadres have set themselves to work creating rules and regulations on everything from fishing and dress codes to the sale of counterfeit brands and university admission systems.



The Isis papers: leaked documents show how Isis is building its state

About 340 official documents, notices, receipts, and internal memos seen by the Guardian show that they have been trying to rebuild everything from roads to nurseries to hotels to marketplaces, from the Euphrates to the Tigris. They have also established 16 centralised departments including one for public health and a natural resources department that oversees oil and antiquities.

This has been the plan all along. A 24-page statecraft blueprint obtained by the Guardian, written in the months after Isis's declaration of a caliphate, shows how deliberate the state-building exercise has been, and how central it is to its overall aims.

لادب اللاد
اللد
اللد

الدولة الإسلامية
خلافه على منهاج النبوة

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم


فَلَا وَرَبِّكَ لَا يُؤْمِنُونَ حَتَّى
يُحَكِّمُوكَ فِي مَا شَجَرَ بَيْنَهُمْ
ثُمَّ لَا يَجِدُوا فِي أَنفُسِهِمْ حَرَجًا مِمَّا قَضَيْتَ
وَيُسَلِّمُوا تَسْلِيمًا

مبادئ في إدارة الدولة الإسلامية

1435
للهجرة

مبادئ في إدارة الدولة الإسلامية

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مع انطلاق انتفاضة الشام المباركة ضد التصيرية ، دخل المجاهدون بأعداد كبيرة غيرة على دينهم .

ومنهم نخوة عروبية وقبائلية ، ومنهم حماساً واندفاعاً دون أهداف شرعية .

وكان لا بد من تنظيم هذه الأعداد ومبداؤها تنظيمياً شرعياً يقبل الواقع الحالي

الذي حشد له العالم من جنوده ومخبراته .

ومن ثم مواجهة تغيير المبادئ وشراء النعم الذي لم يكن براعيه المجاهدون الأوائل في أفغانستان والعراق والشيشان وغيرها .


ومن ثم مراعاة التغير التربوي والاجتماعي الذي عايشه المهاجرون

وتنظيم صفوفهم مع الانصرار أهل البلد

وكانت هناك الكثير من التحديات والصعوبات التي كان لا بد من التعامل معها وفق منشاها ووفق منهجيتها الخاصة ، والتعامل لكل واحدة على حدة .

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الباب الأول :

إعلان الخلافة الإسلامية :

كان إعلان تجديد الخلافة في العراق عام ١٤٢٧ للهجرة هو الفاصل بين الفرقة والتوحد وعزة المسلمين ، كان ذلك العام بمثابة الفلج للغرب المشرك الذي بدأ بعد العدة والمشروع لضرب أي مشروع للدولة الإسلامية ، وكان إعلان الخلافة هو نتيجة ادراك المجاهدين من عدم جدوى الأعمال القتالية ضد المشركين دون وجود قائد و خليفة يجتمع المسلمون تحت رايته ويكون عزاً لهم .

استطاعت أمريكا وحلفاؤها من تقويض مشروع الخلافة لحد كبير في العراق بعد قيامهم بإنشاء الصحوات العراقية السنية وضرب الحاضنة السنية للدولة وإظهارها كدولة عميلة وإرهابية وذات مشاريع سياسية منافقة وعبر تجييش إعلامي كبير اقتصرت أفعال جنود الدولة على عمليات أمنية لضرب الأهداف الأمريكية وحلفاؤها .

بعد قيام انتفاضة الشام المباركة كان لدولة الإسلام دوراً كبيراً في ضرب التصيرية فيها وتقويض أركان حكم الأسد في قلب مراكز القيادة .

وكان أن درس قادة الدولة قبالاً كيفية الاستفادة من أخطاء الماضي ، وكيفية الإبقاء على النزعة الجهادية لثوار الشام وعدم قولبتهم في أطر غربية بجرها الدعم الغربي .

وفي الباب الثاني بيان إدارة المجاهد المهاجر خصوصاً وتنمية عقيدة الدولة الإسلامية لدى الأنصار في بلاد الشام .


كان إعلان الخلافة في بلاد الشام ضربة قوية لم يتوقعها عملاء الغرب الذين كفوا بسرون على منهج صحوات العراق الذين ظن الغرب أن ينهي بهم مشروع الخلافة الإسلامية كما أضطه في العراق .

كان هناك مشكل جديدة متغيرة استطاع قادة الدولة التعامل معها ، ومنها إعلان الجولاني رفضه للإلتصام لدولة الإسلام رغم بيعته للخليفة في العراق ، وكان بذلك يحاول شق الصف وواد المشروع تبعاً لأجنداته الخاصة المرتبطة بدول إقليمية وكان رفضه صدمة للمشروع الإسلامي الذي نصره الله رغم كثرة المشبطين ودعاة الذل والعبودية .

والذي يشهد أحداث الشام يرى كيف أعز الله دولة الإسلام وأذل الجولاني ومن معه .

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الباب الثاني :

تنظيم الفرد والجماعة :

مع دخول انتفاضة السلم عامها الثاني ، دخلت الميليشيات الشيعية بمختلف جنسيتها الى بلاد الشام للقتال الى جانب النظام التصيري الراقصي الذي استفحل اجرامه بحق أهل السنة والجماعة ، مما أدى لانتفاضة إسلامية عالمية تمثلت بهجرة الآلاف الشبان المسلمين للقتال ف صف أهل السنة من مختلف أصقاع الأرض .

هاجر الآلاف الى بلاد الشام للقتال الى جانب المجاهدين ، دون علمهم بمنهج أي فصيل وتبعيته أو أجنسته الخاصة فيها .

وكان لا بد من إعداد منهج سليم يستقل به المهاجرون بحيث يثمر جهادهم عن عزة للإسلام والموحدين .

فكان إعلان الخلافة هو الواجب الذي يجمع الوافدين الى أرض الجهاد ويستقطب قلوبهم وتستقر به أفئنتهم ويجمعهم على اختلاف ألوانهم تحت راية واحدة وكلمة واحدة وخليفة واحد .

كان معظم المهاجرون الأوائل ينحدرون من دول الخليج والمغرب العربي الذين حثتهم غيرتهم على دينهم ومنهم على اخوتهم العرب السنة دون وازع ديني جهادي ، ودون أن يكون لهم خبرة سابقة في تنظيمات جهادية عالمية .

وكان من بعدهم هجرة من دول العالم بعد إعلان الخلافة ، حيث لم تبق دولة كفرة إلا وعانت من هجرة شبابه الى نصرة دولة الإسلام التي رفضها جنود الجولاني وصحوات الردة من الجيش الحر وغيره .


وأمر بعدها الشيخ أبو بكر البغدادي بإحداث أول معسكر يضم المهاجرين الجدد غير ذوي الخبرة والعقيدة الراسخة قرب الحدود السابقة لمخطط سايكس بيكو " العراق - سوريا "

وكان المعسكر يشمل على تنظيم الفرد المهاجر في دولة الإسلام والنزاع العصبية المحلية والجاهلية من قلبه ، وجعل التماثل للدين وحده وراية واحدة .

وكان المعسكر يشمل على زرع روح الأخوة بين المهاجرين والاتصال عبر النزاع الهوية السابقة للمهاجر ، وتوطئه في دولة الإسلام مع عقلته دون شعور بالغربة أو بالتميز بينه وبين إخوته من المهاجرين والاتصال .

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وغير الإسلام لا يمكن أن يضمن هذا التغيير الذي وجد صعوبة في البداية بسبب العصبية المكنية التي أحسها المجاهدون يوم قتالهم مع صحوات الجيش الحر ونزعات الوطنية والنفرة العنصرية التي كانت تقف المهاجر حماسه للقتال إلى جانبهم .

ونتج عن المصكر تشكيل مجموعات مقاتلة مشتركة بين المهاجرين والأتصار تقوم على قيادة الفرد الأقدر على حمل المسؤولية والخبرة السابقة واختبارات المصكر العسكرية والشرعية ، ومجموعات من المهاجرين من دول الغرب خاصة نظراً لصعوبة التواصل اللغوي في مرحلة البداية والإنتلاقي ونظراً للفهم والتنسيق المسبق بين بعض المهاجرين من الشيشان وفرنسا للقتال في خلايا واحدة دون وجود أي تمييز لهم عن غيرهم .


وكان لا بد للطابع العربي أن يظب على طبع المهاجرين

ف لغة القرآن عربية ، وأحاديث النبوة عربية وعادات المجتمع الإسلامي كانت عربية بمنحى كبير ، ونظراً لطبيعة المجتمع المحلي لأهالي الشام كان لا بد من زرع الطبع العربي لغة وثقافة دينية في المهاجرين وانتزاع الهوية الأجنبية التي تحمل في خباياها معاداة الإسلام وثقافته وجنوره .

فتوحيد حياة المجاهد ولغته وثقافته هو الضامن لتوحيد صف المجاهدين وتحقيق اندماجهم الكلي في الدولة الإسلامية التي تضم مهاجرين من كل بقاع الأرض .

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الباب الثالث :

إدارة المعسكرات :

المعسكر الإعدادي هو منزل المجاهد الأول ومدرسته الأولى التي يتلقى فيها تدريباته العسكرية والجهادية ويتلقى التعليم الوافي في أمور دينه وحياته وجهاده .
بحسب خطة الدولة الإسلامية لإنشاء جيل الخلافة فإن المعسكرات تقسم في ثلاث :

١ - معسكرات الإستمرار :

وهي معسكرات خاصة بالمجاهدين السباقين بالجهاد ومن أصحاب الخبرة في إدارة وتخطيط المعركة بداية ونهاية

ويشمل المعسكر على إعداد بدني لمدة ١٥ يوماً ، وذلك في دورة تدريبية كل عام ، ويتلقى المجاهد من خلال المعسكر آخر فنون استخدام السلاح والخطط العسكرية والتقنيات العسكرية المطروحة حديثاً في المعارك والسلاح المرتقب استخدامه من قبل العدو مع شرح مفصل عن تقنيات استخدام العدو للسلاح ومساحات استخدامه وقوته وتقادي جنود الدولة له .

٢ - معسكرات الإعداد الأولي :

للمجاهد يوم انضمامه للدولة الإسلامية مهاجراً كان أو من الأنصار .

ويشمل المعسكر على فترات شرعية يدرس من خلالها المجاهد فقه الأحكام والعقيدة الإسلامية والولاء والبراء ، بالإضافة إلى فنون القتال وفنون استخدام السلاح ، مع فرز كل مجاهد في اختصاص بجيده واستكمال معسكره وفق مهارته في سلاح معين .


٣ - معسكرات الإعداد للأطفال :

ويشمل المعسكر على نورات شرعية في فقه العقيدة والأحكام ، مع فترات توعية في المجتمع الإسلامي والأخلاق ، وتدريب على حمل السلاح الخفيف ومبادئ الاستخدام .

ويتم انتقاء المميزين منهم لمهام ذات طابع أمني ومنها الحواجز والدوريات والأمنيات المختلفة .

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


وتقوم إدارة المعسكرات على خطة وأهداف ونتائج ، بحيث تكون نتيجة المعسكر مطابقة لأهداف ومبادئ الدولة الإسلامية ، لذا كان لابد من إنشاء مركز لإدارة المعسكرات تكون مهامه كالآتي :

- ١ - إعداد مناهج شرعية خاصة بالمعسكرات بالتنسيق مع هيئة البحوث والإفتاء .
- ٢ - إعداد مناهج تعليمية لتعليم اللغة العربية وتلاوة القرآن بالتنسيق مع ديوان التعليم لكل ولاية .
- ٣ - إعداد مناهج عسكرية تدرس أنواع السلاح والتكتيكات العسكرية بإشراف القائد العسكري في كل ولاية .
- ٤ - دراسة تكاليف ومصروفات كل معسكر تتم دراسته أو اقتراحه من قبل القائد العسكري أو والي كل منطقة حسب الاحتياجات المرتبطة بكل ولاية وتقديم الدراسة للوالي .
- ٥ - الإشراف على انتقاء الكادر التعليمي والتدريب في المعسكر .
- ٦ - وضع مخطط تفصيلي وبرنامج سير المعسكر .
- ٧ - متابعة الإشراف على المعسكر وفق البرنامج المحدد .
- ٨ - تقييم دورة المعسكر ورفع تقرير للمسؤولين عن جاهزية الدورة بعد المعسكر .

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الباب الرابع :

ادارة التوجيه :

يبقى المجاهد بحاجة للتوجيه والمتابعة بعد إنهائه لدورة التدريب الخاصة به ، فالتوجيه المعنوي للمجاهد هو أساس نجاحه في كل أمر يقوم به ويكون توجيه المجاهد في كل مرحلة يقوم بها بتكثيره بأهداف الدولة والأحاديث في فضل المجاهد والمثيرة والمتابعة رغم صعوبة درب الجهاد .

١ - توجيه ما قبل المعركة :

ويكون هنا من قبل القائد العسكري للمهمة أو الشرعي المرافق له ، ويكون التوجيه قبيل انطلاق المجاهد للمعركة عبر ذكر أحاديث فضل الجهاد والصبر على لقاء العدو والالتزام بقرارات القائد الميداني وتعليماته خلال المعركة ، كما فضل الشهادة في سبيل الله لإعلاء راية الإسلام والخلافة وفضل المصاب الجريح في أرض المعركة ، وكل هذا يتم خلال التجهيز والإعداد للمعركة ، ويرافق الموجه المجاهدين في كل لحظاتهم حتى غيابهم عنه في معركتهم .


ولا يكون الموجه مشطاً ولا متردداً ولا متلعثماً ولا جبناً لأنه هو القوة التي يستحضرها المجاهد كلما حمى وطيس المعركة .

٢ - توجيه ما بعد المعركة :

- في حال النصر يستحضر الموجه ماورد عن النبي من أنكار في فضل المجاهد وأشعارهم بأن ما أنجزوه يصب في خدمة دينهم وعقيدتهم ، مع تذكيرهم بالالتزام بالتعليمات الصادرة عن قيادة المعركة من أحكام القنم وعدم اتخاذ أي قرار بسلب أموال الناس إلا بحظها وبأمر صريح من القائد المسؤول .
- في حال الإنكسار يكون التوجيه بالصبر والإحسان والتثبت على لقاء العدو وعدم الإصغاء للمترددين والذين يبثون الإشاعة والرعب في صفوف الجند .

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
٣ - التوجيه الدائم :

الإبقاء على النشاط والثبات لدى المجاهد في كل حالاته ودروس في الولاء والبراء والفتنة والعقيدة الإسلامية والسمع والطاعة للأمير .

يكون كادر التوجيه في كل ولاية من نخبة الشرعيين والصكريين المطلقاء الذين لديهم القدرة على الحجة والإقناع والتشجيع ومن الجند الذين تتلف الجماعة حولهم ويكونون ذوي ثقة لديهم .

مبادئ في إدارة الدولة الإسلامية

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الباب الخامس :

تنظيم الولايات :

حاولت اتفاقيات سايكس بيكو ومن بعدها حكم الغرب غير المباشر لدول الإسلام وضع حدود إدارية ترسم الإختلاف الطبقي والمذهبي والعرقي لكل منطقة ، وتعيق جنود الإختلاف بين المسلمين السنة .

إذا كان واضحاً في ولايات العراق فصل السنة عن الشيعة وإهمال مراكز الإدارة في كل منطقة سنوية ، بل وتعيين المسؤولين في مناطق أهل السنة من خبثاء الرافضة ، بينما أولت المناطق تحت حكم الطوائف الكردية والشيعة استقلالاً في القرار عن الرئاسة الحاكمة كما رأينا في كركوك وأربيل بل وفي مناطق أصغر اعتباراً منها في النجف وكربلاء اللتين كانتا تتمتعان باستقلال " ديني " إداري غير معطن .

وكل التقسيمات تلك حرمت أهل السنة من أبسط حقوقهم فجعلت الطويين هم أسبغ البحر ، والشيعة في العراق ملوك النفط والطرق التجارية ، والأكراد الأزيديين شيوخ الجبال وساد الدروز الجبال المظلة على إسرائيل .

كل ذلك لم يكن بمحض صدفة ، بل كان قراراً سياسياً قنراً وضع لتضييق الخناق على أهل السنة وجعلهم آخر القوم وتجريدهم من كل مقومات النهوض أو التفكير بدولة إسلامية راشدة .

فلو رأينا اليوم حدود الدولة الإسلامية وحدود مناطق أهل السنة لرأيناها ممزقة محاصرة مضطهدة ، فالشيعة من جنوب العراق والطويين غرب سوريا والأحزاب الشيوعية الكردية شماليها والدروز من جنوبيها .


فلا عجب اليوم أن ترى الدمام تسيل في أرض الشام والعراق .

فكان من الشرع والعقل إعادة ترسيم حدود الولايات والتراث في كل تطور يطرأ في المنطقة فبذلك تحفظ شوكة أهل السنة وتقوي مدنها ومراكزها ومن ثم تتطرق الأفواج لتغيير جنري في هيكله المناطق التي تخضع لحكم الدولة الإسلامية .

وكان مما اتبعه الصحابة ومن بعدهم من الخلفاء في كل أمة مارقة ، هو تفريق جموعهم بحيث لا يبقى لهم رأي ولا شوكة ولا منعة ، ويبقى المسلم وحده صاحب الدولة والقرار لا يشاركه فيه أحد .

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ومما لا شك فيه أن من مقومات الأمة هو " مالها - طبيعتها أرضها - سكانها - مياهاها " وفي كل تفصيل :

١ - مال الدولة :

هو المقوم الرئيسي ومصدر تمويل كافة العمليات الداخلية والخارجية ، وينبغي وجود مصادر مالية ثابتة لا تتغير قيمتها في كل زمان ومكان وتكون حاجة الناس إليها جلية لا يستطيع الأمم التخلي عنها رغم وجود الموانع التي تحول دون استخدامها وشرائها من أرض الدولة ومنها النفط والغاز وما تحويه الأرض ومنها الذهب كعملة للدولة لا تبلى ولا ترد ، ومنها طرق التجارة التي لا غنى لهم عنها وكلها تدخل الدولة الإسلامية كطرف قوي في كل مخططاتهم لا يتجاهلون وجودها ولا عزها .

٢ - طبيعة أرضها :


لا يمكن لدولة أن تبقى دون وجود الأرض التي تسمح باستمرارها وتمتددها ، فمقومات الأرض هي " الجبل - والزرع - والبحر - والنهر " فهذه المقومات الطبيعية هي التي تكسب الدولة أهميتها وأهمية الموقع ، وقد أسست اتفاقيات الغرب في سايبكس بيكو على تجريد أهل السنة من تلك المقومات فجعلت الجبال للكراد والدروز والطويين وجعلت البحر للرافضة والتصيريين والنهر وملحوله استثماراً لليهود والزرع تحت إدارتهم .

فكانت تلك نكسة جديدة أضيفت لكل طموح باقائمة دولة الإسلام وتحررها من عبودية التصيرية النجسة والرافضة الكافرين ، إذا لامقوم لهم فقد أطبق العدو على منافذهم من كل صوب .

٣ - سعت الحكومات العميلة على تضليل الشعوب السنية في كل البلاد العربية ، إذ دسنت لهم المناهج الفاسدة وتشرت بينهم حب الرذيلة واللعوذ والرشوة والربا وترك العبادة وتسيان أحكام الجهاد ، فعاش أهل السنة في بلاد الشام جهلاً جديداً بعد جهل خلال الاحتلال الفرنسي لأرضهم فكانت الحكومة الطوية التي زرعت رذائلها في كل بيت وأحلت الحرام وجعلت من الحرام تطوراً وحضارة .

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وبعد نهضة قام بها أهل السنة في العراق والشام وخصوصهم من عبودية الطغاة بدأت الخطة الثانية والتي تكفي بإحداث تغيير "ديموغرافي" في مناطقهم وتهجير أهل السنة من مناطقهم ، فكان ما رأيناه في الفلوجة وحلب وحمص وتكريت وغيرها من مناطق أهل السنة التي عانى أهلها الكثير جراء وجودهم في أرضهم .


إنهم يدركون أن الدولة الإسلامية لا تقوم دون عنصر بشري قادر على الإنتاج دائماً على تجديد نماء الأمة ، وكان إغراء خيرة شبلها ونخب البلد بالهجرة خارج مناطقهم وتصفية الكثير منهم .

ولابد اليوم من خطة مدروسة ترد بالمقابل وتحدث التغيير المعاكس في ديار الكفر المستباحة وتشريد أهلها وقتل شبانها حتى لا تقوم لهم قائمة وتكون الأرض لله والعبادة .

وبالمقابل تنفيذ الخطط التي تضمن عودة الشباب المسلم إلى أرضه واستقطاب الخبرات من بلاد المسلمين وخروج الدولة من حاجتها للكادر المختص في مجالاته إن لم يكن من ذوي العهد في الإسلام .

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الباب السادس :

إدارة الأموال :

إن عز الدولة الإسلامية لا يكون إلا بتحررها الكامل من كافة قيود الإستعباد التي يملكها الغرب كأوراق ضغط عليها ، ويسيرها وفق حاجته وهواه بناءً على معرفة منه بحاجة المجاهدين للدعم والأموال والسلاح .

وعاشت الجماعات الجهادية في العراق وبلاد الشام قيود نل طويلة مرهونة بالدعم الغربي المشروط حتى وبعد سيطرتها على مناطق شاسعة في البلاد وامتلاكها كافة مقومات النهوض .


وكان ذلك بسبب الإدارة الجاهلة التي تحكمها والتي تبقىها تحت الوصاية الغربية لكافة نشاطاتها وحروبها وتمدها .

إن سيطرة الدولة الإسلامية على مساحات واسعة تضم كل مقومات النهوض لا يمكن دون وجود إدارة ترعى المصالح وتدير الأزمات إذ لا بد من وضع خطة تضمن عز الدولة واستقلالها كما نوضح في الفقرات التالية :

- الإبقاء على الكفاءات التي كانت تدير المشاريع الإنتاجية في ظل الحكومات السابقة " مع الأخذ بالإعتبار بوضع رقابة مشددة وإدارة تتبع للدولة الإسلامية .
- وضع مختصين في المحاسبة والرقابة على كافة المديرية الإنتاجية في الدولة الإسلامية ومنها منشآت النفط والغاز والمناطق الأثرية ومعامل التصنيع والإنتاج .
- الإبقاء على أرصدة احتياطية تضمن استمرار العمل بنسق واحد في كل الظروف .
- ضبط المصاريف عبر إدارة متكاملة تضمن المصروف الجماعي والإنتاج الجماعي دون تفرد ولاية أو مجموعة بمقررات تفوق حاجتها اعتبارياً .
- إنشاء معامل الإنتاج المحلي العسكري والذخاني والإستقلال عن إحتكار تجار السلاح للمادة الضرورية وقطعها بحال اختلاف المصالح .

مبادئ في إدارة الدولة الإسلامية


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- إدراك الحاجة المحلية وتوفيرها داخل حدود الدولة في مناطق آمنة معزولة وربط الطرق التجارية داخل الدولة عبر مراكز رئيسية وفروع مستفيدة .
- تخفيض المصروف الزائد عبر إدارة الولاية التي يجب أن تعمل بشكل مستقل وتستطيع اتخاذ القرار في القرارات التي تخص الولاية .
- اعتماد التجارة الخارجية كمصدر دخل رئيسي عبر منافذ الدولة الى الطرف الآخر دون وسيط ، فالتبادل المباشر هو الوسيلة الأضمن من احتكار الوسيط للمراجح التجارية ووسائل الإتصال .

مبادئ في إدارة الدولة الإسلامية

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الطلب السابع :

إدارة المشاريع :

بالتوازي مع الإعداد العسكري في خطوط القتال والمصكرات ، يتم وضع لجنة لإدارة المشاريع الإنتاجية ووضع خطط لتنفيذ مشاريع استثمارية جديدة .

ويعطى المستثمر في أراضي الدولة الحماية الكاملة وفق الاتفاق الحاصل مع مراعاة مصالح الدولة الإسلامية في الإنتاج والتصدير والأسعار .

استقلال المستثمر عن إدارة الولاية هو طريقة أفضل لإدارة الأموال وزيادة الإنتاج المحلي ورفع كفاءة المادة المنتجة وضبط الوقت والكلفة ، ويكون ضمن من الخسائر الناتجة عن أي مشروع استثماري كبير .

فالمؤسسة المستقلة هي خارج حدود الاستهداف من كونها مشاريع تتبع ولاية الدولة الإسلامية .

ولا يحق للمستثمر وفق الشرع إيصال المنتج إلى غير مستحقيه وهم من تقررهم الإدارة الموكلة بالمشروع والمشرقة على تنظيمه من قبل الولاية التي يقام فيها المشروع .

وينص الاتفاق على وضع المستفيدين وطرق الاستفادة مع ضمان الدولة بوصول المواد إلى حدود الدولة الإسلامية داخلياً دون تعرضها لأي طارئ .


ولا يسمح للمستثمر في المشاريع التالية :

١ - المواد النفطية :

لا يسمح لفرد ليس في رقبته بيعة للخليفة أن يستثمر في حقل نفطي أو غاز أو مسار مسارهها ، ويسمح مادون ذلك من إنتاج مشتقات بعد شراء المواد الخام من حقول الدولة الإسلامية ، كما يسمح بيعها وتجارتها داخل وخارج الدولة .

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٢ - الذهب والأثر :

لايُسمح بالتفتيش عن الذهب والأثر إلا بموافقة صريحة من ديوان الركاز ، وتصادر كافة المواد المنقولة أو الموجودة والمخزنة لصالح بيت المال .
ويُسمح بتجارة الذهب غير المستخرج من الأرض وفق الأطر الشرعية المعروفة حصراً .


٣ - السلاح :

يمنع إقامة معامل إنتاج السلاح والمواد الخاصة به مع عدم إعطاء أي تصريح تسمح بالموضوع ، كما يمنع إقامة محلات بيع للسلاح العلم دون السلاح الشخصي والإتجار به دون ظم مسبق وموافقة من الأمير العسكري المسؤول في الولاية .

أما المواد الرئيسية الأخرى والتي تدخل في صلب حياة الناس فيجب إطلاع المسؤولين عن كافة طرق العمل والإنتاج مثل تجارة المياه والطحين والمواشي .

مبادئ في إدارة الدولة الإسلامية

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الباب الثامن :

إدارة التعليم :

التعليم هو اللبنة الأساس التي يبنى عليها المجتمع الإسلامي ، وهو الفرق الذي يجعل المسلمين يختلفون في حياتهم عن باقي ملل الكفر .
حاولت الحكومات البعثية والشيعية السابقة حرف الجيل المسلم عن مساره عبر مناهج تعليمية توافق حكوماتهم وهو اهم السياسي .
كانت المناهج تركز على تمجيد السلطات الحاكمة ونبذ الخلاف مع الطوائف التي شرحت هوية أهل السنة .
ومن أبرز أهدافها كانت :

١ - التركيز على تمجيد وتخليد القادة والعياذ بالله وإخالفهم في شرك خطي عبر تخليد شخصيات زائلة بافدة .

٢ - نشر أهداف أحزابهم وأفكارهم وإبعاد النشئ عن الفكر الإسلامي ، إذا بعد الحزب الحاكم عندهم هو نبض المجتمع ورمز صموده ، بينما المبادئ الإسلامية فهي في المسجد فقط وبين العهد وربه مع إجراءات صارمة لكل من يحاول المساس بالفكر الحزبي أو التعديل عليه .


٣ - نبذ الخلاف مع الطوائف الكافرة ، واعتبار التعايش معهم هو العقد الاجتماعي الصحيح الذي يجب على الامة أن تسير وفقه لحفظ أهدافها ، بينما في الواقع يتم حفظ حقوق جميع أمة الكفر واضطهاد أهل السنة ومبلائهم .

٤ - نشر ثقافة الاحتلال الخلفي عبر الترويج لها بعبارات الحضارة وتبادل الثقافات مع الغرب .

وكان أن نخلت الامة في مناهات أنستها عزتها ورهبتها وماضيها ، كما صورت الخلافت الإسلامية السابقة على أنها احتلال وأنها من أسباب جهل وتراجع الأمة والقومية .

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


- من أهداف المنهاج الإسلامي في الدولة الإسلامية :

- ١ - زرع القيم الإسلامية في المجتمع والأخلاق والعادات الاجتماعية الشرعية السليمة .
 - ٢ - تصحيح الرؤية الخاطئة التي زرعتها المناهج السابقة عن الطفلاء والأمة السابقين .
 - ٣ - تطوير المجتمع الإسلامي أخلاقياً وشرعياً وفكرياً .
 - ٤ - إنشاء جيل إسلامي علمي فكري على حمل الأمة ومستقبلها دون حاجة لخبرات الغرب .
- كما إن المدرسة الإسلامية هي بيت من بيوت العبادة ، لا تنحصر أهدافها بتلقي العلم فقط بل هي بيئة تعليمية تربوية تنشأ الفرد تنشئة بنوية جسمية وعقلية كاملة .
- وتكون بها مرافق التدريب الجسمي والفكري والصناعي ، إذ لا تعتمد المناهج الناجحة على ما بين المسطور فقط دون تدريب عملي على كافة المواد المطبقة .
- كما أن الاهتمام باللغة العربية واستخدامها في الحياة اليومية للفرد أمر مهم في الدولة الإسلامية والإبتعاد عن الألفاظ السوقية التي تم طرحها في المجتمع بخطئة منروسة لضمان تسيان الهوية الإسلامية للمجتمع .

مبادئ في إدارة الدولة الإسلامية

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الباب التاسع :

إدارة العلاقات:

العلاقات الخارجية هي أسس البناء الأولي لكل دولة ناشئة ، وهي من الأسس التي تظهر قوة الدولة وعزتها ، بأن يكون لها موقف علم في كل ما يحصل في العالم مع اهل الإسلام وأن تكون لها يد خارجية تحفظ لها تعاملاتها .

والرسول صلى الله عليه وسلم باعترابه صاحب الرسالة الإسلامية العالمية كان لزاماً عليه أن يحيط بما يجري حوله في الدول المجاورة، ومعرفة أخبارها وبالتالي دعوتها إلى الإسلام، وفعلاً أثبت الرسول صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم (مقدرته وبراعته في التحرك الخارجي عبر بُعد النظر وتشخيص الصالح من الطالح، والتقدير المناسب للأمور والقدرة الفائقة في عملية الكسب إلى الإسلام .

إن العلاقات الخارجية هي من مفاتيح معرفة السياسات الدولية المحيطة بدولة الإسلام ، وتكون التحالفات أيضاً كورقة قوة وضغط تستخدمها القيادة الإسلامية في كل أمورهما مع العلم الخارجي .

وبناء على السياسة الشرعية ، فلا يحل للقيادة اتخاذ القرارات بالتحالف مع دولة أو تطبيق اتفاق معها إن كان ذلك مخالفاً للسياسة الشرعية المتفق عليها من قبل جمهور العلماء ورموز الجهاد ، فإن كل اتفاق يجب أن يضمن مايلي :

١ - سيادة الدولة الإسلامية داخلياً وعدم اشارك الدول الأخرى في التدخل في شؤون الحكم الإسلامي أو السياسة العامة للدولة الإسلامية .


٢ - حفظ حدود الدولة الإسلامية من كل مشرك وكافر ومعدي وحتى صديق ، فلا يحل دخول أي جيش أو قوة أخرى لحدود الدولة الإسلامية مهما كانت الحجة .

٣ - ضمان أن تكون الدولة مشهوداً لها بحسن التعامل مع المسلمين في أراضيها والتعاطف مع المسلمين في أنحاء العالم ، ولا يحل التعامل مع دولة لها تاريخ في معاداة الإسلام أو نشره أو بناء المساجد والتضييق على المسلمين في أراضيها .

٤ - ضمان أن يكون الاتفاق أولاً في مصلحة المسلمين وليس في مصلحة الكافرين .

مبادئ في إدارة الدولة الإسلامية


١٤٣٥ للهجرة



- ٥ - أن لا يتضمن الاتفاق أي شروط مستقبلية تمس من حرية وسيادة الدولة المسلمة ولا عقود دين أو شروط انتفاع تضر ولو مستقبلاً بشؤون الدولة .
 - ٦ - أن يكون للمسلمين حقوقهم وحررياتهم ضمن الدولة التي تكون في اتفاق معاً .
 - ٧ - أن تكون جميع نقاط الاتفاق ظاهرة للإمام ومن معه .
- وفي حال نقض أحد شروط الاتفاق أو عدم توفرها فلا يحل للإمام أن يدخل الأمة والمسلمين في عقود مشبوهة ترهق الأمة ومسيرة تطورها .

مبادئ في إدارة الدولة الإسلامية

١٤٣٥ للهجرة



الباب العاشر :

إدارة الإعلام :

إن كل مذكرته سابقاً هو خطوات عملية على الأرض ينبغي أن يكون لها مروج رئيسي يكون مضموناً وتصب جميع أفكاره ونشاطاته في مصلحة مآلهم ، ولا يتحقق ذلك دون مؤسسات إعلامية متفرعة ومتكاملة العمل ضمن إدارة وخلفية واحدة .

فيكون هناك مؤسسة واحدة متفرعة ضمن جيوب متعددة وفق مخطط يكون على الأسس التالية :

١ - المؤسسة الأم :

وهي التي تتبع مباشرة اديوان الخلافة أو مجلس الشورى أو من ناب عنها ، ويكون المسؤول فيها مرتبط بعلاقته مع القائد العسكري والمسؤول الأمني والخليفة ذاته ، ويضع المكتب القواعد الرئيسية للإعلام ومهامه ويكون مشرفاً على توزيع المكاتب الإعلامية في الولايات أو المؤسسات التي تتخذ اسماً وشكلاً مستقلاً عن إدارة الولاية .

وتحدد المؤسسة الأم أولويات النشر والدعاية والحملات الإعلامية ، كما تشرف مباشرة من خلال لجنة على نشاطات المكاتب وتقوم بحملات دورية في الولايات والأماكن النشطة . كما تحدد المؤسسة أعداد الكادر الإعلامي ومصاريفهم ومستلزماتهم وتتلقى تقارير شهرية بأعمال كل مكتب .

٢ - إعلام الولايات :


وفي كل ولاية يكون مكتب إعلامي يتبع للوالي نفسه ويكون بالتنسيق ذاته مع المسؤول العسكري والأمني في منطقته ، ويكون مديره على اتصال مباشر بمسؤول الإعلام في المؤسسة الأم .

ومن مهام المكتب تغطية الأعمال العسكرية وإنجازاته ، مع إصدارات تختتم نهاية كل عمل عسكري كبير أو أعمال معيزة لجنود الدولة ومرافق الخدمات وتطبيق الأحكام الشرعية وسير الحياة في الولاية .

كما يهتم المكتب بتنفيذ مهام الطباعة والنشر أو الإشراف عليها ضمن الولاية .

مبادئ في إدارة الدولة الإسلامية

١٤٣٥ للهجرة



٣ - الوكالات والمؤسسات الرديفة :


يتم طرح تأسيس مؤسسات إنتاج او وكالات رديفة وفقاً لحاجة المكتب الأم الذي يرى فيه مصلحة إعلامية .

ويختص المكتب الرديف بمتابعة التغطية العسكرية والخدمية في ولاية او عدة ولايات دون أن يكون في اسم المؤسسة او شعارها ما يمت لصلتها مباشرة بالدولة الإسلامية .

لا يحق للمؤسسات الرديفة تغطية عمليات أمنية او تنفيذ احكام .

مبادئ في إدارة الدولة الإسلامية

١٤٣٥ للهجرة



هذه الاقتراحات عامة وضعتها لكم العبد الفقير لله خدام الدولة الإسلامية ، لتكون منارةً يهتدى به وتنظيمات عامة وسريعة .
تتلقى الكوادر الإدارية تدريباً على العمل وفق البرنامج التالي .

أبو عبدالله المصري

Examined together the Isis papers build a highly detailed picture of what is going on in the militants' putative state.

In the early days after the declaration of the caliphate in June 2014, the emphasis was on regulations on dress and behaviour. These included a prohibition on selling and displaying tight-fitting and “ornamented” garments. Fatwas were issued on playing billiards and table football. And in one of the more bizarre rulings, Isis banned rooftop pigeon-keeping because it was deemed a waste of time.

Then around the turn of this year, Isis appeared to seize the momentum, issuing a slew of documents directly relating to state building and job creation.

It posted notices advertising job opportunities within the newly established department of *zakat* or tithes – akin to a social services department. On the education front, there were announcements about the beginning of the school term, the opening of a kindergarten and recruitment for teachers.

Isis's civil servants also issued agricultural plans for the summer growing season and a plethora of civil regulations, those that have nothing to do with a specific ideology, such for drivers (they must carry “a comprehensive repair toolkit” at all times) and shop owners (they must not block the pavement with goods without a licence).




Image of farm workers taken from Isis propaganda footage. Photograph: Screenshot

During the past five months there has been a noticeable rise in the number of documents relating to security measures and military mobilisation; Isis is becoming increasingly paranoid.

There has been a complete prohibition on private Wi-Fi networks, notices have been issued to checkpoints to crack down on smuggling of gold, copper and iron, and at the start of October the group issued an amnesty for military deserters – presumably because it needs more soldiers.

At the same time, fearing traitors in their midst, the department of public security has ordered anyone previously associated with “enemies of the state” to immediately register themselves.



That is the general chronological progression of Isis, but there are several themes that cut across this timeline.

In trying to assert its jurisdiction across what were once two separate countries, Isis is engaged in a programme of unification. This is apparent in the issuing of standard work IDs and the campaign to, as the group puts it, “break the borders”.

To that end Isis has created a new district, Euphrates Province, which falls over both sides of the international boundary, and has been busily issuing regulations like the rest of the group’s dozen or so provinces.

Where Isis struggles on this front is with tertiary education – the differences in the Syrian and Iraqi secondary systems have made it too hard to create a unified university admissions system – and the currency, where it still deals in Syrian pounds, Iraqi dinars and the ubiquitous US dollar.

In wider economic matters, Isis appears to have little patience with Adam Smith's "[invisible hand](#)" and has been enforcing rent and price controls on a whole variety of goods and services from caesarean sections (\$70/£46) to sugar (70 cents per kg). But the caliphate is not implementing Soviet-style levels of economic control. It allows private citizens to own property, run businesses and carry out state projects such as road building.

A [copy of a payment order](#) goes into some fascinating detail. In return for having asphalted the Iraq-Syria highway that runs alongside the right bank of the Euphrates river and planting it with trees, "so as not to expose the forces of the Islamic State" to aerial assault, someone going by the name of Abu Dujana al-Libi was paid \$100,000.



Still from Isis propaganda footage shows members engaged in road maintenance.
Photograph: Screenshot

One of the most striking documents reveals how Isis is making its money. A six-page [monthly financial statement for Deir ez-Zor province for January 2015](#) shows total monthly revenue was \$8.4m (£5.6m) – handsome for a terrorist group, but pitiful for a state.



The Isis papers: a masterplan for consolidating power

Taxes generated 23.7% of its income while oil and gas sales made up 27.7%. If that figure is correct then, as Tamimi notes, daily revenues from Isis's most oil rich province yielded \$66,400 dollars a day – nothing like estimates of \$3m a day that have been bandied around.

But topping both oil sales and taxes are “confiscations”. Isis has been fining smugglers of outlawed goods such as cigarettes – including the electronic kind – and auctioning off property seized from designated enemies of the state. This activity made up a whopping 45% of its income, almost as much as natural resources and taxes put together.

On the expenditure side, 63.5% of the province's cash was spent on soldiers' salaries and upkeep for military bases. And only 17.7% was used for public services.

The last and strongest of the themes that comes through from the documents is Isis's desire to portray itself as a utopia for true believers. This can be split into two; a drive to create positives and attempts to do away with negatives.

To that second end it has initiated an anti-corruption drive. There are standard complaint forms which even have suggestion boxes. And at some point in 2014 Isis opened a “complaints office” in its self-declared capital of Raqqa. Caliphate-wide rules also forbid Isis members from being involved in state investments or to “exploit their position ... and work in the state for personal interests”. This sort of cronyism plagues governments throughout the Middle East and Asia, so their attempts to explicitly outlaw it are very noteworthy.

Isis have also been busy promoting the positives of life under the caliphate and buoying morale. It regularly awards \$100 prizes for excellence in religious studies and in May, it doled out free passes to an amusement park and its newly renovated five-star hotel in Mosul, to celebrate its military victory which saw Isis take the ancient city of Palmyra from Assad’s forces.

In the space of a year, Isis has radically reshaped the Middle East. Emerging from the chaos of weakened states, it has turned the lives of ordinary Syrians and Iraqis upside down

The group’s department of *zakat* has been raising a tithe tax in order to distribute the cash to destitute families. One undated set of statistics from Isis’s Aleppo province shows they registered 2,502 families with each family receiving an average of \$260. Whether that is monthly or annually is unclear.

Of course, the theory of statecraft has been sorely tested by the sobering realities of aerial bombardment from without and disenchantment from within.

The coalition airstrikes are believed to be seriously degrading Isis’s economic infrastructure – particularly oil and gas installations. Just as critical for the group, it clearly has a long way to go to win over local Sunni populations despite acting as a bulwark against the spread of Shia influence.

A former nurse who reluctantly fled Raqqa this autumn after Isis tried to arrest him said bureaucracy was the first matter the group wanted to deal with when it arrived at his hospital. The group was quick to change the rubber stamps and the headed note paper so people knew this was an Islamic State hospital and then it dealt with the people. “They kicked out all the administration team out and they put [in their own] administrators but they kept the workers at the hospital, [the] doctors, nurses and cleaners,” he said.

One area in which Isis seem to be having the greatest difficulties is in health. Over 2015 Isis has issued several warnings to departed doctors to return to work

or have their property confiscated.

The nurse from Raqqa, who now lives in the Turkish city of Gaziantap, confirmed that this punishment is indeed meted out. “As soon as some one flees they take everything from him; home, clinic, everything that person has.”

Blueprint

The overarching document sets out a theory of government, a civil servant’s handbook.

Entitled [Principles in the Administration of the Islamic State](#) it is Isis’s blueprint for statecraft. The memorandum is marked for internal use only and is meant to be a foundation text for the “cadres of administrators” which Isis wishes to train.

Each of the 24 pages is decorated with a sword and its final page is signed by “Abu Abdullah al Masri [Father of Abdullah the Egyptian]”. The Guardian has not been able to discover any further information about the author but the anti-Isis organisation, Raqqa is Being Silently Slaughtered, [references a man with the same nomme de guerre](#) working as the chief of the electricity grid.

Charlie Winter, a senior research associate at Georgia State University, says the document tells a story “totally consistent” with his own research into Isis’s propaganda.

“It is exacting and comprehensive, something which is testament to the fact that, at the highest levels, IS is focused on entrenching its political longevity, not just military relevance,” he said.

Split into 10 chapters and written in a bureaucratic style, the document begins with a potted history of the caliphate and what came before it, stressing that well trained administrators are at the heart of Isis’s survival and separate it from all other jihadi groups.

“The state requires an Islamic system of life, a Qur’anic constitution and a system to implement it,” it says, and goes on: “There must not be suppression of the role of qualifications, skills of expertise and the training of the current generation on administering the state.”

Isis appears to have numerous categories of civil servants including those for statistics, finance, admin and accounts.

The blueprint then goes on to lay out plans for future departments, including the military, education, public services and media relations.

The chapter focussing on media strategy sets out the need for a central media organisation supported by provincial and auxiliary agencies. Winter says that the way has grown to understand how the media offices function is precisely what is laid out. "It is exactly the structure I had mapped out."

There's also a long section on how to administer military camps, specifying three types: "first preparation" camps for regular initiates; continuation camps for veterans who will be sent there annually for two weeks; and camps for children.

Describing the camps for veterans it says they will be taught the "latest arts of using weapons, military planning and military technologies ... along with detailed commentary on the technologies of enemy use ... and how the soldiers of the state can take advantage of them".

It specifies that children should receive training in light arms and religious indoctrination and that "outstanding individuals" will be given security assignments such as manning checkpoints.



[Facebook](#)[Twitter](#)[Pinterest](#)

Boys known as the 'caliphate cubs' hold rifles during a parade near Mosul in Iraq.
Photograph: AP

The main body of the text discusses the centrality of natural resources. While committees will, it says, “administer production projects”, the blueprint is explicit about allowing individuals to invest in all areas of economic life, except in the sensitive areas of oil or gas extraction.

Describing the importance of education, it describes it as “the foundational brick on which Islamic society is built.”.

One further paragraph hints at the desire to be self-sufficient in the future by “raising a knowledgeable Islamic generation capable of bearing the Ummah [Islamic Nation] and its future without needing the expertise of the west.”

The retired [general Stanley McChrystal](#), who led coalition forces in Afghanistan and was credited with leading the special operations units in Iraq that killed Isis’s founding member [Abu Musab al-Zarqawi](#) in 2006, described the playbook as required reading.

He said: “It seems a far cry from something produced by an organisation that routinely commits horrific acts of seemingly mindless brutality. And that may

be the most chilling aspect. If the west sees Isis as an almost stereotypical band of psychopathic killers, we risk dramatically underestimating them.”

Lt Gen Mike Flynn, who retired in August 2014 after three years as the US’s chief military intelligence gatherer, heading up the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), said that a “totally incoherent” and “piecemeal” western military strategy has given Isis time to organise itself.

Describing the playbook as a “very legitimate document”, he added: “The tendency for the Islamic State to act as a state is growing. And any time that they get to do that is to their advantage.”

The source



Aymenn al-Tamimi. Photograph: Graham Turner for the Guardian

The documents have come to light via a 23-year-old researcher from Cardiff, Aymenn al-Tamimi.

Tamimi spends his nights scouring Facebook, Twitter and internet forums in order to compile his trove of primary source material -about 300 documents relating to the state Isis is attempting to build.

“It occurred to me one evening to do something on Isis administration ... because for a time some documents had come out, not released officially by [Isis]; exam timetables and pharmaceutical price controls,” he said.

Tamimi believes the records say more about Isis than the propaganda it releases everyday. Most of his archive is made up of photos of official

pronouncements that have been pinned to notice boards or documents that have been handed to people individually such as education texts, receipts or forms. When Tamimi finds a document, he then meticulously verifies, translates into English, and logs it on his website alongside the original where it is open to scrutiny from around the globe.

But it is not just through the internet that he makes his discoveries. Since beginning this work at the start of the year, journalists and fellow analysts pass him documents and he has on one occasion travelled inside Syria to cultivate insider connections.

The connections have now borne fruit. One source, a trader working inside Isis territory, gave him about 30 officially stamped memos, pronouncements and internal Isis texts including the two most significant finds to date, the monthly financial statement and the statecraft playbook.

Separately, the Guardian has also obtained documents from Kurdish forces who seized the town of Tel Abyad on the Turkish border during this summer and materials dating from 2013 relating to local Isis military structure, discovered by Free Syrian Army forces fighting in Aleppo province.

Additional reporting by Mona Mahmood, Alice Ross and Muhammed Almahmoud.

Unseen Islamic State Administrative Documents: Overview, Translation & Analysis

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

[Jihadology](#)

August 24, 2015



Introduction

Of all jihadist groups, the Islamic State [IS] by far has presented the most comprehensive, ostensible bureaucratic structure as part of its claimed state project, embodied foremost in a system of *diwans* (government departments) since the declaration of the Caliphate in June 2014. The best means to analyse the nuances of this set-up is through looking at documents issued by these departments that have not been officially released in IS' media outlets.

Here, numerous shades emerge that go beyond simple statements such as 'IS provides services.' For example, one pattern in the documents from the IS takeover of parts of Iraq is that the Diwan al-Khidamat (services department) in a given city is normally composed of the same staff, workers and offices of already existing government service offices in that city. It is simply that the personnel have been compelled to return to work under threat of confiscation of their homes. For a more in-depth survey, see my [recent paper](#) in the academic journal *Perspectives on Terrorism* primarily based on [my current archive of IS documents](#) and [other collections of mine](#) currently totalling over 200 specimens.

This post presents 26 further documents not previously in the public domain, obtained from a businessman from a town in northeast Aleppo province that is currently a stronghold of IS. For reasons that are self-evident, this person's exact location and identity cannot be revealed, but it may be added that this person does business across IS territory, including regular trips to Mosul and Anbar. Though not necessarily a hardline, ideological supporter of IS, he nonetheless finds the security environment amenable to doing business: a common advantage perceived by Syrians who make investments and conduct transactions in IS territory.

Islamic State vs. Jabhat al-Nusra Administration

Before proceeding to the selection of documents, one question worth pondering- first suggested to me by Aaron Zelin- is comparing the IS administration with that of Jabhat al-Nusra, Syria's al-Qa'ida affiliate. To put it briefly, Jabhat al-Nusra's administrative structures lack the same sense of comprehensiveness *and* consistency. Jabhat al-Nusra does not have the same level of contiguous territory and urban strongholds, and the extent of its presence varies considerably from one place to another. Further, Jabhat al-Nusra is not claiming yet to be a state.

The main Jabhat al-Nusra administrative bodies that can be identified are the [Dar al-Qada](#) (Judicial Body), the Maktab al-Da'wa wa al-Irshad (Da'wa and Guidance Office) and [al-Idarat al-Aama lil-Khidamat](#) (Public Administration for Services). Broadly speaking, the Dar al-Qada corresponds to IS' Diwan al-Qada wa al-Mazalim and Diwan al-Hisba, dealing with legal matters such as real estate and enforcement of Shari'a justice (including harsher hudud punishments like stoning fornicators to death), while the Maktab al-Da'wa wa al-Irshad corresponds to IS' Diwan al-Da'wa wa al-Masajid (Da'wa and Mosques department), and al-Idarat al-Aama lil-Khidamat to the Diwan al-Khidamat.

However, these bodies do not exist in every place where Jabhat al-Nusra has a presence, and sometimes functions are blurred. The Dar al-Qada can be clearly identified in Idlib towns controlled by Jabhat al-Nusra, such as Sarmada, Salqin and Darkush, but in at least one instance the Dar al-Qada seems to have assumed entered into the realm of provision of public services, with the undertaking of a [project to reform the main road in Sarmada](#). Even so, evidence suggests that Jabhat al-Nusra continues to [allow civilian local and service councils in Sarmada to operate](#) and provide services such as fixing water pumping lines, contrasting with IS co-optation of such bodies in cities like Raqqa whereby they only have the Diwan al-Khidamat label now. More recently, as part of the Jaysh al-Fatah coalition that has driven the regime out of all major towns in Idlib province since

the spring, Jabhat al-Nusra has agreed with the other factions in Jaysh al-Fatah on the [formation of a judicial council](#) that is supposed to be "independent in its decisions and rulings, with no right for any faction to intervene in it." The council is also supposed to unify judiciary authority in all areas liberated at the hands of Jaysh al-Fatah. This development comes amid [complaints from the Islamic Commission for the Administration of Liberated Areas](#) (mainly linked to Ahrar al-Sham) that some members of Jabhat al-Nusra have attacked its branches in places like Kafr Nabl.

Moving to Aleppo province, one will note the Dar al-Qada branch in Hureitan, which claims authority also over Kafr Hamra and Anadan. Here the Dar al-Qada is undoubtedly supported by the jihadi coalition Jabhat Ansar al-Din that has a presence in these towns (most notably the coalition's main component Jaysh al-Muhajireen wa al-Ansar). Further up north in Azaz, the Jabhat al-Nusra presence has been limited to bases with control of one of the mosques in the town ([the Mus'ab ibn Umair mosque](#)), railing against the public school system in Azaz and offering alternative education for children.

Nevertheless, with talk of the establishment of a U.S.-Turkish safe zone stretching from Azaz to Jarabulus in the north Aleppo countryside, Jabhat al-Nusra has evacuated most of its bases in the Azaz area and is primarily operating as a small military force to provide limited reinforcements for the rebels fighting IS to the east of Azaz (these rebels being primarily the Levant Front and Ahrar al-Sham, with smaller contributions from mainly Levant Front break-offs like Thuwar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Mujahideen elements). These Jabhat al-Nusra members on the frontlines are mostly locals, while the remainder have already gone to Idlib province.

Thus it can be seen how much more complex the picture is with Jabhat al-Nusra administration. The bodies do not have a uniform presence and the group's approach seems split between a more hardline approach embodied in the rise of the Dar al-Qada and the more traditional picture of Jabhat al-Nusra as a faction willing to work with others in administration. In 2013 what was then the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) indulged in the latter to a degree in the occasional issuing of joint statements for defensive projects and the like.

The Documents

Below, each document is translated and notes provided where applicable.

Specimen A: Activities of the services office, Manbij, Aleppo

منبج



الدولة العراقية في العراق والشمال

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

بأمر من والي حلب

المكتب الخدمي في مدينة منبج بوضع أكثر من ١٠٠ راية

على كافة مداخل المدينة ومحيطها

وقام المكتب بتعبيد طريق منبج - جرابلس

المكتب بفتح ورشة صيانة للمجرور الصحي في حي الشرقي

وتشجير شارع الأمان وصيانة دار القضاء في المدينة

وقم رفع كافة النفقات الى ديوان الولاية



Manbij**Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham****In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful**

By order of the wali [provincial governor] of Aleppo, the services office in the town of Manbij has placed more than 600 flags on all the entrances to the town and its surrounding. The office has also made the Manbij-Jarabulus road passable for traffic, and has opened a maintenance workshop for the sewage system in the eastern quarter, has planted trees on al-Imaan street, and has done maintenance work on the Dar al-Qada in the town. And all the expenses have been referred to the Diwan al-Wilaya.

And glory belongs to God, His Messenger and the believers but the hypocrites don't know it.

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham**Abu [?] Al-Azadi****Wilayat Halab**

Notes: Dating uncertain. The 'Diwan al-Wilaya' (Province Department) appears to be the same as the "General Administration" (al-Idarat al-Aama) for a given Islamic State province. A similar interchange of names can be observed in some documents regarding healthcare labelled 'Diwan al-Siha' (Health Department) and others labelled 'al-Idarat al-Tibbiya' (Medical Administration).

Specimen B: Prohibition on hoarding of goods, Yarmouk, Damascus



Islamic State
Wilayat Dimashq
Diwan al-Hisba
28 Rajab 1436 AH [17 May 2015]

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

On the authority of Mu'ammr bin Abdullah- may God be pleased with him- from the Messenger of God (SAWS): he said: "One does not hoard except in error."

All shops and storages in al-Yarmouk quarter are to be inspected by order of the Diwan al-Hisba in the Islamic State, and all goods being stored in hoarding will be confiscated and distributed to the Muslim populace.

Notes: Evidently in response to the dire shortage of basic commodities in Yarmouk on account of the regime siege.

Specimen C: Payment for completion of road project between Albukamal and al-Qa'im

ديهان الخدمات



الاية الخير

الدولة الإسلامية
أمر صرف

(وقل اعملوا فسيرى الله عملكم ورسوله والمؤمنون
وستردون إلى عالم الغيب والشهادة فينبئكم بما كنتم تعملون)
يصرف للأخ ابو دجاجة الليبي مبلغ مائة ألف دولار

لقاء تزفيت طريق البوكمال - القائم

وتشجيره بشكل لا يظهر قوات الدولة الإسلامية

في عبورها خلال المدينتين

ويخصص من المبلغ مائتين به شوارع المدينتين بأعلام الخلافة

والله غالب على أمره ولكن أكثر الناس لا يعلمون



**Islamic State
Wilayat al-Kheir
Diwan al-Khidamat**

Payment Order

"And say: 'Work, for God will observe your deeds, as will His Messenger and the believers, and you will be rendered to the One who knows the Unseen and Seen, then He will inform you of what you were doing.'" [Qur'an 9:105]

The brother Abu Dujana al-Libi [the Libyan] is to be paid a sum of \$100,000 for asphaltting the Albukamal-al-Qa'im road and planting with it trees so as not to expose the forces of the Islamic State in their crossing through the two towns. Also designated from the sum is that by which the streets of the two towns were decorated with the banners of the Caliphate. And God is predominant over His affair but most people don't know it.

Published on 17 Ramadan 1436 AH [5 July 2015].

Notes: Observe the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham stamp on the bottom even though this document dates from after the Caliphate declaration. Occasionally these discrepancies in stamps come up. The payment in U.S. dollars is also noteworthy: currently the three currencies used in IS territory are Syrian pounds, Iraqi dinars and U.S. dollars. Despite all the hype about a new IS currency, no documents attest to any practical use for it. Indeed, it would not be viable as interaction between IS and the outside world is still essential for the continued cash flow and revenue streams for IS. Finally, despite the Deir az-Zor province labelling for the document, al-Qa'im and Albukamal are part of the IS-created 'Euphrates Province' spanning the Iraq-Syria borders.


Specimen D: Preparations for the town of Sawran, Aleppo

الدولة الإسلامية



حلب
لخدمات

علم الدولة الإسلامية على برج الهاتف في صوران
كونه أعلى برج في المنطقة الشمالية لولاية حلب
ويتم تجهيز كافة أطراف المدينة لحماية الطرق
لمرور أرتال الدولة الإسلامية
نوع استهدافها من قبل التحالف الصليبي
يرفع التكاليف لديوان الحسبة في ولاية حلب




**Islamic State
Wilayat Halab
Diwan al-Khidamat**

The flag of the Islamic State is to be raised on the phone tower in Sawran as it is the highest tower in the northern region of Wilayat Halab. And all sides of the town are to be prepared to protect the roads for the passing of the Islamic State's convoys without their being targeted by the Crusader alliance, and the expenses are to be referred to the Diwan al-Hisba in Wilayat Halab.

Notes: Sawran is a small town to the east of Azaz that once had a Hizb-ut-Tahrir presence. Sawran came under the control ISIS following its seizure of Azaz in the fall of 2013, but was abandoned following its withdrawal to the east of Aleppo province in February 2014, seeing as how these places were isolated from its contiguous holdings and were not viable to hold. The Northern Storm Brigade, which had then joined the Islamic Front, returned to Azaz and Sawran. As IS made advances in north Aleppo countryside in summer 2014, the Northern Storm Brigade was responsible for manning the Sawran-Ahtimilat frontline. This remained static until IS' offensive in late May this year that most notably seized Sawran, which the rebels have since been unable to recover. The raising of the banner on the phone tower was [advertised in official IS propaganda](#).

Specimen E: Prohibition on moving and doing business with historical artefacts in found in Palmyra



Wilayat Homs
Diwan al-Khidamat


Statement for distribution to the brothers in the Islamic State checkpoints:

It is forbidden to move or deal in any type of historical artefacts that the brothers find in Tadmur. The decision has been similarly spread in the streets to the Muslim populace. All shown to be dealing in any historical artefact from the town for outside the borders of the wilaya will be reprimanded.

**Diwan al-Khidamat: 8 Ramadan 1436 AH [25 June 2015]
Abu Muhammad al-Tunisi [the Tunisian]**

Notes: Recall that IS advertised the smashing of statues that had been smuggled from Palmyra, though those statues would have been destroyed anyway for idolatry. The attempt here to stop smuggling of artefacts from Palmyra is to be noted alongside licenses for excavation that have been uncovered elsewhere in IS territory under the 'antiquities administration/division' that belongs to the [Diwan al-Rikaz](#) ['Precious Resources' department], under which some smuggling of artefacts has undoubtedly taken place.

Specimen F: Sewage Works, Damascus Province



**Wilayat Dimashq
Diwan al-Khidamat**

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Sewage pipes are being prepared as tunnels for the service of the Muslims in Wilayat Dimashq. These tunnels pass from Yarmouk quarter to al-Hajr al-Aswad quarter. A special tunnel is being opened for the Muslim populace and the others are being preserved for the private service of the soldiers of the Islamic State.

Notes: Exact dating uncertain but probably around the same time as Specimen B. Note how IS soldiers are often in a class of their own: cf. [in my archive Specimen 60](#) that makes an exception on recording IDs of Islamic State soldiers who use the Internet.

Specimen G: Repentance Document, Ninawa Province



Islamic State
Wilayat Ninawa
10 Sha'aban 1436 AH [28 May 2015]
Recorded with the Diwan al-Wilaya with no. 3245

Repentance Document

The one called Suleiman Muhammad bin Saleh wa Hua' has undertaken a Shari'a lesson in the [Grand Mosque](#) in the city of Mosul. And the brother Abu Nabhan al-Kuwaiti [of Kuwait] has overseen his repentance. And thus the brother Suleiman is to be treated as of the Muslim populace in the abode of the Caliphate.

And glory belongs to God, His Messenger and the believers.

Notes: cf. Specimen A on the Diwan al-Wilaya

Specimen H: Educational Regulations, Deir az-Zor Province

ديوان التعليم

لا إله إلا الله

الله
رسول
محمد

الخير

سبين والعلمين تحت حكم الدولة الإسلامية:

المناهج السابقة الصادرة عن حكومات الردة في الولاية

باسم الوزارات النظامية والموقفة واستبدالها بديوان التعليم في الدولة الإسلامية

بيعة الإسلامية وأصول التوحيد واللغة العربية هي المواد الرئيسية في مناهج الدولة الإسلامية

م : تحذف كل نظريات الشرك التي تتحدث عن بدايات الإنسان والشمس

سبيعة هي من إرادة الله

سبى الولاء والبراء في كل المواد والانتفاء للدولة الإسلامية

نظ الدولة الإسلامية في مناهج التاريخ والجغرافيا

Wilayat al-Kheir Diwan al-Ta'aleem

All lecturers and teachers under the rule of the Islamic State must adhere to the following:

- Cancel all prior programs issued by the apostasy governments.
- Cancel work in the name of the regime and interim ministries and replace them with Diwan al-Ta'aleem
- The subjects of Islamic Shari'a, principles of tawheed, and the Arabic language are the main subjects in the Islamic State's programs.
- The sciences: all theories of shirk [idolatry] that speak about the beginnings of man and the Sun are to be done away with. The laws of nature are from God's will.
- Focus on al-wala' and al-bara' [loyalty and disavowal] in all subjects and belonging to the Islamic State
- Putting the maps of the Islamic State in the history and geography programs.

Abu Hafs al-Masri [the Egyptian] Head of the Diwan al-Ta'aleem in Wilayat al-Kheir

Notes: [Nothing particularly surprising here](#). It seems that muhajireen play a disproportionate role in the management of the Diwan al-Ta'aleem at the provincial and central level in the Islamic State. The "interim" ministry refers to the Syrian opposition interim government: repentance from this system is necessary too.

Specimen I: Confiscation of a person's property in Deir az-Zor province for not paying zakat

ولاية الخير ديوان الحسابة

٦ صفر ١٤٢٥ للهجرة

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

نِ الْذَّهَبِ وَالْفِضَّةِ وَلَا يُقْفُونَهَا فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ فَبَشِّرْهُمْ بِعَذَابٍ أَلِيمٍ

بادر أموال المدعو " حسين شمال بن وردة " وأراضيه

لمنعه زكاة أمواله عامين كاملين

بقرار ويتم إحضاره لدورة شرعية لدى الأخ أبي عبدالله الشرعي

في مدينة الميادين

والله غالب على أمره ولكن أكثر الناس لا يعلمون



**Islamic State
Wilayat al-Kheir
Diwan al-Hisba
6 Safr 1435 AH [sic.]**

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

And those who hoard up gold and silver and do not spend it in the path of God, inform them of a painful torment [Qur'an 9:34].

The property and lands of the one called 'Hussein Shamal bin Warda' are to be confiscated for his refusal to pay the zakat of his wealth for two years. And he will be imprisoned, rebuked and made to attend a Shari'a session with the brother Abu Abdullah al-Shari'i [Shari'a official] in the town of Mayadeen.

And God is predominant over His affair but most people don't know it.

Notes: Dating should be Safr 1436 AH [c. late November 2014]. Logically, the wholesale confiscation follows from [taking half of a person's wealth for refusal to pay in one year](#).

Specimen J: Prohibition on circulating published material not issued by the Islamic State, Damascus

لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ

الله
رسول
محمد

وقل ربي زدني علماً

دمشق
التعليم

الدولة الإسلامية

قال تعالى :

فِعِ اللَّهُ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا مِنْكُمْ وَالَّذِينَ أُوتُوا الْعِلْمَ دَرَجَاتٍ

بأمر من والي دمشق

باتاً التداول بأي منشورات أو جرائد أو مرفقات تعليمية
صادرة عن مكاتب الدولة الإسلامية في ولاية دمشق
جميع الكتب والجرائد والصحف المخزنة في المكاتب
حرصاً من ديوان التعليم على عدم نشرها .

Islamic State

Wilayat Dimashq

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

"And say: My Lord, increase me in knowledge" [Qur'an 20:114]

The Almighty has said: "God will elevate those of you who have believed and been given knowledge by degrees" [Qur'an 58:11].

By order of the wali of Damascus

It is absolutely forbidden to circulate any publications, newspapers or educational schedules not issued by the Islamic State offices in Wilayat Dimashq. And all books, newspapers and stored newspapers will be confiscated in the offices and held by the Diwan al-Ta'aleem so as not to spread them.

The decision applies to al-Yarmouk quarter, al-Qadam and al-Hajr al-Aswad

14 Muharram 1435 AH [sic.]

Notes: Ignore incorrect dating (probably from recycled material). Likely issued around same time as Specimen B.

Specimen K: New educational regulations for Palmyra

لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ

الله
رسول
محمد

ديوان التعليم

حمص

قَالَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى
يٰۤاَيُّهَا الَّذِيْنَ اٰمَنُوْا مِنْكُمْ وَالَّذِيْنَ اٰوْتُوْا الْعِلْمَ دَرَجَاتٍ وَاللّٰهُ بِمَا تَعْمَلُوْنَ خَبِيْرٌ ۙ
سورة المجادلة : ١١

بعد أن من الله علينا بفتح تدمر أرض الصحابة
م من ديوان التعليم وجب تنفيذه حرفياً من الإدارة العامة للدولة الإسلامية

عقيدة الشرك التي زرعتها النظام النصيري في نفوس أهل المدينة
مناهج العقيدة الإسلامية السليمة الخالية من الشرك والردة وتقديس الأصنام
ية عامة المسلمين بأن أرض الخلافة تشمل جميع المسلمين إلا من أتى شركاً ور
به من عقوبة التجارة بالآثار الشركية والتماثيل الزائلة
ية الأطفال بأن البقاء لله وحده دون المشركين وأحجارهم
سينة تدمر إلى خرائط الخلافة مع ارفاق صور من المدينة بخصوص الأمر "

Wilayat Homs
Diwan al-Ta'aleem

God Almighty has said: "God will elevate those of you who have believed and been given knowledge by degrees, and God is well-aware of what you do"- Surat al-Majadala 11 [Qur'an 58:11].

After God blessed us with the conquest of Tadmur, the land of the Companions. This is a statement for distribution from the Diwan al-Ta'aleem that must be implemented to the letter from the General Administration for the Islamic State.

- . Cancel the doctrine of shirk that the Nusayri regime cultivated in the souls of the people of the town.
- . Establish correct Islamic doctrine free of shirk, apostasy, and sanctifying of idols.
- . Making the Muslim populace aware that the land of the Caliphate encompasses all the Muslims except whoever comes upon shirk and apostasy.
- . Warning of the consequences for dealing in idolatrous antiquities and ephemeral statues.
- . Making children aware that one remains for God alone without the mushrikeen and their idols/stones.

"Adding the town of Tadmur to the maps of the Caliphate with provision of photos from the town with regards to the matter."

Specimen L: Educational regulations, Aleppo province

لا إله إلا الله

الله
رسول
محمد

حلب
التعليم

١٣ ذو القعدة ١٤٣٥ هـ

قال الله تعالى

اللَّهُ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا مِنْكُمْ وَالَّذِينَ أُوتُوا الْعِلْمَ دَرَجَاتٍ وَاللَّهُ بِمَا تَعْمَلُونَ خَبِيرٌ

سورة المجادلة: ١١

تغلق جميع مدارس الولاية حتى إتمام الأمور القالية :

ج الجديدة التي وضعتها الدولة الإسلامية

مع مدرسي الولاية لدورات شرعية في الولاء والبراء

ببين جدد في ديوان التعليم المحدث من قبل والي حلب

Wilayat Halab
Diwan al-Ta'aleem
13 Dhu al-Qa'ada 1435 AH [8 September 2014]

God Almighty has said: "God will elevate those of you who have believed and been given knowledge by degrees, and God is well-aware of what you do"- Surat al-Majadala 11 [Qur'an 58:11].

All schools of the wilaya are to be closed until fulfilment of the following matters:

- . Fulfillment of the new programs put in place by the Islamic State
- . Subjecting all teachers of the wilaya to Shari'a lessons in al-wala' wa al-bara'
- . Appointing new overseers in the current Diwan al-Ta'aleem by the wali of Aleppo.

Specimen M: On women's travel and dress, Raqqa Province

**Wilayat al-Raqqa
Diwan al-Hisba
Shari'i notification**

On the authority of Abu Huraira may God be pleased with him: he said: the Prophet (SAWS) said: "It is not allowed for a women who believes in God and the Last Day to travel by day or night unless she has a guardian with her."

It is forbidden for the women without a mahrim [male guardian] to pass over the Islamic State checkpoints in the event she is travelling.

It is forbidden for the women to depart the Islamic State without her hijab and veil.

The one who is responsible for her and does not make her comply with Shari'i dress will be punished by flogging 30 times.

The women is to attend a Shari'a session for 7 days in the event of her violation of the orders of Shari'a regarding dress.

**Diwan al-Hisba
Wilayat al-Raqqa**

Specimen N: Fuel blockade on areas outside IS control in Aleppo and Idlib

ديوان الحلبنة



حلب

الدولة الإسلامية

سيارات الوقود المحملة الى مناطق سيطرة المرتدين
في حلب وادلب , حتى اشعار آخر
أي سيارة تعبر الى خارج سيطرة الدولة الإسلامية
صاحبها بالسجن ودفن مبلغ ضعفي سعر الوقود



**Islamic State
Wilayat Halab
Diwan al-Hisba**

All vehicles bearing fuel are to be stopped from heading to areas controlled by the apostates in Aleppo and Idlib until further notice. And any vehicle attempting to cross to areas outside the control of the Islamic State is to be confiscated, and its owner will be reprimanded with imprisonment and paying a sum double the price of the fuel.

Notes: This blockade was imposed following IS' offensive launched in north Aleppo countryside in late May. A [respite came at the end of June](#) with a lull in the clashes and a deal between rebels and IS to allow mutual exchange of fuel and goods, but fighting has since reignited and continued, and transportation of goods and cash between areas remains difficult but possible.

Specimen O: Formation of women's Hisba oversight team in Mosul

2 شوال 1436

مدينة الموصل

ديوان الحسبة



ولاية نينوى

الدولة الإسلامية

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

" تعميم "

تم بعون الله إنشاء جهاز الحسبة النسائي في المدينة لمراقبة الأمور التالية :

- إظهار الملابس النسائية في واجهات المحال
- دخول النساء إلى محلات الرجال دون محرم
- تجول النساء في المدينة دون لباس شرعي كامل
- تم كافة التعزيرات بحق المخالفين للشريعة على الرجال

Islamic State
Wilayat Ninawa
2 Shawwal 1436 AH [19 July 2015]
City of Mosul
Diwan al-Hisba

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful:

Statement for distribution

By God's help the women's Hisba team has been established in the town to oversee the following matters:

- Display of women's clothes in the shop displays.
- Entry of women into men's shops without a mahrim.
- Women moving about in the city without full Shari'i dress.
- Fulfilling all the reprimand consequences with regards to those who violate the law upon men.

Islamic State
Amir of Mosul
Abu Qatada al-Iraqi

Notes: The prototype for this set-up was the '[al-Khansaa Battalion](#)' set up to recruit women and to enforce Shari'a law in Raqqa city after the ISIS takeover in January 2014. We also learn here the name of the IS governor of Mosul. On the whole, Iraqis unsurprisingly seem to play a disproportionate role in governor positions, particularly the provincial level: cf. Abu Anas al-Samarra'i [of Samarra] the governor of Euphrates Province, Abu Osama al-Iraqi one-time of Hasakah province, Abu Ayman al-Iraqi once of Latakia, then of Anbar (both Abu Osama and Abu Ayman deceased).

Specimen P: Shop conduct regulations for women



Dear customers,

- Adorned women may not enter the shop.
- Women may not raise their niqab.
- The woman is not to enter the shop alone, unless she has a mahrim or group of women or her sons with her.
- No talking with women except on points of buying and selling.

Please follow the instructions or leave the shop.

Notes: Dating and origin uncertain.

Specimen Q: Hisba regulations against smoking, Hit, Anbar Province

لا اله الا الله



بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

الدَّوْلَةُ الْإِسْلَامِيَّةُ

ديوان الحسبة
ولاية الأنبار
مركز / هيت

بلاغ رقم (٢)

الحمد لله القائل : ﴿الَّذِينَ يَسْعَوْنَ الرَّسُولَ النَّبِيَّ الْأَمِينِ الَّذِي يُجِدُّوهُ مَكْتُوبًا عِنْدَهُمْ فِي التَّوْرَةِ وَالْإِنْجِيلِ يَأْمُرُهُمْ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَيَنْهَاهُمْ عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ وَيُحِلُّ لَهُمُ الطَّيِّبَاتِ وَيُحَرِّمُ عَلَيْهِمُ الْخَبَائِثَ﴾ [الأعراف: ١٥٧]. وكما هو معلوم للجميع أن التدخين حيث الطعم حيث الرائحة حيث الأثر في الجسد.

والصلاة والسلام على نبيه القائل : ((من تخس سماً فقتل نفسه فسمه في يده يتحساه في نار جهنم خالداً مخلداً فيها أبداً)) [رواه البخاري]. وكما هو معلوم للجميع أن التدخين من المواد السامة بل يقول عنه صانعه من الأسباب الرئيسية للسرطان .

ولأن الشريعة الإسلامية حرمت إتلاف الأنفس وإتلاف الأموال تقرر منع شرب الدخان وبيعه والإتجار به ونقله ، ابتداءً من تاريخ ١١ محرم ١٤٣٦ وبتعرض المخالف لهذا البلاغ للعقوبات التالية :

ت	المخالفة	العقوبة
١	المُجَاهِر بالتدخين في الأماكن والطرق العامة	إتلاف علبة الدخان ونُصحه وتوبيخه والزامه بالإخبار عن بائع الدخان .
٢	بائع الدخان (تاجر المفرد)	إتلاف المواد المضبوطة + غرامة على (تكة) الدخان عشرة آلاف دينار .
٣	أصحاب بضائع الدخان (تاجر الجملة)	مصادرة السيارة التي تحمل البضاعة اذا كانت ملك له + إتلاف الكميات المصادرة + حبس التاجر ١٥ يوم .

**In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Islamic State
Diwan al-Hisba
Wilayat al-Anbar
Centre: Hit**

Notification no. 2

Praise be to God who says: "Those who follow the Messenger, the illiterate Prophet whom they find written about among them in the Torah and Gospel, who commands them with what is right and forbids them from what is wrong, makes lawful to them good things and forbids them from evil things" - al-'Araf 157 [Qur'an 7:157]. And it is known to all that smoking is evil of consumption, evil of odour and evil of pain in the body.

And prayers and peace be upon His Prophet who says: "Whoever sips poison, kills himself, so he will sip this poison in his hand forever and ever in Hellfire" - narrated by Bukhari. And similarly it is known to all that smoking is not only composed of toxic substances but also addiction to it is said to be among the main causes of cancer.

Since the Islamic Shari'a has forbidden harming oneself and wealth, it is decided to forbid smoking as well as selling it, dealing in it and transporting it, beginning from 11 Muharram 1436 AH, and the violator of this notification will be subject to the following consequences.

Number	Violation	Consequence
1	Smoking openly in public places and roads	Destruction of t advising him, r him embrace th notification on
2	Selling cigarettes (dealing in isolation)	Destruction of t on e-cigarettes:
3	Owners of smoking goods (dealing in whole)	Confiscating th it belongs to hi confiscated qua dealer for 15 da
4	Owner of a taxi used to transport cigarettes	Detaining the c written pledge r and a fine of 25 event of repeate confiscated.

Date of publication: 8 Muharram 1436 AH [2 November 2014]

Notes: Hit fell to IS in October 2014 after many months of stubborn resistance. Note how a small period elapsed before the Hisba regulations were imposed.

Specimen R: Hisba regulations on women's dress, Hit, Anbar Province

لا اله الا الله

رسول الله
محمد

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

الذِّكْرَةُ الْإِسْلَامِيَّةُ

ديوان الحسبة
ولاية الأنبار
مركز / هيت

بلاغ رقم (٣)

الحمد لله القائل في سورة النور : ﴿ وَقُلْ لِلْمُؤْمِنَاتِ بَعْضُنَ مِنْ أَبْصَارِهِنَّ وَيَحْفَظْنَ فُرُوجَهُنَّ وَلَا يُدْرِينَ
مُرَبِّيهِنَّ إِلَّا مَا عَظَمَ مِنْهَا وَيُضَرِّبْنَ بِخُمُرِهِنَّ عَلَى جُيُوبِهِنَّ وَلَا يُدْرِينَ مَرَبِّيهِنَّ إِلَّا لِعُقُوبَتِهِنَّ أَوْ آثَامَهُنَّ يُعَاقِبُهُنَّ أَوْ
آثَامَهُنَّ أَوْ آثَامَ مُؤَلَّفَاتِهِنَّ أَوْ إِخْوَانِهِنَّ أَوْ بَنِي إِخْوَانِهِنَّ أَوْ سَائِلِهِنَّ أَوْ مَا مَلَكَتْ أَيْمَانُهُنَّ أَوِ التَّامِيمِ غَيْرِ أُولِي
الْبُيُوتِ مِنَ الرِّجَالِ أَوِ الطِّفْلِ الَّذِينَ لَمْ يَكُنْ لَهُم مَّا يَنْظُرُونَ عَلَى عَوْرَاتِ النِّسَاءِ وَلَا يُضَرِّبْنَ بِأَرْجُلِهِنَّ لِيُعْلَمَ سَائِحِفِهِنَّ مِنْ مَرَبِّيهِنَّ
وَيُؤْوَى إِلَى اللَّهِ جَمِيعاً إِنَّهَا الْمُؤْمِنُونَ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَقْلِحُونَ ﴾ (النور: ٣١)

والصلاة والسلام على رسوله الذي بلغ أمر زينة في سورة الأحزاب عندما أمره بقوله : ﴿ يَا أَيُّهَا النَّبِيُّ قُلْ
لِلْمُؤْمِنَاتِ وَرَبَاتِنَ السَّامِيَّاتِ بَرِّئْنَ مَا كَتَبْنَ فِي أَنْفُسِهِنَّ ذَلِكَ أَدْنَى أَنْ يُسْرَبْنَ فَلَا يُؤْذِنَنَّ اللَّهُ عُقُوباً
مُرَجِئاً ﴾ (الأحزاب: ٥٦)

ولذا كان من مقومات المجمع الإسلامي العفاف والستر تقرر إلزام النساء بالحجاب الشرعي
الكامل وحسب ما قرره العلماء من شروط للحجاب بأن لا يكون ضيقاً يصف الحسد وأن لا يكون
رقيقاً يشف عما تحته وأن لا يكون لباس زينة أو لباس شهرة أو فيه تشبه بالرجال أو الكفار أو أن
يكون معطراً وأن يتضمن الحجاب ستر الوجه وجميع الحسد ، وسوف يتم الإحساب على لباس
النساء ابتداءً من ٢٥ / محرم / ١٤٣٦ هـ وسوف تعرض المخالفة لما يلي :

١- نجر ولها على شراء حجاب شرعي ونحوه - (٢٠) جلد أمامها .

٢- يتم حجب سائر الأجزاء التي يحملها المرأة سادة عن وجهها - (٢٠) جلد أمامها .

**In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Islamic State
Diwan al-Hisba
Wilayat al-Anbar
Centre: Hit**

Notification no. 3

Praise be to God who says in Surat al-Nur: "And tell the believing women to reduce their sight and guard their private parts and not to flaunt their adornments, except what has appeared by necessity. And tell them to wrap a portion of their veils over their chests and not expose their adornments except to their husbands, fathers, husbands' fathers, sons, husbands' sons, brothers, brothers' sons, sisters' sons, women, that which their right hands possess, male attendants who have no sexual desire, or children who do not yet know of women's genitals. Let them not stomp to make it known what they are concealing of their adornments. And repent to God, all of you, oh believers; peradventure you will succeed" - al-Nur 31 [Qur'an 24:31].

And prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God who brought the command of His Lord in Sura al-Ahzab when He commanded him with His words: "Oh Prophet, tell your wives, daughters and women of the believers to bring down the outer garments over themselves. That is more fitting that they should be known and not abused. And God is ever forgiving, merciful" - Ahzab 59 [Qur'an 33:59].

Since integrity and protection have been among the basic components of Islamic society, it is decided to make women embrace the entire Shari'i hijab and according to what the 'ulama have stipulated among the conditions of the hijab: that it should not be tight-fitting for the body, nor should it be delicate and transparent for what is underneath it, nor should it be adorned dress, dress of renown, or imitating men or the disbelievers. Nor should it be perfumed, but the hijab should include veiling the face and all the body. And women will be held accountable for clothing beginning from 25 Muharram 1436 AH [19 November 2014], and violation will be subject to the following consequences:

1. Her guardian will be made to buy a Shari'i hijab and will be reprimanded with 20 lashes in front of her.
2. A taxi bearing that carries a woman with her face uncovered will be detained for 24 hours.

**Islamic State: Wilayat al-Anbar
Diwan al-Hisba
Centre: Hit**

Specimen S: Marriage Contract, Mosul

ديوان القضاء

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

عقد زواج شرعي

انه في يوم السباج من شهر سنة ١٤٢٦ هجرية - الموافق ٢٠٠٤/٠٤/٢٠ ميلاديا.
جرى في تاريخه بين كلا من :

اولا : الأخ / محمد جاسم بن محمد رضية المقيم بـ / مدينة الموصل
ثانيا : الأخت / سلمى جاسم بنت خالد و فرج والمقيمة بـ / مدينة الموصل

أقر الطرفان بأهليتهما للتصرف والتعاقد واتفقا في حضور كل من :

- ١- الأخ / خالد جاسم بن صالح - مهنته / مزارع والمقيم بـ / مدينة الموصل (وكيل الزوجة)
- ٢- الأخ / هاشم البونمر - مهنته / تاجر سيارات والمقيم بـ / مدينة الموصل (شاهد أول)
- ٣- السيد / عمر العويد - مهنته / محل صرافة كركنة والمقيم بـ / مدينة الموصل (شاهد ثاني)

الطرف الأول (الزوج) الاسم / محمد جاسم بن محمد رضية
الطرف الثاني (الزوجة) الاسم / سارة جاسم بنت خالد و فرج

تم عقد القران بحضور الله بمهر مستحق و نعمة الزوج وقدره : مننا الف ليلة سورية كمعجل مشترى به أشياء جهازية للزوجة ، ومننا الف ليلة سورية مؤجلة بالقرية في نعمة الزوج في حال بطلان الزواج أو فسخ عقد نكاحهما .

الطرف الثاني (الزوجة)
الاسم / سلمى جاسم
التوقيع /

الطرف الأول (الزوج)
الاسم / محمد جاسم
التوقيع /

الشهود

الشاهد الثاني
الاسم / عمر العويد

الشاهد الأول
الاسم / هاشم البونمر

Diwan al-Qada
316/8

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Shari'i Marriage Contract

Today is 7 Rajab 1436 AH corresponding to 26 April 2015.

Published on this date between the two comprising:

1. The brother Muhammad Jasim Fahad Wafiya who lives in the city of Mosul.
2. The sister Salma Jasin Bint Khalid Wafrah, who lives in the city of Mosul

The two have determined their suitability to conduct and contract to marriage and have agreed in the presence of:

1. The brother Khalid Jasim bin Saleh. Occupation: farming. Lives in the city of Mosul (wife's guardian).
2. The brother Hashim Albu Nimr. Occupation: car dealer. Lives in the city of Mosul (first witness).
3. Mr. Omar al-Adid. Occupation: mobile phone shop. Lives in the city of Mosul (second witness).

The first side (husband): Muhammad Jasim bin Fahad Wafiya
The second side (wife): Salma Jasim bint Khalid Wafrah

The contract of the Qur'an has been fulfilled by God's favour with a deserving dowry: i.e. contract of the husband, and its extent is: 200,000 Syrian pounds as an upfront purchase for the wife's preparations, and 200,000 Syrian pounds as a postponed remainder in the contract of the husband in the event of the falsity of the marriage or invalidation of the marriage contract.

The first side (husband): Muhammad Jasim bin Fahad Wafiya
Signature:

The second side (wife): Salma Jasim bint Khalid Wafrah
Signature:

The witnesses

First witness: Hashim Albu Nimr.
Signature:

Second witness: Omar al-Adid
Signature:

Registration number: 316/8

Registered with the Shari'i brother Abu A'isha al-Jazrawi.

Islamic State Diwan al-Qada

Notes: Interesting to note the use of Syrian currency in the dowry payments even though the marriage contract is for people living in Mosul. The Abu A'isha al-Jazrawi in this document should not be confused with the [one-time amir of Azaz of the same kunya](#) who replaced Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Kuwaiti and was killed in the infighting with Syrian rebels in early 2014. The establishment of the Islamic court (i.e. of what is now the Diwan al-Qada [wa al-Mazalim]) with offers to conduct marriages is (alongside the da'wa office) one of the earliest features of ISIS administration in Syria in 2013, being set up in e.g. Deir az-Zor city in the fall of 2013 at a time when other factions existed in the city. When Mosul fell in June 2014, an [Islamic court quickly emerged](#), only this time there were no rivals to challenge what became the Islamic State and so marriages could only be legally held there.

Specimen T: Marriage Contract

١٠٢
١٠
بين القصار

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
عقد زواج شرعي

انه في يوم ٨ رمضان سنة ١٤٢٦ هـ - الموافق ٢٠٠٥/٧/٢٠ ميلاديا.

حرر في تاريخه بين كلا من :

اولا : الاخ / عقيد الجبوري ابن محمد وعيد المقيم - انا صبي السودة
ثانيا : الاخت / وفاء الصالح بن سليم وعيد المقيم - انا صبي السودة

أقر الطرفان باهليتهما للتصرف والتعاقد واتفقا في حضور كل من :

(وكيل الزوجة)

١- الاخ / احمد الصالح بن مسكن وعيد مهنته / انا صبي السودة
والمقيم - انا صبي السودة

(شاهد اول)

٢- السيد / مسكن الكاوي بن احمد وعيد مهنته / انا صبي السودة
والمقيم - انا صبي السودة

(شاهد ثاني)

الطرف الأول (الزوج)

الاسم / عقيد الجبوري ابن محمد وعيد

الطرف الثاني (الزوجة)

الاسم / وفاء الصالح بن سليم وعيد

تم عقد القران بفضل الله بمهر مستحق ي ذمة الزوج وقدره : ملتا الف ليرة سورية كمعجل مشترى به أشياء جهازية للزوجة . وملتا الف ليرة سورية موجلة بالقبلة في ذمة الزوج في حال بطلان الزواج أو فسخ عقد نكاحهما .

الطرف الأول (الزوج)

الاسم / عقيد الجبوري
التوقيع /

الطرف الثاني (الزوجة)

الاسم / وفاء الصالح
التوقيع /

Diwan al-Qada
103/10

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Shari'i Marriage Contract

Today is 8 Ramadan 1436 AH corresponding to 26 June 2015

Published on this between the two comprising:

1. The brother Hafid al-Juburi ibn Muhammad Wahida, who lives in al-Shura district [agricultural district [south of Mosul](#)]
2. The sister Wafa al-Saleh bint Salim wa Khadija, who lives in al-Shura district

The two have determined their suitability to conduct and contract to marriage and have agreed in the presence of:

1. The brother Salim al-Saleh bin Muhammad wa Haifa. Occupation: farmer (wife's guardian).
2. The brother Ahmad al-Saleh bin Mursa wa Sara. Occupation: farmer. Lives in al-Shura district (first witness).
3. Mr. Musa al-Qaturi [?] bin Ahmad wa Huna. Occupation: merchant. Lives in al-Shura district (second witness).

The first side (husband): Hafid al-Juburi ibn Muhammad Wahida

The second side (wife): Wafa al-Saleh bint Salim wa Khadija

The contract of the Qur'an has been fulfilled by God's favour with a deserving dowry: i.e. contract of the husband, and its extent is: 200,000 Syrian pounds as an upfront purchase for the wife's preparations, and 200,000 Syrian pounds as a postponed remainder in the contract of the husband in the event of the falsity of the marriage or invalidation of the marriage contract.

The first side (husband): Hafid al-Juburi ibn Muhammad Wahida

Signature:

The second side (wife): Wafa al-Saleh bint Salim wa Khadija

Signature:

The witnesses

First witness: Ahmad al-Saleh

Signature:

Second witness: Musa al-Qaturi

Signature:

Registration no. 103/10

Registered with the Shari'i brother Abu Dujana al-Libi [the Libyan]

**Islamic State
Diwan al-Qada**

Specimen U: Regulations for bakeries, Hit, Anbar Province

ولاية الأنبار
ديوان الخدمات - مركز هيت



بسم عاقل جميع الذوات في مركز هيت

بسم استلام كمية ١٠ طن من الرقيق موصلة يومية بعد فرز
مرسلة خوارج من ديوان الحسبة وتتم بشكل أسبوعي إلى ديوان الخدمات
عربي حال الخصال يغلب الفرس وينرم صاحبها بحيات الأطباء الناقصين

**Islamic State
Wilayat al-Anbar
Diwan al-Khidamat: Hit centre**

Publication for all the bakeries in Hit centre

A quantity of 10 tonnes of flour is to be received as a daily quota for every oven with inclusion of receipts through the Diwan al-Hisba that on a weekly basis will be referred to the Diwan al-Khidamat. And in the event of violation the bakery will be closed and its owner will be fined according to the quantities missing in tonnes.

**Islamic State
Wilayat al-Anbar: Hit centre
Diwan al-Khidamat**

Issued by the Diwan al-Khidamat **no. 13/2**
6 Shawwal 1436 AH [22 July 2015]

Specimen V: Request for garbage compactors, Hit, Anbar

ولاية الأنبار
ديوان الخدمات - مركز هيت



بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

” وتعاونوا على البر والتقوى ولا تعاونوا على الإثم والعدوان ”

يرجى إرسال ضاغطات لتعبئة القمامة من مركز الولاية
ونحيطكم علماً بأن ثلاث ضاغطات كانت في مركز المدينة
قد تم تحويلها بمرفق من ديوان الوالي لولاية الخير
وأن الشكوى المقدمة من ديوان الحسبة
هي صحيحة ولنا أسبابنا نلتمسها بهذا الكتاب

**Islamic State
Wilayat al-Anbar
Diwan al-Khidamat: Hit Centre**

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

"And cooperate on the basis of piety and fear of God, not sin and hostility."

It is requested to send compactors for the loading of garbage from the centre of the wilaya. And we inform you that three compactors were in the centre of the town and were moved through facilitation of the Diwan al-Wali to Wilayat al-Kheir [Deir az-Zor province]. And the complaints presented from the Diwan al-Hisba are true and for us are our reasons that we solicit them with this note.

**Islamic State
Wilayat al-Anbar: Hit Centre
Diwan al-Khidamat**

Notes: Diwan al-Wali= Diwan al-Wilaya. Exact dating uncertain

Specimen W: Prohibition on mortgaging homes, Hit, Anbar

لا إله إلا الله

الله
رسول
محمد

الدولة الإسلامية

ولاية الأنبار

ديوان الخدمات - مركز هيت

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

يُمنع رهن المسارك نومدية هيت بقره صارة عن ديوان الحسبة
في ولاية الأنبار .

وسبب تدارك حالات الرهن والعرض الذي يجر المنفعة لصاحب المنزل

يتم حسن تنظيم كد مسائل بالرهن ويحال إلى ديوان الحسبة

وتنجز على المنزل لصالح ديوان الخدمات

**Islamic State
Wilayat al-Anbar
Diwan al-Khidamat: Hit Centre**

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

The mortgaging of homes in the town of Hit is forbidden by order of the Diwan al-Hisba in Wilayat al-Anbar.

On account of the frequency of the states of mortgage and the loan that brings along interest for the owner of the house [cf. [here](#) for context] all who deal in mortgages will be detained, reprimanded and referred to the Diwan al-Hisba, and the house will be confiscated for the interest of the Diwan al-Khidamat.

**Islamic State
Wilayat al-Anbar: Hit Centre
Diwan al-Khidamat**

Diwan al-Khidamat no. 6/1
2 Rajab 1436 AH [21 April 2015]

Specimen X: Request for broadcast of media release, Ninawa Province

ديوان الخلافة



ية نينوى

المكتب الإعلامي

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

في ظل انتصارات إخوتكم في الدولة الإسلامية
وتقدم مجاهديها في جميع الجبهات المترامية في بلاد الشام والعراق

يرجى تقديم إصدار إعلامي

ينشر في جمع وسائل الإعلام

ليأخذ صلواته عن إنجازات الخلافة الإسلامية

ويتم إقامة ندوات عامة في مدينة الموصل

لا إله إلا الله



الدولة الإسلامية

صدقة من :

Islamic State
Diwan al-Khilaf[a?]
Wilayat Ninawa
Media Office

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

In the shade of the victories of your brothers in the Islamic State, and the advance of its mujahideen on all extensive fronts in Bilad al-Sham and Iraq, the presentation of a media release is requested, which will be published in all media outlets, so as to take an echo from the successes of the Islamic Caliphate, and hold public seminars in the city of Mosul.

Islamic State
Media Office for Wilayat Ninawa

Certified by the amir of Mosul: Abu Qatada al-Iraqi

Notes: Likely dates from the aftermath of the conquests of Ramadi and Palmyra in May 2015: cf. [Specimen 4H in my archive](#) with offer for free entry to the Waritheen hotel and amusement park in Mosul in celebration of the conquests.

Specimen Y: Request for dispatch of personnel contingent and weapons,
Azaz

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام
ولاية حلب

إلا الله
الله
يقول
حمد
الإسلامية
عراق والشام

سلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته

الإمام الفاضل / أبو عبد الله الحسين

وكتبه أرسال محمود بن الحسين بن علي بن أبي طالب

بنا منة عامه في...

**In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Wilayat Halab**

Salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu. To the distinguished brother Abu Abdullah al-Libi, we ask you to send Abu Obeida al-Benghazi's group to us for we are in need of them and to ask for weapons from their amir Abu Obeida.


[...]

**Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Wilayat Halab
Amir of the Azaz area**

Abu al-Waleed al-Muhajir

Notes: Abu al-Waleed al-Muhajir is otherwise unknown. He was never the amir of the Azaz area: it is just this document has the amir's stamp. Dating unclear, though it may relate to the conflict with the Northern Storm Brigade that began in September 2013.

Specimen Z: Punishments for not closing shop during prayer time, Homs Province



**Wilayat Homs
Diwan al-Hisba**

All shops are to be closed during prayer time. Whoever is absent from prayer three times in a row will have his shop confiscated and be flogged 30 times in front of his shop, to be an example to others besides him from those falling short in undertaking prayers.

**Islamic State
Wilayat Homs: 11 Ramadan 1436 AH [28 June 2015]**

Unseen Islamic State Financial Accounts for Deir az-Zor Province

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

[Jihadology](#)

October 5, 2015



The question of where the Islamic State [IS] acquires its funding has been a subject of much discussion. Though ideological partisans often see a private Gulf Arab funding hand behind IS, the general consensus now seems to accept that IS is not dependent on foreign donors in any meaningful way, and thus largely acquires its revenues from resources within the territories it operates, including taxation, sales of oil and gas, antiquities and the like. Thus, the majority of the debate now focuses on trying to determine the relative importance of each of these sources of revenue.

A number of analyses have been produced relying on local sources within Iraq and Syria, and in this regard I highly recommend [Die Zeit's investigation from December 2014](#), the fruit of a team of researchers including my colleague Yassin Musharbash.

However, a deficiency in all the work thus far on IS finances is a lack of statistics from IS itself on income and expenditures, and so a degree of guesswork in estimating has always been involved. The exclusive documents that will be presented below- obtained from IS' Diwan Bayt al-Mal (financial ministry) in eastern Syria's Deir az-Zor province (Wilayat al-Kheir)- provide a remedy in giving a first time view of IS budgets by its own account for the month of Rabi' al-Awal 1436 AH (c. 23 December 2014-22 January 2015).

For context, Deir az-Zor province has been almost entirely under the control of IS since July 2014, while a regime presence still holds out in parts of Deir az-Zor city and at a military airport. In defeating the rebels in Deir az-Zor province, IS has gained a monopoly on oil and gas resources in the province. The province's long-standing importance to the oil and gas sector of the Syrian economy is well-known, and it undoubtedly constitutes the largest pool of oil and gas resources in Syria that IS has been able to exploit.

As part of its narrative of 'breaking the borders' between Syria and Iraq, IS created a ['Euphrates Province'](#) that spans eastern Deir az-Zor province and western Anbar province, including the districts of Albukamal in Syria and al-Qa'im, Rawa and Anah in Iraq.

Figures in the documents help us to quantify IS financing. From IS' richest province in fossil fuels, revenues and expenditures for the province come in the form of millions of dollars on a monthly basis, not tens or hundreds of millions. Further, despite the significant holdings of oil and gas resources, these sources of revenue by no means constitute the majority of IS' income in the province. Statistically, revenue streams for the province can be divided as follows using the data from the documents:

Source	Percentage of Revenue
Oil & Gas	27.7%
Electricity	3.9%
Taxes	23.7%
Confiscations	44.7%

As can be seen, a plurality of the income actually comes from confiscations of property and money. This may take place for a number of reasons: e.g. residents who fled their homes, violations of IS regulations and illicit smuggling of goods, particularly forbidden items like cigarettes and alcohol. Movement across border areas is important in this regard when combined also with transit fees for legitimate travel and transportation of goods.

Meanwhile, IS' expenditures primarily go towards military upkeep in the form of expenditures for bases and paying fighters' salaries. Conspicuously absent from the expenditures are accounts for salaries of workers officially under the authority of the Diwan al-Ta'aleem (education). [The reason](#) for this is that the IS process of revamping the education system in accordance with its ideology required the closing of many schools in this period to subject teachers and staff to 'repentance' and Shari'a lessons, while the regime continued to pay salaries though under strict conditions for the recipients to come in person to the relevant places stipulated by the regime. Note that the Islamic Police comes under the Diwan al-Hisba working closely with IS' judiciary department (Diwan al-Qada wa al-Mazalim), and both these diwans play key roles in [confiscations of goods](#) and [property](#). Here is the breakdown of expenditures by percentage.

Expenditure	Percentage of Expenditure
Expenditures for bases	19.8%
Fighters' salaries	43.6%
Media	2.8%
Islamic Police	10.4%
Diwan al-Khidamat (Services Department)	17.7%
Diwan Bayt al-Mal: aid sums	5.7%

Some more points of analysis to consider:

– Popular conceptions of IS income need to have a more sober and realistic perspective on the role oil and gas revenues. Daily revenues from the oil wells here (total divided by 30) yield on average \$66,433. If this is the average revenue from IS' best oil holdings in Syria and one engages in reasonable extrapolation, then one will come nowhere near the total figure of [\\$3 million a day for IS in oil sales](#) that was [widely touted in the media in summer 2014](#), even when making allowances for subsequent damage to infrastructure from coalition airstrikes. A sounder estimate would put such income at no more than 5-10% of that figure.

– On a related historical note, one should dismiss accounts that portray IS' predecessors as being [suddenly enriched from eastern Syrian oilfields and antiquities beginning in late 2012](#), based on hearsay about alleged computer flash sticks revealing IS finances and off-base regarding the dynamics of control of eastern Syrian oil over the course of the Syrian civil war (pace the Guardian report, IS' predecessor ISIS did not exist in late 2012, let alone 'commandeer' eastern Syrian oilfields).

– The sale of antiquities under the authority of the antiquities subdivision of the [Diwan al-Rikaz](#) is not explicitly mentioned in the accounts here, but it is most likely included within taxation as part of the IS bureaucratic structure. [Documents captured from the Abu Sayyaf raid by U.S. forces](#) appear to show a 20% tax to be paid on antiquities sold in Deir az-Zor province. Two of the individual transactions presented from December 2014 illustrate tax payments of more than \$10,000, while the third constitutes a little over \$1000.

– Despite IS' propaganda on 'breaking the borders' and the creation of 'Euphrates Province', the inclusion of Albukamal within Deir az-Zor province financial data and transactions is an example of how IS still deals in prior administrative boundaries. Compare with [a previous July 2015 document I published](#) from *Wilayat al-Kheir's* Diwan al-Khidamat ordering for an Abu Dujana al-Libi to be paid \$100,000 for a road project between Albukamal and al-Qa'im. [Other administrative documents from 'Euphrates Province'](#) indicate that IS administration rarely seems to deal with the territory as a united entity, but rather by its Syrian and Iraqi halves. This is so even as travel within 'Euphrates Province' is relatively easy, as a friend of mine from Rawa now works in Albukamal, and residents on both sides of the Iraq-Syria border regularly cross both ways for business, market shopping etc.

– Ultimately, the most vital IS revenues depend on the continued existence of its bureaucratic structure within the territories it controls, and there is little one can do to disrupt that short of destroying that structure militarily. The suggested siege-like strategy to trigger a collapse from within is impossible to realize in the current circumstances, as one cannot wholly isolate IS territory from interactions with the outside world, and so cash flows will continue. The Iraqi government's decision to cut off direct salary payments to workers in IS-held areas will certainly help reduce IS taxation revenues, but it was not the sole avenue for cash flow, and though hardships for residents will increase, IS' rigid security apparatus is still highly capable of suppressing major revolt.

Below are the documents with translation.

١٥ ربيع الثاني ١٤٣٦ هـ
الموافق لـ ٢٠١٥/٢/٥ م

ولاية الخير
إدارة بيت المال

الدولة الإسلامية

ولاية الخير

مديوان بيت المال

مسودة عمل مشروع إدارة الأموال

بيت المال في ولاية الخير

نسخة لمديوان الولاية

نسخة لمديوان الحسبة .

غير ملحق

**Islamic State
Wilayat al-Kheir
Diwan Bayt al-Mal
Bayt al-Mal Administration
15 Rabi' al-Thani 1436 AH
5 February 2015**

**Rough draft of the operation of the management of wealth project.
Bayt al-Mal in Wilayat al-Kheir
Copy to the Diwan al-Wilaya [governor's office]
Copy to the Diwan al-Hisba [checks for potential irregularities in the records
etc.]**

Uncirculated

١٥ ربيع الثاني ١٤٣٦ هـ
الموافق لـ ٢٠١٥/٢/٥ م

ولاية الخير
إدارة بيت المال

الإدارة العامة



بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

جدولة حسابات ولاية الخير لشهر ربيع الأول من عام ١٤٣٦ للهجرة .

جدول الوارد لصندوق ولاية الخير

ولاية الخير	التوكمل	المباين	الباقية	حدود	تجمعات
أبار نطف	٨٢٠ الف دولار	٥١٣ الف دولار	٦٣٠ الف دولار	٣٠ الف دولار	-
غاز	١٢ الف دولار	—	٣٣٠ الف دولار	-	-
كهرباء	٥٣ الف دولار	٦٨ الف دولار	١٣ الف دولار	٩ آلاف دولار	١٨٨ الف دولار
جنيبة	٦١١ الف دولار	٣١٣ الف دولار	٢٩٧ الف دولار	٥٧٧ الف دولار	٢٠٠ الف دولار
مضمرات	٣٣ الف دولار	١٧ الف دولار	٢٨٠ الف دولار	٢٠٧ مليون دولار	٧٤٤ الف دولار

حساب مجموع الوارد لصندوق الولاية لشهر ربيع الأول من عام ١٤٣٦ للهجرة عن مركز

ولاية الخير والبيكوال والمباين والباقية والحدود والكنال والجمعيات والولايات

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Table of accounts for Wilayat al-Kheir for the month of Rabi' al-Awal of the year 1436 AH

Table for income to the treasury of Wilayat al-Kheir.

Wilayat al-Kheir	Albukamal Al-Mayadeen	Al-Badiya	Borders	Tajammu'at [Deir az-Zor area residential districts]	
Oil wells	\$820,000	\$513,000	\$630,000	\$30,000	
Gas	\$12,000		\$330,000		
Electricity	\$53,000	\$68,000	\$13,000	\$9,000	\$188,000
Taxes	\$611,000	\$313,000	\$297,000	\$577,000	\$200,000
Confiscations	\$33,000	\$17,000	\$280,000	\$2,700,000	\$744,000

Total accounting of income for the treasury of the Wilaya for the month of Rabi' al-Awal of the year 1436 AH from the centre of Wilayat al-Kheir, Albukamal, al-Mayadeen, al-Badiya and the border centres for the Wilaya is \$8,438,000.

١٥ ربيع الثاني ١٤٣٦ هـ
الموافق لـ ٢٠١٥/٢/٥ م

ولاية الخير إدارة بيت المال

جدول المصادر لشهر ربيع الأول من عام ١٤٣٦ للهجرة :

ولاية الخير	البوكمال	المتكئين	البائية	حدود	تجمعات
منزل	—	-	٦	١٧	٥٦
سيارة	٣	٢	-	٨٠	١١
شاحنة	١	-	١١	٣٦	-
مبالغ مالية	٢٠٠٠ دولار	١٣٠٠ دولار	١٣ الف دولار	٤٨٠ الف دولار	-
ارض ١ لوتم	-	-	-	١٨٠ لوتم	٢٠
محرمات	-	٣٠٠٠ نكان عنية	١٠٠ صندوق نكان	١٢٠٠ صندوق نكان	-
ماشية	٩٣	-	٦٠٠ رأس غنم	١٣٢٠ رأس غنم ٥٠ بقرة	—

Table of confiscations for the month of Rabi' al-Awal of the year 1436 AH:

Wilayat al-Kheir	Albukamal	Al-Mayadeen	Al-Badiya	Borders	Tajammu'at
House			6	17	56
Car	3	2		80	11
Truck	1		11	36	
Material sums	\$2000	\$1300	\$13,000	\$480,000	
Land				180 dunams	20
(in dunams)					
Forbidden items		Cigarettes: 3000 packs	100 cases of cigarettes	1200 cases of cigarettes	
Livestock	93		600 head of sheep	1320 head of sheep, 50 cows	

In what follows is a table of expenditures for Wilayat al-Kheir for the month of Rabi' al-Awal of the year 1436 AH:

١٥ ربيع الثاني ١٤٣٦ هـ
الموافق لـ ٢٠١٥/٢/٥ م

ولاية الخير
إدارة بيت المال



فيما يلي جدول مصاريف ولاية الخير لشهر ربيع الأول من عام ١٤٣٦ للهجرة :

٢٦٢ الف دولار	مصروف مقرات " إطفاء " وغيره في مركز الولاية
١٣٠ الف دولار	مصروف مقرات " إطفاء " وغيره في الميدانين
٩٨ الف دولار	مصروف مقرات " إطفاء " وغيره في البوكمال
٥١٢ الف دولار	مصروف مقرات " إطفاء " وغيره في البادية
١٠٤ الف دولار	مصروف مقرات " إطفاء " وغيره مطار
٦٠٠ الف دولار	مصروف مجاهد عن مركز المدينة
٤٨٠ الف دولار	مصروف مجاهد عن الميدانين والبوكمال
١,٣٦٠ مليون وثلاثمائة وستون الف دولار	مصروف مجاهد عن البادية
١٥٥ الف دولار	المركز الإعلامي
٥٨٠ الف دولار	مراكز الشرطة الإسلامية
٩٨٨ الف دولار	ديوان الخدمات لمركز وريف الولاية

Expenditure for the bases: "Provision of food" etc. in the centre of the wilaya	\$262,000
Expenditure for the bases: "Provision of food" etc. in al-Mayadeen	\$130,000
Expenditure for the bases: "Provision of food" etc. in Albukamal	\$98,000
Expenditure for the bases: "Provision of food" etc. in the Badiya	\$512,000
Expenditure for the bases: "Provision of food" etc.: airport	\$104,000
Mujahid allowance [monthly salaries for fighters] from the city centre	\$600,000
Mujahid allowance from al-Mayadeen and Albukamal	\$480,000
Mujahid allowance from the Badiya	\$1,360,000
Media centre	\$155,000
Islamic Police centres	\$580,000
Diwan al-Khidamat for the centre and countryside of the wilaya	\$988,000
Diwan Bayt al-Mal: aid sums	\$318,000
Total	\$5,587,000

Zakat taxes in Wilayat al-Kheir for the month of Rabi' al-Awal of the year 1436 AH:

١٥ ربيع الثاني ١٤٣٦ هـ
الموافق لـ ٢٠١٥/٢/٥ م

ولاية الخير
إدارة بيت المال



جباية الزكاة في ولاية الخير لشهر ربيع الأول من عام ١٤٣٦ للهجرة :

زكاة القمح :

- ٣٠٠ الف دولار موزعة على المساحات المزروعة " قمحاً " في ولاية الخير ، دون حساب
كسور الزكاة لعام ١٤٣٥ للهجرة . ويتم حساب الزكاة في شهر ربيع الأول عن كل عام .

زكاة الشعير :

- ١٧٠ الف دولار موزعة على المساحات المزروعة " شعيراً " في ولاية الخير دون حساب
كسور الزكاة لعام ١٤٣٥ للهجرة . ويتم حساب الزكاة في شهر ربيع الأول عن كل عام .

زكاة الأموال :

- ١,٢٠٠,٠٠٠ مليون ومئتا ألف دولار زكاة الأموال في ولاية الخير .

Zakat on wheat:

. \$300,000 distributed upon [i.e. imposed as zakat taxation on] the cultivated lands in 'wheat' in Wilayat al-Kheir, without taking into account the kusus of the zakat [zakat that could not be paid]* for the year 1435 AH, and accounting of zakat will be accomplished in the month of Rabi' al-Awal every year.

Zakat on barley:

. \$170,000 distributed upon the cultivated land in 'barley' in Wilayat al-Kheir, without taking into account the kusus of the zakat for the year 1435 AH, and accounting of zakat will be accomplished in the month of Rabi' al-Awal every year.

Zakat on wealth:

. \$1,200,000 of zakat on wealth in Wilayat al-Kheir.

١٥ ربيع الثاني ١٤٣٦ هـ
الموافق لـ ٢٠١٥/٢/١٥ م

ولاية الخير إدارة بيت المال

ذات الملكة



زكاة الإبل :

- ٢٠٦ آلاف دولار عن زكاة " الإبل " في ولاية الخير مع حساب كسور الزكاة عن عام ١٤٣٥ للهجرة .

زكاة الثمار :

- ١٠٠ الف دولار موزعة على المساحات المزروعة وثمار النخيل في ولاية الخير دون حساب كسور الزكاة لعام ١٤٣٥ للهجرة . ويتم حساب الزكاة في شهر ربيع الأول عن كل عام .

Zakat on camels:

. \$206,000 from zakat on "camels" in Wilayat al-Kheir taking into account the kusus of the zakat for the year 1435 AH.

Zakat on fruits:

. \$100,000 distributed upon the cultivated fields and the fruits of the trees in Wilayat al-Kheir without taking into account the kusus of the zakat for the year 1435 AH, and accounting of zakat will be accomplished in the month of Rabi' al-Awal every year.

*[**Note:** My friend Rashad Ali further clarifies that the kusus of zakat is that which is not obliged/charged for zakat taxation, as it falls below minimum threshold for mandatory zakat taxation].

[**Update 15 October 2015:** my friend from Rawa further explains that his work in the realm of Internet involves back and forth between Rawa and Albukamal, going up to the latter town on a weekly basis].

Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi • Jan 27, 2015 at 12:25 pm



My recent series on IS administration in Ninawa province focused on [education](#), [public services](#) and [religious life](#) using numerous specimen IS administrative documents from that province. This post aims to provide an archive of similar translated IS documents in other provinces, and will be continually updated.

Specimen A: Childbirth Operations in Deir az-Zor Province

**Islamic State
State of the Caliphate
Wilayat al-Kheir
Medical Administration**

In view of what the land is going through from difficult circumstances including the debilitation of souls from the exploitation of their Muslim brothers, in order to assist the believers from the sons of Islam who are working in the medical corps to support their brothers from the poor and others besides them from the Muslim populace, and with the

desire to keep the course of medical work removed from arbitrary whim, the Diwan al-Siha [health administration/department], after consideration and examination of medical work in the field concerning women [gynaecology etc.] has decided on the following:

1. Fixing of the price of Caesarean childbirth operations to 15000 Syrian pounds.
2. Fixing of the price of normal childbirth operations to 10500 Syrian pounds.
3. This includes keeping the child in the hospital for 12 hours after birth only.

Note: This is to be considered as tantamount to a written order and all who contravene it will be held accountable in the Dar al-Qada [IS judiciary] with attendant consequence.

2 Muharram 1436 AH

26 October 2014

General Medical Official

Specimen B: Landline Telephone Subscriptions in Deir az-Zor Province

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Kheir

Islamic Administration for Public Services

Phone connection: Number 035

[...]

Date: 14/11 [14 November 2014].

The sum receipt has been completed: 400 Syrian pounds [per month]*

And that is to meet support for connections' services.

Name of subscriber: ...

Subscriber's number: ...

Register's number

[Signatures]: Office official; Service official

NB: For comparison, landline subscriptions according to Northern Storm's spokesman [Azaz area] cost \$2 a month (around 365 Syrian pounds). The landline subscription generally only works for local landline connections.

Specimen C: Fishing Regulations (Agricultural Department): Deir az-Zor Province

Decision

As a result of the lack of oversight over the abundance of fish, paucity of awareness, and the greed and ambition of some of the fishermen and their audacity in carrying out fishing in ways that are illegal and harmful to the life of the people, the fish and the river environment.

The Islamic State has decided on the following:

1. The use of electric current in hunting fish is forbidden because it leads to extermination of many river/water creatures as well as congenital disfigurement for small fish and other river creatures.
2. No fishing with use of explosive materials, dynamite and the like.
3. No fishing with use of toxins and other chemical substances because that leads to the death of all the creatures of fish and others besides them, as well as poisoning people who obtain food from them.
4. No fishing at a time of proliferation of the fish and river/water creatures because that leads to the prevention of the proliferation of the fish and the killing of their eggs, which constitutes a threat to the abundance of fish.

We ask all who come upon this decision to be bound by it for it is in the interest of the Islamic State and the Muslims in the totality.

Specimen D: Regulations for Pharmacies in Deir az-Zor Province (only preserved in indirect testimony)

Da3esh [IS] insists that all pharmacies operating in Deir az-Zor province must provide the medical administration in the province (Wilayat al-Kheir) with a number of statements including the provision of a degree for the pharmacist; further, it is required that anyone who works in the pharmacy must have a degree of a medical/health institute (pharmacy division) and he is responsible for any mistake that happens in the pharmacy with no provision of anaesthetics, menstrual drugs or prohibited medications except by doctor's prescription.

Further, it has been imposed on pharmacy owners that their profits cannot exceed 20%. They must also bring a document from the Diwan al-Zakat to indicate that payment has been fulfilled. Whoever does not possess those statements will have his pharmacy shut for a period of a month from the date of the decision. Whosoever contravenes will be held accountable in the Dar al-Qaḍa al-Shari'i with attendant consequence.

[5 November 2014]

Specimen E: Prayer Times in Deir az-Zor City (Diwan al-Awqaf wa al-Da'wa wa al-Masajid)

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Kheir

City area

(Diwan al-Awqaf wa al-Da'wa wa al-Masajid)

We remind the Muslims under the shadow of the Islamic State that the time standard authorized for the call to prayer, prayer and the rest of the proceedings is the old time standard ('summer') so please observe this directive by order of the general committee for the Islamic State.

[statement emerged in late November 2014].

Specimen F: Announcement of Acceptance of Students for School (Diwan al-Ta'aleem: Raqqa Province)- late January 2015



"In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful:

The Almighty has said: "Say: Are those who know and those who don't know equal?" [Qur'an 39:9].

The Diwan al-Ta'aleem in Wilayat al-Raqqa announces the acceptance of the sons of the Muslims in the schools of the city within the school activity in the wilaya [province].

Our children are the buds/blossoms of Islam."

Specimen G: Educational Plans of Diwan al-Ta'aleem in Raqqa Province (indirect testimony: via local pro-IS Raqqa Islamic News Network [RNN])

For general distribution and benefit:

Details of the educational plan in Raqqa:

9 years of study: in two divisions. 5 primary, 4 secondary. After the 9 years, selection for colleges or institutes. As for teachers who have not previously had an education qualification (graduate with no prior teaching experience), there is subjection for 10 months to the Institute for the Preparing of Teachers. And after that there is direct entry to teaching. As for those who have previously had a teaching qualification, they must undergo a Shari'a session lasting 2 months, and they sign a document calling for repentance. As for those who have been previously studying in the universities but have not yet graduated and would like to teach, they are subjected to a Shari'a session lasting

15 days and they must pass a test with a score over 70% that the person may be allowed to enter the Institute for the Preparing of Teachers for a period of 10 months, after which the person may teach.

NB: According to RNN, IS' Diwan al-Ta'aleem in Raqqa is in what used to be the education college

Specimen H: Announcement of Beginning of School Term with List of Schools (Raqqa Province)

Islamic State

Caliphate on the program of the Prophets/Prophethood

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

The Diwan al-Ta'aleem in Wilayat al-Raqqa announces the acceptance of the sons of the Muslims in the following schools:

Girls' Schools	Boys' Schools
Aisha Mother of the Believers	Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi
Fatima the Daughter of Muhammad	Sa'ad ibn Abi Waqas
Umm Amara	Ahmad
Hind bint Utba	Al-Farouq
Al-Qadisiya	Uqba ibn Nafi
Thabit ibn Qais	Abdullah ibn Mas'ud
Juwariyya bint al-Harith	Khalid ibn al-Waleed
Arwah bint Abd al-Mutallab	Ubada ibn as-Samit
Dhat al-Nataqain [Asma bint Abi Bakr: sister of Aisha]	Osama ibn Munqidh (Sword of the State)
Julaybib	Hatin
Abu Dhar al-Ghifari	Umm Habiba
Umm Salamah	Abu Bakr al-

	Sadiq (al-Wazi)
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Within the plan of the realization of the schools derived from the Diwan al-Ta'aleem according to the decided stages. Term in schools begins on Saturday 26/3/1436 AH (17 January 2015).

NB: It will be noted that the schools practice gender segregation according to IS regulations, and most of the schools are named after figures from the time of the Prophet and the immediate era after him, most notably in the girls' section a number of Muhammad's wives. Note also the naming of a school after Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi: hardly a surprise.

**Specimen I: Qur'an Memorization Competition (Raqqa Province)-
September 2014**

Islamic State

Diwan al-Da'wah wa al-Awqaf wa al-Masajid

Committee for Affairs of the Teaching of the Noble Qur'an

Announcement

The Committee for Affairs of the Teaching of the Noble Qur'an announces a competition for memorization of the Noble Qur'an.

Details of the Competition:

Level One: Memorization of 5 parts with correct rules of recitation and memorization.

Level Two: Memorization of 3 parts with correct rules of recitation and memorization.

Session begins on 26 Dhu al-Qa'ada 1435 AH on a daily basis except Friday. Session lasts for a whole month.

Conditions of application for the competition:

1. The applicant's age for the competition should be between 18 and 40 years old.
2. Must attend and cannot be absent except for a legitimate excuse [according to Shari'a]
3. Applicant must have memorized at least 3 parts.

Notice: All those who pass the test in this competition will be appointed as teachers for the Noble Qur'an if they so wish and there will be granted an accredited qualification from IS. Monetary and real prizes will be distributed according to the levels, with precious prizes for those who excel.

Place and time: al-Nawwi mosque after afternoon prayer

To register head to the office for the affairs of teaching the Noble Qur'an in the HQ of the Diwan al-Awqaf. Registration begins Monday 20 Dhu al-Qa'ada 1435 AH.

Specimen J: Employment Opportunities with the Diwan al-Zakat in Raqqa Province

Islamic State

Diwan al-Zakat

Centre of Wilayat al-Raqqa

Announcement

The Diwan al-Zakat- centre of Wilayat al-Raqqa- announces the holding of a hiring campaign for those with the following qualifications in 'Ilm [knowledge]:

1. Qualification in Shari'a sciences
2. Qualification in economics- specialty (accountancy, management, computer and information system)
3. Secondary business institute
4. Secondary education in business
5. General secondary education in its two divisions of sciences and humanities
6. Preparatory education

And that is to appoint them as employees according to their specialties in the Zakat Centre in Wilayat al-Raqqa and the division offices affiliated with it. Those who wish to apply for the campaign should go and register with the Zakat Centre- City Office- within the ten days from this date.

Wednesday 11 Safr 1436 AH

3 December 2014

Official of the Diwan al-Zakat: Wilayat al-Raqqa

Specimen K: Employment Opportunities with Diwan al-Hisbah, Raqqa Province

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Raqqa

Hisbah Centre

Oversight and Inspections Office

The Hisbah Centre- Oversight and Inspections Office- announces its need to appoint civilian employees according to the following specialties:

1. Veterinary doctor
2. Assistant veterinary doctor
3. Office administration
4. Accountant
5. Guard
6. Health inspector
7. Butcher for cutting the throat (dhibah)
8. Butcher
9. Cleaning work

Those who wish to be appointed as employees should go and register with the Oversight and Inspections Office...Registration begins on Tuesday, 4 November 2014, and ends on Tuesday, 11 November 2014.

Oversight and Inspections Office

Specimen L: Shari'a Session for Teachers, Raqqa Province

Islamic State

Caliphate on the Program of the Prophets/Prophethood

Diwan al-Ta'aleem: Wilayat al-Raqqa

Announcement

The Diwan al-Ta'aleem in Wilayat al-Raqqa announces a Shari'a session for all directors and teachers of the schools, male and female. That will take place on Saturday, 5 Dhu al-Qa'ada 1435 AH corresponding to 30 August 2014. Duration of the session: one week. Place of the session: for males, auditorium of the College of Education and Literature, at 4

p.m. For females: in the A'isha Mother of the Believers- may God be pleased with her- Institute (previously the Cultural Centre) at 9 a.m.

Note: No male or female teacher inside or outside the proprietors will be allowed to teach in the schools of the province except after being subjected to the session. Otherwise, there will be inquiry according to Shari'a.

Specimen M: On Movement of Women and the Garages: Raqqa Province

Islamic State

Diwan al-Hisbah

Wilayat al-Raqqa

Statement for distribution on the matter of Travelling Women and the Garages [area of Raqqa]

[...]

Indeed it is from the door of cooperation on the basis of piety and awareness of God and by which God has ordered us to safeguard the safety of the religion of the women and cultivate their religious and worldly interests, and it is for the abundance of inquiries about some of the reprehensible acts and manner of dealing with them especially on the issue of women travelling without a mahrim [close male relativ], and after the holding of a meeting by the supervisor of Hisbah in the centre for the city with the amir of Hisbah in Wilayat al-Raqqa and with the Shari'a supervisor and by the agreement of the amir of the city, especially on some of the reprehensible acts on the issue of women travelling without a mahrim, we publicize the following:

- Women may not leave the province without a mahrim unless they have a transit document from Hisbah and an ID photo with seal of approval from the Hisbah office in Karajat.
- It is absolutely forbidden for women to travel to the land of kufr [disbelief]- except for serious medical conditions and by decision of the general hospital with seal of approval from the amir of the hospital.
- Women aged 50 and above are allowed to travel to the lands of the Islamic State without a mahrim.

- Women younger than 50 are allowed to travel to the lands of the Islamic State with a mahrim.
- Elderly women are not pressured on the issue of the hijab.
- If the travelling woman has her son with her, of competent, distinguished mind, he can be considered a mahrim for her.
- Every Muslim who does not have ID proof must go to the centres of the Islamic police to be given the document of ID proof.
- To all checkpoints and offices of the garages, the populace of the Muslims are not to be allowed to pass except after bringing forth the document of personal ID proof from the centres of the Islamic police for those who don't have family IDs/cards or something to prove their identities.
- Buses- coaches- must not allow passengers to get on or off outside the garage for whatever reason.

Anyone who contravenes these instructions from coaches, offices and passengers will subject himself to the necessary consequence and inquiry.

Hisbah supervisor in Raqqa city.

Abu Talha the Kuwaiti.

Islamic State

Hisbah Admin

Raqqa Centre.

Specimen N: Obligation of Fasting in Ramadan: Raqqa Province (Indirect testimony: June 2014)

The Diwan al-Hisbah affiliated with the organization of the Islamic State has distributed a statement under the title- 'Consequence of Abandoning the Prayer' [sic: confusion: 'fasting' is meant]- in which it cited verses from the Noble Qur'an making clear the obligation of fasting in this month. It also cited prophetic hadiths the threat of God for abandoning the fast in Ramadan, as well as citing the words of the Ahl al-'Ilm in classifying abandoning the fast as one of the great sins. The statement also asked whoever cannot fast in this month for legitimate reason according to Shari'a to inform the Diwan

al-Hisbah and prove it before the people, and whoever does not fulfill the conditions is to face the punishments of the law on the subject of lack of fasting during this month.

Specimen O: IS Birth Certificate (Aleppo Province): January 2015

Islamic State

Diwan al-Siha [Health Department]

Wilayat Halab

Birth Certificate

Name of child:

Father's name:

Mother's name:

Place and date of birth:

Date of granting [of birth certificate]:

Weight:

Height:

Medical official in Wilayat Halab

Wilayat Halab

Medical official in al-Bab and its countryside

Specimen P: Affirmation of faith (al-Bab: Aleppo Province): May 2014



Diwan Khidamat al-Muslimeen in al-Bab, Aleppo province.

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham [preceding Caliphate announcement]

Wilayat Halab: al-Bab Area

Diwan Khidamat al-Muslimeen *Diwan al-Awqaf

Disavowal

God- Almighty and Exalted is He- has said: "An example of merit has been for you in Ibrahim and those with him when they said to their people: 'We disavow you and what you worship besides God, we have declare you to be disbelievers and thus have enmity and hatred begun between us and you forever until you believe in God alone.'"

And the one upon whom be prayers and peace has said: "Whoever has said there is no deity but God and has declared to be disbelief what is worshipped besides God has entrusted his property, blood and reckoning to God" - narrated by [Sahih] Muslim.

[...]

I affirm and so with all power of my mind and definitive belief without any pressure or compulsion:

1. I disavow to God every religion that contravenes the religion of Islam
2. I disavow to God every guidance that contravenes the guidance of the Prophet- may prayers and peace be upon him.
3. I declare to be disbelief every idolatrous tyrant that worships beside God and at the

head of these idolatrous tyrants Bashar 'al-Assad' and those like him from the idolatrous tyrants of the Arabs and non-Arabs as well as their soldiers and those who are loyal to them.

4. I disavow to God the Sufis and their beliefs as well as their imams, at the head of whom are Ibn Araby, al-Sha'arani and al-Nabahani.
5. I affirm that I embrace what has been ascribed to the Prophet (PBUH) with the understanding of the Companions- may God be pleased with them.
6. I affirm that the uprightness of this religion in 'a Book [Qur'an] guides and a sword gives victory.'
7. I affirm embrace of the clear guidance of the Prophet from the obligation of the beard and not letting the clothes drop [below the ankles].
8. I affirm that I bear the result of any contravention of the above from the consequences according to Shari'a.

And God is witness to what I say.

I the affirmer:

First witness:

Second witness:

Official for the Diwan al-Awqaf

Specimen Q: Day of Ashura and Month of Muharram Pamphlet: Aleppo Province

Islamic State

Diwan al-Awqaf wa al-Masajid

Wilayat Halab Division

The Day of Ashura:

The day on which God rescued Musa- peace be upon him- from Pharaoh and his soldiers, so Musa fasted in thanks to God Almighty. And so the Messenger of God (PBUH) also fasted in thanks to God Almighty.

The Prophet (PBUH) said: "As for fasting on the day of Ashura, I hope that God will accept it as an expiation for sins committed in the preceding year." - narrated by [Sahih] Muslim.

Fasting on the ninth day along with the day of Ashura is deemed desirable in opposition to the Jews [who only fast on Ashura- 10 Muharram- because that is Yom Kippur]: On the authority of Ibn Abbas- may God be pleased with them both: the Messenger of God said: "Indeed should I remain capable, I should fast on the ninth" [...]

Extending the fast in the month of Muharram is deemed desirable: On the authority of Abu Huraira- may God be pleased with him: The Messenger of God said: "The most preferable fast after Ramadan is the month of God: Muharram. And the most preferable prayer after the obligatory ones is the night prayer." Narrated by [Sahih] Muslim.

[Specimen R: Call for Submission of Complaints: Aleppo Province \(December 2014\)](#)

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
ولاية حلب

وَأَنْ أَحْسِبَهُمْ رَبَّنَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ
الدَّوْلَةَ الْإِسْلَامِيَّةَ

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

دعوة عامة لرعية الدولة الإسلامية

شأن رفع المظالم لديوان القضاة والمظالم لئلا من تعرض لظلم أو تعد عليه في نفسه أو ماله من قبل
خطوط الدولة الإسلامية وأمراتها على السواء.

العمد به القائل: (لقد أرسلنا رسلنا بالبينات وأنزلنا معهم الكتاب والميزان ليقوم الناس بالقسط)
والصلاة والسلام على الدال: ﴿انصروا الله ظالماً أو مظلوماً﴾. قال: يا رسول الله، نصرته مظلوماً.
فكيف نصرت ظالماً؟ قال: "تنتفع من الظلم، فذلك نصرت إياه". أخرجه البخاري في المظالم ١٩٨٥، ومسلم
في المبر والسنن برقم (٢٥٨١)

أما بعد: فليأمنوا بواجب نصرة المظلوم ورد العتوق إلى أهلها وعملوا على متابعة وملاحقة التجاوزات
الصادرة عن أمراء وحكومات الدولة الإسلامية ومخالفاتها والانتصار للمستضعفين من المسلمين فمن
لظلمهم أي ظلم أو تعد أو أذى على يد أحد من أمرائنا أو حكامنا فإننا نحسد دعوتنا لكافة رعية الدولة
الإسلامية من المسلمين وأهل الذمة على السواء بشوحيه إلى المحاكم الإسلامية التابعة لديوان القضاء
والمظالم برفقهم برفع تلك المظالم لاسترداد حقوقهم والانتصاف لهم ممن ظلمهم كائن من كان ونشهد الله
وسائر المسلمين أننا لا نرضى به ولا نسكت عليه، واحسب أهلنا وعملنا على رد الحق إلى أهلنا ونصرتهم
ما استطعنا إذا بلغنا ذلك.

هذا ونوصي إخواننا من الجنود والأسرى بالقوى الشرعية والعدل والاعتدال من الظلم والتعدي على أحد
من الرعية ولغوهم من عواقب تلك في الدنيا والآخرة، والتقوا دعوة المظلوم فإنها لمن بينها وبين الله
حجاب.

(والله في عون العبد ما دام العبد في عون أخيه)
والنفع لله رب العالمين

الوالي
عبد الرحمن بن محمد
١٤٣١ هـ
٢٠١٠ م

**Islamic State
Wilayat Halab**

General/Public Call for the Citizens of the Islamic State

On the matter of raising misdeeds with the Diwan al-Qada wa al-Mazalim for all who have been exposed to wrong-doing or infringement on himself or his property whether by the soldiers of the Islamic State or its amirs.

Thanks be to God who says: "We have sent our Messengers with clear affirmations and We have sent down with them the book and the balance so that the people may establish fairness."


And prayers and peace be upon the one who says: "Support your brother: oppressor or oppressed. It was said: 'Oh Messenger of God, I have supported him when he is oppressed, but how can I support him as oppressor?' He said: 'You stop him from oppression, so that is your support for him.'" Bukhari put it out in al-Mazalim 198/5 and Muslim in Piety and Connection no. 2584.

As for what follows: Undertaking the obligation to support the oppressed and restore rights to its people, and in our effort to track and catch infringements on the part of the amirs and soldiers of the Islamic State, as well as the necessity of the accountability of its people, and victory for the oppressed of the Muslims: so if anyone catches one of our soldiers or amirs engaging in wrong-doing, infringement or offense at hand, we renew our call to all the citizens of the Islamic State- whether from the Muslims and the Ahl al-Dhimma [dhimmis: Jews/Christians]- to head to the Islamic courts affiliated with the Diwan al-Qada wa al-Mazalim, and ask them to raise the issue of those misdeeds to seek the restoration of their rights and demand justice from whosoever has wronged them- whoever he may be. And we bear witness to God and the rest of the Muslims that we will not be content with him or keep silent about him. And we will hold the people in this matter to account and we will work to restore right to its people and support them as we can, when that matter has reached us.

In this context we also advise our brothers from the soldiers and amirs of the Islamic State to be aware of God in private and public, and beware of oppression and aggression against any of the citizens, and we warn them of the consequences of that in this world and the Hereafter. So be aware of the call of the oppressed, for there is no veil between it and God.

[...]

Wali [governor] of Wilayat Halab

Specimen S: Ultimatum for the Christians of Mosul

Islamic State**Diwan al-Qaḍa****19 Ramadan 1435 AH****17 July 2014**

[...]

God Almighty says: "And when a community of them said: 'Why do you warn a people whom God is going to destroy or punish severely?' They said: 'To be absolved before your Lord and perhaps they will beware of Him.'" - Qur'an 7:164.

After informing the heads of the Christians and their followers of the appointment for a meeting to affirm their status in the shadow of the state of the Caliphate in Wilayat Ninawa, they avoided it and failed to attend on the intended appointment...and it had been decided that we offer them one of these three choices:

1. Islam
2. Dhimmi pact (and it is taking the jizya from them)- [cf. Qur'an 9:29]
3. If they refuse that, only the sword for them.

But The Commander of the Believers- Caliph Ibrahim- may God make him mighty- has given them the blessing of allowing them to get themselves out of the borders of the state of the Caliphate at the latest by Saturday 21 Ramadan 1435 AH at noon. After this, there is only the sword between us and them.

[...]

Diwan al-Qaḍa**Wilayat Ninawa**

Specimen T: Islamic State-Issued Exam Timetable for Pharmacology College, Mosul University (2014)



**Islamic State
Caliphate on the Program of the Prophets/Prophethood
Diwan al-Ta'aleem**

[...]

After resumption of regular time in the Diwan al-Ta'aleem: Mosul University and the technical, engineering and agricultural institutes and colleges, it has been decided to set the supplementary exams for the first setting beginning from Saturday in Muharram 1436 AH corresponding to 1 November 2014, and as is made clear from the accompanying timetable, it is thus obligatory on all the educational, administrative and technical proprietors to embrace the regular time from 24 Dhu al-Hijja 1435 AH- 18 October 2014- and this statement for distribution is considered binding and the one who contravenes it will be held accountable.

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

NB: See [this](#) for explanation of 'supplementary exams'.

Specimen V: Barring of Entry into Schools Except by Permission: Ninawa Province (December 2014)

#من المومل : تعميم من #ديوان التعليم في #ولاية نينوى
 بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
 : الحمد لله والصلاة والسلام على رسول الله ... وبعد
 نقرر عدم السماح لأي شخص بالدخول الى المدارس بمسفة
 المحاسبة الا بكتاب من ديوان التعليم ، ويستثنى من ذلك
 . #ديوان الحصة ، وسوف تتم محاسبة المخالف
 . والله من وراء القصد .
 مركز ولاية نينوى
 لمير ديوان التعليم
 ولاية نينوى المركز
 صفر 1436 16

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

Wilayat Ninawa

Statement for Distribution

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful.

Thanks be to God and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God...and what follows:

It has been decided not to allow any person to enter the schools at risk of being held accountable except by written permission from the Diwan al-Ta'aleem. But the Diwan al-Hisbah is exempt from this regulation. The one who violates will be held accountable. And God is the one behind the intent.

Wilayat Ninawa Centre
Amir Diwan al-Ta'aleem
16 Safr 1436 AH

[Specimen W: General Notification: Opening of Factory for Synthetic Body Parts](#)



Islamic State

Caliphate on the Program of the Prophets/Prophethood

General Supervisory Committee

16 October 2014

**To all the Diwans and Wilayats.
Statement for distribution.**

[...]

We would like to inform you of the opening of a factory to make synthetic body parts in Wilayat Ninawa. So we ask the brothers who need a synthetic body part to go and register with the Diwan al-Siha in order for them to send for the desired part by writing to the factory.

May God reward you best.

Notice: please do not send any ill person to Turkey for the making of a part.

**Islamic State
General Supervisory Committee
Abu Muslim**

[Specimen X: General Notification: Ban on GPS and Apple devices](#)

**Islamic State
General [Supervisory] Committee
No. 17
21/2/1436 AH [c. 14 December 2014]**

[...]

Statement for distribution

To all the wilayats, diwans, committees and central joints in the Islamic State:

In accordance with the demands of the public interest and to protect the souls of the soldiers of the Islamic State and their possessions in the shadow of the fierce Crusader campaign against the state of the Caliphate, and in order to shut one of the doors of penetration the enemy uses to attain its goals and strike with exactness by means of its war and remote-guided aircraft, it has been decided to forbid the use of any electronic device or a system that has access to service to enable precise location of positions (GPS).

Technician brothers have been appointed in every wilaya to block this service and remove it from mobiles and tablet computers completely, so we ask the soldiers of the Islamic

State to take the initiative to remove it from their devices with a deadline of one month from the publication of this statement for distribution in the provinces, and after that any electronic device with access to GPS will be confiscated, and the owner will be questioned as to his lack of obeying order and exposing his brothers to veritable danger.

Let it be known that this statement for distribution does not include connection devices that are products of the Apple network, since the use of devices of this network- from phones and tablet computers- will be completely banned on account of the risks they create.

General Supervisory Committee

Specimen Y: Educational Regulations for Deir az-Zor Province (late January 2015)

Wilayat al-Kheir

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful:

Thanks be to God, the Lord of the Worlds, and prayers and peace upon the Lord of those who were sent [Muhammad]. As for what follows:

The Almighty has said: "Say: Are those who know and those who don't know equal?"

For knowledge [Ilm] is the only path to know Truth from Falsehood, for knowledge is what encourages the communities and guides them to the centres.

The Islamic State in Wilayat al-Kheir [Deir az-Zor province] has decided to open the schools and introduce new educational programs for them to contribute to the lifting of ignorance from our sons. We will eradicate the illiteracy that has spread among them and the Islamic State has organized the operation to be comprehensive and devoid of gaps, thus:

- Students from first to ninth grade [ergo, up to age 15/16: same as prior school leaving age] must go to the schools according to the regular hours, class period and their organization according to the timetable.
- Uniform is not compulsory for students but it suffices that the clothing meet Islamic modesty standards and be clean.

- No introduction or teaching of any regime book is allowed except in special [private] institutes and schools.
- Students are not to stand to line on the entry of the teacher and no prior slogans are to be repeated [i.e. from the era of the Syrian Arab Republic].
- All days of the week are regular hours for school except Friday and the use of the bell in the school is absolutely forbidden.
- The duration of one lesson is 45 minutes. After every two lessons is a 15-minute break. The number of lessons is 4 per day.
- The regular schedule of the first group [primary school] is [begins at] 8'o'clock and for the second [secondary school] 12'o'clock according to Islamic State time.
- Prayer is to be observed at its time, the call is to be raised for it, a place is to be designated for prayer, and students who wish to pray in the mosque and undertake the remaining duties can do so.
- Noon prayer is established after the end of the first lesson so the regular schedule is thus:

12:00-12:45 p.m.: Lesson

12:45-1:00 p.m.: Noon prayer

1:00-1:45 p.m.: Lesson

1:45-2:00 p.m.: Break

2:00-3:30 p.m.: Two lessons together.

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Kheir

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

[Specimen Z: Call for Repentance of Teachers \(Ninawa Province: December 2014\)](#)

Islamic State

Caliphate on the Program of the Prophets/Prophethood

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

28 Safr 1436 AH

Statement for distribution: No. 09

[...]

Indeed the educational system is considered among the most important centres that states establish and cultivate, and through this system is made clear the ideology/creed of the state, its program, its consideration of the situation, as well as the nature of its relations with internal society and its classes, and external society in its varying directions and cultures.

And Satan has not found a greater entrance than the entrance of ignorance and arbitrary whim, and this has been among the most important causes of misdeeds and rebellion.

For knowledge has been a condition of tawheed...and among the qualities of the Prophet (PBUH) that the Qur'an mentioned about him was the quality of teaching this Ummah, as the Almighty said in describing him: "Who may teach them the Book and Wisdom and to purify them" [Qur'an 2:129]. And the One whose affairs are exalted said: "Who may teach you the Book and Wisdom."

And Islam has warned about the influence of those who take charge of education for themselves because they are the ones responsible for tampering with the inborn-nature of tawheed that God has endowed as related in a hadith of the Prophet [PBUH]: "Every child is born with true faith. It is the parents who make him Jewish, Christian or Magian."- Bukhari 1358.

After God Almighty enabled the Islamic State and it announced the Caliphate, it has directed attention towards the programs of the ministries of education affiliated with the kafir and apostate governments that have been reckoned to be programs attempting to separate religion from state, so the current educational system has been found to be...a decadent program establishing the call to kufr [disbelief] and establishing the principles of secularism, nationalism and Ba'athism in its various forms- something that calls for disavowal of it and the realization of the call for repentance from those working in it on the legal level.

Thus the Diwan al-Ta'aleem has decided to adopt the following measures:

1. Putting a stop to the current educational committee for now:

a) Ceasing the preparation of the new educational programs bound by the restrictions of our Hanif law.

b) Stopping the work of all prior teachers until the fulfillment of the call for their repentance.

2. None of the old educational programs are to be taught in the areas of the state of the Caliphate, whether public or private schools or lessons.

3. Citizens of the Islamic State are not allowed to attend schools outside its borders and which establish principles of disbelief.

4. Whoever wishes to work in the educational foundations: after his repentance, and definition of his stance before the special Shari'a committee, must record his affirmations in the education centres, so as to undertake developmental and qualifying Shari'a sessions. After that the educational qualifications of each according to his speciality will be completed.

5. The one who contravenes this statement for distribution will be subject to judicial inquiry with the coming down of deterrent consequences according to Shari'a for him.

Note: The authority of this statement is the result of an investigation prepared by the al-Eftaa and Buhuth Committee [NB: the same that issued rulings justifying the treatment of Yezidis, burning the Jordanian pilot etc.] under the title: "Clarification Message on the Statement of Judgment on the Education System in the Nusayri government."

And God is predominant over His affair but most people don't know it.

Islamic State

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

Dhu al-Qarnain

NB: Some sources (e.g. Noman Benotman) have claimed this is a statement specifically for IS' foothold [supposed 'emirate'] in Derna, Libya, but that notion is inaccurate. The signature of 'Dhu al-Qarnain' here is to be linked with a report by [Iraq's Sumaria News](#) (put out around the same time as this statement emerged), which cites a "local source in Ninawa province" on the suspension of regular classes in Ninawa province's schools by Dhu al-Qarnain- the official in charge of the Diwan al-Ta'aleem- on the grounds educational programs were contravening IS ideals, despite curriculum regulations that had been issued months before. Besides a call for repentance from

teachers and subjecting them to training sessions, plans were also reportedly made to print new books and introduce new programs, and only then would regular class times be resumed. Dhu al-Qarnain is said to be of Egyptian nationality with a German passport, having been part of IS' original predecessor, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's Jamaat al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad.

Dhu al-Qarnain earlier emerged in a [report by Sumaria News in October](#) of that year (with a photo of his distinct signature), barring students in areas of Iraq's provinces under IS control in Ninawa, Salah ad-Din, Kirkuk (i.e. mostly south-west of the province) and Anbar from going to Kirkuk city or the Kurdistan region to complete special baccalaureate exams at the preparatory sixth [i.e. age 17/18] and secondary third [i.e. age 14] levels, issuing the orders from his base in Ninawa province.

Specimen 1A: Call for Recruitment: Euphrates Province (February 2015)

Islamic State

Caliphate on the Program of the Prophets/Prophethood

Wilayat al-Furat

Military/Training Camps' Administration

The Almighty has said: "Go forth, whether light or heavy, and strive with your wealth and souls in the cause of God. That is better for you, if you truly know" - [Qur'an 9:41].

The Messenger of God said: "And when you are called on to fight, go forth" - narrated by Bukhari.

In obedience of the command of God Almighty, and thus the command of the Noble Messenger, the Islamic State calls on the youth of Islam in Wilayat al-Furat to fight and calls on them to join the convoy of their mujahideen brothers in obedience to God and in support of His religion, so oh you who love what is best and desire jihad, get up, hasten and prepare the forearm of earnestness, perhaps you will be a just brick in the building of this blessed structure.

NB: '[Euphrates Province](#)' is one of the new IS provinces that encompasses both sides of the Syria-Iraq border along the Euphrates, including al-Qa'im in Iraq and Albukamal in Syria.

Specimen 1B: Invitation to Repentance: Euphrates Province (January 2015)

Islamic State**Wilayat al-Furat****17 Rabi' al-Awal 1436 AH****8 January 2015 In the name of God.**

Thanks be to God, and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God, his family, and all his companions. As for what follows:

Working on the basis of the instructions of the Amir al-Mu'mineen [Commander of the Believers: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi] whom God has granted success and whose line He has directed, the door of repentance is opened to the factions that have fought the Islamic State, and thus included with them are their families. And so the opening of the door of repentance is announced in the town of Albukamal for the following factions:

1. Factions of the Free Army
2. The so-called Islamic Front
3. The Jowlani Front [Jabhat al-Nusra]
4. Soldiers of the Nusayri regime (from the Ahl al-Sunna)

And repentance is embraced on the following conditions:

1. The person acknowledges his apostasy
2. Submitting to a Shari'a session
3. Heading to the military/training camps and from there to the fighting fronts
4. Presentation of all information he has
5. Handing over all arms he has

So whoever wants to repent according to the aforementioned conditions will have protection from us: what is for us will be for him and what is upon us will be upon him. Let it be known that this chance for repentance includes whoever was fighting and whoever was sitting and whoever did not repent with the Islamic State but absolutely does not include the leaders of the factions

Specimen 1C: List of hudud punishments (Aleppo Province)**Islamic State****Wilayat Halab****Statement of hudud**

[...]

The Lord- Almighty and Exalted is He- has said: "For no, by your Lord, they will not believe until you judge the dispute between them and they find in themselves no discomfort from what you have judged and willingly submit." [Qur'an 4:65].

The Exalted has also said: "Whoever does not judge by what God has sent down, they are the disbelievers." [Qur'an 5:44]

The Exalted has also said: "So is it the ruling of the age of ignorance [before Islam] they desire? And who is better than God in judgement for a people certain in faith?" [Qur'an 5:50]

The Exalted has also said: "That is the judgment of God between you: and God is all-knowing, all-wise" [Qur'an 60:10, though slight misquotation here as the words **يُحْكَمُ بِذِكْمِ** are missing before 'and God is all-knowing...'].

Oh Muslims, indeed the one who ponders these verses will find in them great meaning far removed from much of the minds of the people in this time and among these meanings are:

- Denial of faith of those who do not submit to Islamic Shari'a judgement.
- The necessity of being led by and submitting to Shari'a rulings without discomfort in the soul.
- The one who does not judge by what God has sent down is a kafir [disbeliever] and God forbid, even if he fasts, prays and asserts he is Muslim.
- There exists no better ruling than the ruling of God and all other rulings are ones of ignorance.
- When God- Almighty and Exalted is He- has judged between His servants, He has ruled between them and He is all-knowing, all-wise and there is no one more knowing or wiser than He- the Exalted.

Therefore, the Islamic State, believing in God- Almighty and Exalted is He- who has sent down the Book, and regarding as kufr [disbelief] the nations united to wage war on the Lord of the Lords, and regarding as kufr [disbelief] the judgements/rulings put in place by those created from the soil, pledges to God- Almighty and Exalted is He- to rule by His Shari'a in His land among His servants even if the disbelievers hate it. Thus we would like

to make clear to the people the hudud of God- Almighty and Exalted is He- as a warning and deterrent.

Blasphemy against God: Almighty and Exalted is He	Death
Blasphemy against the Messenger [PBUH]	Death even if he repents
Blasphemy against the religion	Death
Adultery	1. Stoning to death for the chaste [muhsan] 2. 100 lashes & banishment for a year for the unchaste
Homosexuality	Death for the penetrator and receiver
Theft	Cutting off the hand
Drinking wine [alcohol]	80 lashes
Calumny	80 lashes
Spying for the interests of the disbelievers	Death
Apostasy from Islam	Death
Highway criminality	1. Killing and taking wealth: death and crucifixion 2. Killing: death 3. Taking wealth:

	<p>Cut off the right hand and left foot</p> <p>4. Terrorizing the people: banishment from the land</p>
--	------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

And indeed we make the people fear their Lord and call them to enter into His mercy by embracing His commands and adhering to His prohibition orders for that is the best outcome in that and there is nothing better in the one judged if he does not submit to the law of the Lord and there is nothing better for the one who judges if he does not judge/rule his servants by the ruling of God. And indeed the Islamic State will not compromise on this great attainment for whose sake it has offered hundreds of martyrs from its pious and pure sons, but rather it has established the law of God among its soldiers, and it has brought judgements even of death without exception among them.

And God is predominant in His affair but most people don't know it [Qur'an 12:21].

Specimen 1D: Introduction of death penalty for blasphemy [Jarabulus area: September 2013]

**In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Wilayat Halab: Jarabulus Area**

Important Warning

Thanks be to God and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God as well as his family and companions.

God has said: "Those who abuse God and His Messenger, God has cursed them in this world [dunya] and the Hereafter [akhira] and has prepared for them a painful torment" - Surat al-Ahzab, 57 [Qur'an 33:57].

Then He has mentioned regarding the munafiqeen [hypocrites etc.]: "Accursed wherever they are found, seized and massacred completely" [Qur'an 33:61].

The Sheikh of Islam [Ibn Taymiyya] [has said](#): "This must include seizure and massacre among the effects of the curse that they promised."

The Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham announces the application of the Shari'a punishment that is:

DEATH

For:

1. Whoever blasphemes against God- blessed and Almighty is He- belittles His exaltedness or says something of Him not befitting Him.
2. Whoever blasphemes the Prophet- prayers and peace be upon him- belittles his place or says something of him not befitting him.

This is so and the punishment will be implemented on the one proven guilty of that by judicial means in the Square of the Martyr (as reckon him) Abu al-Sa'ad al-Maghrebi at the Cultural Centre.

[...]

NB: This statement comes from the pre-Caliphate era at a time when ISIS was aiming to expand in Syria without wider infighting with rebels and only controlled a few northern border towns as strongholds, being only one of many groups in the vast majority of places where it had a presence. For this reason, the degree and speed of implementation of Shari'a was slower back then. Indeed, Jarabulus had been controlled as an 'emirate' by ISIS (an important designation as a predecessor to the Caliphate) for around 3 months before this statement introducing death penalty for blasphemy emerged. Compare with the ISIS 'emirate' of Azaz, where smoking was [only rebuked by word](#), whereas it is punished now in Islamic State territories by flogging.

Abu al-Sa'ad al-Maghrebi was an ISIS fighter whose death was first announced [in late July 2013](#). He reportedly died fighting for the 'cleansing' of Jarabulus from ISIS opponents, which either refers to the local Family of Jadir that was [subjugated in June of that year](#), or the vanquishing of the small Kurdish PYD presence in the town in late July (previously tolerated by ISIS and it exercised no governing authority) after wider infighting broke out between ISIS and the PYD in that month following the expulsion of ISIS from Ras al-Ayn town.

[Specimen 1E: Diwan al-Amn al-Aam \[Public Security Department\]: Reward for Killing/Wounding Jordanian Pilots](#)

Islamic State

Diwan al-Amn al-Aam

The Almighty has said: "Fight them: God will torment them at your hands, cut them down, give you victory over them and heal the chests of the believing people, and the fury in their hearts will vanish. God forgives whom He wishes to forgive. And God is All-Knowing, All-Wise" - Qur'an 9:14-5.

[...]

By the agreement of the Majlis Shura [consultation council] of the Islamic State, a financial reward has been set for all who kill a Jordanian pilot or wound him such as to prevent him from flying or working within the Crusader alliance that targets the Muslims in the Islamic State. And the Diwan has set the reward at 100 gold dinars that the one who deserves the sum can receive it in currency of the Islamic State or any other currency of his choice that suits him. And the Islamic State will be obligated to send the sum to the place that he chooses by God's permission after verification of his deserving to be payed by any means of verification possible.

And in what follows is a list of the names of the Jordanian pilots, their ranks and their titles as well as the information whose extraction is facilitated after completion of verification with the captive pilot of the Islamic State (Muadh Safi al-Kassasbeh), and it does not escape us...that we seek to give support to our Muslim brothers in Jordan of al-Sham and urge them to target these criminals who have engaged in spilling the blood of the Muslims by any means possible or publish any information that will facilitate our reaching them. The Almighty has said: "Oh you who believe, fight those of the kuffar [disbelievers], and may they find in you harshness. And know God is with the righteous." - Qur'an 9:123.

NB: This statement confirms that IS regards Jordan as part of al-Sham which was in its geographic coincidence as ISIS.

Specimen 1F: Diwan al-Hisbah (Derna: Cyrenaica Province, Libya) on women's clothing (October 2014)

Islamic State

Wilayat Barqa: Derna

Thanks be to God and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God, his family, companions and whoever is close to him. As for what follows:

Imam Muslim narrated on the authority of Abu al-Hayaj al-Asadi- may God be pleased with him: he said: "Ali- may God be pleased with him- said to me: 'Do I not induce you to what the Messenger of God [PBUH] induced me? Do not allow a statue to stand unless you have obliterated it or a grave raised unless you have levelled it.'"

My brother in God:

This is an order from the Prophet (PBUH) to demolish statues- and this order is to prevent the step towards idolatry- for thus in the statues is resemblance to God's creation.

And there is another order of warning:

It is regarding the display of revealing women's clothes, and it is one of the things by which many people have been enticed...we offer this [warning] as sincere and affectionate advice for you, for the believers are sincere [?], while the munafiqeen [hypocrites/lukewarm] are swindlers.

Your brothers the men of al-Hisbah for virtue and vice

Diwan al-Hisbah

[Specimen 1G: Warning against certain customs on Eid al-Adha: Hasakah Province \(October 2014\)](#)

Islamic State

Diwan al-Hisbah

Wilayat al-Baraka

Centre: al-Shaddadi

Statement number: 5

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Known condemned practices and innovations on Eid al-Adha

Thanks be to God, the Lord of the Worlds, and may God bless our Prophet Muhammad and all his family and companions. As for what follows:

Muslim brother: we congratulate you on the beginning of the arrival of the blessed Eid al-Adha, and we ask you to accept this message from us in which we have put together some of the innovations and condemned practices that take place during the day of Eid: and we ask God for this to be useful to you and all the Muslims.

1. People visiting the tombs during the day of Eid: this contravenes the guidance of the Prophet (PBUH) who forbade 'taking up tombs on festivals' [lit. meaning, most broadly encompasses any act of worship etc. at tombs], and visiting them in fixed times and festivals is among the meanings of 'taking up tombs on festivals.' Making this day one of sadness contravenes the truth of the festival that must be an occasion of joy and happiness just as the law has ordered, **and thus we warn the people not to commit this condemned act and all who contravene this order will be held accountable [emphasis in original]**

2. People killing the sacrificial victim for their dead, thus when someone says: "Oh God, I have sacrificed for so-and-so," this is condemned by the consensus of the four imams. Thus Imam Shafi'i- may God have mercy on him- said: "One's sacrifice does not benefit a dead person," but rather the Sunna is: "Oh God, I have sacrificed for myself and my family."

3. Some believe in the legitimacy of celebrating the night of Eid, but there is no prescription in marking out the night of Eid from the rest of the days for special customs.

4. Selling some of the parts of the sacrificial victim: whether its skin, foot, or head, or giving a part of it as a fee for the butcher. All of this is legally forbidden.

5. Killing the sacrificial victim before Eid prayer: the Prophet (PBUH) said: "Whoever commits the slaughter before the Eid prayer, he has slaughtered it just for himself, but whoever commits it after the prayer has completed his sacrifice and followed the Sunna of the Muslims"- thus following on that.

6. Mixing of women with men: note the words of the Prophet (PBUH): "A man and woman are not to be left together unless she also has her mahrim with her." In the same way the abundance of women wearing perfume who go out on this day, the Prophet (PBUH) said: "When a woman seeks to apply perfume to herself and thus goes out among the people so they may find in her such and such," of any whore/adulterer. And women shaking hands with men especially what happens among relatives among the sons of the

general populace, the Prophet (PBUH) said: "Whoever touches the palm of a woman and is not from her is on the path of placing on his palm the ember of the Day of Judgment."

May God reward you best.

8 Dhu al-Hijjah. Thursday

Specimen 1H: Notice to truck/lorry drivers (Ninawa Province)



Warning to all lorry/truck drivers not to give a lift to soldiers of the Islamic State, by order of the Islamic State

Specimen 1I: Restrictions on women's clothing, Tel Abyad, Raqqa province (December 2013)

Islamic Court

Statement: 1

1434 AH [sic: 1435]/2013 CE

Beginning from next Saturday- 11 Safr 1435 AH/14 December 2013, there will be a complete ban on unveiling, as well as the wearing of tight trousers and cloaks, and the adorning of oneself and imitation of kafir [disbelieving] women. And any woman who contravenes this statement for distribution will expose herself to the severest consequences.

May God reward you best.

**Virtue and Vice Committee
Islamic Court in Tel Abyad
Leadership of the Court**

The judge [signature]

NB: This statement dates from before the town came under the sole control of the Islamic State (note too this is the pre-Caliphate era) in the following month on account of the infighting with Tel Abyad's other factions (including Ahrar al-Sham battalions) that culminated in their expulsion from the town. ISIS' presence in Tel Abyad dates back to the late spring of 2013 following the defection of the local Jabhat al-Nusra contingent to ISIS on account of Baghdadi's call for merging under ISIS. The concept of the 'virtue and vice committee' is also important to note here as a predecessor to the Diwan al-Hisbah and Diwan al-Qada bodies that developed in areas under the sole control of the Islamic State for the enforcement of Islamic morality. For comparison, when Fallujah first fell out of government control, ISIS was not the sole faction involved, and still having to deal with the fact other groups were in the town, ISIS set up a 'virtue and vice committee' (see specimen 1N).

Specimen 1J: New rent regulations, Hit, Anbar province (early December 2014)

**Islamic State
Diwan al-Qada wa al-Mazalim
Wilayat al-Anbar
Hit district**

To property owners and owners of real estate offices

Thanks be to God the Lord of the Worlds, and prayers and peace be upon the Seal of the Prophets, as well as his family and esteemed, fortunate companions. And for what follows:

The Blessed and Almighty Truth says: "And if someone is in hardship, let there be postponement until ease, but if you give charity, it is better for you, if you knew" [Qur'an 2:280].

On the authority of Abu Huraira: he said: the Messenger of God said: Whoever relieves a believer of one of the worries of the material world [dunya], God will relieve him of one of

the worries of the day of Judgment, and whoever provides ease for one in hardship, God will provide him ease in this world and the Hereafter, and whoever protects a Muslim, God will protect him in this world and the Hereafter, and God in helping His servant is such as His servant has been in helping his brother [narrated in Sahih Muslim].

On this basis we call on all owners of residential and business real estate to show mutual understanding and deference to the circumstances of those renting [tenants] in such a situation as this, and we urge that the rent for residential and business real estate be thus:

Take the rent at a starting point of 100,000 dinars [around \$84 at current exchange] and what has been added to that should be halved. So e.g., if the prior rent is 300,000 dinars, take the starting point sum as 100,000 dinars and so with the remaining sum of that at 200,000 dinars, divide that sum in half and one gets 100,000 dinars. Therefore, add this half to the original sum and the new rent is 200,000 dinars- fair and just among all.

Notice: Accountability begins from the beginning of the upcoming month [month of Safr], and if the one seeking to let out for rent [the owner of the real estate] refuses to apply this special decision on rents, the tenant must go to the Islamic court to take up the necessary decision.

And God is the one behind the intention.

Islamic State

Diwan al-Qada wa al-Mazalim

Wilayat al-Anbar/Judge for Hit court

NB: On a related note, it is worth noting the [following prices](#) from a Hit news page for commodities in IS-controlled Hit [February 2015]. Though units of measurement are not given in the original, comparison with prices elsewhere in Iraq points to the probable unit in each case:

Potato [1kg]: 500-750 dinars

Cucumber [1kg]: 750 dinars

Tomato [1kg]: 500-750 dinars

Lettuce [1 head]: 350-500 dinars

Satsuma [1kg]: 750 dinars

Orange [1kg]: 500 dinars

Sheep meat [1kg]: 7000-8000 dinars

Eggs [dozen]: 3500-4000 dinars

Sack of Flour: 20000-25000 dinars

Dahina [kind of sweet]: 3000 dinars


Gas: 25000 dinars

Petrol (Syrian:1 litre): 1000 dinars.

Shortage of Iraqi petrol.

Canned goods and sweets are said to have decreased in price on account of import from Syria (no specifics given).

Specimen 1K: Daily Coach Journeys in Islamic State Territory [December 2014]



Islamic State

Wilayat al-Raqqah

Connections Administration

(The Garages)

The Connections Administration in Wilayat al-Raqqah announces the starting up of daily journeys to al-Shaddadi [in Hasakah Province]- al-Qa'im [in Anbar province, on border with Syria, part of 'Euphrates Province']- Tel Afar [in Ninawa province, Iraq]- Sinjar- Mosul, as well as daily journeys from Raqqah to the town of al-Bab [Aleppo province]. Place to reserve tickets: Albu Laman garage.

Official for connections.

Specimen 1L: Vaccinations Card for Children, Aleppo Province (September 2014)

المنطقة
المركز الصحي
رقم هاتف المركز:

بطاقة لقاحات الطفل

الرقم:

الاسم والكنية:

اسم الأب: اسم الأم:

تاريخ الولادة:

**Islamic State
Diwan al-Siha
Wilayat Halab**

Area:

Health Centre:

Centre's Phone Number:

Child's Vaccinations Card

Number:

Name and kunya:

Father's name:

Mother's name:

Date of birth:

Specimen 1M: Vaccinations Table for Child (as with Specimen 1L)

Dear mother:

The benefits of God upon His servants are numerous, and the pinnacle of those is the excellence of the sons/children. Observe the appointments for visits and be sure after the birth of the child to give it vaccinations according to the following timetable:

Visit	Child's age	Vaccinations that will be given during the visit
1	From birth	BCG (tuberculosis) and hepatitis
2	Beginning of third month	5-in-1 (tetramune & hepatitis) and poliomyelitis
3	Beginning of fifth month	Tetramune and poliomyelitis
4	Beginning of seventh month	5-in-1 (tetramune & hepatitis) and oral polio vaccine
5	1 year	MMR & oral polio vaccine & Vitamin A [supplement in vaccine]
6	1.5 years	Tetramune & oral polio vaccine & MMR & Vitamin A: supplement
7	1st grade [school: around 7 years old]	DT vaccine & oral polio vaccine & meningitis
8	6th grade	DT vaccine

Tetramune: Diphtheria, pertussis [whooping cough], tetanus, haemophilus influenza type B

MMR: measles, mumps, rubella

NB: This system of vaccinations for children represents virtually no change from that in Assad regime-held areas: cf. [this](#) Syrian government website page on vaccinations.

Specimen 1N: Establishment of Virtue and Vice Committee (Islamic Court) in Fallujah, January 2014

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

Wilayat al-Anbar

Statement no.: 11

14 Rabi al-Awal 1435 AH

15 January 2014

Thanks be to God and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God as well as his family, companions and whosoever is loyal/close to him. As for what follows:

The Almighty has said: "Those We have enabled in the land have established prayer, given zakat and commanded what is right and forbidden what is wrong. And to God belongs the outcome in the matters" [al-Hajj 41: Qur'an 22:41]. And on the authority of Hudaiqa- may God be pleased with him- on the authority of the Prophet [PBUH]: he said: "By the One in whose hand is my soul [God], you must command what is right and forbid what is wrong or God- Almighty and Exalted is He- may well send a torment against you from His power and then you may implore Him but He will not heed you." Al-Tirmidhi narrated this and deemed it reliable. From the aforementioned ayah [verse of the Qur'an] and hadith, the obligation and importance of commanding what is right and forbidding what is wrong are apparent to us.

Therefore we have decided to form a Virtue and Vice Committee that will undertake its role in doing away with conflict and separation among the Muslims, working according to the book of God [Qur'an] and the Sunna of the Prophet (prayers and peace be upon him), guiding them to the best on the program of the Prophets. It will also undertake to receive the complaints of the Muslims to address injustices and support the oppressed. So whoever wants to bring complaints with evidence against anyone even if he is one of the Islamic State members, let him hand in the complaints to the nearest known place for the Islamic State and they should be written down.

For know, oh Muslims, that we only want from this matter to satisfy God- Almighty and Exalted is He- implement the ruling of His Shari'a, and provide salvation for the oppressed believers in the land.

So oh our noble people in Fallujah, we say to you just as the Prophet (prayers and peace be upon him) said to the Ansar: "Blood is blood, and what is sacred is what is sacred , you

are from us and we are from you, we wage war on those you have waged war on, and we are at peace with those you have been at peace with." So we have only come to remove oppression from you, defend your honour and the honour of all the Muslims for this is our program and this is our creed (a book guides and a sword gives victory). And it has sufficed for your Lord as guiding and supporting. God's peace and blessings be upon Muhammad, his family and companions.

Specimen 10: Directions for Prayer on Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha: Fallujah (2014: after IS-takeover of the city: [here](#) and [here](#) for originals)

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Fallujah

Mosques Centre (Markaz al-Masajid)

Prayers of the Two Eids

Thanks be to God the Lord of the Worlds and prayers and peace be upon on His Trusted Prophet and all his family and companions. As for what follows:

Wisdom from the legitimacy of the two Eids: every people has a day in which they adorn themselves and go out from their homes with their adornment. On the authority of Anas ibn Malik: "The people of Jahiliyya [age of ignorance before Islam] used to have two days every year in which they would celebrate with play, but when the Prophet came to Madina, he said: "You used to have two days in which you would celebrate with play, but God has exchanged those two for two things better for you: Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha." Narrated by Ahmad and al-Nisa'i.

Indeed the day of fitr and slaughter are legitimized by God and He chose them for His creation because the two constitute two great pillars of the pillars of Islam- 'fasting and hajj [pilgrimage]'- and in these two God forgives sins and spreads His mercy on His obedient servants. As for the festivals- Nawruz, Flag Day and National Day- and other such occasions, they are by the choice of the rulers of this time and what a difference between the two choices: one in which sins are forgiven and the gates of heaven are opened, the other a choice of error and in which the gates of hellfire are opened, between the joy of the Merciful [God] and the joy of Satan, so consider God has shown you the clear difference.

Ruling of the Prayers of the Two Eids:

The people of 'Ilm [Islamic knowledge] have differed in the ruling of the prayers of the two eids on three expressed views:

1. That it is obligatory on the notables: the school of thought of Abu Hanifa [founder of Hanafi school of jurisprudence], one of two expressed views of the Shafi'i and a narration on the authority of Ahmad followed by Ibn Taymiyya and the expressed opinion of some of the Maliki jurists followed by al-Shukani.

("Innovations, Ibn Abedain, Fairness, Collection of Fatwas, The Dragging Stream")
[These are references for the citations].

2. That it is obligatory on the collective: were some of them to undertake it, it would escape the rest, and this is the opinion of the Hanbali school of jurisprudence and some of the Shafi'i (al-Mughni, Collection).

3. It is an affirmed Sunna and it is not obligatory: of the school of thought of Malik and al-Shafi'i and most of the companions of the two (Jawahir al-Aktheel, Collection).

Its timing: The time of Eid prayers is after the rising of the Sun (i.e. visible to the onlooker/after the passing of the time of loathsomeness) and ends with the disappearance of the Sun and in this regard the collection have spoken (Hanafi, Maliki and Hanbali):-
Ibn Abedein, Beginning of the One Who Engages in Ijtihad, al-Mughni.

The most preferable in al-Adha prayer is that you pray at the first of its time [as soon as possible] so that the Muslims can be free after it to slaughter their victims, but it is preferable for it to be slightly delayed on Eid al-Fitr to allow for the people to bring out zakat al-fitr.

Place to carry it out: on th authority of Abu Sa'id al-Hadari: he said: "The Messenger of God was going out on the day of al-Fitr and al-Adha to the place for prayer, for the first thing he used to do was pray..." Sahih Bukhari. And the Sunna is that you pray in "open country or a wide space" unless there is a legitimate excuse "like rain, or fear of an enemy, or illness" and others besides these so there is no impediment for you to pray in the mosque.

Customs of going out to Eid prayers:

1. It is desirable to wash before going out.
2. Adorning oneself and wearing best clothes.

3. Crying 'Allahu akbar' [takbir] from going out till prayers.
4. Women and youth go out to pray.
5. Contrast the path to the place of prayer.
6. Go to the place of prayer early.

Manner of Takbir

There is no reliable raised hadith from the Prophet on the manner of takbir but ascertainment on the authority of Ibn Mas'ud: that he used to say: "Allahu akbar, Allahu akbar, la illah ill Allah, Allahu akbar, Allahu akbar wa lillah al-hamd." Ibn Abu Shayba brought this out with reliable isnad.

Use [of the takbir]:

- In al-Fitr prayers: from last sunset of Ramadan to the entry of the Imam into the mosque for prayers.
- In al-Adha: one should cry the takbir from the dawn of the day of Arafa until the last day of the days of Tashreeq, and this is the consensus view of the predecessors, jurists and imams: Collection of Fatwas.
- There is no Sunna before or after the prayers: On the authority of Ibn Abbas: "The Prophet prayed on the day of Fitr two rak'ah and did not pray before or after it..." Bukhari, Tirmidhi, Nisa'i and Ibn Maja.
- There is no call to prayer for Eid and no establishment of the call for it: On the authority of Jaber ibn Samurah, he said: "I prayed with the Messenger of God on the two Eids, more than once or twice, without call to prayer or establishment for call to it." - narrated by Muslim, Tirmidhi and Nisa'i.

Manner of prayer for Eid: Eid prayer has two rak'ah, thus by hadith of Omar: he said: "Prayer of Safr is two rak'ah, Friday prayer and Eid two rak'ah, complete without shortening" on the tongue of Muhammad. Ahmad and Ibn Maja [hadith collectors] brought this out.

Prayer is thus:

1. Takbirat l-Ihram like the rest of the prayers [see [here](#) for video demonstration].
2. Then one says the takbir seven other times before recital [of the Qur'an]. There has been no reliable hadith from the Prophet with fixed mention of his silence between the takbirs but Ibn Mas'ud said: "Between every two takbirs [he said:] thanks to God and

praise for Him." Brought out by al-Bayhaqi with sound transmission.

3. It is desirable to recite after the Fatiha (Sura Qaf, by the Glorious Qur'an) in the first Rak'ah, and in the second, "The hour has drawn near and the moon has rent asunder," just as ascertained from the Prophet: brought out by Muslim and Tirmidhi. Or he recites, "Recite the name of Your Lord on High," and "Has there reached you report of the Overwhelming Event?" Narrated by Muslim.
4. Five takbirs in the second rak'ah up to what has come forth in the first rak'ah.
5. Prayer is completed.

This method of prayer for Eid is the expressed opinion of most of the Ahl al-'Ilm in accordance with what was narrated on the authority of A'isha and Abdullah ibn Amro.

Eid sermon after prayer: And the Sunnah is that the imam gives a sermon after prayer standing on the ground, not on the pulpit, just as the Messenger of God and the Rightly-Guided Caliphs from after him did. The sermon is like other sermons but opens with the takbir.

Condemned practices on Eid:

1. Shaving beard.
2. Shaking hands with foreign women [i.e. not your relatives].
3. Following the kuffar in dress and shaving.
4. Gender mixing.
5. Women's adornment.
6. Designating a visit for the tombs on Eid.
7. Spreading use of stringed instruments.
8. Listening to songs.
9. Squandering on something useless.

Specimen 1P: Regulations Imposed by Public Services Committee: Raqqa Province (December 2014)

**System for dealing with violations, issued from the Municipal Office
Islamic State
Wilayat al-Raqqa
Public Services Committee**

1. The sale of combustibles and gas cylinders in populated places is absolutely forbidden.
2. Displays in the public streets and their sidewalks are forbidden.
3. Store owners must embrace store regulations and must not display their goods outside the store.
4. Store owners must embrace cleanliness standards.

The consequences for violating any of the aforementioned clauses (1,2,3,4) will be as follows:

First: Written warning for a period of 4 days [i.e. 4 days to stop violating the clause(s)].

Consequence no. 1: Fine of 10000 Syrian pounds w/ removal of the display, as well as making the owner clean the place.

Consequence no. 2: Fine set by the committee w/ prison sentence and removal of the display. [i.e. if violation continues despite first and consequence no. 1].

5. Small displays and sales wagons in the public streets are forbidden.
6. Displays that impede the movement of traffic and pedestrians are forbidden.
7. Owners of displays that are around/in the vicinity of the mosques must nor raise their voices.
8. Owners of displays and sales wagons must embrace cleanliness standards.

The consequences for violating any of the aforementioned clauses (5,6,7,8) will be as follows:

First: Written warning for a period of 4 days.

Consequence no. 1: Fine of 5000 Syrian pounds w/ removal of the display, as well cleaning the place.

Consequence no. 2: Fine set by the committee and prison sentence.

9. Merchants in the al-Khadra market must leave a distance of 3m for the passage of pedestrians.
10. Merchants in the al-Sham market must leave a distance of 4m for the passage of pedestrians.
11. Merchants in the al-Khadra and al-Sham markets must embrace cleanliness standards.

The consequences for violating any of the aforementioned clauses (9,10,11) will be as follows:

First: Written warning for a period of 4 days.

Consequence no. 1: Fine of 10000 Syrian pounds w/ removal of the display, as well as cleaning the place.

Consequence no. 2: Fine set by the committee w/ prison sentence and removal of the display for anyone who has violated one of the clauses.

12. People must dispose of rubbish from 6 pm to 6 am in the specially designated places and the one who contravenes is to pay a fine of 500 Syrian pounds.

Specimen 10: Friday sermon for Ninawa Province Mosques: February 2015

Islamic State

Caliphate on the Program of the Prophethood/Prophets

Diwan al-Da'wah wa al-Masajid

Wilayat Ninawa Centre

Statement no. 128

20/4/1436

9/2/2015

Unified sermon: rulings of the abode

Sermon of need: with which the Prophet would begin

Indeed the message of the Prophet came for all mankind but he- may my father and mother be sacrificed for him- was sent for two weighty things, calling to God and warning of Satan and his loyalists. And indeed our hanif Shari'a has made clear to us that the dwellings of creation should be in the Hereafter after accounting in the first two abodes: the dwellings of the people of Islam and they constitute the abode of comfort, happiness, security, guarantee, excellence and satisfaction in which there is no concern, affliction, fear, anxiety, but rather it is the abode of eternity, the abode of those who fear/are aware of God, the abode of comfort, the Paradise of the Lord of the Worlds. The Almighty has said: "Those who do good in this world, for them is good. And indeed the abode of the Hereafter is better; and how great is the abode of those who fear/are aware of God"- (al-Nahl 30: Qur'an 16:30).

Second: the dwellings of the people of kufr [disbelief] and they constitute the abode of torment, sadness, fear, loss, concern, affliction and anxiety. Indeed it is the abode of perdition, the abode of sadness and fire, in which there is no security or tranquillity.

Indeed it is the hellfire that has been prepared for the disbelievers. The Almighty has said: "Have you not considered those who exchanged the blessing of God for disbelief and settled their people in the abode of perdition?" - (Ibrahim 28: Qur'an 14:28).

So just as creation's abode in the Hereafter is divided into an abode of peace and an abode of torment- so similarly in this world- just so there are two abodes: the abode of Islam and the abode of disbelief. Every abode has its rulings, in which on combination there are obligations that have been brought by our Hanif law. And we must recognize when the abode will be an abode of Islam and when it will be an abode of disbelief. The Ahl al-'Ilm [people of Islamic knowledge] have said: "The abode depends on what rulings reign supreme in it: if it's the rule of God and His Shari'a, it is the abode of Islam even if its people are predominantly disbelievers. But if the ruling of idolatrous tyranny [taghut], secularism and man-made laws of the moment, it is the abode of kufr, even if its people are predominantly Muslims for there is no mutual attachment between the rule of the abode and the rule of members just as in Mecca before the hijra and Medina after the hijra, Khaybar, Andalus and other places besides those.

The consensus of the Ahl al-'Ilm- among them the four imams- on the fact that the world consists of two abodes: the abode of Islam and the abode of kufr.

The abode of Islam: it is where the rule of God is truly supreme and not merely in superficial form, truth in reality and not mere talk in analogies. Al-Shafi'i (may God have mercy on him): "The abode of Islam is all land in which the rulings of Islam appear and no trace of disbelief has appeared from declaring the Prophet or Book of God to be false, or disdain or atheism/apostasy." And when the enemies of Islam have seen this Caliphate which rules in this good land by the ruling of God alone, look how quickly they marshalled against it from everywhere, striking at it from one bow, from their east and west, Arabs and non-Arabs. All have agreed on waging war on the Islamic State because the Islamic State rules by the Shari'a of God, and because the religion of Islam is a comprehensive religion and program for life, for it is a whole not to be divided and it is not as the Al al-Salul [House of Saud] and others besides them from the lands of apostasy claim when they assert the rule of the Shari'a and believe in a part but declare another part to be disbelief. For they apply what does not conflict with their interests and the interests of America and others besides them from the states of disbelief so they are close to/assist the enemies of God against those close to God for the sake of pleasing the Crusader alliance.

As for the abode of disbelief: where the rule of idolatrous tyranny and not that of God Almighty is supreme. So it is the abode of disbelief even if most of its people and inhabitants are Muslims like the lands in which the idolatrous tyrants rule now, so it is the abode of disbelief and apostasy as the rule of the abode has no link with the rule of the members just as the Ahl al-'Ilm have specified. The abode of disbelief is divided into two divisions: the abode of original disbelief like America, Europe, Greece and other lands besides them from the land of original disbelief. And the abode of incidental disbelief: disbelief of apostasy after Islam like the Arab states now and others besides them from those who claim Islam when they are apostates waging war on the law of God Almighty.

And it is ambiguous for many of the people today that the Arab lands are the abode of Islam and in reality they are the abode of disbelief and apostasy despite the fact that many of their people are Muslims because the rule of idolatrous tyranny is supreme over them and so immigration and travel to them are forbidden. Al-Baghawi (may God have mercy on him) said: "Whoever has become Muslim in the abode of disbelief, he must leave that abode and go out from among them to the abode of Islam." And on this basis the Ahl al-'Ilm have made clear the **obligation** of emigrate from the abode of disbelief to the abode of Islam.

Second sermon: Thanks be to God the Powerful, the Strong, and may God's peace and blessings be upon the one sent by the sword as a mercy to the worlds. As for what follows:

The Almighty and Exalted says: "Indeed, those whom the angels take while they wrong themselves, will say to them: 'In what condition were you in?' They will say: 'We were oppressed in the land.' They will say, 'Was not the earth wide for you to make emigration in it?' For them is the destination of Hell, and it is evil a destination." [Nisa 97: Qur'an 4:97]. The interpreters have agreed on this ayah, stipulating the obligation of emigration from the abode of disbelief to the abode of Islam. Those who excused their emigration because they were oppressed, the angels responded to them that God's Earth is wide and there is no excuse for them to abandon emigration. And today, o servants of God, there is scarcely any land ruled by the Shari'a of God except the land of the Caliphate, on which the Islamic State has spread the authority of God and established in it His Shari'a so what is the sense for people abandoning the abode of Islam and fleeing to the abode of disbelief, atheism, secularism and subordination to the Jews, Christians and Rafidites [Shi'a]. [?] The Messenger of God said: "Whoever joins with the mushrik [polytheist/idolator] and dwells with him, he is like him"- (Sound). The One on whom be Prayers and Peace said: "I disavow every Muslim living among the mushrikeen." They

said: Oh Messenger of God, why? He said: "Their two fires should not appear together" [reliable]. So be sure oh servants of God not to fall into what your Lord has forbidden you from in His book [Qur'an] and on the tongue of His Prophet. The Ahl al-'Ilm have said: "That is, the Muslim does not stay in the place whose fire the mushrik sees when he has lit it but he stays with the Muslims in their abode, because the mushrik has no treaty and guarantee." They have also said: "The Muslim is not characterized by the feature of the mushrik and does not imitate/follow him in his direction or form and does not adopt his manners." And the Prophet has said: "Whoever imitates/follows a people is from among them." (sound).

May God make mighty Islam and the Muslims.

Islamic State

Diwan al-Da'wah wa al-Masajid

Wilayat Ninawa Centre.

Specimen 1R: Friday sermon for Ninawa Province Mosques

Islamic State

Wilayat Ninawa

Diwan al-Da'wah wa al-Masajid

No.: 134

Date: 17 February 2015

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Unified sermon (Faith)

Sermon of need: with which the Prophet would begin

Introduction: The one who observes affairs of life and the matters of the servants [of God] will find groups of people living in various types of trouble and distress, and their chests exhale various types of dissatisfaction and complaints- distress that is stormy in the tranquillity and calm of life. They are missing repose and happiness, and they lack contentment and tranquillity. And why shouldn't it be so since their souls are immersed in their resentment, hatred, misery and egoism? And the observer returns again in his view to see groups of people who have been blessed in the calm of life, noble to their souls, noble to the people, noble to God, good at heart, peaceful at heart, free of concerns. What is the difference between these two groups? What has distinguished the two camps? It is faith and tranquillity of the soul. The Prophet said: "May he who has been content

with God as a Lord, Islam as a religion and Muhammad as a Messenger taste the nourishment of faith" - Sahih Muslim). And similarly the truth-teller to be believed- peace and prayers be upon him- said: "Three conditions will lead to the sweetness of faith: that God and His Messenger should be most beloved to him, above all besides the two; that he should love a person for God's sake alone; that he should hate to return to the disbelief from which God has saved him just as he should hate to be thrown into the fire (muttafiq alayhi- i.e. transmitted by Sahih Bukhari & Sahih Muslim).

So what is faith oh servants of God?

Faith is just as it is known oh servants of God: word and deed that are magnified by obedience to God and diminished by insubordination and sins, and completely taken away by disbelief and apostasy. Al-Bukhari said: "I have recognized 1000 of those who preceded this Ummah saying faith is word and deed."

And mankind will not be unified until their deeds give credibility to their words. The Almighty has said: "Great has become the hatred in God's sight when you say what you do not do" - al-Saff 3 [Qur'an 61:3]. Thus God has equated word with deed, and this is the truth nature of what is called faith among the Ahl al-Sunna, and it is the word of truth/righteousness that we have been ordered to call for and fight for. The Prophet said: "I have been ordered to fight the people until they testify that there is no deity but God, and Muhammad is the Messenger of God, and they establish prayer and give zakat. If they do those things, they have guarantee from me for their blood and property except with respect to Islam. And their reckoning is upon God" - muttafiq alayhi.

So our faith- we of the Ahl al-Sunna- is in the middle between the negligence of the people of irja and the excess of the khawarij. For the people of irja have said: "Nothing conflicts with faith." While the khawarij have declared people to be disbelievers for sins, and this is great falsehood and distortion.

For whoever has testified that there is no deity but God and Muhammad is the Messenger of God, prays in the direction of our qibla [i.e. towards Mecca], and does not fall into principles denied by tawheed, we bear witness of his adherence to Islam outwardly and entrust the issue of conscience to God. And we do not declare him to be a disbeliever unless God and His Messenger declare him to be thus, such as if he mocks the religion of God Almighty or any part of it. To illustrate this, the speech of the Almighty: "Say: Is it God, His verses and His Messenger you were mocking? Make no excuse: you have disbelieved after your belief" - Tawba 65-5: Qur'an 9:65-6]. Just as it happened in the

Tabuk raid, when a man in the council said: "I have not seen the likes of these readers, more covetous on the inside, or more lying in tongues, and more cowardly on encountering them. So a man in the mosque said: "You have lied, but you are a munafiq, thus I should inform the Messenger of God." So that reached the Messenger of God, and he revealed the [verses of the] Qur'an. Abdullah ibn Omar said: "And I saw him clinging to the baggage of the she-camel of the Messenger of God...and saying: "Oh Messenger of God, we were only conversing and playing." And the Messenger of God was saying: "Is it God, His verses and His Messenger you were mocking? Make no excuse: you have disbelieved after your belief." [i.e. this whole story is the 'reason/occasion for revelation' of Qur'an 9:65-6].

And religion has levels as the Prophet clarified in the long hadith of Gabriel (muttafiq alayhi) when he asked him: "Tell me about Islam, tell me about faith, tell me about al-ih-san..."

The second sermon: Thanks be to God, the Powerful, the Firm, and prayers and peace be upon the one sent by the sword as a mercy to the worlds, and on his good family, and may God be pleased with his companions and followers- the [Ibrahimiya salat](#)- and as for what follows:

Oh brothers of faith: Just as we brought forth that faith is word and deed and we stipulated that word must conform with deed. Similarly, faith is magnified by obedience and diminished by rebellion. So whenever mankind increases in obedience to God Almighty, the mercy of their Lord covers them, their faith increases and God Almighty loves them just as the Prophet informed: "[Indeed God Almighty said](#): Whoever shows hostility to a friend of mine, I have declared war on him. My servant does not grow closer to me through anything more beloved to me than the duties I have imposed on him. My servant continues to draw near me with extra works until I love him. When I love him, I am his hearing with which he hears, his seeing with which he sees, his hands with which he strikes, and his foot with which he walks. Were he to ask something from me, I would surely give it to him. If he were to ask me for refuge, I would surely grant it to him. I do not hesitate to do anything as I hesitate to take the soul of the believer, for he hates death and I hate to disappoint him." - narrated by Bukhari.

The Prophet has made clear: "We have the path of faith and the method by which we ascend in its levels. And we have warned against falling into rebellion and sins which diminish man's faith just as he said: The adulterer is not a believer when he fornicated,

and the drinker is not a believer when he drinks wine when he drinks , and the thief is not a believer when he steals. And the robber is not a believer when he robs and the people look on at him" - muttafiq alayhi).

And it has been made clear on the authority of Ibn Abbas- may God be pleased with him- that he was calling to his youths, and said: 'Am i not to marry you off?' It is not for man to commit adultery unless God has taken away the light of faith from him'. And Akrima asked him: 'How is faith taken away from him?' He said: 'Like this'- and he clasped his fingers and brought them out- 'and if he repents it returns to him like this'- and he clasped his fingers.

So beware oh servants of God that death should come to you and you are without the faith the Prophet brought because it is the rope of salvation and the path of happiness in the two abodes. The Prophet said: "You are to follow my Sunna and the Sunna of the rightly-guided, leading successors [caliphs]. Hold onto them and clasp them with your teeth."

. To those established in the mosques, please follow these instructions:

1. Remove the word 'shaheed' from the names of the mosques.
2. No beggars in the mosques, because there is the Diwan al-Zakat wa al-Sadaqat to give zakat and sadaqat to those who deserve it.
3. No abandoning of the [Dua Qunut al-Nawazil](#) in the five prayers. Brothers who have abandoned the Dua Qunut must return to continue it.

Diwan al-Da'wah wa al-Masajid

Amir al-Markaz

Diwan al-Da'wah wa al-Masajid

Markaz Wilayat Ninawa: Amir

Specimen 1S: Advertisement of Services for Umm al-Mu'mineen A'isha Hospital, Aleppo Province



Islamic State

Umm al-Mu'mineen A'isha Hospital

Diwan al-Siha

Wilayat Halab


Medical service day and night.

- . [Services for] Children and nursemaids of premature babies and breast-feeding infants
- . Women and childbirth operations
- . Surgical operations in all specialties

General-Bone-Urinary Tract-Nervous System

- . Outpatient clinics for all specialties.

Specimen 1T: Book on First Aid: Diwan al-Siha (Aleppo Province)



"First Aid in Armed Conflicts and other situations of violence." Reportedly the second publication from this Diwan al-Siha.

Specimen 1U: Abu Omar al-Baghdadi Hospital Sign, Jarabulus [Aleppo province]. Diwan al-Siha publication: Guide to Nursing the Sick

Specimen 1V: Call for repentance of teachers in IS-controlled parts of Syria:
February 2015

Islamic State

Caliphate on the Program of the Prophets/Prophethood

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

Statement for distribution: 11- for the wilayat [provinces] of al-Sham only.

Date: 25 Rabi' al-Thani 1436 AH

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful.

Important announcement from the Diwan al-Ta'aleem

Thanks be to God and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God and all his family and companions. As for what follows:

God Almighty has said: "Say: oh my servants who have transgressed against themselves, do not despair of God's mercy. Indeed God forgives all sins. Indeed He is the Forgiving, the Merciful. And return to your Lord and submit to Him before the torment comes upon you. Then you will not be helped. And follow the best of what has come down to you from your Lord before the torment suddenly comes upon you and you do not realize it." - Zumr 53-55 (Qur'an 39:53-55).

The Almighty has also said: "Whoever does not repent, those are among the wrongdoers/oppressors." - Hujurat 11 (Qur'an 49:11).

By the permission of God and His success, a special committee will undertake the placing of programs of required repentance for those belonging to the educational organization affiliated with the disbelieving Nusayri government.

And that will take place on the first Friday of Jumada al-Awwal 1436 AH corresponding with 20 February 2015.

The repentance will be carried out in the following mosques:

1. Al-Alu Mosque [in [Raqqqa](#)]
2. Martyrs Mosque [also in [Raqqqa](#)]
3. Al-Nur Mosque [also in [Raqqqa](#)]
4. The Great Mosque [also in [Raqqqa](#) etc.]

5. Zain al-Abadeen Mosque
6. Zaid bin Haritha Mosque
7. Abdullah bin Mas'ud Mosque

All the male teachers must attend the Friday prayers and sermon in the aforementioned mosques for their required repentance to be completed after the prayers. Whoever can't attend for a legitimate excuse should head to the educational centre (formerly the education college) to complete the repentance proceedings within 2 weeks at the latest from the date of notification of the requirement for repentance. And whoever does not attend for required repentance, it will be considered evidence of his apostasy and the necessary judicial proceedings will be applied against him.

As for female teachers, their required repentance will take place on Tuesday, 4 Jumada al-Awwal 1436 AH corresponding with 23 February 2015 in the Dhat al-Nataqain centre (formerly the Literature College [in Raqqa city]) at 10 a.m.

We urge all to embrace attendance and not to delay, and whoever contravenes the ruling of this statement will expose himself to inquiry.

And God is predominant over His affair but most people don't know it.

Dhu al-Qarnain

Amir of the Diwan al-Ta'aleem

Specimen 1W: Opening of Schools in Raqqa for Children of English-Speaking Foreign Fighters

ديوان التعليم
وقل زب زذني علما

لا اله الا الله
الله
رسول
محمد

الدولة الإسلامية
خلافة على منهاج النبوة

الولاية: _____

العدد: _____

التاريخ الهجري: _____

ATTENTION ENGLISH SPEAKING MUHAJIROON!

By the grace of Allah we have opened schools for English speaking children. The boys school is called Abu Mus'ab Zaraqawi School (formally known as Al Qadhim school) and the girls school is called Aisha School and is located next door.

- The Schools are for the children from the age of 6 to 14 years old
- The lessons start at 9.00 am and ends at 12.00 noon every day except Thursday and Friday which are the days off
- The lessons taught in English are Aqeedah, Hadith, Seerah , Fiqh, Thabiyah Jihadiyyah, Maths and English Language
- The lessons taught in Arabic are Quran and Arabic Language
- If you would like to send your child/children to school please visit us on any day (except Thursday and Friday) between 9.00am – 12.00 noon
- If you are interested in teaching at the schools (part time and full time) please contact us
- For more information please contact us via telephone on 231 480 and ask to speak to Abu Muhammad

Masjid
Ibraheem

Masjid
Eidgah

Boys
School

Girls
School

children's
park

Specimen 1X: Mathematics & Arabic Language Textbooks issued by Diwan al-Ta'aleem for 1st grade, primary school, year 1436 AH





Specimen 1Y: Fatwa on Women's Travel: Al-Buhuth wa al-Eftaa' Committee

Islamic State

Al-Buhuth wa al-Eftaa' Committee

Fatwa no.: 45

Date: 25/2/1436 AH

Question: What is the ruling on a woman travelling without a mahrim (and her mahrim is present with her and does not go out with her)?

Answer: A woman may not travel without a mahrim because Bukhari narrated from a hadith on the authority of Ibn Abbas (may God be pleased with him): "He said: The Prophet [PBUH] said: 'The woman is not to travel without the mahrim.'" And is the mahrim compelled to go out? In this there is disagreement and the right response: He is not compelled and God knows best.

Islamic State**Diwan al-Buhuth wa al-Eftaa'****Specimen 1Z: Fatwa on Playing Billiards****Islamic State****Al-Buhuth wa al-Eftaa' Committee****Fatwa no.: 49****Date: 6/3/1436 AH****Question: What is the ruling on playing billiards?****Answer: It is permitted to play billiards on these conditions:**

1. It should be devoid of gambling and included in that definition is having the loser pay to hire the game. The Almighty has said: "Oh you who believe, indeed wine, al-Maysar, stone altars and divination by arrows [an Arab pre-Islamic practice] are filth of Satan's handiwork. Avoid them that you may have success"- al-Ma'ida 90 [Qur'an 5:90]. Ibn Abbas and Ibn Omar- may God be pleased with them both- said: 'Al-Maysar is gambling.' [Tafsir Ibn Katheer- 3/178].
2. That it should not be a barrier to obligatory mention of God's name, or any obligatory act of obedience, and when you have become distracted from what is obligatory externally or internally, it is forbidden by the agreement of the 'ulama, just as the Sheikh of Islam [Ibn Taymiyya] affirmed in the exposition of his discussion on chess and this discussion also applies to billiards and whatever else corrupts the two from among contemporary games.
3. In it there should not be blasphemy, cursing, scorn, resentment, hatred, according to what Bukhari narrated from a hadith of Ibn Mas'ud from the Prophet [PBUH]. He said: "Vituperating the Muslim, committing injustice against him or fighting him is disbelief."

And one must also drawn attention to this: it is not proper for the mujahideen servants of God to occupy their leisure time with these sorts of things that render no benefit on them but rather constitute a waste of time. The Prophet said: "There are two blessings in which most people are deceived: health and leisure." And among this is the harshness of the heart of which God knows and thus the Sunnah has come not to encourage increasing the number of permissible deeds [i.e. through speculative theology- 'talk'/kalam]. Thus came in the Sunan of Tirmidhi on the authority of Ibn Omar: that the Prophet said: "Don't

increase talk without mention of God, for abundance of talk without mention of God is harshness for the heart. And indeed the furthest of people from God are those with harsh heart." And God knows best. God bless our Prophet Muhammad and all his family and companions.

Islamic State

Diwan al-Buhuth wa al-Eftaa'

NB: This interesting fatwa, which does not outlaw billiards but recommends IS fighters in particular against playing it, is to be compared with a ruling from Jabhat al-Nusra's judicial body- the Dar al-Qada- that [ordered all shops with billiards in Hureitan, Aleppo province, to close](#). Below also is a photo from over a year ago of then ISIS members playing billiards in a café in Raqqa.



Specimen 2A: Fatwa on Playing Table Football

Islamic State

Al-Buhuth wa al-Eftaa' Committee

Fatwa no.: 50

Date: 6/3/1436 AH

Question: What is the ruling on playing table football?

Answer: It is permitted to play table football on these conditions:

1. It should be devoid of gambling and included in that definition is having the loser pay to hire the game. The Almighty has said: "Oh you who believe, indeed wine, al-Maysar, stone altars and divination by arrows [an Arab pre-Islamic practice] are filth of Satan's handiwork. Avoid them that you may have success" - al-Ma'ida 90 [Qur'an 5:90]. Ibn Abbas and Ibn Omar- may God be pleased with them both- said: 'Al-Maysar is gambling.' [Tafsir Ibn Katheer- 3/178].
2. That it should be devoid of statues and portraits in accordance with the strong prohibition against that. And that means that the head is cut off from the original part of the game [i.e. the head is cut off from the figurines so they don't look like statues].
3. In it there should not be blasphemy, cursing, scorn, resentment, hatred, according to what Bukhari narrated from a hadith of Ibn Mas'ud from the Prophet [PBUH]. He said: "Vituperating the Muslim, committing injustice against him or fighting him is disbelief."
4. That it should not be a barrier to obligatory mention of God's name, or any obligatory act of obedience, and when you have become distracted from what is obligatory externally or internally, it is forbidden by the agreement of the 'ulama, just as the Sheikh of Islam [Ibn Taymiyya] affirmed in the exposition of his discussion on chess and this discussion also applies to table football and whatever else corrupts the two from among contemporary games.


We warn as we warned in the ruling on playing billiards about the dimension of these matters that do not render the Muslim benefit, especially the mujahid in the path of God and what is in these things regarding wasting time and harshness of the heart. And God knows best. God bless our Prophet Muhammad and all his family and companions.

Islamic State

Diwan al-Buhuth wa al-Eftaa'

NB: Compare again with the Jabhat al-Nusra Dar al-Qada ruling that ordered the closing of shops with table football in Hureitan, Aleppo province.

Specimen 2B: Fatwa on Selling Passports



Islamic State

Al-Buhuth wa al-Eftaa' Committee

Fatwa no.: 48

Date: 28/2/1436 AH

Question: What is the ruling on selling passports to the Muslim populace?

Answer: If the travel is to the land of kufr for the purpose of a temporary undertaking out of need/necessity, whether for business or some other permissible purposes/goals, it is conditional on the ability to show disavowal of the disbelievers and hatred of idolatry, disbelief and its people with a hatred that has no affection in it, and not to take them as friends/helpers.

Similarly it is conditional on guarantee over the religion, and the ability to display the rituals of Islam perfectly without fear or opposition, and not to imitate their features, and not to share with them in their disbelieving customs and their nationalist, idolatrous occasions of joy, and not to congratulate them for these occasions. You are also not to glorify them and in that regard, in short: you are not to concord with them inwardly or outwardly.

Thus there is no doubt that it is without gain for anyone who wants to travel to the land of disbelief. Thus it is not permitted to have the citizens of the Islamic State realize travelling to the land of disbelief, and they are to be prevented from doing that. Thus it is not permitted to sell the passport that is tantamount to the identity that makes it possible for its owner to travel to that land, and to the means apply the rulings of intentions.*

And the knowledge is with God Almighty, and lastly we affirm thanks to God the Lord of the Worlds, and may God's peace and deliverance be upon Muhammad, his family, companions and brothers till the Day of Judgment.

Islamic State

Diwan al-Buhuth wa al-Eftaa'

NB: Compare with the unified Friday sermon for Ninawa Province mosques (Specimen 1Q) on the necessity of migrating to the Dar al-Islam [abode of Islam] and abandon the Dar al-Kufr [abode of disbelief], and also with the general notification of Specimen W urging for people not to be sent to Turkey to seek synthetic body parts. The overall tone of all this is the same: to discourage any potential migration out of IS territory. The phrase 'and to the means apply the ruling of intentions' (al-wasa'il laha ahkam al-maqasid) marked with an asterisk is employed in fatwas as the following line of reasoning: if I have to do/need X to accomplish Y, where Y is a forbidden act, then X is forbidden. So e.g. if I want a passport to go to a place to commit theft, then it is forbidden for me to obtain that passport or for someone to sell it to me.

Specimen 2C: Fatwa on Replicating Global Brands for Sale

Islamic State

Al-Buhuth wa al-Eftaa' Committee

Fatwa No.: 51

Date: 14/3/1436 AH

Question: What is the ruling on imitating some of the global brands and displaying them in the market with the same brand name?

Answer: Among the types of deception forbidden by the law is displaying the product before the buyer without its true appearance. This is clearly forbidden by the Legislator [Muhammad]. On the authority of Abu Huraira (may God be pleased with him): that the Messenger of God came upon a pile of food, put his hand inside it, and his fingers felt wetness. So he said: "What is this, oh owner of the food?" He said: "The sky has hit it [i.e. rain ruined it], oh Messenger of God." He said: "Why did you not put it on top so that people should see it? Whoever deceives is not one of us" - narrated by Muslim.

And this goes to the heart of his words: "Whoever deceives is not one of us." Selling the imitation product with the same name of the original brand without making that clear constitutes deception and swindling the buyer, for the buyer will purchase it thinking that it is from such-and-such company which he knows about on account of the excellence of its product. But when it then becomes apparent that the opposite is true after the purchase, this is forbidden deception not allowed by the law. Rather it is obligatory on the merchants of the Muslims to fear/be aware of God in their selling and buying for blessing is fulfilled in sale by honesty, while it is ruined by lying. The Prophet says: "The two types of sale are thus distinguished: if by honesty and clarity, the two [buyer and seller] are blessed in their transaction, if by falsehood and deceptively keeping silent [about details etc.], the blessing of their transaction is ruined." - narrated by Bukhari & Muslim.

If the merchant insists on writing the name of the brand on the imitation product, he must fear God and observe the following:

1. He must write around the name of the brand with the same point- i.e. size of writing- 'imitation' so that the buyer is not deceived in the product.
2. The price of the imitation product should be lower than the price of the original product.

And God Almighty knows best.

Islamic State

Diwan al-Buhuth wa al-Eftaa'

Specimen 2D: Fatwa on Ransom for the Apostate Prisoner

Islamic State

Al-Buhuth wa al-Eftaa' Committee

Fatwa No.: 52

Date: 22/3/1436 AH

Ruling on ransom for the apostate prisoner

Question: Is it allowed to have the apostate prisoner ransomed for wealth or men?

Answer: It is not allowed to have the apostate ransomed prisoner or show him benevolence. On this matter is the evidence of the book [Qur'an] and the Sunna, and the consensus of the imams. And that holds that the apostate is not to be established in his religion in any state.

God Almighty has said: "Say to those left behind of the desert Arabs: 'You will be called to fight a militarily mighty people: you can fight them, or they will submit.'" [Qur'an 48:16].

And these are the apostates because He has said: "You can fight them, or they will submit." And there has been no mention of jizya [i.e. by contrast, the option of jizya is offered to Jews and Christians- cf. Qur'an 9:29].

The Imam Ibn al-Jawzi, may God have mercy on him, said: "...The Banu Hanifa on the Day of Yamama and they were companions of Musaylima the Liar. Al-Zuhri said it, Ibn al-Sa'ib said it, and Muqatil said it. Muqatil said: 'The Caliphate of Abu Bakr: in this is clear evidence.' And Rafi' ibn Khadij said: "We were reading this verse [Qur'an 48:16] and did not know who they were until Abu Bakr was called to fight the Banu Hanifa, so he taught us that they were the people referenced."

And some of the Ahl al-'Ilm have said: This verse may only be applied to the Arabs, on account of His words: "You can fight them, or they will submit," whereas the Persians and Romans are to be fought until they submit [i.e. convert to Islam] or offer forth the jizya. A

group of the 'ulama had pointed to the soundness of the imamate of Abu Bakr and Omar with this verse." - Zada al-Masir- 4/131

And on the authority of Ibn Abbas may God be pleased with him: he said: The Prophet [PBUH] said: 'Whoever changes his religion, kill him.' [Bukhari].

And when the Imam Abu Zakariya Yahya bin Sharif al-Nawawi (died: 676 [AH- all subsequent dates are AH]) on the subject of the program of students and leadership of the muftis: 1/309: "If women of the kuffar and their youths are taken prisoner, they are to be pitied, and likewise the slave. But the Imam issues a ruling for the entirely free ones, and the most appropriate course of action is to be implemented: the Muslims have the right to kill, to show benevolence, to ransom for prisoners and wealth, and to enslave."

Shams ad-Din Muhammad bin Ahmad al-Sharbayni (died: 977) in his commentary on the expressions of al-Nawawi: "The Imam makes a judgement"= or the Amir al-Mu'mineen [Caliph] on the kuffar by origin [i.e. not apostates] prisoners- "the entirely free ones"- and they are the mature males of sound mind..." To that he said: "It has come about in our speech: 'Kuffar by origin'; the apostates..." [Mughanni al-Muhtaj ila ma'arafat al-faz ma'ani al-manhaj- 6/39].- [i.e. a distinction is drawn here between people who are born as disbelievers and apostates].

And Sheikh Abu Bakr Othman al-Dumayati (died: 1310): "In this the concept of original kufr [disbelief] has come about so it is not called apostasy [ridda], and this leads to distinctions between the two in matters, among them that the apostate is not to be established in his apostasy and so only Islam is to be accepted from him. He is to embrace our rulings for his embrace of them in Islam; his marriage is not to be validated, his sacrifice is to be forbidden, he may not have property, he is not to be held captive, ransomed or shown benevolence. He is not to inherit or to pass on inheritance. This contrasts with the original disbeliever in all of that." [[T'anat ul-Talibayn 'ala hal al-faz fath al-mua'yyan- 4/150](#)].

And the Imam Ibn Muflih al-Maqdisi said (died:884)- may God have mercy on him- the judgement of the apostate: "'Whoever changes his religion, kill him'- so it is not allowed to take a ransom for him, because his disbelief is cruder." [al-Bid' Shirh al-Muqni'- 7/482].

And the Imam Musa al-Hajjawi (died: 968)- may God have mercy on him- said on the ruling of the apostate: "...Only the Imam or his deputy may kill him, whether the apostate is a free man or a slave, and it is not allowed to take ransom for him. If someone else kills

him without his permission, he has done badly and is to be reprimanded as it has not been insured whether he killed him before the demand for repentance." - [al-Iqna fi Fiqh al-Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal- 4/301].

And Sheikh Mansur al-Buhuti (died: 1051)- may God have mercy on him- said in his book Kashaf al-Qina' 'an Matn al-Iqna' 6/175: "And it is not allowed to take ransom for him'- this means the apostate: rather he is to be killed."

Indeed the question of killing the apostate and not ransoming him or showing him benevolence is agreed by consensus among the Ahl al-'Ilm. The Sheikh of Islam Ibn Taymiyya (died: 728)- may God have mercy on him- said regarding the apostate sects: "These are greater criminals in the eyes of God, His Messenger, and the believers than the original kafir of many faces. Indeed these people must be killed without question if they do not return to what they have left. They may not be granted a dhimma pact, a hudna [temporary truce], a guarantee, and their prisoner may not be released or ransomed with wealth or men. Their sacrifices may not be eaten, their women are not to be married and they are not to be enslaved, so long as they remain in apostasy by agreement." - (Collection of Fatwas: 28/414).

Thus the point is that the Ahl al-'Ilm are agreed by consensus on killing the apostate and not having him ransomed or showing benevolence towards him, though it may also be said: This ruling is like the rest of rulings that make the forbidden action permissible in the circumstance of necessity. So in this case, he may be ransomed for some of the leaders of the Muslims from the amir and 'ulama whose release is in the general/public interest. And God knows best.

Al-Buhuth wa al-Eftaa' Committee

Islamic State

Diwan al-Buhuth wa al-Eftaa'

NB: A substantial number of theologians, jurists and figures from Islamic history are mentioned in this fatwa. Some are listed here for context:

Ibn al-Jawzi: Hanbali jurist of the medieval period.

Musaylima the Liar: prophet pretender and rival to Muhammad with influence among the Banu Hanifa. He was subsequently done away with by Abu Bakr.

Al-Zuhri: An early hadith authority.

Muqatil: an 8th century interpreter of the Qur'an.

Rafi' ibn Khadij: contemporary of the Prophet.

Imam al-Nawawi: of Syrian origin, a prominent Shafi'i jurist who compiled the famous 40 Hadiths collection of traditions considered fundamental to Islam.

Shams ad-Din Muhammad bin Ahmad al-Sharbayni: a Shafi'i jurist.

Ibn Muflih al-Maqdisi: a Hanbali jurist.

Musa al-Hajjawi: a Hanbali jurist.

Mansur al-Buhuti: a Hanbali jurist.

Specimen 2E: End of Year Exam Timetables: Ninawa Province

Islamic State

Caliphate on the Program of the Prophets/Prophethood

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

End of School Year 2014-2015 Exams Timetable (First Setting)

For Sixth Grade Primary School

Day	Date	Subject
Wednesday	20/5/2015	Islamic education
Thursday	21/5/2015	Arabic language
Saturday	23/5/2015	English language
Sunday	24/5/2015	Mathematics
Monday	25/5/2015	Sciences

End of School Year 2014-2015 Exams Timetable (Second Setting)

For Sixth Grade Primary School

Day	Date	Subject
Saturday	15/6/2015	Islamic education
Sunday	16/6/2015	Arabic language
Monday	17/6/2015	English language
Tuesday	18/6/2015	Mathematics
Wednesday	19/6/2015	Sciences

1. The exams take place at 9 a.m.
2. In the event of coincidence of vacation on the day of the exam. The exam will take place on the following day.

Specimen 2F: Instructions on Dates for End of Year Exams- Ninawa Province (1)

Islamic State

Caliphate on the Program of the Prophets/Prophethood

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

Final exams for finishing grades for school year 2014-2015

1. Primary level (sixth primary grade)

1. Final exams (first setting) begin for the final grades- the sixth primary grade- on Wednesday 20/5/2015 and end on Monday 25/5/2015
2. Final exams (second setting) begin for the final grades- the sixth primary grade- on Wednesday 12/8/2015 [12 August 2015] and end on Monday 17/8/2015.

2. Secondary level (third secondary grade)- [i.e. grade 9/First Bacallaureate]

1. Final exams (first setting) begin for the final grades- the third secondary grade- on Tuesday 2/6/2015 [2 June 2015] and end on Thursday 18/6/2015.
2. Final exams (second setting) begin for the final grades- the third secondary grade- on Wednesday 12/8/2015 [12 August 2015] and end on Thursday 20/8/2015.

3. Preparatory level (science-humanities-Islamic-vocational)

1. Final exams (first setting) begin for the final grades of preparatory level study in its divisions (Science-Humanities-Islamic-Vocational) on Sunday 3/6/2015 [sic: Wednesday] and end on Thursday 19/6/2015 [sic: Friday?].
2. Final exams (second setting) begin for the final grades of preparatory level study in its divisions (Science-Humanities-Islamic-Vocational) on Wednesday 12/8/2015 and end on Saturday 22/8/2015.

Note

The first school day for the school year 2015-2016 begins on Tuesday 1/9/2015 [1 September 2015].

Specimen 2G: Instructions on Dates for End of Year Exams- Ninawa Province (2)

Islamic State

Caliphate on the Program of the Prophets/Prophethood

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

Final exams for non-finishing grades for school year 2014-2015

1. Primary level

1. Final oral exams (first setting) begin for non-finishing grades for primary level study on Saturday 2/5/2015 [2nd May 2015] and finish on Thursday 7/5/2015 and will take place during lessons on these days.
2. Final written exams (first setting) begin for non-finishing grades for primary level study on Saturday 9/5/2015 and finish on Sunday 17/5/2015.
3. Final written and oral exams (second setting) begin for non-finishing grades for primary level study on Saturday 22/8/2015 [22nd August 2015] and finish on Thursday 27/8/2015.

2. Secondary level

1. Final oral exams (first setting) begin for non-finishing grades for secondary level study on Saturday 9/5/2015 and finish on Thursday 14/5/2015 and will take place during lessons on these days.
2. Final written exams (first setting) begin for non-finishing grades for secondary level study on Saturday 16/5/2015 and finish on Sunday 24/5/2015.
3. Final written and oral exams (second setting) begin for non-finishing grades for secondary level study on Saturday 22/8/2015 and finish on Saturday 29/8/2015.

3. Preparatory level

1. Final oral exams (first setting) begin for non-finishing grades for preparatory level study in its divisions (Science-Humanities-Islamic-Vocational) on Saturday 9/5/2015 and finish on Thursday 14/5/2015 and will take place during lessons on these days.
2. Final written exams (first setting) begin for non-finishing grades for preparatory level study in its divisions (Science-Humanities-Islamic-Vocational) on Saturday 16/5/2015 and finish on Sunday 24/5/2015.
3. Final oral and written exams (second setting) begin for non-finishing grades for preparatory level study in its divisions (Science-Humanities-Islamic-Vocational) on Saturday 22/8/2015 and finish on Thursday 27/8/2015.

Specimen 2H: Car Parking Ticket, Mosul

Wilayat Ninawa

Mosul Area/Left Side [i.e. east Mosul]

Car Parking Ticket (for entry to the car park): Fee Rate of 750 dinars

Vehicle number	
Vehicle type	
Date	21/10/2014

Specimen 2I: Prayer of the Congregation: Fallujah Province

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Fallujah

Al-Hisbah Center

Date: 27 Safr 1436 AH/19 December 2014

Thanks be to God and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God, his family, his companions and whoever is close to/loyal to him. As for what follows:

Prayer of the Congregation

Indeed the preponderance of the discourse of the Ahl al-'Ilm is that the prayer of the congregation in the mosque is obligatory on the able man who hears the call and he should undertake this prayer at its time which God Almighty made obligatory according to the Almighty's words: "Indeed prayer has been decreed for the believers- a decree for specific times"- al-Nisa' [Qur'an 4:103]. And on the authority of Abu Huraira (may God be pleased with him): "By the One in whose hand my soul is: I had in mind to order for firewood to be collected, then to order for the Prayer and thus the call for it, then to order for a man to lead the people, then to go up behind certain men and burn their houses upon them." [muttafiq alayhi]. As long as man can hear the call, he must respond provided the Prophet (PBUH) did not authorize [an exemption].

The blind man is to pray in his home: since he said: 'Do you hear the call to prayer?' He [the blind man] said: 'Yes.' He said: 'So respond.' Narrated by Muslim. Whoever refrains without legitimate excuse, this is a sin and if he insists on that, he is in grave peril and must repent to God Almighty from his possessing some of the qualities of the munafiqeen [hypocrites]. And the excuses that permit refraining from the prayer of the congregation are according to the hadith in which the Prophet [PBUH] said: "Whoever hears the call, no excuse prevents him from following it." They said: "And what is the excuse, oh Messenger of God?" He said: "Fear [i.e. of being targeted by enemy] or illness. [In which case], the prayer he has prayed has not been accepted from him." - narrated by Abu Dawud.

Among the qualities of the hypocrites is putting off prayer, as the Almighty says: "Woe to those who pray but are neglectful of their prayers." [al-Ma'un 4-5: Qur'an 107:4-5]. And on possessing laziness/negligence in standing to prayer, God Almighty described the hypocrites thus in His words: "Indeed the hypocrites think to deceive God but God is deceiving them, and when they stand to prayer, they stand showing negligence/laziness, showing to the people and only remembering God a little." (Nisa 142: Qur'an 4:142).

Reminder: The brothers in the al-Hisbah Center will hold accountable those who refrain from Friday prayers and prayers of the congregation whether they are in the shops or the

streets and similarly whoever is engaging in trade during the time of the call to Friday prayer will be held accountable. "Oh you who believe, when there is the call to Friday prayer, strive to remember God and leave trade. That is better for you, if you knew." [Jum'ah 9: Qur'an 62:9].

And God is the one who grants success and guides for the balance of the path.

NB: this document was obtained by the Shi'a militia [Liwa al-Shabab al-Risali](#) (Sadrist and claiming Najaf's Ayatollah Yaqoubi as spiritual leader), which operates in the al-Karma area to the east of Fallujah as part of an ongoing government offensive. Al-Karma is defined by IS as part of 'Fallujah Province' since September 2014, having driven out [Jaysh al-Mujahideen from al-Karma town in late August 2014](#). In parts of al-Karma countryside, non-IS insurgents can be found such as the [General Military Council for Iraq's Revolutionaries](#), but no evidence suggests coordination with IS.

Specimen 2J: Permission slip for travel to Kuwait

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Kheir

Date: 25/10/2014 (1 Muharram 1435 [sic: 1436] AH)

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful.

Permission is requested for the passing of [so-and-so: illegible] to go to the lands of disbelief (Kuwait). And may God reward you best.

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Kheir

Amir al-Hisbah

Specimen 2K: Permission for Sha'itat tribe members to return home, Deir az-Zor province

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Kheir

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

The Almighty has said: "And fulfill the covenant of God" - al-'Anam 152 [Qur'an 6:152].

Date: / /1436 AH

To the brothers- the sons of the state of the Islamic Caliphate- we would like to inform you that the owner of this home is of the tribe/clan of the Muslim Sha'itat and permission has been granted for him to return to his home and that is by the order of the wali [governor] of al-Kheir.

Name:

Village:

Tribe/Clan:

Signature of the repentance official:

Note: This document is for possession in the home and not for carrying around.

Specimen 2L: Fatwa on Nurses with Doctors

Islamic State

Al-Buhuth wa al-Eftaa' Committee

Fatwa No.: 42

Date: 25/2/1436 AH

Question: What is the ruling on the presence of the nurse with a doctor in the same clinic without a mahrim in the town and some of the villages?

Answer: It is forbidden for a woman to be left alone with the man who is a stranger [i.e. not a close relative] by agreement of the jurists according to what al-Bukhari narrated from a hadith of Ibn Abbas from the Prophet [PBUH] who said: "A man is not to be left with a woman except with a mahrim as well." Further there is what came in Sunan al-Tirmidhi from a hadith of Omar ibn al-Khattab from the Prophet [PBUH] who said: "Man is not to be left with a woman unless their third is Satan." Thus if you excuse the presence of the mahrim, let there be with her a group of women to avert what fitna [temptation] may arise, but if you excuse the presence of the group of women, the nurse's presence is forbidden. And God knows best.

Islamic State

Al-Buhuth wa al-Eftaa' Committee

Specimen 2M: Fatwa on revealing of women's eyes

Islamic State**Al-Buhuth wa al-Eftaa' Committee****Fatwa No.: 40****Date: 25/2/1436 AH****Question: What is the ruling on revealing the women's eyes whereby some of its side/cheek appears?**

Answer: The Almighty has said: "Oh Prophet, tell your wives, daughters and the women of the believers to bring down over themselves some of their outer garments. That is more suitable so that they will be known and not abused. And God is forgiving, merciful." - Ahzab 59 [Qur'an 33:59].

Ibn Abbas- may God be pleased with him- said: "Women are to cover their faces from above their heads with the jilbabs, leaving only one eye showing."

And Muhammad ibn Sirin* said: "I asked Obeida al-Suleimani about the words of God- 'to bring down over themselves some of their outer garments'- so he covered his face and head and exposed his left eye."

And it is not concealed that revealing of the two eyes contains a particular source of fitna if the edges of the eyelids are covered with kohl. The same applies when part of its side/cheek appears. So it is necessary for her to cover her two eyes even if with something delicate, far removed from fitna.

Islamic State**Al-Buhuth wa al-Eftaa' Committee**

**- Interpreter of dreams of Iraqi origin. Lived in the 8th century CE.*

Specimen 2N: Fatwa on Apostates' Agricultural Enterprises and Zakat**Islamic State****Al-Buhuth wa al-Eftaa' Committee****Fatwa No.: 36****Date: 19/2/1436 AH****Question: Does zakat apply to agricultural enterprises that belonged to the apostates?**

Answer: If this apostate is captured in the realm of Islam under its rule and we knew of the obligation of zakat in the time of his acceptance of Islam, it is not cancelled through his apostasy as an offences penalty and thus have affirmed the Shafi'is and Hanbalis. Thus it said in the Gift of the One in Need: "As for when it [zakat] is obligatory and then he apostasises, it is still taken from his wealth/property without exception." [12/284]*

That is because zakat is the right of the poor and the deserving so it is not cancelled through apostasy as expenditures and penalties and the rest of his wealth/property will be in treasury of the Muslims because the apostate does not pass on inheritance.

But if there was no knowledge of the time of the obligation of zakat upon him, we return to the original principle which is that his wealth/property will be war booty for the Muslims and it will be spent in their interests.

But if this apostate has fled to the abode of disbelief and the Muslims seize his wealth/property which is in the realm of Islam, it becomes war booty for the Muslims, because it is wealth/property of a disbeliever the Muslims have seized without treading on it with horse or riding camels. The Almighty has said: "And He has granted for you to inherit their land, abode and wealth/property." [Ahzab 27: Qur'an 33:27]. And that is the case for the apostates who have fled and abandoned their wealth/property and their agricultural enterprises. And God knows best.

God's peace and blessings be upon our Prophet Muhammad and all his family and companions.

Islamic State

Al-Buhuth wa al-Eftaa' Committee

**- A work by Ibn Hajar al-Haytami, a 16th century CE Shafi'i jurist of Egyptian origin.*

Specimen 20: Islamic State Diwan al-Ta'aleem Primary School Level One Textbook (Grades 1-3) on Creed and Jurisprudence



Specimen 2P: Shari'a Committee for Observation of New Moons (Setting up New Calendar)

Islamic State

Caliphate on the Program of the Prophets/Prophethood

General Committee

Shari'a Committee for the Observation of New Moons

Statement no. 1

26/2/1436 AH

18/12/2014

Statement for distribution no. 1

Thanks be to God, and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God, on his family, companions and whoever is close to/loyal to him.

The Almighty has said: "They ask you about the new moons. Say: they are measurements of time for the people and the Hajj." [Baqara 189: Qur'an 2:189].

And Ahmad [ibn Hanbal] brought out in his chain of transmission that the Prophet [PBUH] said: "Indeed we are an illiterate Ummah as we neither write nor reckon accounts. The month is thus, thus and thus"- And he held down the thumb the third time- "And the month is thus, thus and thus." Meaning the completion of thirty days.

To the brothers who are the governors (walis) and the amirs in all the wilayats [provinces] and areas, salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu.

As for what follows:

We ask you to show your noble side in forming committees of just, trustworthy people and among them those with knowledge of observation of the new moons in your areas. And that is in the framework of cooperation with us in this field until the Islamic State should be independent in its calendar and observation for the new moons from all the states of tawagheet [idolatrous tyranny] who have subsumed this issue for their personal and political whims and aims.

And we ask you to take charge of these committees in announcing their work beginning from the coming new moon- that is before the 29th sunset of the current month of Safr and you inform us of the results of the operation of observation via the media brothers or the available methods of connection before evening prayer on the same day.

Similarly we ask you to make us aware of your knowledge of this statement for distribution immediately after its arrival via the media brothers or the following accounts:

Skype: rassd_ahillah

Twitter: @rassd_ahillah

We ask God to write your remuneration and bless your efforts. May God reward you best.

Islamic State

Shari'a Committee for the Observation of New Moons

**Specimen 2Q: Sample Calendar ("Calendar of the Realm of the Caliphate")
from Shari'a Committee for the Observation of New Moons: Jumada al-Awal
1436 AH**



Specimen 2R: Notice to Shop Owners, Manbij, Aleppo Province (February 2015)

Islamic State

Public Services Centre

Manbij Area

Date: //1436 AH

Statement for Distribution

To the brothers who own merchant and industrial shops, shacks and exposition stands (vegetables-fruits-fuels-clothes etc.), observe the following:

1. It is absolutely forbidden to place an exposition stand on the sidewalk or street without heading to the Public Services Centre to obtain a license within defined conditions.
2. It is forbidden to bring out and place goods- whether food or manufactured- in front of the shop on the sidewalk or street, and in the event of exceeding the width of the sidewalk (1m) the owner of the shop must head to the Public Services Centre to obtain a license to occupy the sidewalk.

3. Whoever sets up an exposition stand or room from a block within the public property of the municipality must obtain a license and pay rent or remove it within 3 days. If it is not removed, the municipality will remove it by force.

Manbij Services Official

Specimen 2S: Shops and Cleaning Services, Manbij (September 2014)

Brothers, owners of merchant shops (and those investing in them), please head to and register with the tax office- Public Services Committee to pay a sum of 1000 Syrian pounds in exchange for cleaning services for the four months (September, October, November, December) for the current year. Registrations begin reckoning from 16/11/1435 corresponding to 10/9/2014 (10 September 2014) and for a period of 20 days beginning from this state (10am to 3pm). Any delay will require the Shari'a inquiry.

Public services official.

Abu al-Ihsan.

Specimen 2T: Local regulations in Manbij (pre-Caliphate era)

The Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

Statement for distribution from the municipality of Manbij

Thanks be to God the Lord of the Worlds and prayers and peace be upon the lord of those who have been sent...as for what follows:

To all the noble inhabitants of the town of Manbij we inform you that the municipality of Manbij has obtained agreement from the Islamic court on the following:

1. Every person who places waste outside the designated containers for him in addition to the violation on the part of every shop owner in front of whose shop is waste will be fined. The municipality has decided that the financial fine should be a sum of 2000 Syrian pounds and if the violation be repeated, the person responsible will be brought to the Islamic court.
2. The municipal office will gather from all the owners of the merchant shops in their various types a services tax of 250 Syrian pounds a month, and the collection will be at one time every three months which means 750 Syrian pounds every three months.

Specimen 2U: On Zakat al-Fitr, Aleppo Province

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Zakat al-Fitr

Definition of terms:

- Zakat as a word: addition and growth
- As convention: An obligatory right and special wealth/property for a designated group at a designated time.
- Zakat al-Fitr: It is the zakat whose reason is the occasion of fitr from Ramadan [i.e. Eid al-Fitr after the period of fasting]

The ruling on it:

An obligation whose evidence is a hadith of Ibn Omar- may God be pleased with him- that the one on whom God's peace and blessings may be imposed as zakat al-fitr from Ramadan a saa' [unit of measure] of dates and a cubic measure of barley on every free man or slave, male or female from among the Muslims.

Its benefit:

On the authority of Ibn Abbas- may God be pleased with him: he said: "The Messenger of God- may God's peace and blessings be upon him- imposed zakat al-fitr as cleansing from null and obscenity for the one fasting and to feed the poor."

On whom it is obligatory:

It is obligatory on every Muslim (free or slave, male or female, young or old) in addition to the one whose day, night and dependants are nourished, and whoever one provides from the Muslims.

Its extent:

A saa' of whatever predominates the nourishment of the people of the land (dates, wheat, rice, raisins, cottage cheese, barley).

Its timing:

1. Time of the obligation: onset of the night of Eid
2. Time to bring out [the zakat]: preferably a) from the beginning of the dawn of the day of Eid until the time of the Eid prayer; time it is permitted b): before Eid by a day or two days.

Its beneficiaries:

The beneficiaries of the regular zakat: the poor, needy, those employed to collect it, to bring their hearts together, for freeing [captives/slaves], those in debt, for the cause of God, and the stranded sojourner- an obligation of God.

Table of the sums of the zakat al-fitr for some of the types of food:


Type of food	Value of a saa' (grams)
Rice	2300
Raisins	1640
Dates	1800
Wheat	2040
Lentil	2100
Hummus	2000
Semolina	2000
Flour	1400
Beans	2060
Peas	2240
Couscous	1800
Coffee roasting	2000

Islamic State

Wilayat Halab

Shari'a Administration

Specimen 2V: Medical Analysis Form, A'isha Umm al'Mu'mineen Hospital, Manbij Area, Aleppo Province



Specimen 2W: Opening of Kindergarten Centre, Raqqa Province

Islamic State

Caliphate on the Program of the Prophets

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Within the project of opening kindergarten centres,

The Diwan al-Ta'aleem in Wilayat al-Raqqa announces the opening of the second kindergarten centre:

Dawn of the Caliphate Kindergarten Centre for Boys

Address: opposite the Sword of the State clinic

Inquiry and registration: Islamic school for the Excellent: 239017

Notice: there is a bus service for students

Wilayat al-Raqqa
Deputy official of the Diwan al-Ta'aleem
Abu Muawiya al-Salafi

Diwan al-Ta'aleem: al-Raqqa
Town office official
Abu Muhib al-Qurashi

4 April 2015 (15 Jumada al-Akhira 1436 AH: cf. IS calendar [here](#))

[Specimen 2X: Jizya Payment Receipt in Raqqa \[see \[here\]\(#\) for context\]](#)

Islamic State
Diwan al-Qada wa al-Mazalim
The Islamic Court in Raqqa

Receipt no. 1391
8 December 2014

Recipient:

Giver:

Sum given: 27000 Syrian pounds

That to meet: payment of jizya

Recipient's signature

Giver's signature

[Specimen 2Y: Registering children in IS-Run Schools in Deir az-Zor city](#)

Islamic State
Wilayat al-Kheir: City Area
Diwan al-Ta'aleem

Important Statement

The Diwan al-Ta'aleem in Wilayat al-Kheir- City Area the beginning of registration for the year 1436 AH in schools affiliated with the Diwan. Let it be known that education from grades 1 to 9 is compulsory and the one who does not send his child to school will be subjected to inquiry and consequence.

The period of registration begins from 5 Jumada al-Thani until 11 Jumada al-Thani 1436 AH from 11 a.m. until 2 p.m.

Registration centres

1. Imam Nawawi School (previously [Ghafran al-Madad](#))- [al-Ommal neighbourhood](#).
2. Imam Qurtubi School (previously [Sati al-Hasri](#))- al-Ommal central
3. [Imam Dhahbi](#) School (previously Shadi Rabah)- al-Hamidiya neighbourhood by the pilots union
4. Imam Ibn Katheer al-Dimashqi School (previously Mustafa Amin)- Tawheed Street
5. Imam al-Bukhari School (previously Sham lil-Baneen)- Kinamat neighbourhood
6. Tariq ibn Zayid School- al-Matar al-Qadim neighbourhood

Official for the Diwan al-Ta'aleem, City Area

Specimen 2Z: On selling prohibited garments, Ninawa province

Islamic State

Wilayat Ninawa

al-Hisbah Centre

19 July 2014

Statement for distribution on the issue of selling prohibited garments

Thanks be to God the Lord of the Worlds and prayers and peace be upon the most noble of the Prophets and those sent...as for what follows:

To those who sell garments:

Peace be upon you as well as the mercy of God and His blessings.

God- Exalted is He- has blessed us with supremacy, and He is the one who says in His exaltedness: "Those We have made supreme in the land have established prayer, have given zakat, and have commanded what is right and forbidden what is wrong, and God has the outcome in all matters"- Surat al-Hajj [Qur'an 22:41].

Among the things that have been witnessed and observed on the part of some of the women is the wearing of garments violating the law and instructions of our Hanif religion.

So thus your brothers in the Diwan al-Hisbah have worked to track and observe these violations of Shari'a, and following on from that we inform all owners of shops dealing with the sale of garments to observe the following orders:

- It is absolutely forbidden to sell and display garments violating the law, like tight garments, transparent ones [i.e. ones showing the body underneath them], and ornamented ones.
- The quantity of such items present are to be disposed of outside the authority of the Islamic State or returned to their source within 5 days maximum from the date of the issuing of this statement.
- All garments violating the law will be tracked down and confiscated.
- Whoever has a dressmaking factory or wishes to know the directives of Shari'a, should head to the Hisbah Centre.

[...]

And God is the one who assures success.

Islamic State
Wilayat Ninawa
Amir al-Hisbah

Specimen 3A: Training Session for Teachers in Aleppo Province, May 2014

Rule belongs only to God
Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Wilayat Halab
Education Administration

Public statement for distribution

To all lecturers and teachers in Wilayat Halab:

We ask you to attend a qualification session for teachers in aqida [creed] and fiqh [jurisprudence], and the teacher will be granted at the end of it a qualification document to teach in the public schools and whosoever refrains from the session will be barred from undertaking any teaching activity or work in the lands of the Islamic State. The session

begins on Tuesday 13/7/1436 AH corresponding to 12 May 2014. To go and register: head to the education administration in every area. All are asked to attend and embrace this.

And God is the one behind the intention.

Thanks be to God the Lord of the Worlds.

Education Administration Official in Wilayat Halab

Abu Mujahid

8/7/1435 AH

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

Wilayat Halab

Education Administration

[Specimen 3B: Repentance for Teachers et al., Manbij, Aleppo Province, April 2015](#)

Islamic State

Caliphate on the Program of the Prophets/Prophethood

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

The Diwan al Ta'aleem in Wilayat Halab announces the opening of centres for repentance in Manbij in the designated mosques beginning from Friday 28 Jumada al-Akhira 1436 AH corresponding to 17 April 2015, directly after Friday prayers. The repentance will be carried out for all those who worked in the prior education system (director, supervisor, deputy director, temporaries, fixed, non-fixed, retired, employment of youth, employee, guard). And similarly for teachers in the universities and institutes.

Islamic State

Wilayat Halab

Official for the Diwan al-Ta'aleem- Manbij

[Specimen 3C: More on repentance programs in Manbij, Aleppo Province, Aleppo 2015](#)

Islamic State
Education Centre- Wilayat Halab
Education Office- Manbij Area

Important Statement from the Education Office in Manbij

The Almighty has said: "Oh my servants, who have sinned against themselves, do not despair of the mercy of God. Verily God forgives all sins. He is the forgiving, the merciful. Return to your Lord and submit to them before the punishment should come upon you and you will not be helped. And follow the best of what has come down to you from your Lord before the torment comes upon you suddenly and you do not realize it." - Zummar 53-55 [Qur'an 39:53-55]. And the Almighty has said: "Those who do not repent are the wrongdoers." -Hujurat 11 [Qur'an 49:11]

By the permission of God and His granting success a special committee will undertake:

Repentance programs for those affiliated with the educational system affiliated with the disbelieving Nusayri regime.

And that will take place on Friday 28 Jumada al-Akhira 1436 AH corresponding to 17 April 2015, in the following mosques:

1. The Grand Mosque
2. Al-Ala'i Mosque
3. Abu Bakr al-Sadiq Mosque

Prerequisites:

1. ID photo
2. 2 personal photos

Whoever cannot attend for legitimate excuse must go to the education office in the area located on al-Rabita street to complete the proceedings for repentance within two weeks from the announcement for repentance.

And whoever does not attend for repentance, will be considered as insisting on his apostasy, and in this regard the relevant Shari'a judicial proceedings will be applied.


As for female teachers, their repentance will be carried out in the Muawiya ibn Abi Sufian school by the Aleppo garage beginning from 29 Jumada al-Akhira 1436 AH for two weeks

from 10 am until afternoon prayers. We advise all to embrace attendance, and not to delay, and whoever contravenes the proceedings of this statement will be subjected to Shari'a inquiry.

"And God is predominant over His affair but most people do not know." [quote from the Qur'an]

Education office official in the area

Specimen 3D: Repentance for Teachers et al. in al-Bab, Aleppo Province (9 April 2015)- [identical to 3B]



Specimen 3E: Call for Reinforcements from Aleppo Province to Anbar and Salah ad-Din Provinces

**Islamic State
Wilayat Halab**

To the amirs of the areas- may God give them victory in religion- and their brothers the soldiers of the Caliphate in their area.

"Make your lifeblood their fuel."

The Messenger of God (PBUH) has said: "When you are summoned to go forth, go forth."

Summons call from the amir al-mu'mineen [Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi] to his soldiers in the wilayat of al-Sham [Syria provinces]- may God give them victory in religion- to reinforce the two fronts of "Anbar and Salah ad-Din."

This is a day from among the days of God Almighty and indeed before and after it, the parties from the servants of the Cross, the riffraff of the Rafidites, and the apostates of the Arabs with their horses and men have gathered, wanting to wage war on God and His Messenger and obliterate what has arisen from the signs of this religion and attack the honour of the Muslims, so they have attacked our brothers in the two wilayas of Anbar and Salah ad-Din.

So indeed today we remind you of God Almighty for the riffraff of the Rafidites will not be content with your brothers in those provinces as long as in you is a beating heart, and indeed not one of you will be able to preserve effort without exerting it, and not one of you will be able to hold back in supporting them and striving. God has taught that He is capable to undertake what He wills without asking for it to be done but God is God in the religion of God, so summon your brothers in your area to be in their frontline as martyrdom operatives and commandos, and make them worthy of the people of obedience and service and the people of patience and endurance from the flames of the wars who do not turn aside their faces until they are killed and do not put aside their arms until they meet their Lord or God grants them victory, that it may be observed in their choice firstly that they should be among those willing to go voluntarily and no promise

should have to be made to them for return or other rewards until God Almighty should grant His servants victory by His permission as He is the best of the Fatiheen.

Those brothers wishing to enlist should register with the Office of Da'wah and Mosques in Manbij...and registration will last for up to 48 hours from the arrival of this notification.

May God reward you best.

Da'wah and Mosques Centre

Islamic State

Wilayat Halab

Da'wah and Mosques Official

8/7/1436 AH [27 April 2015]

Specimen 3F: Educational Regulations Notification Distributed in Aleppo Province

Islamic State

Caliphate on the Program of the Prophets

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

To all directors of schools, you are asked to observe the following:

1. Schools open on 14/9/2013
2. Regular hours for the morning session begin at 7:30 a.m. and finish 11:20 a.m.
3. Regular hours for the afternoon session begin at 12:00 p.m. and finish at 3:50 p.m.
4. The morning session will be for girls and the afternoon session for boys.
5. Each session is divided into 5 classes and each class lasts 40 minutes with 15 minutes repose.
6. Weekly vacation is on Friday and Saturday and all vacations are over-riden during the vacations of Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha.
7. All school directors and deputy heads must work to separate boys and girls and prevent mixing.

8. All school directors are to notify refugees to leave schools and are to notify the Diwan al-Ta'aleem in the event they do not do so.
9. Every student is to pay registration fees that amount to 1000 Syrian pounds from every class. The fee pays for two students only from every family and these fees are acknowledged to cover the school's needs including teachers, female teachers and the requirements of the school.
10. Exemption from the fees will be granted on a case by case basis from the Diwan al-Ta'aleem after assessment of the material state is submitted by the director of the school on condition that the rate of exemption will not exceed 5%.
11. All directors of the schools are to receive the fees from the students and then hand them over to Diwan al-Ta'aleem for the sake of paying teachers' salaries and covering the schools' needs.
12. All directors of the schools are to inform the officials of the offices affiliated with Diwan al-Ta'aleem of any vacancies they have.
13. Every teacher or female teacher who has not submitted to a Shari'a session is barred from teaching and those who have not taken up the Shari'a session must go to the Diwan al-Ta'aleem.
14. The following subject programs are not to be taught: drawing and fine art, music, nationalism, French language, history, philosophy and social studies (at primary level), and in the subject of geography, teaching is limited to regions only. The cancelled subjects are to be replaced with the following: aqeeda [creed], Qur'an, Hadith, Sira [life of Muhammad], fiqh [jurisprudence], and the name of PE will be replaced with Jihadi Training.
15. All teachers will be provided with a list of the cancelled lessons and classes and all teachers must refrain from teaching the cancelled subjects, classes and lessons from the programs.
16. All directors of the schools are to make teachers of the cancelled subjects teach the primary grades or to employ them according to the school's need.
17. All teachers must not accept students with any inappropriate clothing and falling short of Shari'a dress.

18. All female students are to embrace Shari'a dress as follows:

- From first to third grade, covering the head.
- From fourth to sixth grade, covering the face.
- From seventh grade, the remainder of what is required from Shari'a dress in its entirety in that veiling.

19. Directors are to have all teachers teach in the schools in which they are employed and whoever is not affiliated with the school is not allowed to work in it or have a position of responsibility in the educational assembly.

20. The use of any seal/register bearing the portrait of the tyrant Bashar or the Syrian Arab Republic or anything concerning nationalism and nationhood is forbidden, and all these expressions and seals are to be done away with.

21. With regards to the countryside, in the event that schooling cannot be provided, students can be gathered in the nearest school with the possibility of including grades 1-4 in the event of lack of availability of academic staff.

And God is the one behind the intention.

Islamic State

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

Deputy Head

Specimen 3G: Registration Form at Shari'a Institute for Girls in al-Bab, Aleppo Province [c. May 2014]

Da'wah Office in al-Bab and its Countryside

Dar Umm al-Rabab (Haylat al-Qusayr) for Shari'a Sciences

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Date: 1435 AH

Female student registration card

Name:

Age:

Level of Study:

Social Status:
 Father's line of work:
 [etc.]

Specimen 3H: Regulations for drivers in Raqqa

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Raqqa

22/4/2015 [22 April 2015]

Brothers who drive

It is absolutely forbidden for cars to go out without the presence of a comprehensive repair tool kit (spare tyre...etc.) [see [here](#) for visualization]. The driver of every car that does not have the tool kit will be subjected to the consequences which may entail suspension from work. This decision becomes binding in a week's time from the date of its issuing.

And God is the one behind the intention.

Connections official [dealing with transportation].

Specimen 3I: Reopening of applications for medical school in Raqqa

Islamic State

Diwan of Health

Announcement

The Diwan of Health in the Islamic State announces the reopening of the door of application for the medical college. So all students wishing to join this institution should go and register with the medical college and its base in Wilayat al-Raqqa.

Application conditions:

- . The age of the applicant should not exceed 30 years old.
- . The one with the general certificate of secondary education (science division) should have an average of 80% or above.
- . All students applying must pass the competitive selection exam.

Notices

- . Applications are to be submitted in the base of the medical college in the city of Raqqa.
- . Application begins from 15 Rajab 1436 AH [4 May 2015] until the middle of the month of Ramadan.
- . Application will be for males and females.
- . This study and the competitive selection exam will be done in English.

For inquiry: 239591.

Specimen 3J: Employment Opportunities in Education in "Euphrates Province" (Syria region)

Islamic State Caliphate on the Program of Prophethood Diwan al-Ta'aleem

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

The Almighty has said: "But those among them well-versed in knowledge and the believers believe in what has come down to you and what has come down from those before you, and the ones who establish prayer, give zakat, and believe in God and the Last Day: those will be given a great reward from Us."- Nisa 162 [Qur'an 4:162].

Announcement

The education centre in Wilayat al-Furat- al-Sham area (western area) announces its desire to employ educational staff (university level- institutes- secondary) for both sexes in the schools of the Islamic State and competency will be a condition for appointment for the following specialties:

Administration officials, educational directors, specialty teachers, grade teachers, Shari'a officials.

Let it be known that registration is for a defined period and begins from Monday 24/6/1436.

All who wish to go to register their names must fulfill the following conditions.

. Employment application accompanied by a personal photo, photo of qualification, photo of the document of repentance for the prior teachers, statement of service for number of years (for agents). Registration will be done in the two education offices in Albukamal and Hajin.

For inquiry connect on the following numbers:

739872-723445

Specimen 3K: Fatwa on Eating Meats Imported from Turkey

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Fatwa no. 5

23/9/1435 AH

Question: What is the ruling on eating Turkish meats?

Answer

On the authority of Adi bin Hatem may God be pleased with him: he said: the Messenger of God (may God's peace and blessings be upon him and his family) said: "...And if you have thrown an arrow at the game and find it after a day or two days with nothing on it but the mark of your arrow, eat it. But if it fell dead in the water, don't eat it." - Muttafiq alayhi, and in the narration of Muslim: "and if you don't know if it died in the water or through your arrow."

Imam Ibn Qudama (may God have mercy on him) said: "...and because there is doubt regarding lawful hunting, it is necessary to adhere to the ruling of declaring it forbidden" (al-Mughni: 12/17).

And he also said: "...The principle is prohibition, and the solution rests on a condition and that is slaughter according to the law by the people who undertake that or those who hunted it." (al-Mughni: 12/17).

As for meats imported from Turkey, it has not been ascertained 1. who have slaughtered them, and 2. what is the nature of the slaughterer by people; therefore it may be the case that many of those dealing with the slaughter in Turkey are from the people of apostasy - for all we know. Therefore we consider adherence to the principle that is declaring it forbidden until evidence makes clear the contrary.

Imam Nawawi (may God have mercy on him) said: "In this is a statement of important foundation and that is that if there is doubt on the legality of the slaughter of the animal, there is no solution of making it permissible to eat, because the principle is to declare it forbidden and there is nothing to the contrary on this." - Commentary on Sahih Muslim 13/116.

And God knows best.

Islamic State

Diwan al-Eftaa wa al-Buhuth

Head of the Diwan al-Eftaa wa al-Buhuth.

Specimen 3L: Fatwa on Prayer and Fasting for the Muhajir in Ramadan

Ruling on the taking of license of travel for the muhajir

Question: What is the ruling on shortness of prayer and fitr [breaking fast] in Ramadan for the muhajir in the path of God?

Answer

The Ahl al-'Ilm have differed on the timing of travel. The Hanafis have been of the opinion that the traveller becomes established in a place if he intends to stay in a land for 15 days or more. The Malikis and Shafi'is have held that if the traveller intends to stay in a place for 4 days, he becomes established. The Hanbalis have been of the view that if he intends more than 4 days, he becomes established.

And some of the Ahl al-'Ilm like Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim opined that whoever has gone out from his land is a traveller to the place in which he has become established but has not been sought for permanent residence.

However, this disagreement concerns the timing of broad travel- whether travel of obedience [i.e. to perform the Hajj] or lawful travel, but as for the muhajir from the Dar al-Kufr- in which the rulings of the disbelievers prevail- to the Dar al-Islam in which the rulings of Islam prevail, he is only established in one sense, and he may not take the license of travel with regards to shortening [of prayer] or breaking the fast etc.

For the land to which he has migrated is his land, and it has not been established from the Prophet (may God's peace and blessings be upon him) that he took license of travel in

Medina to which he migrated, and this is true also of all the muhajireen from his companions may God be pleased with them, and in God is success.

Diwan al-Buhuth wa al-Eftaa

Head of the Diwan

NB: The date of this fatwa is particularly worth noting (1 Ramadan 1435 AH): considering that the Caliphate was announced to mark Ramadan in 1435 AH and this is the second fatwa issued by the Diwan, it is reasonable to suppose the Diwan al-Eftaa wa al-Buhuth only came into existence when the Caliphate was declared.

Specimen 3M: Excerpt of a Textbook on Creed and Jurisprudence for Primary School Children

Page number	Subject	
69	First subject study	Purity
69	Lesson One	The quality of true ablution
71	Lesson Two	Qada al-Hajah (Meeting Need)
75	Lesson Three	Wiping and Purification with stones
80	Lesson Four	Removal of filth
83	Lesson Five	Conditions of ablution, its pillars and sunnah
93	Second subject study	Prayer
93	Lesson Six	The quality of true prayer
97	Lesson Seven	Conditions of prayer, its pillars and obligations
109	Lesson	The Sunna

	Eight	traditions of prayer
116	Lesson Nine	Times of obligatory prayer
122	Lesson Ten	The consequence of abandoning prayer and disdaining it

Specimen 3N: Excerpt II of a Textbook on Creed and Jurisprudence for Primary School Children

Creed: Level Two

Contents

Page number	Subject	
5	First subject study	Worship
5	Lesson One	Meaning of tawheed
9	Lesson Two	Meaning of worship
17	Lesson Three	Messengers, and the wisdom from their being sent
21	Second subject study	Tawheed: its meaning and types
21	Lesson Four	Meaning of Tawheed
24	Lesson Five	Tawheed of divinity
30	Lesson Six	Tawheed of uluhiya [belief in oneness of worship of God]
38	Lesson Seven	Tawheed: names and qualities

46	Third subject study	Faith in God and disbelief in Taghut
46	Lesson Eight	The first thing God imposed on people
50	Lesson Nine	The meaning of taghut, and the obligation of disbelieving in it and fighting it.
56	Lesson Ten	Some of the types of tawagheet
63	Lesson Eleven	The meaning of al-Urwa al-Wuthqa [the link that cannot be dissolved]

Specimen 3O: Excerpt III from textbook: on quality of prayer



Specimen 3P: Excerpt IV from textbook: on quality of ablution



Specimen 3Q: Slip from the Antiquities Division of the Diwan al-Rikaz

Islamic State

Diwan al-Rikaz

Antiquities/Remains division

Date: //1436 AH (//2015)

To the brother ...

Salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu

Help is requested for the bearer of this document in searching for and excavating remains/antiquities. Let it be known that he can bear apparatus for uncovering remains/antiquities.

Islamic State

NB: It may be wondered how one can reconcile this document with the official Islamic State hostility to notions of archaeology and anything that might entail idolatrous reverence of the past- particularly in association with the pre-Islamic (Jahiliya) era [illustrated by the closing down of the archaeology department of Mosul University, the destruction of Nimrud etc.]. The real intent here is revealed by the designation of "Diwan al-Rikaz", which also has a department dealing with oil resources, including the leasing of gasoline stations in Mosul. Thus, excavation of small and medium-scale antiquities, as has often been reported in media, becomes nothing but a means to make money through sale and smuggling.

Specimen 3R: Closing of shop in Al-Bab, Aleppo province

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

This shop has been closed for a period of two days for disregarding the fulfillment of obligation of prayer.

Specimen 3S: Closing of shops during prayer time in Al-Bab, Aleppo province (March 2014)

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful,

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

Wilayat Halab- Eastern Area- town of al-Bab and its surrounding

God- Almighty and Exalted is He- has made numerous mentions of prayer in His noble book [Qur'an], has given it great importance, and has ordered for it to be maintained and fulfilled in a congregation. The Almighty has said: "Maintain the prayers, particularly the middle prayer, and stand to God in obedience."

And from what points to the obligation of prayer of the congregation is what Abu Huraira narrated in both Sahih traditions [Bukhari and Muslim] on the authority of the Prophet may God's peace and blessings be upon him. He said: "I had a strong desire to order for

prayer to be established, then to order for a man to lead the people in prayer, then I should go with some men carrying bundles of wood to a people not observing prayer so I should burn their houses upon them."

In Muslim's tradition, on the authority of Abdullah ibn Mas'ud may God be pleased with him. He said: "You have seen us and there is no disagreement on prayer except a hypocrite aware of his hypocrisy or a sick one but even if he is sick let him go between two men until he comes to prayer."

On the basis of this and according to the Almighty's words- " Those We have enabled in the land have established prayer, given zakat, commanded what is right and forbidden what is wrong. And to God belongs the outcome of affairs" - the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham announces the prohibition on opening shops after the establishment of prayer and the obligation to head to the mosques. And whoever has been shown to have disregarded that will be subjected to Shari'a inquiry. Cooperate on the basis of piety and fear of God, not on the basis of evil and enmity.

Specimen 3T: Prohibition on pigeon-keeping on roofs of houses, "Euphrates Province"



In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Islamic State

Caliphate on the Program of Prophethood

**Wilayat al-Furat
Diwan al-Hisbah**

Date: 20 Rabi al-Thani 1436 AH/9 February 2015

Announcement

Prohibition on pigeon-keeping above the roofs of houses

Praise be to God and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God, his family, companions and whosoever is close to/loyal to him. As for what follows:

All those who keep pigeons above the roofs of their houses must stop doing this entirely within a week of the date of the issuing of this statement and whosoever violates it will be subject to consequences of reprimand including a financial fine, imprisonment and flogging.

So the Muslim populace must inform the Hisbah of any person who has taken it upon himself to continue this line of work and that is to put a stop to the greater criminal act of harming one's Muslim and Muslim women neighbours, revealing the genitals and wasting time.

And God is the guarantor of success.

Islamic State

**Wilayat al-Furat
Amir al-Hisbah**

Diwan al-Hisbah for Wilayat al-Furat.

NB (Update: June 3, 2015): I have glossed the phrase kashf lil-awrat ("revealing the genitals") because a number of subsequent media reports have misinterpreted this phrase literally. I had assumed that it would be taken as a mere idiom for dishonourable activity, but instead outlets such as The Daily Mail have interpreted this to mean revealing the pigeon's genitals (which wouldn't make any sense). My friend Hassan Hassan gives the best corrective in comments below:

"Hamamchiya/hmaimatiya (pigeon keepers) are notorious for using pigeon keeping on roofs to stare & look inside neighbours homes (hence 'hurumat',

honour, not genitals). That's also why they traditionally don't qualify for bearing testimony etc"

Specimen 3U: Notice to those who have repented, western part of Raqqa Province



**Diwan al-Amn al-Aam [Public Security]
Western Area- Summons Office
Date: 13/6/1436 AH [2 April 2015]**

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Praise be to God and prayers and peace be upon our Prophet Muhammad and all his family and companions. As for what follows:

To all those whose repentance has been completed from all of the following factions (Free Army, Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, the regime, the popular committees), including those who have become affiliated with the Islamic State:

We inform you:

You must head to the Summons Office located beside the Civil Defence building in the city of Tabqa to sort out your affairs for a period not exceeding 15 days from the date of the issuing of this statement. All who violate this will be subject to inquiry and held accountable.

May God reward you best.

**Islamic State
Wilayat al-Raqqa
Amir of the Western Area**

[Specimen 3V: Repentance confirmation document, Deir az-Zor Province](#)

**Islamic State
Wilayat al-Kheir
Repentance Office
17 April 2015**

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Repentance number:

To the sons of the Islamic State:

Salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu

We inform you that the one called...has undertaken in our presence a repentance session after his apostasy and I have given him this document that he may be among the Muslim populace.

Repentance official

Specimen 3W: Central Cub Scouts of the Caliphate Institute, Raqqa Province **[May 2015]**

The Education Centre in Wilayat al-Raqqa announces the opening of the second session for the Central Cub Scouts of the Caliphate Institute where education for the cub scouts will take place in Shari'a sciences, arts of fighting, military sciences.

Registration conditions:

1. Student should be 10-15 years old.
2. Proficiency in reading and writing.

To go and inquire:

Centre of Education (Education College previously).

Specimen 3X: Opening of the Central Cub Scouts of the Caliphate Institute, Raqqa Province

Islamic State

Caliphate on the Program of Prophethood

Diwan al-Ta'aleem: Wilayat al-Raqqa

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Beginning from the words of God Almighty: "And prepare for them what you can from force and steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of God and your enemy." - Al-Anfal 60 [Qur'an 8:60]. And the words of the Prophet (may God's peace and blessings be upon him): "The strong believer is better and more beloved to God than the weak believer." - Muslim.

In consideration of the foremost matter in the Islamic State to cultivate future generations, the Diwan al-Ta'aleem in Wilayat al-Raqqa announces- and with the

supervision of the wali [provincial governor] may God protect him- the opening of the Central Cub Scouts of the Caliphate Institute.

Here there will be preparation of the cub scouts in faith through teaching them the Shari'a sciences, preparing them in the dunya [material world] and teaching them on the arts of fighting that they may be capable of taking over the banner of jihad under the slogan: "The proper establishment of this religion is by 'A book guides and a sword supports/gives victory."

"And your Lord suffices as a guide and helper." - al-Furqan 31 [Qur'an 25:31].

For inquiry and registration, go to the Diwan al-Ta'aleem- Education College previously.

Special Office of Education: Phone number: 267734-247821

Specimen 3Y: List of Those Missing from Shaitat Tribe of Deir az-Zor

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Kheir

Diwan al-Alaqaq al-'Aama [Public Relations Department]

Names of the missing from the Shaitat

[the tables list some 394 names, in the following form, and as far as 'status' goes, all are listed as 'killed']

Number	Name and surname	Status
--------	------------------	--------

Specimen 3Z: Notice to the soldiers of Kweiris airbase, Aleppo province [c. May 2015]

To all the besieged soldiers in Kweiris airbase,

God's ruling upon you is a strike with the sword, and by God we won't have mercy on any of you so strive to repent and defect from this kafir regime and we will accept the tawba [repentance] of the one who repents from among you before we gain power over him if he comes to us. And your taghut will not save you from anything for indeed your blood is to no avail and we will make no exception unless for the one who comes to us, and a lesson is

for you in Tabqa airport [where a massacre of regime soldiers took place at the hands of IS].

Numbers to connect with the soldiers of the Islamic State

0937699601

0935007806

Whatsapp number: 00905378489193

Specimen 4A: ID Card to Participate in Secondary School Exams

Islamic State

Caliphate on the Program of the Prophets

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

Card to Participate in Exams

Secondary Level

1436 AH

2015

Full name:

Mother's name:

Age group: 1999

School: Secondary [...]

Exam number:

Province: Ninawa

Director's name: Barid Abdullah al-Kalyahchi [NB: this is a name from Mosul]

Signature

Soecimen 4B: Notice to members of Ramadi Teaching Hospital

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Anbar

**Diwan al-Siha
Ramadi Teaching Hospital**

Caliphate on the Program of Prophethood

Statement no.: 182

Date: 18 May 2015

To: members of Ramadi Hospital

Notice

Salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu

To our brothers and our people in the beloved Wilayat al-Ramadi we would like to inform you that regular hours will be resumed in the Ramadi hospital after this notification. So all members of the hospital from technician, administrative, service and health staff to return and embrace regular hours for the sake of the interest of all the sick from our people and we count on you for the provision of medical staff and free treatment.

May God reward you best.

**Dr. Abu Othman
Ramadi Teaching Hospital**

**Islamic State
Diwan al-Siha
Ramadi Medical Profession**

[Specimen 4C: Exam Timetable for Nursing College, Mosul University](#)

**Islamic State
Caliphate on the Program of Prophethood
Diwan al-Ta'aleem
Nursing College**

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Final exams timetable for year of study 2013-2014 for the morning and evening classes of study.

Day	Date [all	First	Second	Third	Fourth Year
-----	-----------	-------	--------	-------	-------------

	2014]	Year	Year	Year	
Saturday	11 October	Arabic language		Drugs	
Sunday	12 October		Health Promotion		A: Elective B: Epidemiology
Monday	13 October	Basics of nursing		A: Medical Statistics B: Studies into nursing	
Tuesday	14 October		Social medicine		A: Psychology B: Contemporary views/guidances in nursing

Note: exams begin at 9 a.m. sharp.

With our prayers of success and excellence for you in this world and the Hereafter.

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

Specimen 4D: Education Regulations: Euphrates Province (Iraq sector)

Islamic State

Caliphate on the Program of Prophethood

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

Hijra date: 2/3/1436 AH [c. 24 December 2014]

No. 20

Education Centre in Wilayat al-Furat

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

To the administrations of all schools

Instructions

1. Women visiting schools may not enter without embracing Shari'a regulation dress.
2. Female employees and students may not be allowed to attend regular hours in the event they violate Shari'a regulation dress, and they will be considered absent from official regular hours.
3. The proprietor form and summary form of the timetable of provision of classes to one of the education offices (al-Qa'im, Rawa, Anah).
4. All teachers for all specialties must fulfill the assigned proper place; otherwise they will be transferred to the primary schools by administrative order.
5. Times of official regular hours are to be complied with and one must enter into the class even if no students are present inside the class.
6. One must have night watchmen with their presence in the schools by night.
7. The school director must report on the absence of the watchman in the event he does not embrace regular hours and is to submit disclosure of the event of any harm/damage that takes place in the school.
8. Displaced persons from educational staff in the province are informed that they must return to their schools by 2 January 2015, otherwise the education centre in the province will take the necessary proceedings and decisions according to Shari'a with respect to that person.
9. The teacher who is insufficiently qualified or falls short in his duty will be relieved of his post.
10. The school director is the one responsible for the standard of learning in the school.
11. The school director, chief supervisor and deputy supervisor are to work together to raise the quality and standard of learning in the school.
12. One must show interest in and assure the cleanliness of the school.
13. The school director bears ultimate responsibility for the violation of instructions.

And God is the one who guarantees success.

Islamic State
Diwan al-Ta'aleem
Wilayat al-Furat Centre

Abu Abdullah al-Qahtani

Specimen 4E: Notice to Service Offices in Hit, Anbar Province

Islamic State
Wilayat al-Anbar
Hit Area

Office of Services of the Muslims
General Notice
19 Safr 1436 AH [c. 12 December 2014]

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Announcement to all service offices

All employees in all the service offices must attend daily regular hours as usual and whoever does not comply to do so after more than 4 days from the date of the issuing of this notification will be a target for the confiscation of his home and Shari'a reckoning.

In particular for these offices: electricity, water, education, municipal, civil defence, health, agriculture, commercial.

Wilayat al-Anbar
Hit Area
Office of Services of the Muslims

NB: Compelling public office workers to do their jobs is a key part of IS administration: cf. [Specimen B](#) in the IS documents on public services in Ninawa province. It has worked to the group's advantage in Syria too, where previous rebel groups might have allowed employees to skive.

Specimen 4F: Requirement of ID Documents for Internet Café users, Ninawa Province

Islamic State

Wilayat Ninawa: Diwan al-Amn: Public Security Office

Statement no.: 164

12 May 2015

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

To all Internet shop owners

Notification

As salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu

We ask you to inform all users who deal with you to provide the four necessary documents [identity card, proof of identity, residence card, rations card] and have them verified with you, so that they can be requested from you on requirement.

May God reward you best.

Islamic State

Diwan al-Amn

Wilayat Ninawa Centre

Public Security for Wilayat Ninawa

NB: The system of the four ID documents dates back to the Saddam regime. The Iraqi government has aimed to [replace this system](#) with a new unified national identity card to be issued beginning from [mid-2015](#).

Specimen 4G: Sample Receipt, Rutba, Anbar Province

وصل قبض
 رقم ٤٣٧٠٧
 لا اله الا الله
 الله
 رسول
 محمد
 الدولة الإسلامية
 خلافة على منهاج النبوة
 ديوان بيت المال

اني: أبو عبد الله
 استلمت مبلغاً قدره: 300
 من: أحمد خطاب
 التاريخ: ١٦ / ٥ / ١٤٢٧ الموافق: ٢٠١ / /
 الملاحظات: ديوان بيت المال
www.mulhak.com
 توقيع المستلم
 توقيع المسلم

Islamic State
Caliphate on the Program of Prophethood
Diwan Bayt al-Mal

Receipt
No. 033707

I Abu Abdullah have received a sum of \$300 from Ahmad Shihab.

Date: 16/5/1436 (c. 7 March 2015)

Notes:

Recipient signature

Giver signature

Islamic State
Diwan Bayt al-Mal
Rutba Office: 2

Specimen 4H: Free Entry to Waritheen Hotel and Amusement Park in Mosul
[May 2015]

The Diwan al-Khidamat is pleased to invite you to enter the Waritheen Hotel and the Amusement Park for free in relation to the conquest of Wilayat al-Anbar and the conquests in Bilad al-Sham. And praise be to God who supports/gives victory to the believers and lowers polytheism and the polytheists.

Diwan al-Khidamat

Specimen 4I: Statement to the Ninawa Province Tribes

Islamic State
Caliphate on the Program of Prophethood
Diwan al-Asha'ir [Tribes Department]
Wilayat Ninawa

No. 79

6 Jumada al-Ukhra 1436 AH

23 March 2015

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

To the sheikhs and tribes of Wilayat Ninawa

Notification

Praise be to God and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God.

1. You are requested by obligation to come to the Diwan al-Asha'ir of Wilayat Ninawa at 10 a.m. on Monday Jumada al-Ukhra 1436 corresponding to 23 March 2015 and the one who violates and refuses will expose himself to binding Shari'a consequence as he will be among those who turn away.

2. Speeches of the conference participants and speakers on our part will be defined and there will be general debate for the discussion: that is, resisting the Safavid, Rafidite enemy, the forces of the mobilization [Hashd] and the apostate Peshmerga.

Oh God, I have indeed reached, oh God, so I bear witness

Islamic State

Amir Diwan al-Asha'ir Wilayat Ninawa

Copy to:

- **Islamic Military Police**
- **Islamic Police**
- **Intelligence services of the Islamic State**

For direct informing at the hands of the sheikhs, and let us know immediately those who reject and refuse

[Specimen 4J: Room Prices per Night at the Waritheen Hotel](#)

Room Prices

1. Single room: 65000 [Iraqi dinars]
2. Double room: 65000

3. Suite room and hall: 97500
4. Additional bed: 20000

With breakfast only.

Specimen 4K: Excerpt from an Islamic State textbook: on the concepts of al-Wala' and al-Bara'

Pg. 38

al-Wala' and al-Bara'

Getting to know the concept by word:

al-Wala' as a word: from Wilaya and it means affection.

al-Bara' as a word: the masdar [noun derivative] of bara with the meaning of cutting, and from it, bara al-qalam, he sharpened it.

Getting to know the concept as a technical term:

al-Wala': Affection for the Muslims, supporting them, dignifying them, respecting them and being near to them.

al-Bara': Hating the disbelievers, being distant from them, and abandoning support for them.

The Importance of al-Wala' and al-Bara'

1. Among the principles of Islamic creed
2. The most indissoluble bonds of faith
3. It is from the faith of Ibrahim- peace be upon him- and the faith of Muhammad may God's peace and blessings be upon him.

Types of al-Muwala:

Two types:

1. Tawalli
2. Muwalatun

Specimen 4L: Excerpt from an Islamic State textbook: on the concept of al-Imaan

Pg.45

al-Imaan [faith]

Meaning of the word:

-Believing and confirming.

Al-Imaan among the Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaat [Sunnis]

It is:

1. Believing in the heart.
2. Uttering with the tongue.
3. Practising with the limbs and pillars [i.e. outward practise of the faith]
4. Increasing obedience.
5. Reducing rebellion

Specimen 4M: Denial of Killing Media Guys, Cyrenaica Province, Libya

Islamic State

Wilayat Barqa

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Praise be to God and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God, and on his family, companions and whosoever is close to him. As for what follows:

In refutation of what has been disseminated from rumours against us, we in the Islamic State deny what the lying media channels and connection outlets affiliated with the corrupt media have published about our responsibility for the killing of 6 youths from Ajdabiya affiliated with one of the media channels, just as we previously denied our responsibility for kidnapping them.

And to God belongs the matter before and after.

Wilayat Barqa: Media Office

Issued on date 8 Rajab 1436 AH/27 April 2015

Specimen 4N: Regulations for Pharmacies, western Deir az-Zor province

Islamic State
Wilayat al-Kheir

[...]

As-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu

Pharmacists in the western region are asked to embrace the following guidelines and any violation will require consequences:

- . Pharmacists must be present in the pharmacy from 9 a.m. to 2 p.m.
- . The pharmacy must be cleaned and medicines must not be exposed to sunlight.
- . There must be a fridge to preserve hormonal medicines and some of the eyedrops [?]
- . One must display a license given by the Islamic State and for those who don't have licenses, they must go to the health office in the Public Hospital of Ma'adan (?)
- . Pharmacies violating without a pharmacy certificate established in the wilaya are given a deadline of 10 days from this date, otherwise the owner will be detained and the pharmacy closed definitely.
- . The required documents for license:
 - Pharmacy certificate and graduation certificate
 - One identity card
 - One personal photo
 - Statements of the pharmacy worker (copy of his personal ID)
- . No selling of psychological drugs or anaesthetics without going and registering with the health office in Ma'adan (?) for prescription approval to be given to the patient.

Islamic State

[...]

27/6/1436 AH [c. 16 April 2015]

Specimen 40: New employment opportunities for teachers

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Islamic State
Diwan al-Ta'aleem

No. 15

Date: 5/8/1436 AH [c. 23 May 2015]

Announcement

Qualification and development of teachers for educating the generations of the Muslims

Praise be to God who says: "It is He who has sent among the illiterate a Messenger from among them reciting to them His verses, purifying and teaching them the Book and wisdom, even if they were previously in clear error." - Jum'ah 3 [Qur'an 62:3]

And prayers and peace be upon the one who was sent as a teacher for His Ummah and a guide for its path, as for what follows:

Indeed the Ummah excels through its teachers when they direct what they have assumed responsibility for with truthfulness and guarantee, and among the most important reasons for the backwardness and degradation of the nations is their lack of getting to know the power of their teachers, and not elevating them from among their affairs. For the teacher is the one people entrust to teach their sons, discipline and educate them. So the importance of the teacher is to polish minds, refine souls, implant virtues and tear out vices, and to educate the generations with an established, correct education for that is among the qualities of the prophets.

Thus the Diwan al-Ta'aleem announces its acceptance of a new contingent of those qualified from among male and female teachers and those with expertise to participate in the education of the sons of the Muslims for all educational stages according to the following specialties:

1. Shari'a sciences, Arabic language subjects, history, geography, mathematics, chemistry, physics, biology and physical education.
2. Vocational subjects: business, industry, agriculture, nursing.
3. Administration and services.

Acceptance conditions

1. Proficiency in teaching and bearing responsibility.
2. Passing prepared sessions: i.e. qualification and development; ways of teaching new programs.

So all who find in themselves proficiency and ability to bear responsibility and implement the guarantee of knowledge should head personally to register with one of the education offices spread throughout all the wilayat of the Islamic State. Registration begins from Monday 7 Sha'aban 1436 for two weeks from 9 a.m. till 2 p.m.

Note

- . First session begins on Saturday 12 Sha'aban 1436 AH.
- . Next year of study begins inshallah on Saturday 21 Dhu al-Qa'ada 1436 AH (5 September 2015).
- . The number of schools to be opened is linked to the number of successes and acceptances of teachers in the Shari'a sessions and paths of teaching.

We ask God to use us and not replace us.

The Almighty has said: "And if you turn away, He will replace you with another people who will not be like you."- Muhammad 37 [Qur'an 47:37]

Islamic State

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

Amir Dhu al-Qarnain.

[Specimen 4P: Agricultural Summer Plan in Deir az-Zor Province](#)

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Kheir

Centre for the Diwan al-Zara'a wa al-Rayy [Agriculture and Irrigation]

As salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu

Praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds, and may good health be upon those on the right path, and may there be no enmity except on the wrongdoers. And there is no deity but God, the deity of the first and last, and the establishment of the heavens and the earth, and master of the Day of Judgment, and prayers and peace be upon the one who was sent in front of the Hour with the sword so that God alone may be worshipped with no companion for him, and upon his family, companions, the followers and whoso has followed them with ihsan till the Day of Judgment. I bear witness that there is no deity but God alone, having no companion, and I bear witness that Muhammad is the servant and Messenger of God (PBUH).

The Agricultural Plan for the Summer Season

To the distinguished brothers in the offices of the Diwan al-Zara'a in Wilayat al-Kheir, may God protect them.

We ask you to work to implement the agricultural plan for the current summer season and make mention of it through gathering the peasants and heads of the associations and making them embrace what follows in the decision on this matter.

1. 30% of the field land is to be cultivated with summer crops (cotton, yellow corn, vegetables)
2. 70% of the field land is to be cultivated with crops that only require one watering/irrigation...(watermelon, melon, sesame and seed crops)

This should also draw the peasant's attention to the decrease in the river level and the importance of preserving irrigation water, and thus it is absolutely forbidden for field lands to be irrigated in violation of this agricultural program, and thus the peasants who violate will be subjected to reprimand (the lands that draw water from the path of the irrigation projects).

[...]

And may God reward you best.

Abu Ahmad (?) al-Tunisi

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Kheir

Diwan al-Zara'a Centre

Specimen 4Q: Tax Form for Electricity, Deir az-Zor Province

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Kheir

Local administration for electricity

Tax form

Series no.

Town/village

The user...has paid a sum of 1000 Syrian pounds only and no other tax for the month of April.

Tax-collector's signature

27 May 2015

Specimen 4R: Gas Distributions in Deir az-Zor Province

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Kheir

Diwan al-Rikaz Centre

No. 2

6 Sha'aban 1436 AH [c. 24 May 2015]

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Notification

Praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds, and prayers and peace be upon the most noble of those sent, our Sayyid Muhammad, and on all his family and companions. As for what follows:

To all the Muslim populaces: we inform you that gas bottles will be distributed according to the following procedures.

Showing the marriage proof document (family register, family statement, original marriage bond).

Similarly we inform you that the price of one gas battle is 750 Syrian pounds and in the event of having multiple wives, the bottles will be distributed according to the number of wives after showing proof, so those who wish to receive the bottles should see the representative for their area, neighbourhood or village and in the event there is no representative the people of the neighbourhood, village or area should appoint a representative themselves.

Note: 700 [pounds] for the Diwan al-Rikaz Centre
50 for the representative.

And God is the guarantor of success.

Specimen 4S: Notice to Mosques in Deir az-Zor Province**Islamic State****Wlayat al-Kheir****Diwan al-Da'wah wa al-Masajid****In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful****Statement for distribution to the mosques**

The Mosques Administration in the Diwan al-Da'wah wa al-Masajid has issued a decision to oblige the muezzins on the following matters:

1. The dawn calls to prayer are to be raised in two different voices until the true dawn becomes clear from the false dawn to the people, while the tathwib [the line: '[prayer is better than sleep](#)'] will be for the first call to prayer only and the time interval between the two will be 15 minutes.
2. There will be a restriction to one call for prayer for Friday prayers after the imam ascends the pulpit.
3. The voice is to be raised with external amplifiers in prayer, lessons and sermons without iqama al-salat [see [here](#) for explanation], which should be done with internal amplifiers only.

Mosques Administration**Islamic State****Specimen 4T: Barring Teachers from Work, Northern Deir az-Zor Province****Islamic State****Wilayat al-Kheir****Caliphate on the Program of Prophethood****Diwan al-Ta'aleem****In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful**

Praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds and prayers and peace be upon the one who was sent with the sword as a mercy to the worlds and his mercy. As for what follows:

We have decided to dismiss all these teachers, whose names follow:

...

All the teachers mentioned above by name are not allowed to work in the field of education or enter school for any reason, because they reject jihadi thought [i.e. they refused to repent and attend IS Shari'a sessions for teachers].

And God is the one who guarantees success.

Diwan al-Ta'aleem Official in the Northern Area

Abu Haitham

29/6/1436 AH [c. 18 April 2015]

[Specimen 4U: Call for Repentance of Female Education Workers, Al-Basira, Deir az-Zor Province](#)

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Date: 1/8/1436 AH [c. 19 May 2015]

Announcement

All female workers who worked in the education corps in the days of the kafir Nusayri regime must attend the al-Rahman mosque in al-Basira on Tuesday after noon prayers on 8/8/1436 AH to attend a repentance session that will last one week only (one hour a day).

(Let it be known that the session is compulsory)

And God is the guarantor of success

Diwan al-Ta'aleem: Northern Area

Abu Haitham

[Specimen 4V: General Notification: Agricultural Department](#)

Islamic State

Diwan al-Zara'a

3 June 2015

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

The Almighty has said: "And prepare for them what you can from force and steeds of war so that you may terrify the enemy of God and your enemy." [Qur'an 8:60]

Oh Muslims:

The deranged war being waged against the Islamic State by the Crusader alliance and their followers is no secret, and the economic war is one of the methods of this war. Thus we must make preparations to resist it and that will be done by leaving reserve stocks of grain in every home of the homes of the Muslims, which is in compliance with the command of God Almighty to prepare material and His command for us in this sort of state of affairs to accumulate storage with His words: "And what you harvest, leave in its spikes." [Qur'an 12:47]

Islamic State

Diwan al-Zara'a

[Specimen 4W: Notification to the Mosques of Ramadi](#)

الدولة الإسلامية
وزارة الأوقاف / دوائر الدعوة والمساجد / مكتب مدينة الرمادي

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

الحمد لله والصلاة والسلام على رسول الله وعلى آله وصحبه ومن ولاة بعدد ...

الى / مساجد مدينة الرمادي
م / تعميم

لبارئكم من حمد الله وركائه ...

لما برئ نعيات وخطوات عمل يجب الالتزام بها في كافة المساجد وسيتم متابعة ومحاسبة المتخلف.

1. الانضمام بالكتاب والسنة وترك البدع والضلالات.
2. الالتزام بالهدى الظاهر لكافة العاملين في المسجد من امام او خطيب او مؤذن:
1. اداء التيمم ب. تقصير الثوب ج. حسن الخلق.
2. برك اذان لصلاة الفجر كما يأتي: أ. اذان اول يرفع قبل الفجر الصادق ب. اذان تسمى بعد ظهور الفجر الصالح (بعد الوقت) ويكون التتويب (الصلاة خير من النوم) في الاذان الاول.
3. عند الاذان يوم الجمعة يكون اذان واحد بعد صعود الخطيب الى المنبر.
4. عدم التعلل في قضائها عقود الترواح او الفتاوى الشرعية وذلك لوجود المحكمة الشرعية المتخصصة بذلك.
5. عدم قلعة حفات تعليم القرآن الكريم او التروس والمحاضرات الا بأمر من مكتب الدعوة والمساجد.
6. عدم تسبق او قراءة أي بيان لو امر في المسجد.
7. عدم فصل او تعيين أي عامل في المسجد امام او خطيب او مؤذن.

كل ذلك لا يكون الا بأمر من مكتب الدعوة والمساجد في مدينة الرمادي

وجزاكم الله خيراً

مسجل في:

• ابو عبد الله الرمادي
• ابو عبد الله
• ابو عبد الله

ابو عبد الرحمن العراقي
أصدر مكتب الدعوة والمساجد / دائرة الرمادي

Islamic State**Wilayat al-Anbar: Diwan al-Da'wa wa al-Masajid: Ramadi directorate office****Statement no. 1****4 June 2015****In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful**

Praise be to God and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God and his family, companions and whosoever is close to him. As for what follows:

To the mosques of the city of Ramadi**Statement for distribution**

As-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu

In what follows are instructions and work plans that must be embraced in all the mosques, otherwise the violator will be tracked down and held accountable.

1. Adherence to the Kitab [Qur'an] and Sunna and abandoning innovation and errors.
2. All those who work in the mosque- imam, preacher and muezzin- must embrace the clear guidance
 - a) Growing a beard
 - b) Shortening the clothing [i.e. not allowing it to drape]
 - c) Good character
3. The calls to prayer for dawn prayers will be as follows:
 - a) A first call to prayer will be raised before the true dawn.
 - b) A second call to prayer will be after the appearance of the true dawn (entry of the time) and the tathwib ('Prayer is better than sleep') will be in the first call to prayer.
 - c) The call to prayer on Friday will be one call to prayer after the preacher ascends to the pulpit.
4. No interference in the matters of holding marriages or Shari'a fatwas as that is of the concern of the Shari'a Court

5. No holding of circles for teaching the Noble Qur'an or lessons and lectures except by order of the Da'wah and Masajid office.

6. No sticking of or reading any statement or order in the mosque.

7. No dismissal or appointment of any worker in the mosque (imam, preacher or muezzin)

All of that [i.e. points 6 or 7] will only be by order of the Da'wah and Masajid office in the city of Ramadi.

May God reward you best.

Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Iraqi

Amir of the Da'wah and Masajid Office- Ramadi Area

[Specimen 4X: Ban on Importing Iranian Food and Medical Goods](#)



10 Sha'aban 1436 AH
28 May 2015

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

To all the wilayats and diwans
Prohibition on importing

Praise be to God, and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God, and on his family be protection, as for what follows:

As-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu:

I ask God (Almighty and Exalted is He) to protect you, show your opinion the right way, make firm your steps, raise your strength and grant you success in what He loves and is pleased with. Indeed He is powerful over everything...

We would like to inform you about an important issue: and that is concerning Iranian goods (food and medical), for complaints have come to us and there is a lack of confidence in dealing with these goods that come to us from Iran, for in Wilayat al-Anbar, they found the watermelon was contaminated with poisonous substances, and the brother the amir of the Diwan al-Siha mentioned the lack of trust in Iranian medical treatments/goods etc., for these are a people of treachery and betrayal who are not to be trusted, for this is their habit. Thus it is forbidden to import food and medical goods from Persian Iran.

Notice:

This letter comes into effect from the date it reaches you, and as for goods present in the shops, they are not to be confiscated, but rather the opportunity is to be given to sell them to whoever might get rid of them, and no new goods are to be imported after this process is completed.

May God reward you best.

Islamic State
General Supervisory Committee

[Specimen 4Y: Oil and Gas Distributions in Ramadi](#)



In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Anbar: Ramadi Area

Diwan al-Rikaz

Announcement

To the brothers who own functioning generators only within the Ramadi area we ask you to head to the complaints office near the Haji Ziyad restaurant and that will be for the distribution of gas and oil to the families/people.

May God reward you best.

Abu Omar

10 June 2015

NB: thanks to a local contact n Saqlawiya, Fallujah, with relatives in Ramadi for sending this document.

Specimen 4Z: Notice to employees of the Gasworks in Ramadi

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Anbar: Ramadi Area

Diwan al-Rikaz

Announcement

To all the employees of the al-Rikaz gasworks we ask you to head to the registration office near the al-Haj Ziyad restaurant at 9 a.m. every day in order to fulfill the numerous necessities.

May God reward you best.

Official for the al-Rikaz gasworks

Abu Omar

10 June 2015

Specimen 5A: Minutes of a meeting on educational reform by the Diwan al-Ta'aleem for upcoming academic year (unofficial document)- June 2015

1. Study will be 5 years primary, 2 secondary, 2 preparatory [pre-college] and university study by years according to specialty.
2. Preparatory study will have a number of divisions: industrial, scientific, Shari'a, agriculture, nursing.

3. Primary study will focus on doctrine, Arabic language, as well as mathematics, sira (history), and foreign languages (English et al.)
4. Physical education will be replaced with physical jihad training including: shooting, swimming, and riding horses with compliance with the subject name changes [see [here](#) for last year's subject changes]
5. A student should finish study/education having memorized between 7 to 10 parts of the noble Qur'an with mastery of being able to read the entire Qur'an.
6. The staff cadre will be of new blood, by which I say to all graduates from the educational colleges and others: the Diwan al-Ta'aleem has opened up the doors of appointments, so you may go and submit your applications (either gender): salaries begin from 300,000 Iraqi dinars (\$250 and above).
7. The programs were defined and refined in their contents by professors of the college of education: psychology division, so they could express their opinion on its state in relation to the student's mind and age, and their agreement came about after some adjustments.
8. The official responsible for designing the programs and books is a French brother in origin who was a director for one of the printing presses in France who made hijra specifically for this matter in the path of God.
9. The official responsible for the writing of the books is an Egyptian brother in nationality who was one of the senior officials in the Egyptian ministry of education. God helped him make hijra and entrusted this matter to him.
10. All educational staff must undergo two sessions: the first Shari'a and the second to get to know the programs. This matter will begin in the next few days, and academic study in the ninth month [September] inshallah.



Apparently the committee within the Diwan al-Ta'aleem responsible for preparing this year's educational system and program.

NB: Via Omar Fawaz, a pro-IS source in Mosul

Specimen 5B: Timetable for prayer times in Ramadan, Ramadi area

مواقيت الصلاة لمدينة الرمادي وظواحيها لشهر رمضان ١٤٣٦ هـ										
رقم	يوم	الربيع			الصيف			الشتاء		ملاحظات
		الأحد	الاثنين	الثلاثاء	الأحد	الاثنين	الثلاثاء	الأحد	الاثنين	
١	الأربعاء	١٧	حزيران، ٢٠١٥							
٢	الخميس	١٨	حزيران، ٢٠١٥							
٣	الجمعة	١٩	حزيران، ٢٠١٥							
٤	السبت	٢٠	حزيران، ٢٠١٥							
٥	الأحد	٢١	حزيران، ٢٠١٥							
٦	الاثنين	٢٢	حزيران، ٢٠١٥							
٧	الثلاثاء	٢٣	حزيران، ٢٠١٥							
٨	الأربعاء	٢٤	حزيران، ٢٠١٥							
٩	الخميس	٢٥	حزيران، ٢٠١٥							
١٠	الجمعة	٢٦	حزيران، ٢٠١٥							
١١	السبت	٢٧	حزيران، ٢٠١٥							
١٢	الأحد	٢٨	حزيران، ٢٠١٥							
١٣	الاثنين	٢٩	حزيران، ٢٠١٥							
١٤	الثلاثاء	٣٠	حزيران، ٢٠١٥							
١٥	الأربعاء	١	تموز، ٢٠١٥							
١٦	الخميس	٢	تموز، ٢٠١٥							
١٧	الجمعة	٣	تموز، ٢٠١٥							
١٨	السبت	٤	تموز، ٢٠١٥							
١٩	الأحد	٥	تموز، ٢٠١٥							
٢٠	الاثنين	٦	تموز، ٢٠١٥							
٢١	الثلاثاء	٧	تموز، ٢٠١٥							
٢٢	الأربعاء	٨	تموز، ٢٠١٥							
٢٣	الخميس	٩	تموز، ٢٠١٥							
٢٤	الجمعة	١٠	تموز، ٢٠١٥							
٢٥	السبت	١١	تموز، ٢٠١٥							
٢٦	الأحد	١٢	تموز، ٢٠١٥							
٢٧	الاثنين	١٣	تموز، ٢٠١٥							
٢٨	الثلاثاء	١٤	تموز، ٢٠١٥							
٢٩	الأربعاء	١٥	تموز، ٢٠١٥							
٣٠	الخميس	١٦	تموز، ٢٠١٥							
٣١	الجمعة	١٧	تموز، ٢٠١٥							

ملاحظة: يكون موعد صلاة العيد بعد شروق الشمس بعشرين (٢٠) دقيقة.

عدت من قبل لجنة من مركز الدعوة والمباعدة ولاية الأنبار

"Notice: appointment of Eid prayers will be 20 minutes after sunrise." "Prepared by a committee from the Da'wah and Masajid Centre- Wilayat al-Anbar."

Specimen 5C: Dates for Zakat proceedings, Ramadi area**Islamic State****Wilayat al-Anbar****Zakat and Sadaqat Office: Ramadi area****No.****Date: 20.../14... [CE vs. AH]****Noble brothers:**

The dates for registering poor and displaced families will be from 1st to 8th of every Hijra month. The dates for registry and inventory will be from 10th to 18th of every Hijra month. Distributions will be from 21st to 29th of every Hijra month.

Zakat and Sadaqat Office

NB: You are required to bring identity card, proof of identity, residence and rations card [cf. Specimen 4F]

Specimen 5D: Preparation sessions for teachers, northern Deir az-Zor province (June 2015)**Islamic State****Caliphate on the Program of Prophethood****Diwan al-Ta'aleem****In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful**

The Diwan al-Ta'aleem in the northern region announces:

The beginning of operation in the Higher Institute for the Preparation of Teachers on Saturday 26 Sha'aban 1436 AH, according to the following program:

- . First lesson in the al-Imaan mosque in the village of al-Sabha at 8:30 [a.m.]
- . Second lesson in the Abu Bakr al-Sadiq mosque in Hatla at 11:00 a.m.
- . Third lesson in the al-Sur mosque in the locality of al-Sur at 2:00 p.m.

For the villages and areas extending from al-Tabiya till al-Basira in the east to al-Hajna in the north, head to the al-Imaan mosque in al-Sabha.

For the villages and areas extending from Khasham till al-Kabr in the west head to the Abu Bakr al-Sadiq mosque in Hatla.

For the villages and areas extending between al-Hijna to Ruwayshid, head to the al-Sur mosque in al-Sur.

And God is the guarantor of success.

Diwan al-Ta'aleem Northern Region

Abu Haytham

Specimen 5E: General notification, Aleppo Province, Jumada al-Awal 1436 AH (February/March 2015)

Islamic State

Wilayat Halab

General Administration

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Statement for distribution Jumada al-Awal

1. When the Prophet (PBUH) wanted to conduct a raid, he would conceal it under another purpose, saying when he wanted to conduct the Battle of Hunayn: How do we find a path and its waters? And who is among them from the enemy? And he would say: "War is deceit." So we remind you brothers not to disclose news and information of the movement of your brothers through use of the Internet.

2. Every brother who participated in the battle against the Khalid Hayani battalion- 'Shuhada Badr'- which came months before the Sahwa wars [in 2013 in Aleppo city], and likewise the one who knows a martyr who participated in that battle and his family in the land of the Islamic State should register his name with the war spoils and booty administration in Wilayat Halab.


3. In so far as permission has been granted for the wilayats to launch assaults in accordance with the wars against the gangs, the war spoils in the custody of a particular squadron are to be divided among all the members of that squadron, and all who helped them in their raid are to have a share of the spoils. And those who embarked upon the raid are to be distinguished with having a third part of the spoils, while the remaining two thirds are to be divided equally among them and those who helped them, meaning that

the amir al-mu'mineen may God protect him [Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi] is to cede a fifth part of the spoils as well in accordance with the interest/right of those who take spoils [cf. [here](#)].

4. Transfers are to be stopped completely, from military battalions to other formations
5. The brother cannot transfer to another province before spending 6 months of his existence in the province
6. The car whose value for repair after exposure to an accident exceeds \$100: the value for repair is not to be spent except after raising the issue with the court and obtaining a form from them indicating that the issue has been raised.
7. By order of the general committee, working hours in the Dawla's centres and offices are fixed from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. with observance of hours of watch, being on call/duty and other obligations during work.
8. Signs stuck to cars of the Islamic State that distinguish them from others are to be removed in light of the ease by which they can be targeted by the enemy (God forbid). In addition, avoid some of the strange signs and expressions that are for show and devoid of meaningful content, like names of wilayats and non-existent places and the like. The exception is officially authorized expressions written on the cars of al-Hisba, the Islamic police, and traffic police, for these are to remain.
9. Photos of sabaya [concubines/female sex slaves] are not to be put on the Internet in any form
10. No member of the state except commanders and soldiers is to have a share in state property/wealth, similarly their companions of the public/general populace are also barred from sharing in it.
11. No member of the state is to be assigned investment, bidding, auction etc.,
12. No member may exploit his position and work in the state for personal interests.
13. Whoever has made a share or investment on the part of the state is to return it to the amir of the Diwan centre or specialist committee dealing with this matter in that affair or the wali's office
14. Women are not allowed to bear arms openly in the markets or streets

15. The military police has the competency to deal with those who refuse to rise with the patrol in the necessary manner.

Specimen 5F: Centres for application for positions in education, Mosul



Centres for reception of applicants


Centres to receive men

Left side [east Mosul]

1. Sadiq Rashan Mosque/al-Muthanna
2. Al-Huda Mosque/al-Quds neighbourhood
3. Rashan Mosque/Palestine

Right side [west Mosul]

1. Al-Yaqdha Mosque/al-Jadida
2. The Grand Mosque (al-Nuri)
3. Al-Ibadi Mosque/al-Islah



Centres to receive women

Left side

al-Ashraf al-Ikhtisasi/al-Maliya neighbourhood

Right side

Female teachers' institute/al-Jadida

Education centre- Wilayat Ninawa

Specimen 5G: Unified Friday sermon for Ninawa mosques: March 2015 (partially missing): Origins of the Shi'a and why they are not Muslim

الدولة الإسلامية
ولاية نيسابور / ديوان الدعوة والمساجد

العدد: ١٦٠
التاريخ: ١٤٢٧ / ٥ / ٢٥
٢٠١٥ / ٢ / ١٦

(هل أتاك حديث الرافضة)

- خطبة الحاجة التي كان يبدأ بها النبي ﷺ:

إن الناظر في تاريخ الفرس على مرّ العصور يجد أنهم يمجّدون تاريخهم ويرون فضلهم على سائر الخلق . حالهم كحال اليهود لعنهم الله حيث يرون ألهم أوصياء على الناس ويظنّون إليهم نظرة احتقار ويريدون استعبادهم ، إذ أن حقد الفرس بدأ على الناس عامة وعلى المسلمين خاصة لأن المسلمين كانوا سبباً لسقوط إمبراطوريتهم وأطلقوا نارها التي كانوا يعدونها من دون الله تعالى وذلك على يد الخليفة الراشد عمر بن الخطاب ؓ الذي ألزمهم بأحكام الإسلام وهذا دين خلفاء المسلمين الموحدين حيث أنهم إذا شكّوا في الأرض فإنهم يلزمون الناس بأحكام الإسلام.

فبدأ الفرس المجوس -الرافضة- منذ صدر الإسلام بالكوبل بين المسلمين لإثارة الفتن والفتن والطعن بالإسلام والمسلمين . وكما يعرف القاصي والداني بحقيقة (صد الله بن سبأ) هذا اليهودي الرافضي الذي كان أول من أنشأ دين الرافض في زمن الخليفة الراشد علي بن أبي طالب ؓ، وقام بإشعال نار الحرب والفتنة بين الصحابة رضوان الله تعالى عليهم وبقت أحقاد الرافض إلى يومنا هذا...

قال شيخ الإسلام ابن تيمية في كتاب منهاج السنة: (الرافضة ليس لهم سعي إلا لهدم الإسلام ونقض عراه وإفساد قواعده) وقد أفاض علماء السلف في بيان حقيقة الرافضة فقالوا: (أن الرافض أساس الزندقة) وكذلك قالوا: (أن دين الرافضة بذر يهودية عرسها المجوسية في أرض نصرانية).

فدين الرافضة دين يختلف تماماً عن دين الإسلام الذي جاء به النبي محمد ﷺ ولا يلتقي معه لا في أصول ولا في فروع لا من بعد ولا من قريب وأنهم يرفضون الإسلام جملة وتفصيلاً :

 - ولأنهم: حولوا جبريل عليه السلام وحسن الله تعالى لأتباعه الذي قال الله عنه: ﴿كَذَّبْتَهُ النَّبِيُّ﴾ (النجم: ٣٠) . قالوا: أنه خان الأمانة ولم ينزل على علي ؓ ونزل على محمد ﷺ .
 - ولأنهم: قالوا: أن رسول الله ﷺ لم يكمل شليح الرسالة ولم يوصي بالخلافة لعلي ؓ. وقد قال الله تعالى: ﴿أَيُّوَرَأْسُكُمُ لَكُمْ دِيْنُكُمْ وَأَنْتُمْ عَلَيْهِ كَفَرْتُمْ فَمَنْ يَمُنَّ بِكُمْ لِيَشْرَ لَكُمْ مِنْكُمْ فَيُؤْتِيَكُمْ أَمْثَلَكُمْ﴾ (النور: ١١) .
 - ولأنهم: ملعنوا في القرآن الكريم وردوا آياته التي جاءت تزييناً أم المؤمنين عائشة (رضي الله عنها).
 - والله تعالى يقول: ﴿لِلَّذِينَ جَاءُوا بِالْإِيمَانِ فَغَيَّبْنَا عَنْكُمْ آلَهُمْ نَسَبُهُمْ شَرًّا لَكُمْ بَرًّا فَكَيْفَ يُؤْتِيكُمْ اللَّهُ مِنْ شَيْءٍ إِذْ يَأْتِيَنَّكُمْ نَخْتِ الشَّجَرَةَ لَعْنَةً مَّا فِي قُلُوبِهِمْ أَتَزَكَّى أَعْيُنٌ عَلَيْهِمْ وَآيَاتُهَا تُنْكِرُ﴾ (التغ: ١٨) .
 - ولأنهم: ردوا أحاديث رسول الله ﷺ وطعنوا بمن نقلها وطعنوا في البخاري ومسلم والنسبي ﷺ يقول: ((ألا إني أتيت الكتاب ومثله معه...)) (صحیح) .

Islamic State**Wilayat Ninawa: Diwan al-Da'wah wa al-Masajid****No. 160****25/5/1436 AH****16/3/2015 CE****Has the story of the Rafidites come to you?**

. The al-Haja sermon with which the Prophet (PBUH) would begin:

The one who observes history of the Persians on the passing of the eras will find that they take pride in their history and consider themselves to be favoured over the rest of creation, their state being like that of the Jews- may God curse them- since they think that they are the trustees over people, looking at them with scorn and wanting to rule over them, as the Persian hatred began for people in general and for the Muslims in particular because the Muslims were the reason for the fall of their empire and extinguishing of their fire that they worshipped without God Almighty, and that occurred at the hand of the Rightly-Guided Caliph Omar ibn al-Khattab (may God be pleased with him) who made them embrace the rulings of Islam, for this is the practice of the caliphs of the monotheist Muslims, when they obtain power in the land, they make the people embrace the rulings of Islam.

So the Majus [Zoroastrian] Persians- the Rafidites- began from the heart of Islam to infiltrate among the Muslims to stir up strife and discord, and challenge Islam and Muslims. Similarly, the one near and afar knows the truth of Abdullah ibn Saba- this Rafidite Jew who was the first to have established this rejectionist religion in the time of the Rightly-Guided Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib (may God be pleased with him) and thus he kindled the flame of war and strife among the Companions (may God Almighty's contentment be upon them) and the descendants of the Rafidites have remained to this very day of ours...

The Sheikh of Islam Ibn Taymiyya in the book Manhaj al-Sunna said: "The Rafidites' only goal is to destroy Islam, destroy its bonds and corrupt its principles." And the 'ulama al-Salf have affirmed in a statement on the truth about the Rafidites, saying: "Rejectionism's foundation is heresy." And similarly they have said: "The Rafidite religion is a Jewish seed planted by the Majus in a Christian land."

For the religion of the Rafidites is a religion wholly different from the religion of Islam that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) brought, concurring with it neither in principles, divisions, nor from near or afar. They reject Islam totally and in detail:

. Because they have accused Gabriel- peace be upon him- of betrayal and deemed unreliable God's cultivation of His Prophets about whom God said- "One intense in strength has taught him" (al-Najm 5: Qur'an 53:5). They have said: he betrayed the entrusted mission and did not reveal to Ali but revealed to Muhammad.

. Because they have said: the Messenger of God did not fulfill the deliverance of the message and did not entrust the Caliphate/succession to Ali. And God Almighty has said: "Today I have fulfilled your religion for you, completed My blessing upon you, and I have approved Islam as a religion for you."- (al-Ma'ida 3: Qur'an 5:3).

. Because they have defamed the Noble Qur'an and rejected its verses that came exonerating A'isha the Mother of the Believers- may God be pleased with her. And God Almighty says: "Indeed those who came with a falsehood are a group among you, but do not reckon it is evil for you, rather it is good for you."- (al-Nur 11: Qur'an 24:11).

. Because they have defamed the Companions- may God be pleased with them- and declared them to be infidels, except five of them. And God Almighty says: "Indeed God has been pleased with the believers when they have pledged allegiance to you under the tree and He knew what was in their hearts, so He sent tranquillity upon them and rewarded them with an imminent conquest." (al-Fath 18: Qur'an 48:18).

. Because they have rejected the hadiths of the Messenger of God, defaming those who have transmitted them and attacking al-Bukhari and Muslim. And the Prophet says: "Indeed I have bestowed the Book [Qur'an] and a Sunna with it..." (Sahih)

Specimen 5H: Arabic language exam for secondary school (grammar section)

Islamic State

Caiphate on the Program of Prophethood

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

Public Exam Questions

Year of Study: 1435-1436 AH/2014-2015 CE

Subject: Arabic language

Study: secondary

Time: 3 hours

Arabic language grammar: 70 marks

1. Indicate the type [of word] in 5 of the derivatives underlined in the following sentences (10 marks):

- i) al-qa'id rahbun sadran
- ii) al-'ilm 'amda silahin
- iii) al-mujahid muqatilun li-'ila' kalimat Allah
- iv) dhalika tayrun khawwamun fi l-jaw
- v) al-sadqu mahmudatu awaqibihi
- vi) a mat'amu Muhammad dayfuhu?

b) Compare the adjective in likeness with the verb form 'taba' then place it in a sentence & mention its form (4 marks)

c) Give an example of intensification on the form fa'ul relying on a question in a sentence (3 marks)

d) Give the form/pattern of five of the following words: akbar, muhawila, muqsha'ir, qul, sa'altum, qif (5 marks)

2a) Indicate the reason for the appearance of five of the following noun forms on the photo you see (5 marks):

saleel, tasmiya, jadhab, faydhan, duwar, hisar, tujara

b) Give the imperfect tense of five of the following verbs, and indicate their category (10 marks):

sarafa, sahula, wahaba, nabata, zahada, wara'a, haraba

c) Give three examples of what follows in sentences (6 marks):

- i) A comparative in which agreement with its thing described is, and non-agreement.
- ii) A word of form maf'ul from a non-trilateral verb
- iii) A word of form fa'il from a trilateral verb that falls best.
- iv) An intransitive verb [i.e. one that has fa'il but not maf'ul]

3a) Find the first and second accusative in the following words of the Almighty: Inna ja'alna ma'ala al-ard zaynatan. Then indicate the verb's meaning (3 marks)

b) Derive every masdar [noun form] of the non-trilateral verbs from the following text, then indicate its verb (5 marks):

su'ila ahad al-hukama': ayy al-umur ashaddu ta'bidan lil-'aql? Faqala: mushawaratu l-'ulama, wa tajrib ul-umur wa husn al-tathabbut, wa tadhiyat ul-fikr.

c) Put in place of every verb the form maf'ul in the following two texts with necessary adjustment (4 marks):

al-maktaba turattibu kutubaha
al-batl yuhmalu ala al-aktaf

d) In the following noble text is a derivative: indicate it, its type, its state, its hikm and why? (5 marks)

sabbih isma rabbika al-'ala

e) Give the 'irab [vowel marking] of five of the underlined words (10 marks)

- i) al-shilal bahij mandharihi
- ii) 'innani ra'aytu al-majda sa'ab al-murtaqa
- iii) a nadhama akhuka sha'aran?
- iv) al-mu'min mahmudatu akhlaqihi
- v) khaba al-munafiqu

Specimen 5I: Ultimatum for Medical Professionals and Academics to return to IS-held areas, Ninawa Province (May 2015)

عدد: ٢٩٦١
الدولة الإسلامية

التاريخ: ١٤/٥/١٤٤٦هـ
إعلانات الصحّة

٢٠٢٥ = ١٤/٥

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

إلى / الأطباء والعيادلة وأستاذة الطب والتمريض الذين غادروا أرض الخلافة
م / إنذار نهائي

الحمد لله، والصلاة والسلام على رسول الله، وعلى آله وصحبه وسلم تسليماً.

فقد قال تعالى: (إِنَّ الَّذِينَ تَوَفَّاهُمُ الْمَلَائِكَةُ طَالِمِ أَنفُسِهِمْ قَالُوا لِمَ كُنتُمْ قَالُوا كُنَّا
سُئِلْتُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ فَأَلَّوْا أَنَّهُ لَنْ نُؤْمِنَ بِاللَّهِ زَيْعَةً فَهَانُوا بِهَا فَلَوْلَئِكَ مَا لَأَمُّ جَهَنَّمَ
وَسَاءَتْ مَصِيرًا) (النساء: ٩٧) وفي ذلك وعيد شديد لمن ارتضى البقاء في دار الكفر وترك
الهجرة إلى دار الإسلام مع قدرته عليها فإن الملائكة الذين يقبضون روحه سيؤخرون بهذا
التوبيخ العظيم (فيم كنتم) أي: على أي حال كنتم؟ وأي شيء تبرأتم عن المشركين؟ بل
أنكم قد كنتم سوادهم، وفانكم تكون مع المسلمين والجهاد معهم ومعاونتهم على أعدائهم،
فأستحقتم بذلك جهنم وبئس المصير (يسر الكريم الرحمن في تفسير كلام المنان للعلامة السعدي).

لذا نرى رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم من كل مسلم موجود في دار الكفر والتخلف
عن واجب الهجرة إلى دار الإسلام وهو مستطيع، فقال (صلوات الله وسلامه عليه) (لنا
بريء من كل مسلم يقم بين أظهر المشركين) (سنة صحاح، أو دار، وترجم، فكيف يمكن
كان في دار إسلام وعزة وعدالة وعفاف، فهجروا والتف إلى دار كفر وثنية وظلم وانحراف!!

وبعد أن فتح الله تعالى لعباده المجاهدين في ولاية تهلوي وغيرها من ولايات الدولة
الإسلامية، وظهرها من ندم الصفويين والعمانيين، وأزالوا معالم الشرك والبدع، ونشروا
التوحيد والسنة والظاهر والباطن، وطبقوا الحدود، وأقاموا التواوين، وأصلحوا شأن الرعية،
وانتصروا للمظلوم وأخذوا على يد الظالم، وأعلنوا خلافة إسلامية على منهاج النبوة،

الدولة الإسلامية
الدولة الإسلامية

ديوان الصحّة
ديوان الصحّة

29 Rajab 1436 AH
18 May 2015

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful


To: Doctors, pharmacists, medical and nursing professors who abandoned the land of the Caliphate.

Subject: Ultimatum

Praise be to God and prayers, peace and protection be upon the Messenger of God and his family and companions.

The Almighty has said: "Indeed those whom the angels take in death while wronging themselves, it will be said unto them: 'In what state were you?' They will say: 'We were oppressed in the land.' They [the angels] will say: 'Was not the land of God wide for you to emigrate to?' They will be confined to Hell, and evil it is as a fate." - Nisa 97 [Qur'an 4:97]. And in that is a clear threat to whosoever has contented himself to remain in the Dar al-Kufr and abandoned hijra to Dar al-Islam despite his ability to do so. For indeed the angels who will seize his soul, and they will severely rebuke him ('In what state were you?') [the statement gives an i.e. clarification: *fim kuntum= fi ay hal kuntum?*]. And in what way have you distinguished yourselves from the mushrikeen? But rather you have been greatly blackened, having abandoned existence with the Muslims, the jihad with them and working with them against their enemies. Thus you have deserved Hell and an evil fate (Taysir al-Karim al-Rahman fi Tafsir Kalam al-Madan lil-'Alamat al-Sa'adi) [cf. [here](#)]

For this reason, the Messenger of God (PBUH) disavowed every Muslim present in Dar al-Kufr and abstaining from the duty to migrate to Dar al-Islam when he could do so, for he (upon whom be God's blessings and peace) said: "I disavow every Muslim established among the backs of the mushrikeen" (Sahih narrated by Abu Dawud and Tirmidhi). So how could anyone who was in Dar al-Islam, in glory, justice and integrity, then abandon it and move to Dar al-Kufr with its humiliation, oppression/wrong-doing and decline!



And after God Almighty granted conquest for His mujahideen servants in Wilayat Ninawa and other wilayats of the Islamic State, and they cleansed them of the filth of the Safavids and secularists, and they erased the signs of idolatry and innovation, and they spread tawheed, the Sunna, cleansing and integrity. And they have applied the hudud punishments, established the Diwans, set right the state of affairs of the citizens, sought justice for the oppressed and seized upon the wrongdoer's hand. And they have

announced an Islamic Caliphate on the Program of Prophethood, in which the Muslim lives with pride and in safety for himself, honour and property.

After these conquests that the Muslims had expected for a long time, we were surprised that a group of those belonging to Islam were leaving the land of the Caliphate and migrating to the land of Kufr for the sake of a vanishing material world, small property/commodities and cheap employment. And among the most notable of these people are a group of doctors, female doctors and health staff.

For some of them have taken refuge in the fortresses of the Rafidites in the provinces of Iraq, some have established themselves with the secularists in what is called the Kurdistan region, some have headed to settle in the Arab states ruled by the idolatrous tyrants, but also some of them have chosen to live with the Crusaders in the land of Kufr-Europe!!

Since the conquest, and the length of time elapsed, the Islamic State has been trying many ways to call these doctors, female doctors and health staff to their homes, hospitals, clinics, colleges and institutes in the realm of the Caliphate, many of them have continued to resist and oppose, so the following is decided:

1. This is the last warning to doctors, dentists, pharmacists, professors of the colleges of medicine and nursing, and health and administrative staff (affiliated with the Health department and higher education) who abandoned the land of the Caliphate, and they must return to their areas and take up their employment posts immediately.
2. The period of warning will be 30 days from the date of publication of this statement, and after the expiry of this period, moved and unmoved property will be confiscated from whoever did not heed the clause no. 1 above, and the confiscation will be entrusted as real estate of the State subject to restrictions/clauses placed by the Diwan al-Qada in advance.
3. The Islamic State will accept repentance from anyone who has touched on Kufr and fallen into apostasy from those mentioned in clause 1 on condition they return to their areas and undertake the necessary proceedings in seeking repentance.

And God is predominant over His affair but most people don't know it.

Diwan al-Siha

General Supervisory Committee

Diwan al-Qada wa al-Mazalim: Property Judge

Specimen 5J: Instructions to Ninawa Province Mosques for Ramadan

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

تعليمات مساجد ولاية نينوى لشهر رمضان

الحمد لله رب العالمين ، الرحمن الرحيم ، ناصر أهل السنة الموحدين ، وواضع الطواغيت وأهل الضلالة
 المبتدعين ، وصلى الله على نبيه محمد الأمين ، إمام المجاهدين ، الذي بعث بالسيف رحمة للعالمين ، و
 الطيبين ، اغفر العياصين ، ورضي الله عن صحبه والتابعين ، وبعد:

فهذه تعليمات للأئمة القائمين على مساجد ولاية نينوى لشهر رمضان المبارك لسنة ١٤٣٦ للهجرة :

- ١- سيكون الإعلان عن دخول شهر رمضان وكذلك ثبوت غرة شوال عن طريق إنذاعة الشبان حصراً.
- ٢- على جميع أئمة المساجد الالتزام بالسنة في صلاة الغمام (التراويح) وغيرها من العبادات ، كما ورد في الحديث عن عائشة (رضي الله عنها) أنها قالت: (إنا كنا نرسول الله ﷺ يؤد في رمضان ولا في غيره على إحدى عشرة ركعة يصلى أربعاً ، فلا تسأل عن حسنهن وطولهن ، ثم يصلى ثلاثاً)) (بخاري ٤٤٠٠)
- ٣- على جميع المؤمنين الالتزام بالسنة والامتناع عن التسليح البدعية التي لم ترد عن النبي ﷺ والأفعال المنكفة المنكرة كما في قول (احترام) ، ويجب الالتزام بالشوبة في الأذان الأول ، أي قول (الصلاة خير من النوم) كما ورد في حديث ابن عمر رضي الله عنهما قال : كان في الأذان الأول بعد حي على الفلاح : الصلاة خير من النوم مؤلفين وبدأ الإنسانك عن الطعام والشرب والمطويات حتى الأذان الثاني.
- ٤- على جميع أئمة المساجد الحضور إلى مقر الدورات العام من يوم الأربعاء الموافق ٢٣ / شعبان / ١٤٣٦ هـ ١٠ / ٦ / ٢٠١٥ لتسلم المنهج المعد لدورين شهر رمضان.
- ٥- على الراغبين بحضور دورة لغرامه وحفظ القرآن الكريم مراجعة مقر مركز الدعوة والمساجد في الولاية واحضار إجازة الغرامه.
- ٦- يقوم مركز الدعوة والمساجد باستداف الدورة التوعوية للأئمة وخطباء مساجد الموصل من بداية رمضان ، والحضور إلزامي للجميع وتكون الدورة للمساءل الأسبوعي في جامع صديق باشا في حي المنصور يوم الأحد بعد صلاة العصر من كل أسبوع ، ويوم الأربعاء بعد صلاة العصر للمساءل الأئمة في جامع النوري الكبير في منطقة الفاروق.
- ٧- ميعوم مركز الدعوة والمساجد بتجهيز مساجد ولاية نينوى بمادة (الكاز وأبل) لمولدات المساجد لشهر رمضان فعلى القائمين على المساجد مراجعة المقر العام لمركز الولاية لأخذ وصل الانستلام.



 الدائرة الإسلامية
 مركز الدعوة والمساجد
 مركز الولاية لنيوا

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Instructions to the mosques of Wilayat Ninawa for the month of Ramadan

Praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds, the Compassionate, the Merciful, who gives victory to the monotheist Ahl al-Sunna, and lowers the idolatrous tyrants and people of error and innovation, and may God's blessings be upon His Prophet Muhammad al-Amin, the Imam of the Mujahideen, who was sent with the sword as a mercy to the worlds, and on his good family, the esteemed blessed ones, and may God be pleased with his companions and followers. As for what follows:

These are the instructions for the brothers presiding over the mosques of Wilayat Ninawa for the blessed month of Ramadan for 1436 AH:


1. Announcement of the entry of the month of Ramadan and thus the sureness of the new moon will exclusively be through the Idha'atu al-Bayan [IS radio station]
2. All imams of the mosques must embrace the Sunna of the qiyam prayers (al-taraweeh) and others besides them from the acts of worship, as came in a hadith on the authority of A'isha (may God be pleased with her): she said: 'The Messenger of God (PBUH) did not pray more than 11 rak'ah in Ramadan or any other month. He would pray four, so don't forget their beauty and length, then four, so don't forget their beauty and length, and then three.' - (muttafiq alayhi)
3. All muezzins must embrace the sunna and refrain from innovative hymns that did not come from the Prophet (PBUH), and condemned spoken expressions as in the word 'respect'. And they must embrace the tathwib in the first call to prayer- i.e. the words 'Prayer is better than sleep' - just as was related in a hadith of Ibn Omar (may God be pleased with him): he said: 'There was in the first call to prayer after the words 'Hayy ala al-falah': Prayer is better than sleep. This was said twice.' The imsak [start of the Ramadan fast/end of suhoor pre-dawn meal] abstaining from food, drink and distillates begins up to the second call to prayer.
4. All imams of the mosques must attend the general Diwan base from Wednesday 23 Sha'aban 1436 AH corresponding to 10 June 2015, to receive the prepared program for the lessons of the Ramadan month.

5. Those who wish to open up a session for reading and memorizing the Noble Qur'an must go and register with the base of the Da'wa and Masajid centre and bring a reading license.
6. The Da'wa and Masajid centre will resume the Shari'a session for the imams and preachers of the mosques of Mosul from the beginning of Ramadan, and attendance is obligatory for all and the session will be on the left side in the Sadiq Rashan mosque in al-Muthanna quarter on Sunday after the afternoon prayer every week, and on Wednesday after afternoon prayer on the right side in the Grand al-Nuri mosque in al-Faruq area.
7. The Da'wa and Masajid centre will equip the mosques of Wilayat Ninawa with oil and gas supply for the mosques' generators for the month of Ramadan so those presiding over the mosques must go and register with the general base for for the Wilayat Centre to get the receipt slip.

Islamic State


Diwan al-Da'wa wa al-Masajid

Specimen 5K: Book for doctrinal instruction of teachers



"Beneficial curriculum in the most important matters of aqeeda [creed/doctrine]. Prepared by the office of investigation and studies, special for sessions for the development of teachers and female teachers. Diwan al-Ta'aleem."

Specimen 5L: Regulations for Mosques in Ninawa Province



Islamic State

Wilayat Ninawa: Da'wa wa Masajid

No. 204

23 April 2015

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Praise be to God and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God and his family, companions and whosoever is close to him. As for what follows:

All those presiding over the mosques of Wilayat Ninawa are to observe the following:

1. Adhering to the times of prayer issued by the Da'wa and Masajid in Wilayat Ninawa and not to violate them, because they have been prepared according to scientific Shari'a foundations.
2. The muezzin is to perform the tathwib in the first dawn call to prayer: saying after 'hayy ala al-falah': 'Prayer is better than sleep. Prayer is better than sleep.'
3. The period between the first and second calls to prayer will be 50 Qur'anic verses equal to 20 minutes approximately.
4. Adherence to outward guidance.
5. Adherence to sermons issued from the Da'wa and Masajid Centre.

Notice: One must adhere to the instructions issued from the Diwan al-Da'wa wa al-Masajid to gather the Muslims on one word alone-and the Sunna of the Prophet (PBUH)- and avoiding separation and division.

May God reward you best

And God's peace and blessings be upon our Prophet Muhammad and his family, and may he be pleased with his companions.

Islamic State

Diwan al-Da'wa wa al-Masajid

Da'wa and Masajid Centre

[Specimen 5M: Notification for Kurds to leave Raqqa city](#)

Islamic State
Wilayat al-Raqqa

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Praise be to God and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God. As for what follows:

In view of the Crusader war on the Islamic State and the alliance of the Kurdish parties with them in this war, we inform you that it has been established for us that in your midst are those who have cooperated with the Crusader alliance. Thus, and so that there is no confrontation between us and you on account of some of the foolish ones among you, we ask you to leave Wilayat al-Raqqa within 72 hours towards Wilayat Homs (Tadmur) and all who remain after this time will be arrested and exposed to Shari'a inquiry and trial. And the exit route from Raqqa will be via the al-Jisr al-Jadid checkpoint and that will be done in coordination with the Tribes Office and Real Estate Office so that you can present and register your holdings with the Real Estate Office indicating you are Muslims and so that they will not be considered the property of the Islamic State.

May God reward you best.

NB: Via Raqqa is being Slaughtered Silently, and thanks to Kareem Shaheen who helped transcribe in Arabic some of the more illegible parts of the sentence.

Specimen 5N: Repentance for Female Employees in Schools, Raqqa

Islamic State
Caliphate on the Program of Prophethood
Diwan al-Ta'aleem

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

The names of the schools in which repentance will take for females beginning from Monday 4 Jumada al-Awal 1436 AH (23 February 2015). 9 a.m. till 3 p.m.

- . Umm Amara (Marwan Uwaid)
- . Al-Qadisiya (Dhi Qar)
- . Dhat al-Nataqain (Rab'iat al-Adawiya)
- . A'isha Umm al-Mu'mineen
- . Hind bint Utba (al-Farabi)

[NB: cf. Specimen H for the names of the schools]

Repentance will be done for all female workers in the prior educational system ((director, supervisor, deputy director, temporaries, fixed, non-fixed, retired, employment of youth, employee)).

For inquiry: Dhat al-Nataqain institute: 246868-246710

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Raqqqa

Diwan al-Ta'aleem official

Specimen 50: Notification, Sinai Province

Islamic State

Wilayat Sinai

No. 10

7 Ramadan 1436 AH [24 June 2015]

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Important Statement

Praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds, and prayers and peace be upon the most noble of those sent, Muhammad bin Abdullah the al-Amin Prophet, as for what follows:

The Islamic State in Sinai warns all who participate in, have contracts in, cooperate or work in any of the following fields (transportation and import businesses, and employees, and cars of all types: especially transportation ones) against the company 'Sons of Sinai' owned by the apostate Ibrahim al-Arjani, because he is waging war on God, His Messenger and the believers, and is a collaborator/agent for the Jews, and he is the one supporting and aiding the apostate Egyptian army in implementing the plans of the Jews above all in the land of Sinai and in Egypt in general. And we call on all companies, members, and private cars under contract with this company to dissolve these contracts, and to break any links with it, because it is a legitimate target for us.

Whoever persists in this work after this warning will expose himself and his property/wealth to risk, and will only have himself to blame.

Specimen 5P: Imposition of Hijab Shari'i on Women, Jarabulus, November 2013



**In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Wilayat Halab- Eastern Region- Jarabulus Area**

Al-Hijab...Al-Hijab

God has said: 'Oh Prophet, tell your wives, daughters, and the women of the believers to bring down over themselves some of their outer garments. That is more fitting so they will be known and not be abused. And God is all-forgiving, merciful.'- al-Ahzab 59 [Qur'an 33:59]

The Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham announces

The obligation for women to wear the Shari'i hijab, which should be wide and fluttering, not tight, transparent, and not attractive for the eyes with adornment or perfume, and in that regard.

God has said: '...And do not display yourselves as in the prior time of Jahiliya...' al-Ahzab 33 [Qur'an 33:33]

The Prophet said: '...Women clothed yet naked, inclined to evil and to entice to evil, their heads like the humps of a camel inclined to one side. They do not enter paradise or smell its odour, when its odour can be smelt from so-and-so distance.'

Notice: The Islamic State gives a deadline of one week from the date of this statement to comply with the Shari'i hijab, and any violation of that will expose the woman and the guardian of her affairs to Shari'a trial/court.

"And to God, His Messenger and the believers is honour, but the hypocrites don't know it." [Qur'an 63:8]

25 Muharram 1435 AH [c. 29 November 2013]

Specimen 5Q: Establishment of the Islamic Court, Deir az-Zor City, October 2013

**Islamic State in Iraq al-Sham: Wilayat Deir az-Zor
Islamic Court
Deir az-Zor City**

Important Announcement

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

The Almighty has said: "And no, by your Lord, they will not believe until they have you judge in what they have disputed among themselves, and find in themselves no discomfort over what you have judged, willingly submitting." [Qur'an 4:65]

The Almighty has said: "Legislation is only for God: He has commanded you to worship only Him. That is the correct religion, but most people don't know." [Qur'an 12:40]


So in obedience to God- Almighty and Exalted is He- and then in response to the desire of many of our Muslim brothers from the fighting battalions and even the Muslim populace in Deir az-Zor city, the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham announces- praise be to God, beginning from 27 Dhu al-Qa'ada 1434 AH corresponding to 3 October 2014- the following:

- . Opening of the Islamic Court for Deir az-Zor city as a step to establish the law of God- Almighty and Exalted is He- for examining societal and Shari'a cases and problems.
- . The opening of the complaints office affiliated with the Islamic Court to receive complaints from the battalions and the Muslim populace regarding members and affiliates of the Islamic State, in order to address the injustices and hold the perpetrators accountable, even if they are of the amirs and commanders.
- . To hold marriage contracts and divorces, have them affirmed in documentation in the Islamic Court, and give their owners a signed, stamped copy with the stamp of the Islamic Court with an obligation to embrace the legal consequences of that.

The Islamic Court also announces the acceptance of suggestions from the Muslim populace, like suggestions and feedback in the event of falling into any error, for we are not impeccable, but we go from the Almighty's words: "I only wish to reform as far as I can only succeed through God: He is my reliance and I return to him." [Qur'an 11:88]

This is so and God speaks the truth and guides the path, and praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds.

[Specimen 5R: General notification on claimed lineage from the Prophet Muhammad's family](#)



Islamic State
Diwan Bayt al-Mal
No. 323

10 Jumada al-Akhir 1436 AH

30 March 2015

No. of pages: 1

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

To all wilayats, Diwans and committees

Subject: lineage from the Ahl al-Bayt [Prophet's Family]

Praise be to God, and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God, his family and whoever is close to him. As for what follows:


1. We attach for you a special model form on lineage from the house of the Messenger of God (God's blessings and peace be upon him). You are asked to work to fill out and complete the form with the approval of the sheikh of the tribe that it has been found.
2. A special office for lineage from the house of the family of the Messenger of God (God's blessings and peace be upon him) is open in every Wilaya, Diwan and committee.
3. After completing the form it is to be sent to Diwan Bayt al-Mal after being stamped with the stamp of the wali [provincial governor] or head of the Diwan or head of the committee.

May God grant you success for the service of the Muslims and reward you best.

Islamic State

Diwan Bayt al-Mal

[Specimen 5S: Sample form for tracing out lineage from the Prophet's family](#)



Islamic State

Wilayat: Diwan: Committee:

Detailer:

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Lineage of the mujahid brother:

Father of:

Son of son of son of son of son of son of son of

Repute of the family:

Tribe's title:

Subdivision's name:

Residence:

State: Wilayat: District: Village:

Tribe's stamp

Detailer's stamp

Specimen 5T: Oil and gas sales receipt, Kirkuk Province

Diwan al-Rikaz

Oil and Gas Division

15 Rabi al-Awal 1436 AH

6 January 2015

Sales receipt

No. 005445

Buyer's name:

Substance type: Crude oil

Quantity: [140 barrels?]

Price per litre: [\$12?]

Total price: \$1680

Islamic State

Diwan al-Rikaz

Kirkuk Centre: Oil and gas sales

NB: The document's data entries are a bit confused as far as calculations and units go. Reported IS selling prices for crude oil per barrel- depending on location- have ranged from [as low as \\$10](#) to [as high as \\$60](#) or more. It is possible that this is a sale of 140 barrels of crude oil going at \$12 per barrel, giving a total sale of \$1680. In any event, the sale is definitely not in litres.

Specimen 5U: Another oil and gas sales receipt, Kirkuk Province

Diwan al-Rikaz
Oil and Gas Division
12[?/13?] Rabi al-Awal AH [3/4 January 2015]
Sales receipt
No. 005414

Buyer's name:
Substance type: Crude oil
Quantity: 340 barrels
Price per litre: [\$]12
Total price: [\$]4080

Islamic State
Diwan al-Rikaz
Kirkuk Centre: Oil and gas sales

NB: Same notes apply as with Specimen 5T: this time it appears to be a sale of 340 barrels of at \$12 per barrel to give a total of \$4080. Units for currency are missing in this document.

H/T to Loveday Morris for these receipts.

Specimen 5V: Notification: 'Emirate of Azaz' (September 2013)

الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام
ولاية حلب
قلاع الريف الشمالي
إمارة اعزاز

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

الحمد لله رب العالمين والصلاة والسلام على أشرف خلق الله أجمعين ... أما بعد:

لقد حصل في مدينة اعزاز يوم الأربعاء الموافق ١٤٣٤/١١/١٣ هـ لتطهير للأرض مما يسيء بولاءه عاصمة الشمال) الذي أسى الله إلا أن يفضحهم على رؤوس الخلائق واليكم أبرز خيانتهم فبينما وحدثنا:

- ١ تأسين هروب الجيش الأسدي المجرم والذبابات التي كانت تقصف المدنيين في مطار منع
- ٢ الدعوة للحكم بغير ما أنزل الله عن طريق الديمقراطية على مولاهم الرسمية في الإنترنت
- ٣ استقبال السيناتور الأمريكي جون ماكين في الهنداغ والاتفاق معه على حرب الإسلاميين .
- ٤ موالاتهم للمخابرات الأمريكية والألمانية حماية ودفاعاً وإيواء لعناصرهم ومنها :
 - دفاعهم وقواتهم المسلمت ضد المسلحين من أجل الدفاع عن الجنوس الأثمن يوم الأربعاء الماضي الذي وجد في الكاميرا الخاصة به صوراً لمقرات الدولة الإسلامية وبيوتهم ونسائهم .
 - كشف بعض الأسرى من عاصمة الشمال تعامل هذا اللواء مع شركة "بلاك ووتر" المعادية للإسلام
 - تم التوقيع على عدة جوانيس من عاصمة الشمال ثبت تعاملهم مع المخابرات الأمريكية وهذا موقق ضمن تسجيل مصور سيتم عرضه قريباً على الإنترنت.
 - سرقة ونهب الإغاثة وعدم توزيعها على المستحقين وإزالة الناس رغم أن هذا حق لهم .
 - تصنيق الخنادق على أفندا في معبر السلامة من سلب للأموال ونحرش بالنساء وقهر الرجال .

فبغضاً لذلك قام إخوانكم المجاهدون التصاراً للعبادة والدين وعلماً بقوله تعالى ((وقلت لهم حتى لا تكون فتنة ويكون الدين كله لله)) بطرد هذه العصابة المجرمة من مدينة اعزاز لأن من وإلى الأمريكان صار حكمه حكمهم لقوله تعالى : ((ومن يتولىهم منك فإنه منهم)) .

ودين للناس جميعاً إننا لسنا حريصين على المجر ولا غيره ، فلنأمن ممن يهتف خلف حطام الدنيا والحمد لله .

ونقول لعاصمة الشمال إن باب التوبة مفتوح ولذا تم إطلاق سراح أكثر من ٣٠ عنصرًا من عناصر عاصمة الشمال بعد إعلان توبتهم ورفضهم القتال ضد المسلمين .

لذلك فكل من أتانا تائباً وسلم سلاحه قبل القدرة عليه قبلت توبته ، وإلا فلنأمن عازمون بعون الله تعالى على استئصال شائفتهم .

والله أكبر والعزة للإسلام

والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته.

الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Wilayat Halab

North Countryside Area

Emirate of Azaz

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds, and prayers and peace be upon all the most noble of God's creation. As for what follows:

In the town of Azaz on Wednesday 13/11/1434, there occurred the cleansing of the land from the so-called Northern Storm Brigade...and for you are the most notable of their betrayals past and present:

1. Securing the fleeing of the criminal Assad army and tanks that would bomb civilians in Mennagh airbase.
2. Calling for rule besides what God has revealed, from the path of democracy on their official sites on the Internet.
3. Receiving the American senator John McCain in the hangar and agreeing with him to wage war on Islamists.
4. Their loyalty to American and German intelligence services in protecting, defending and giving refuge to their members, among them:
 - . Their death-defying defence and fight against the Muslims for the sake of defending the German spy last Wednesday in whose camera were found photos of Islamic State bases, their homes and women.
 - . The revelation from some Northern Storm prisoners about this brigade's cooperation with the 'Blackwater' company that wages aggressive war on Islam.
 - . A number of spies from Northern Storm were arrested whose collaboration with the American intelligence services was established and this is documented within a photo recording that will soon be exposed on the Internet.
 - . Stealing and plundering aid and not distributing it to the Muslims, oppressing the people despite the fact that this is their right.
 - . Putting a stranglehold on our people in Bab al-Salama through stealing wealth, harrassing women, and coercing men.

In light of that your mujahideen brothers undertook in victory for the doctrine and religion, implementing the Almighty's words ('And fight them until their is no more fitna and religion wholly belongs to God') the expulsion of this criminal gang from the town of Azaz because whoever is close to the Americans, their rule has become his rule as per the Almighty's words: 'Whoever is an ally to them from among you, he is one of them'.

And we make clear to all people that we are not intent on seizing the border crossing or anything besides it, for we are not among those who pant after the debris of the material world, and praise be to God.

And we say to Northern Storm that the door of repentance is open and more than 30 members of Northern Storm have been released after they announced their repentance and rejection of fighting against the Muslims.

Thus all who come to us in repentance and hand over their weapons before being seized, their repentance will be accepted. Otherwise we are determined by God's help to eradicate them from the root.

And Allahu akbar and honour to Islam.

As-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu

Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant

Abu Nasir al-Azadi

Wilayat Halab

Shari'a Official for Northern Countryside

Specimen 5W: Extension of Repentance: Azaz Area (2013)



**Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Wilayat Halab**

North Countryside Area

Azaz Area

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Statement from the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham:

God Almighty has said: "Whoever repents after his wrong-doing and reforms, God will be merciful to him. Truly God is forgiving, merciful."

In affirmation of the mujahideen's adherence to their pledge and desire to prevent bloodshed, and after the response of people of sound mind from those who repented of the so-called Northern Storm, and after the acceptance of dozens from them and the handing over of their arms to the Islamic State, giving them security guarantee and return to their families safe and sound, and fulfillment of the pledge with them just as per the qualities of the believers- the Almighty has said 'Those who are attentive to their trusts and promises'- and after the demand of many of those desiring repentance for an extension of the deadline and the insistence of their families and relatives:

The Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen in the Islamic State- may God glorify it- has decided on the following:

The repentance period will be extended for 48 hours in demand for the contentment of the Lord- Almighty and Exalted is He- and preventing bloodshed. The one upon whom be God's peace and blessings said: '...And God has not made man grow through pardon except in renown/might.'

Indeed we are a people whose conduct has refused in nobility...to hurt anyone who does not hurt us [NB: from a [medieval Iraqi poet](#)]

And God is predominant over His affair but most people don't know it.

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

Specimen 5X: Sample Insignia Templates (ISIS Era: 2013/2014)



"One Ummah, One Banner"

Specimen 5Y: Reiteration on Ban on Importing Iranian Food and Medical Goods, Ramadan 1436 AH, Diwan al-Hisbah [cf. Specimen 4X from General Committee]



Specimen 5Z: Payment of fees for electricity, eastern Deir az-Zor Province

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Kheir

Public electricity administration

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

The noble families of the village of...are asked to make the second invoice payment for the month of May, and that will be done in the tax forms in the municipality of [Darnaj](#) within 20 days. Otherwise we will regrettably have to consider cutting off the electricity from users.

Specimen 6A: Warning against violating fast in Ramadan

Islamic State

Diwan al-Hisbah

Statement no. 2

Date: 5 Ramadan 1436 AH

The consequences for one who abandons the fast

God has imposed on His believing servants fasting for the month of Ramadan and has made one of the pillars of Islam. The Almighty has said: "Oh you who believe, fasting has prescribed for you just as it was prescribed for those before you. Perhaps you may then fear."- al-Baqara 183 [Qur'an 2:183].

And on the authority of Ibn Omar (may God be pleased with them both): he said: the Messenger of God (God's peace and blessings be upon him) said: 'Islam has been built on five things: bearing witness that there is no deity but God and Muhammad is the Messenger of God, establishing prayer, giving zakat, the Hajj, and fasting in Ramadan.'" - brought out by Bukhari and Muslim.

Therefore, the one who abandons the fast for the month of Ramadan or breaks the fast for one day without legitimate excuse [according to Shari'a] has committed a great sin and great vice. For on the authority of Abu Umamah al-Bahili: he said: I heard the Messenger of God (may God's peace and blessings be upon him) say: 'While I was sleeping, two men came to me, held me by my upper arms, and took me to a rugged mountain, saying: 'Climb.' So I said: 'Indeed I cannot do that.' So they said: 'We will make it easy for you.' So I climbed until I was at a high point on the mountain when I heard shrill cries. So I said: 'What are these cries?' They said: 'These are the shrills of the people of Hellfire.' Then I was released from this until I came among people hung by their tendons, cut by the jaws and pouring out blood. So I said: 'Who are these people?' He said: 'These are the ones

who break their fast before it has been allowed to do so." - narrated by al-Nisa'i and verified by Ibn Khazima.

The Sheikh of Islam Ibn Taymiyya (may God have mercy on him) said: 'Whoever deliberately breaks the fast without excuse has committed one of the great sins.' (Collection of Fatwas: 25/225).

And al-Hafiz al-Dhahabi (may God have mercy on him) said in his book on the great sins: 'Among the believers it is established that the one who abandons Ramadan fasting without illness or purpose entailing necessity, is worse than the adulterer, tax-collector and the one addicted to alcohol; for indeed they doubt his Islam and suspect him of heresy and atheism.'

Thus adhering to the command of God the Exalted to command what is right and forbid what is wrong, the Diwan al-Hisbah in the Caliphate state reminds the Muslim populaces of the obligation to adhere to God's command to fast in this blessed month, and warns them against violating its sanctity and breaking the fast in its daytime without legitimate excuse, and all who have been shown to have engaged in the temptation of this very great sin will be subjected to binding reprimand consequences in front of the people, deterring the people of falsehood, correcting insubordination and putting them on the path of obedience, and returning the people to the straight path of God.

Notice: It is not acceptable for those who have been allowed to break the fast in the daytime of Ramadan with legitimate excuse to show that on the paths and among the people (which would prove a hindrance to the excuse and lead to accusation, as well as in consideration of the sanctity of the month). So the one who displays this breaking of the fast will be subject to inquiry and reprimand.

Islamic State

Amir Diwan al-Hisbah

Specimen 6B: Notice to soldiers of Raqqa on vacated Kurds' homes

ولاية الرقة

الدولة الإسلامية

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

إلى جنود الثورة الإسلامية في مدينة الرقة

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته

الحمد لله رب العالمين والصلاة والسلام على أشرف الأنبياء والمرسلين ...

أما بعد :

نسأل الله أن يتقبل منا ومنكم الصيام والقيام

قال الله تعالى: (وأوفوا بالعهد إن العهد كان مسؤولاً)

فإننا نعلمكم أننا قد أعطينا عهداً لأفراد مدينة الرقة، الذين خرجوا من مدينة "الرقة" إلى مدينة "مدمر" إلا نستعمل بيوتهم. وكما تعلمون أن المؤمنين عند شروطهم. وعليه فإنه يمنع دخول أو استخدام بيوت الأكراد في مدينة الرقة، وكل من ثبت عليه مخالفة هذا الأمر فإنه يحال إلى القضاء.

وجزاكم الله خيراً



ولاية الرقة
أمير المدينة

الموافق لـ: ١٤٣٦/٠٩/١٠
٢٠١٥/٠٦/٢٦

STEP NEWS AGENCY

**Islamic State
Wilayat al-Raqqa**

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

To the soldiers of the Islamic State in the city of Raqqa

As-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu:

Praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds and prayers and peace be upon the most noble of the Prophets and those sent. As for what follows: we ask God to accept from us and you fasting and qiyam. God Almighty has said: 'And fulfill the pledge. Indeed the pledge has been questioned.' [Qur'an 17:34]

So we inform you that we have given a pledge to the Kurds of Raqqa city who went out of Raqqa city for Tadmur city that we will not use their homes, and as you know the believers adhere to their conditions, thus one may not enter or use the homes of the Kurds in Raqqa city, and whoever is shown to have violated this order will be referred to the judiciary.

May God reward you best.

**Wilayat al-Raqqa
Amir of the city**

**10 Ramadan 1436 AH
26 June 2015**

[Specimen 6C: Electricity Generator Operating Hours and Fees, Mosul](#)

Statement No. 83

Date: 19 Ramadan 1436 AH/6 July 2015

**In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Modification of the set timetable**

Praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds and prayers and peace be upon the Seal of the Prophets. As for what follows:

We hope all is well with you.

In view of the proportion of national electricity [i.e. being supplied through the Mosul Dam since March] in this month and the rejection of that by many of the users from the citizen population, the following is decided:

The operating timetable will be thus:

1. 12-3 p.m.
2. 4-6 p.m.
3. 7-10 p.m.
4. 11 p.m.- 12 a.m.
5. An hour will be added in the time of Suhoor [pre-dawn Ramadan meal] during Ramadan and will be cancelled at the end of Ramadan.
6. The price for one ampere will be 7000 dinars.
7. Additional operation will be as normal and unchanged: one hour for 1000 dinars and the rest hour is not accounted for.
8. The set voltages will be 210 V and anything below 210 V is considered in violation.

We ask God to benefit us and you and God is the guarantor of success and guider to the straight path.

NB: This statement from the generators committee for Ninawa province, which existed before the fall of Mosul. It is included to illustrate the current role of the government in supplying electricity to Mosul.

Specimen 6D: New list of al-Waritheen Hotel room prices, Mosul [cf. Specimen 4J]



Al-Waritheen Hotel

Prices for rooms

Room for one person: 29000 [Iraqi dinars]

Room for two persons: 39000

Room and hall: 49000

Two rooms and hall: 79000

Additional bed: 15000

Note: it is forbidden to bring in food from outside the hotel. Thanks.

NB: The discrepancies in prices with 4J are to be noted. It may be that no breakfast is included or prices have simply been lowered.

[Specimen 6E: Notice to locals after capture of Mennagh airbase, August 2013](#)

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

The Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham announces

After the liberation of Mennagh military airport the existence of items and possessions concerning the citizens and they are as follows:

1. Domestic equipment
2. Domestic furniture
3. Big equipment and generators
4. Women's golden jewellery
5. Sums of money

So the citizens who have been exposed to plunder and theft at the hands of the soldiers of the tyrant regime after the strike on the northern countryside, including all of Marea, Tel Refa'at, Mennagh and Azaz should head to the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham in the town of Azaz in the principal base- Public Relations Division and inquire about their lost possessions. That is to be done at the latest by 20 August 2013 with the person to provide detailed statements about the stolen property, along with his name and phone number in order to connect with him and hand over the lost items in the event that they are found. Then a statement of the details of the hand over will be done.

And God is the guarantor of success.

Specimen 6F: Statement on punishment for theft, Deir az-Zor Province

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Kheir

Statement on the hadd punishment for theft

Praise be to God and prayers and peace be upon the most noble of the Prophets and those sent, as well as all his family, companions and whosoever has followed them with ihsan to the Day of Judgment. As for what follows:

When human nature becomes inclined to the impairment of temptations and realizing their intentions from drinking wine, adultery and theft, the wisdom of God Almighty has demanded the law of the hudud punishments to put a stop to corruption and prevent it from being committed. And on the authority of Abu Huraira may God be pleased with him: he said: the Messenger of God (SAWS) said: "The establishment of hadd on earth is better for its people than 40 mornings of rain." (from Ibn Maja and al-Nisa'i and declared sound by Ibn Abani).

And the 'ulama have agreed that theft is one of the great sins and its hadd is established in the Book [Qur'an], Sunna and Ijmaa [consensus]. From the book, the Almighty has said: "And the male and female thief, cut off their hands in recompense for what they have committed- a deterrent from God. And God is mighty, wise"- al-Ma'ida 38 [Qur'an 5:38]. And as for the Sunna, on the authority of Abu Huraira may God be pleased with him: that the Messenger of God (SAWS) said: "God has cursed the thief who steals the egg or the rope, so He has his hand cut off" (from al-Bukhari and Muslim). And on the authority of the Mother of the Believers A'isha may God be pleased with her: "The Quraish people became very worried about the Makhzumiya lady who had committed theft. They said, "Nobody can speak (in favor of the lady) to God's Messenger and nobody dares do that except Osama who is the favorite of God's Messenger. " When Osama spoke to God's Messenger about that matter, Allah's Apostle said, "Do you intercede (with me) to violate one of the legal punishment of God?" Then he got up and addressed the people, saying, "O people! The nations before you went astray because if a noble person committed theft, they used to leave him, but if a weak person among them committed theft, they used to inflict the legal punishment on him. By God, if Fatima, the daughter of Muhammad committed theft, Muhammad will cut off her hand!" (from [al-Bukhari and Muslim](#)).

Therefore the one called 'Ibrahim Akla al-Khalf al-Satam' who stole from a safe and the type of thing stolen has been worth its nisab [NB: value liable to zakat tax], the Islamic court has decided upon him that his right hand should be cut off from the wrist joint and it should hang on his neck for three days and should accompany him in the province's prison and in its markets as recompense for what he has committed, a deterrent from God, and God is mighty and wise. And that should be a deterrent for him and others besides him, cleansing his sin. And perhaps God will forgive him.

And God is predominant over His affair but most people don't know it.

Specimen 6G: Conditions for travel outside Mosul

Islamic State

Wilayat Ninawa: Information Centre

Travel conditions

1. Travel will be allowed for the following necessities:

a) Sick person, who has a stamped medical certificate from the Diwan al-Siha that the illness cannot be treated inside Wilayat Ninawa.

b) Pension matters that can only be transacted in Baghdad.

c) Matters of bartering farmers' property by agreement of the Diwan al-Zara'a.

2. No travel outside will be allowed except by a system in which the guarantor pledges real estate or a car.

3. The period of travel will be set and in the event it is violated, the real estate or car will be confiscated.

4. The guarantor assumes obligation to guide the travel security office to the house, real estate, or car and the traveller will be notified in advance of these matters before travel.

5. The travel office must be provided with the required legal documents on the issue of guarantee and including the original real estate deed and the deeds for the car.

6. For the ill, the number of those accompanying cannot exceed one person, and families may not accompany them.

7. Travel for women for whatever necessity is not allowed for those under the age of 55 without a mahrim [male guardian]

8. A group of women above age 55 (three or more) may travel to complete pension transactions and other matters of necessity.

Specimen 6H:Travel Toll Receipt, Kirkuk Province

Islamic State

Wiayat Kirkuk

Maktab Khalid Garage

Driver's name:

Vehicle type:

Vehicle number:

Sum:

Date:

Tax collector:

NB: Context here from [this article by Kirkuk Now](#) in October 2014:

"Members of the Islamic State organization (Da'esh) prevented citizens' cars from reaching the Maktab Khalid inspection point (south of Kirkuk city) and are forcing drivers to park their cars in a new space in which they pay sums of money to members of the organization. Eye witnesses from the peoples of Hawija affirmed to Kirkuk Now that 'armed members of Da'esh are forcing taxi drivers and owners of cars from among the citizens to park their cars in a space 2km away from the Maktab Khalid, in order to be picked up after that by designated buses to reach the first inspection point subject to the security forces.'

The witnesses, who refused to reveal their names for security reasons, affirmed that the new space is controlled by the armed men, where they impose financial sums as tax on the cars and according to point of departure, so for Hawija, the taxi driver pays 5000 dinars, and 10000 dinars for the districts of al-'Alm and Baiji, while the driver pays 15000 dinars for the car departing for the centre of the province of Ninawa, Salah ad-Din and Anbar.

One of the taxi drivers said to Kirkuk Now that the armed men give the driver after taking the sum of money a receipt on which is written: 'Islamic State/Wilayat Kirkuk/Maktab Khalid Garage' for stopping and parking cars. On this receipt they note down the type of car, the driver's name and travel point, and the driver must hand the receipt to another point for the armed men in the space.

The driver pointed out that some of the organization's members inspect the cars and confiscate any cigarettes they are carrying, and some make efforts to ascertain identities looking for members of the security apparatus. Others inspect women's clothes."

Specimen 6I: Notification on ID cards etc. in Hisbah Offices, Deir az-Zor Province

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Kheir

Al-Hisbah Centre

Statement no. 1

1 Ramadan 1436 AH/18 June 2015

Statement for distribution

As-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu

Praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God, his family and companions and whoever is loyal to him. As for what follows:

We would like to notify you that all ID documents and family registers that are in the al-Hisbah offices in the wilaya will be destroyed if their owners do not come to retrieve them within 10 days from the date of the issuing of this statement.

Edited and published: 5 Ramadan 1436 AH

**And may God reward you best
And God is the guarantor of success**

**Islamic State
Wilayat al-Kheir
Amir of al-Hisbah**

Specimen 6J: Prohibition on shaving beards

**Islamic State
Diwan al-Hisbah
Statement no. 258
Date: 3 Ramadan 1436 AH**

Statement on the prohibition on shaving the beard

The Muslim must follow the command of the Prophet (SAWS) and refrain from what he forbade. The Almighty has said: "What the Messenger has given you, take it. And what he has prohibited, refrain from it. And fear God- indeed God is severe in consequence." (Qur'an 59:7).

And on the authority of Abu Huraira: that the Messenger of God (SAWS) said: "If I have ordered you to do something, practise it as far as you can, and if I have forbidden you to do something, leave it." (muttafiq alayhi)

The Messenger of God (SAWS) ordered us to let the beard grow and forbade us from shaving it in numerous hadiths, and more than one of the Ahl al-'Ilm have transmitted the consensus of the Imams from the masters of the four madhahib [Sunni schools of jurisprudence] and others besides them on the prohibition on shaving the beard.

And when this issue has been made so clear, the Diwan al-Hisbah must hold the men from the Ummah of Muhammad (SAWS) to account, for he orders them to let the beard grow and forbids them to shave it, so our society may return under the authority of the Islamic State to the state of affairs to which the first community adhered: men with their beards, women with their hijabs, and this is from the prophetic methodology.

Thus, whoever from the men violates this in having shaved his beard after the date of the issuing of this statement must be arrested, for he will expose himself to inquiry. And God is the guarantor of success.

Islamic State

Amir of the Diwan al-Hisbah

Specimen 6K: Special slip for facilitating travel, 'Euphrates Province'

**In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Caliphate on the Prophetic Methodology**

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Furat

Facilitation of the crossing of the Muslim populace

To the brothers in the Islamic State checkpoints, may God preserve them.

We ask you to facilitate the crossing of....to Wilayat al-Raqqa...

Reason of necessity: Medical treatment

Those accompanying:

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.

One week only [this is crossed out]

12 days only

And may God reward you best

Islamic State
Wilayat al-Furat
Office of the wali [provincial governor]

Specimen 6L: Notice to Internet Cafés, Raqqa Province

Islamic State
Wilayat al-Raqqa
Public Security Centre
Date: 3 Shawwal 1436 AH

Statement for distribution

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

All Internet satellite shop owners must accept the following:

1. Remove Wi-fi satellite connections dependent on Internet shops and private connections even for soldiers of the Islamic State, limiting network connection to within the shop only.
2. Go and register with the reception office located in the garden opposite the municipal stadium.

The deadline for removing and registering is 4 days only from the date of this statement for distribution and all who violate this will be held accountable.

Note: office opening hours from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.

May God reward you best.

Islamic State
Diwan al-Amn al-Aam
Al-Amni al-Aam: Raqqa

Specimen 6M: City Cleaning Receipt, Mosul

Wilayat Ninawa
Services
City Cleaning Division

Receipt

Type of real estate [tick as appropriate]: Residential [ticked] Business

Real estate owner's name:

Real estate number:

Sum: 2000 dinars

Date: 19 July 2015

Tax collector name:

Signature:

NB: Cleaning services per household in Mosul at around \$1.50 a month, per shop \$3.50

Specimen 6N: Opportunities in Midwifery Courses, Health Department

دewan الصحة DEWAN OF HEALTH

NEW COURSE!!!

**REGISTRATION OPEN
ENROLL NOW
MIDWIFERY**

Enrollments end 20 Sha'ban 1436

- Must be 18+ years of age.
- Must commit to work 12 months post-graduation.
- Have successfully passed secondary school.
- The course is in english only
- Only female applicants accepted.
- Prior nursing knowledge & skills have priority.
- Apply at the Medical College for an interview.

CALL 239 591 **ISHS**

For more information call or visit the medical college in Idkuhah & Raqqah

H/T: ICSR

Specimen 60: Recording IDs of Internet Café Users, Raqqa Province

Islamic State
Wilayat al-Raqqa
Public Security Centre

6 Shawwal 1436 AH

Statement for distribution

To all Internet shop owners:

You must ensure to record the IDs of users except soldiers of the Islamic State and their families.

And may God reward you best.

Islamic State
Diwan al-Amn al-Aam
Deputy head of public security: Raqqa

Specimen 6P: Food Prices in Mosul, 29 July 2015

Food	Price (Iraqi dinars)
Rice (1kg)	900-2000
Sugar (1kg)	750-900
Tea (special blend: 1kg)	6500
Oil (20 packs- case)	29000
Cream (excellent quality: 1 pack at 1kg)	2100
Hummus (1kg)	1700
Beans (Egyptian production: 1kg)	1200
Lentils (1kg)	1700
Eggs (30)	3500
Tomatoes (4kg)	1000
Potatoes (3kg)	1000
Onion (3kg)	1000
Cucumber (1kg)	500

Eggplant (1kg)	500
Pepper (1kg)	1000
Okra (1kg)	2000
Pumpkin (1kg)	500

NB: Not an admin document per se: via pro-IS Mosul source Omar Fawaz, who says the income of a working person in Mosul ranges from 7000 to 50000 Iraqi dinars a day depending on occupation etc.

Specimen 6Q: New Conditions for Repentance, Fallujah (c. late 2014)

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Fallujah

Praise be to God and prayers and peace be upon the one after whom there is no Prophet. As for what follows:

It has now become clear that many of the repenting policemen and soldiers have returned to apostasy again, conspiring to wage war on the Ahl al-Sunna and support the worshippers of fire, the Cross and the Rafidites; similarly conspiracies have been discovered taking place within the city to shed the Muslims' blood, violate their honour and please their Rafidite masters.

Therefore the Islamic State has decided to impose conditions and restrictions for repentance and similarly for their remaining in the city and not force them out, preserving the religion, blood and honour of the Ahl al-Sunna. They are as follows:

1. A written pledge from the sheikh of the tribe or head of the clan not to return to work or conspire inside the city
2. The repenter's home is to be stripped of arms.
3. The repenter's home will be subject to inspection for arms at any time.
4. The repenter must not connect, walk or sit with repenting and non-repenting policemen, and must not sit with the assemblies.
5. In the event of changing place of residence, notification must be given.
6. In the event of leaving the area, notification must be given along with statement of reason.
7. Mobile number with respect to the repenter is to be ascertained, and it may not be changed without the Islamic State's knowledge.

8. The repenter's blood is to be preserved and his wealth is not to be returned [to Islamic State holdings]
9. If the repenter does not stick to the conditions, the guarantor must inform the Islamic State before it learns of that so that consequences do not come upon him.
10. The policeman continuing in service who now wants to repent must bring a pistol, and the one who previously abandoned service and now wants to repent must bring 2 new Kalashnikovs.
11. If any of these conditions are violated, the pledge becomes annulled and the following apply:
 - a) The repenter will be killed for his crime, and there is no dignity, and his home will be destroyed.
 - b) The guarantor's home will be destroyed and he will be banished for a year.

Specimen 6R: Repentance Form, Fallujah

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Fallujah

Repenter's name:

Title:

Nearest indicating point:*

Phone number:

Job:

Place of work:

Rank:

Guarantor's name:

Title:

Nearest indicating point:

Phone number:

No entry or leaving the city except by permission.

State [Islamic State] representative

Repenter's signature

Guarantor's signature


*NB: *A distinctly Iraqi concept of location: see [here](#) for context*

Specimen 6S: News publication, 'South Province', Iraq



"News report for the Islamic State. Media office: Wilayah al-Janub. Tuesday, 4 Muharram, 1436 AH."

Specimen 6T: Form to assist hijra for foreigners joining the Islamic State



From the Islamic State's "Hira Committee." The form is entitled: "Form for inviting the muhajir." Omar

Specimen 6U: Driving License, Tel Abyad Area

"Driving license particular for cars, issued by the traffic police of Wilayat al-Raqqa (Tel Abyad)": H/T Lauren Williams.

Specimen 6V: Work ID Card



Kunya: Abu al-Bara' al-Iraqi Affiliation: Diwan... Work: Date of issue: 15/06/1436 Date of expiration: 15/06/1437 Age: Blood type: B+

Specimen 6W: General Committee Regulation of Media Content

Islamic State

General Committee

Date: / /1435 AH


Statement for distribution no. 7

Praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds, and prayers and peace be upon the Imam of the Mujahideen our Prophet Muhammad and on all his family and companions. As for what follows:

The general committee in the Islamic State has decided to prevent photographing and publication of scenes of slaughter that the soldiers of the Islamic State undertake in raids or beyond them, whether on the official media channels for the wilayat or unofficial or personal accounts on Internet sites, except by special permission from the committee. And any violator will be tracked down in earnest and held to account.

And praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds.

Specimen 6X: "I am Muslim"- Primary School Textbook for Reading



Specimen 6Y: Water Bills, Raqqa Province

Series:

Required Sum: 1000 Syrian pounds [NB: previously 700 Syrian pounds]

The general foundation for drinking water and sewage in Raqqa requires your attendance at the tax office on a regular basis every two months to pay the regulated sums and every delay will require financial penalty.

Expecting swift compliance.

Hours: 8a.m.-12:30 p.m.

Tax collector

Specimen 6Z: Teaching and Memorization of Qur'an, Deir az-Zor Province

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Kheir

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Praise be to God, the Powerful, the Strong, and prayers and peace be upon the Seal of the Prophets. As for what follows:

The Da'wa and Masajid office- the al-Tabiya office- announces the appointment of the establishment of a session for males and females to memorize the Qur'an which has been announced before and that will be on Saturday 16 Shawwal 1436 AH [1 August 2015] after afternoon prayers in the following mosques:

1. From the municipality of al-Basira to Khasham in the municipality of Khasham: the mosque of the Messenger at the district intersection.
2. From the municipality of Murat to the municipality of Hatla in the municipality of Hatla: the Abu Bakr al-Sadiq mosque.

And God is the guarantor of success.

The Da'wa and Masajid office: the al-Tabiya office

Specimen 7A: Medical ID Card for an Islamic State soldier



From the "Diwan al-Jund" training camp administration: the fighter's name is Abu Shamel al-Shishani, his blood type A and he has no drug allergy.

Specimen 7B: Joint statement for mobilization, al-Bab, Aleppo (2013)

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

The Almighty has said: "Go forth, lightly or heavily armed, and strive with your wealth and souls in the path of God."

Results of a meeting of all the mujahid forces in the town of al-Bab with the Shari'a Committee to discuss the general mobilization.

1. Obligation of the general mobilization because jihad tomorrow is fard al-ayn [individual duty incumbent on every Muslim].
2. It has been agreed to establish a general mobilization office in the Shari'a Committee.
3. A joint operations room for all the mujahid factions has been established in the town of al-Bab and its countryside.
4. The Shari'a Committee will oversee the general mobilization with the support of the

rest of the mujahid factions in the town of al-Bab and its countryside.

5. A financial warchest has been established to support the general mobilization to be overseen by a committee of distinguished seniors and elders of the town of al-Bab and its countryside, their task being to collect voluntary donations from the believers.

6. All the mujahid brigades, factions and groups have agreed on uniting work equally in a joint operations room for the town of al-Bab and its countryside.

7. Every Muslim capable and of sound mind must head to the general mobilization office in the Shari'a Committee to wage jihad with his soul or wealth.

8. Pushing back the aggressive enemy is among the foremost obligations today so whoever shrinks from this duty is considered sinful and committing the great sin of refraining from jihad and is classified under the Almighty's words: "If you do not go forth, He will punish you with a painful torment and replace you with another people. And you cannot harm Him at all, and God is capable over everything" [Qur'an 9:39]

Mujahid brigades, factions and groups that are signatories to this statement:

The Shari'a Committee in al-Bab and its countryside

The United Revolutionary Military Council

Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya

Jabhat al-Nusra

Islamic State in Bilad al-Sham and Iraq

NB: An important example of the gradualist strategy of expansion in 2013 combining subversion and cooperation.

Specimen 7C: Joint statement for cooperation in defence efforts, al-Bab, Aleppo (December 2013)

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

God Almighty has said: "Cooperate on the basis of piety and fear of God and do not cooperate on the basis of sin and hostility" - al-Ma'ida 2 [Qur'an 5:2].

And the Almighty has said: "Those who disbelieve would like you to leave aside your weapons and baggage to come upon you in one attack" - Nisa 102 [Qur'an 4:102].

A group of families of the town of al-Bab have summoned each other and formed "The Town Protection Committee" whose members are selected with outstanding concern

according to finely imposed conditions to prevent infiltrations and protect the secrecy of operation from criminal gangs.

And we call on all committees, factions, mujahideen and noble families to come together, cooperate and coordinate to protect the town against imminent dangers in the region by air and land using all forms of cooperation with soul, wealth and arms. For the town is our town for all of us and we are all tasked to defend our religion, mosques, honour, children and homes especially also as the Nusayri enemy has poured the bowl of its violence upon us and will not cease until it fulfills its deterring terror in all means and ways.

And God is the guarantor of success.

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

Islamic Centre to Spread the Sunna

Revolutionary Civilian Council in the town of al-Bab

Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya

Jabhat al-Nusra: Shari'i Office

Al-Fawj al-Awal: Liwa al-Tawheed

Leadership of the Shari'a Committee

The Public Security in the town of al-Bab

Specimen 7D: Joint statement for defence project, Manbij, Aleppo
(November 2013)

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Project to repel the enemy: to secure the liberated towns

God Almighty has said: "And prepare for them what you can from force and steeds by which you may terrorize the enemy of God and your enemy and others besides them you do not know but God knows. And what you spend in the path of God will be paid to you in recompense and you will not be wronged" [Qur'an 8:60]

And the Almighty has said: "Oh you who believe, what is it for you when it is said to you- 'Go forth in the path of God'- you cling heavily to the earth? Have you preferred this worldly life to the Hereafter? But what is the enjoyment of this worldly life compared to the Hereafter but a little? If you do not go forth

He will torment you with a painful torment and replace you with another people; and you cannot harm Him in any way: God is powerful over all things" [Qur'an 9:38-9].

Call to all those of living conscience in the town of Manbij and its countryside:

Indeed the future is risky, for what happened to our people in the town of al-Safira and others besides it is not far from us. We call on the people of the town of Manbij and its countryside to work to build advanced defensive lines to protect the town and its countryside from the advance of the criminal gangs of Assad and his Majusi Shi'a gangs as well as Hezb al-Shaytan and the heretics of Iraq and their mercenaries. So this requires us to work hand in hand, all of us without exception: civilians and military personnel and all according to his physical or financial capabilities for this project, as a precise plan is to be put in place in order to resist any attack or advance towards the town and its countryside, and for the secrecy of the military plan we withhold the details.

This project also aims to work and coordinate with the rest of the liberated regions and towns to implement the same plan. Let it be known that when this plan is completed and fulfilled by God Almighty's help and the efforts of the devoted ones like you we will avoid what befell our ill-fated towns of Qusayr, al-Safira, Tel Kalakh and others besides them. And we will show the places in which petition is to take place for contribution from the Muslim populace after display of the project on the concerned parts and obtaining agreement upon them.

We seek agreement to begin implementing the project, from [i.e. signatories to this statement are]:

**The Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Military Council (FSA)
Shari'a Committee**

5 November 2013

**[Specimen 7E: Notification from Shari'a Court, Tel Manis \(Idlib Province\),
September 2013](#)**

**Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Wilayat Idlib
Shari'a Court in Tel Manis**

Warning

The Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham announces the granting of a deadline of 15 days for the owners of shops from those who sell smoking and tobacco goods and all whose wealth is linked with the two to remove this filthy matter from their shops. Otherwise these shops will be subject to confiscation and burning.

The deadline begins from Thursday 13/11/1434 (19 September 2013)

Notice: Any car transporting these goods or what is connected with/dependent on them will be subject to its confiscation with its load.

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

**Specimen 7F: Statement from the wali (governor) of Aleppo Province:
October 2013**

**Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Wilayat Halab**

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

God- Glorified and Exalted is He- has said: "Indeed the penalty for those who wage war on God and His Messenger and sow corruption in the land is that they should be killed, crucified, have their hands and feet cut off from opposite sides or be driven from the land. That is recompense for them in this world and in the Hereafter will be a great torment for them" [Qur'an 5:33]

After the accumulation of complaints from the Muslim populace against some of those who sow corruption in the land and engage in highwayman behaviour, including:

- . Liwa Ahfad al-Mursaleen under the leadership of Abu al-Layth
- . Liwa Shuhada' Souriya
- . Jama'at Ahmad Qadro
- . Jama'at Abdo al-Fafini

And the complaints comprising:

- . Stealing of factories of merchants of the Muslims on the accusation that they are shabiha without any evidence or witnesses
- . Taking customs duties (taxes) from the Muslims and putting a stranglehold on them on crossing checkpoints on the pretext of supporting the revolution.
- . Regular accusations of rape and kidnapping of members of wealthy families and holding them for ransom for money.
- . Their dealing in hashish and their addiction to pills and drugs.

So after a delegation of the mujahideen went to one of their bases on 5 Dhu al-Hijja 1434 AH (Thursday) [c. 10 October 2013] to support an oppressed Muslim whose merchant goods they had taken because he did not pay them a tax, the delegation asked them to restore the owner's rights and stop harming the Muslims, but they refused to restore the owner's goods and mocked the mujahideen, trying to imprison them by gunfire, which lead to the killing and wounding of some of the brothers, and after their betrayal and imprisonment of some of the mujahideen from the Islamic State and Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya, the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham decided to capture and hold these sowers of corruption to account in obedience of its Lord and to support the weak/oppressed at a time in which it was participating in the liberation of the village of Khanaser from the aggressive Nusayri regime. So the area of al-Indharat and al-Haydariya in Wilayat Halab was cleansed of the corruption-sowing bases and checkpoints affiliated with the aforementioned battalions. And the process of catching them to bring judgment upon them is ongoing, wherever they may be found.

- . As for whoever of these sowers of corruption in the land has fled, we call on you to announce your repentance. Our Lord- Glorified and Exalted is He- has said: "Except those who have repented before you gain power over them: for know that God is Forgiving, Merciful" [Qur'an 5:34].
- . And we call on the rest of the factions in the Free Army to disavow them, the likes of them and not to give them refuge.

We ask God to accept the martyrs, heal the wounded, raise the banner of tawheed over Iraq, al-Sham and every land of the Muslims, and spread security and safety.

And God is predominant over His affair but most people don't know, and praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds.

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Wilayat Halab
The Wali

Specimen 7G: Opening of office to receive complaints about services, Raqqa (2014)

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Wilayat al-Raqqa: City Area
General Committee for Islamic Services

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

To our noble people in the city of Raqqa...

By God Almighty's help, the opening of an **Islamic services office** has been completed to receive complaints regarding the realm of services (sewage, electricity, water, cleaning, education, provisions).

Address: behind the National Hospital: hours: 9:00 a.m.-4:00 [?] p.m.

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Wilayat al-Raqqa
Islamic Services Committee
City Area

Specimen 7H: Electricity Bills, 'Euphrates Province'



On left: "Islamic State/Wilayat al-Furat/Public Foundation for Electricity." The sum requested is 3000 Syrian pounds for the month of Shawwal [1436 AH]. On right, 1000 Syrian pounds requested for first connection [i.e. signing-on sum upfront]. According to [Deir az-Zor is Being Slaughtered Silently](#), every home using electricity from the additional line connected by the Islamic State is to pay 4000 Syrian pounds in the past month [Shawwal 1436 AH: July-August 2015], but otherwise 3000 Syrian pounds every month and 1000 Syrian pounds for first connection.

**Specimen 7I: Regulations on Internet connections, 'Euphrates Province':
Albukamal**

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Furat

Central Public Security Directorate

Praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds and prayers and peace be upon the Imam al-Mursaleen, the leader of the mujahideen and all his family and Companions. As for what follows:

Statement for distribution

To owners of satellite Internet shops,
As-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu

The Almighty has said: "And cooperate on the basis of piety and fear of God, not sin and hostility" [Qur'an 5:2].

- All Wi-fi connections must be removed and transmission limited to inside the shop only, even for the soldiers of the Islamic State.
- All shops are forbidden to open except after registering with the security office and agreement on the conditions.
- All who have a private Internet system within their home must mention it at the security office.
- All who violate this statement for distribution will be subject to being held accountable.

And may God reward you best.

- Hours for information office: 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.
- The office is located at the [Grand Mosque](#).

General Security Official
Al-Wali [provincial governor]

Islamic State
Wilayat al-Furat: [Western] Area

NB: The wali for Wilayat al-Furat at present [August 2015] is reportedly one Abu Anas al-Samarra'i, which suggests origin from Samarra in Iraq.

Specimen 7J: Name Changes for Villages in Manbij area, Aleppo Province

Islamic State
Wilayat Halab
Public Education (al-Ta'aleem al-Aam)

Praise be to God the Powerful, the Strong, and prayers and peace be upon the one sent with the sword as a mercy to the Worlds. As for what follows:

To the brothers in education in the Manbij area, as-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu:

Let it be known that according to the orders of the officials in the Islamic State, the names of the following villages have been changed and dealing with them will be in replacement of the old names and all must embrace that.

Old Name	New Name
Al-Farat	Al-Nasiriya
Al-Manquba	Al-Mansura
Al-Shawha al-Khaznawi	Al-Abbasiya
Manqukha	Mabruka
Al-Bira	Tayba
Jab al-Kalb Saghir	Jab al-Ward Saghir
Jab al-Kalb Kabir	Jab al-Ward Kabir
Umm Udham	Umm al-Hayat
Muhtariq Saghir	Rabi'a Saghir
Shana'a	Al-Shamiya
Muhtariq Kabir	Rabi'a Kabir
Qabr Imo	Al-Yamama
Jabb al-Tur	Jabb al-Nur
Bashar	Al-Baghdadia-Al-Adnaniya
Mahshiya Sheikh Obeid	Al-Amiriya
Mahshiya al-Tawaheen	Al-Tawaheen
Names of quarters inside Manbij	-----
Harat al-Ulawiya	Harat al-Tawheed
Harat al-Asadiya	Harat al-Sa'adiya
Farn al-Ulawiyeen	Farn al-Tawheed
Al-Asadiya	Halimat al-Sa'adiya

Education official in Manbij

NB: Some other local name changes under ISIS/IS for comparison:

Maskanah: Muslimah

Deir Hafer: Dar al-Fatah

[Deir Attiyeh](#): Dar al-Ata' [November 2013 as part of offensive ISIS launched in coordination w/ Nusra & Green Battalion in Damascus province]

[17 Tamuz](#) [Mosul neighbourhood]: [al-Fatah](#) (al-Mubin)

al-Muhandiseen [Engineers neighbourhood, in Mosul]: al-Mu'mineen [the Believers]

[Mosul Grand Mosque](#) [also the Grand Saddam Mosque, not to be confused with the Grand Mosque [al-Nuri]]: al-Khilafa [Caliphate] Mosque

Specimen 7L: Primary School Exam, Second Setting, Islamic Education (Ninawa Province)

الدراسة الإسلامية
 لدراسة على منهاج السلفية
 أسئلة الاختبارات القصيرة
 للعام الدراسي ١٤٢٥ - ١٤٢٦ هـ / ٢٠١٥ - ٢٠١٦ م **الدور الثاني**
 المادة: **تاريخية الإسلام**

الوقت: ساعة واحدة ونصف

من ١: ضع كلمة (سبح) أمام العبارة الصحيحة وكلمة (خطأ) أمام العبارة الخاطئة لخمس مما يأتي: (١٠ درجات)

١. تلفظ لام ال التعريف إذا دخلت على الأسماء التي بدأ بالمروردة المقوية
٢. علامة الحروف التسمية هي الشدة.
٣. القم في كلمة (الجهاد) حكمها اظهار فعلي لأنها دخلت على الحروف القوي (ج) في كلمة الجهاد
٤. الحروف المقوية مجموعة في قولنا (ايح حذلك وحف عظيمه)
٥. كمثل (ال التعريف) على الاعمال.
٦. من أدب تلاوة القرآن الكريم نظافة الجسم والملابس والمكان
٧. القم في كلمة (المجاهدون) حكمها ادغام شمسي لأنها دخلت على الحروف (م)

من ٢: أحب عن أحد العرنيين: (٢٠ درجة)

١. اقل قوله تعالى من سورة لقمان ﴿وَوَعَدْنَا الْإِنسَانَ بِبَرَكَةٍ﴾ التي قوله تعالى ﴿بِمَا كُنْتُمْ تَعْمَلُونَ﴾
٢. اقل قوله تعالى من سورة طه ﴿طه﴾ التي قوله تعالى ﴿بِمَا كُنْتُمْ تَعْمَلُونَ﴾

من ٣: أحب عن فرع واحد فقط مما يأتي: (١٥ درجة)

١. ما معنى (قصة الأنبياء)
 - ١- من الذي خلق الإنسان وماذا خلقه.
٢. ما معنى (قصة الأنبياء)
 - ١- من المصطلح في هذه الآية
 - ٢- من هم اصحاب القوية ؟ وماذا بعث الله لهم.

من ٤: أعط المعنى لبعض مما يأتي: (١٥ درجات)

﴿يَوْمَ الْكَلْبِ - تَعَالَى - الْأَوْزُكَا - وَأَخْطَى - أُنْزِرُ - وَمَسَلْتُ - كَسْرُوكَ - أَرْتِي﴾

من ٥: أحب عن اثنين فقط مما يأتي: (٢٠ درجة)

- أ) اكتب الحديث النبوي الشريف الآتي: قال رسول الله ﷺ (أما أهلكم من هلككم) التي قوله (الطبع يدها)
- ب) ما معنى اثنين مما يأتي: (يؤتاه - الحد - حذ مناعا)
- ج) ما المعروف ١ وما المعنى ٢ (والله عز الإسلام المنكر)

من ٦: أحب عن اثنين مما يأتي: (١٠ درجات)

- أ) قال تعالى ﴿وَلَا تُسَبِّحُوا بِحَمْدِ اللَّهِ عِندَ بَعْضِ آلِهَتِكُمْ﴾
- ب) اقولوا لعزم هم أهل العصر والقبائل على الإيمان من الانبياء لعلوا المشاق لمسوا عندهم فقط
- ج) ما شروط الحج ؟ حذها فقط

Specimen 7M: Academic dates, Ninawa province (indirect testimony)

The new year of study for the schools of Wilayat Ninawa will begin on 1 September 2015...Diwan al-Ta'aleem

By order of the Diwan al-Ta'aleem, dear students application to the University of Mosul will be on 17 Dhu al-Qi'da 1436 AH: 1 September 2015

Specimen 7N: Sample page from Islamic State's al-Naba' newspaper

11 سبتمبر 1436

ولاية حلب: هجوم على مطار كوبرس وبداية فاشلة للحملة الصليبية على الريف الشمالي

في الوقت الذي تنامت فيه الولايات المتحدة وحلفائها تركيا التهاوى على القتال جمعوما للتنشيط العمل العسكري لتعادى الدولة الإسلامية وحيت كان السفهاء من صغوات الشام يبشرون عناصرهم بالمنطقة "الآمنة" التي ستمتصهم إياها تركيا والتي تبيّن لاحقاً أن لا وجود لها إلا في أدمغتهم وعلى صفحات ما سؤروه من فتاوى يحرضون فيها على موالاة حلف الناتو (الذي تنتمي إليه تركيا وتعتبر أهم قاعدة لعدياتها في المنطقة).

ولاية صلاح الدين: السيطرة على أجزاء واسعة من مدينة بيجي والمناطق المحيطة بها

بعد حنود الخلافة عموماً كثيراً على الجهة الغربية المدينة صاحبه تتهدد ثلاث عمليات استهدافية وتفجارية أعدها الخدام مزارع الجيش الرافضي في الجهة الغربية من المدينة وخارجها، مما أسفر عن تحريك لخم كبير من راسم نسبة في الأحياء الشمالية والغربية من المدينة.

ولاية ديالى وبغداد: منادى القتل والجرس من الرواقض في عمليتين استشهائيتين

في ظل التسعيد الخطير للضربات الجوية التي تنفذها طائرات الجيش الصهيوني من أجل السنة والتي أودت بحياة العشرات من أهل السنة في القرحة والرملة والحويجة وغيرها ردت الدولة الإسلامية بالصعيد عمليات عمليات السنف في التجمعات الرافضية ومناطق الحشد الرافضي.

ولاية طرابلس وبرقة

بعد سيطرة الدولة الإسلامية على مدينة سرت وطرد مرتدي "جور لوبيا" منها وبعد هزيمتهم التكرية، حشدت قوة من الأمن والتشكيل القرية حيث خلتها الخليل من التشريف على ضرورة إخراج الدولة الإسلامية من المدينة فقامت مجموعة من الصغوات بارتكاب التبول الخائفة برفع السلاح في وجه جنود الخلافة داخل المدينة سعياً لاداء... هناك في...

جيش العشائر | النصيري ...

ذكرى لمن كان له قلب

Specimen 70: Names of detainees held by IS and judgements upon them,
Deir az-Zor Province

اسماء المحكوم عليهم			
ملاحظة	الحكم	العنوان	الاسم الثلاثي
	قتل	التبعية	سليمان ديف الحاج
	قتل	التبعية	عبد الله العلف
	قتل	زعمرة التبعية	العلي يشار السليم حسين
	بد التعذيب	القبلي	عبد موسى العبد الله
	قتل		يشار العويد محمد
	قتل		حمود موسى الشكر لوي
	قتل		أحمد حمود الشكر لوي
	قتل	حوارح ديف	حسين علي السلي
	قتل	عياش	جليل خلف الحضر
	قتل	التبعية	عبد البراهيم محمد
	قتل	حوارح ديف	زكريا عبد الوهيد
	بد التعذيب	التبعية	جهد مصطفى العبدان
	قتل	التبعية	أحمد ياسر حضر
	قتل		السليمان
	قتل	التبعية	محمد حاسم الشيخ
	قتل		محمد التيسين
	بد التعذيب	التبعية	محمد التيسين
	قتل	التبعية	يشار حسن الأحمد
	قتل		محمد فوزي العيسى
	قتل		عبد الله الزراق
	قتل		الحضر
	قتل		أيهم خلف حسين
	قتل		الحضر
	قتل		أحمد العويد سعد
	قتل		الحملة
	قتل		يوسف المدوح الخلف
	قتل	التبعية	المدوح
	قتل	التبعية	عيسى نسيم الحاسم
	قتل		محمد التيسين
	قتل		رمضان حمد الأحمد
	قتل		حمد محمد الأحمد
	قتل		ياسر العلي
	قتل	المسروب	عبد الله أحمد العلف
			المدوح

الاسم	المكان	التصنيف	موسى بطار صلح عدد
محمد الكريم	المنطقة	المنطقة	محمد بطار صلح عدد
محمد سالم الصلح			
عبد حسن عبد الو		المنطقة	
سليمان			
محمد صلح العباس	المنطقة		
محمد عبد الحميد	المنطقة		
موسى حسن الوشاح			
عبد الحميد مهدي	المنطقة		
عبد الرزاق محمد			
محمد العباس الصلح			
ابراهيم زعيم الخط			
ابراهيم العرج			
عبد الرحمن العرج			
رضي محمد الجابر			
محمد يوسف ابراهيم	عاش		
سليم محمد الحسن	المنطقة		

From right to left: the name, residence [e.g. al-Shamitiya to the west of Deir az-Zot city], judgement [mostly execution] and notes, if any.

Specimen 7P: Qur'an memorization session, Manbij, Aleppo Province

Islamic State

Wilayat Halab

al-Da'wa wa al-Masajid

Announcement

God- Glorified and Exalted is He- has said: "And We have indeed made the Qur'an easy to remember: so is there anyone who will remember it?"- al-Qamar 17 [Qur'an 57:17].

"So is there anyone who will remember it?"- i.e. So is there anyone who will remember it and take heed?

The Messenger of God (SAWS) said: "The best of you are those who learn and teach the Qur'an"- narrated by Bukhari.

And in a narration: "Indeed the most favoured of you are those who learn and teach the Qur'an"- narrated by Bukhari.

The Da'wa and Masajid office in Manbij and its countryside announces:

The opening of a session to memorize the Noble Qur'an. Let it be known that the teachers of the Noble Qur'an are always to be found in the mosque.

Conditions to join the session:

1. Purity in intention to God Almighty
2. Able to read and write
3. Good manners and restraint
4. Commitment to memorizing and not wasting time

Note: All ages without exception are accepted in the session

Those who excel will be honoured at the end of the session

The brothers who wish to join the session are to register in the Abd al-Rahman bin Awf mosque from 9:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m.

Registration begins on 29 Shawwal 1436 AH corresponding to 16 August 2015 and ends on 9 Dhu al-Hijja 1436 AH corresponding to 26 August 2015

Specimen 7Q: Session in 'Ilm, Manbij, Aleppo Province**Islamic State****Diwan al-Da'wa wa al-Masajid****Wilayat Halab****In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful**

Delightful news...the Da'wa office in Manbij announces:

The beginning of an advanced session in 'Ilm on two levels, and for a period of 4 months:

First level: 1. Tawheed (Book of Tawheed), 2. Fiqh (Main Subject of Fiqh), 3. Terminology of Hadith ([al-Biquni](#)), 4. Qur'an sciences (Introduction to Tafsir by Ibn Qasim), Tajwid (al-Nur al-Mubin), 5. Methodology (work of Ibn Adjurrum).

According to the following program	Saturday	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday
First lesson	Tawheed	Tawheed	Fiqh	Fiqh	Fiqh
Second lesson	Hadith Terminology	Methodology	Qur'an Sciences	Methodology	Tajwid

Notices:

- . First level session begins on Saturday 1 Dhu al-Qi'da 1436 AH, corresponding to 15 August 2015.
- . Place of session: al-Khayr mosque. Right after afternoon prayers (there is a place for sisters).
- . At the end of the first level session an exam will be held: undertaking it is required for the first level certificate.
- . For those who excel are valuable prizes of up to \$100
- . One can obtain the lessons (audio) from the media point every Thursday, or download it from the Facebook page.

To connect and inquire...[effaced]; Facebook: shamgreb

Specimen 7R: Notice to checkpoints on checking student IDs

Islamic State

Caliphate on the Prophetic Methodology

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

'And say: Lord, increase me in knowledge.'

Hijra date: 12 Rabi' al-Awal 1436 AH [3 January 2015]

Wilaya:

Number:

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

To the State's checkpoints

Brothers in the checkpoints may God protect you, we ask you to check the identities of students travelling outside the wilaya in view of the approaching exams and that is stop them from going outside [the Islamic State] to undertake the exams in the Taghut state [i.e. regime-held Syria] according to statement for distribution no. 9 issued by the Diwan al-Ta'aleem and transfer the violator to [the Diwan] al-Hisbah.

Diwan al-Ta'aleem official

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Raqqa

Specimen 7S: Notification from security office, western Deir az-Zor province

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Islamic State

Diwan al-Amn al-Aam

Security office: western area

Statement for distribution

All those affiliated with armed factions from the Free Army, Jabhat al-Nusra, the Islamic Front, those who defected from the Nusayri regime army, workers in aid organizations, committees and local councils, and those who left areas controlled by the Nusayri army should go and register with the security office in Hatla [village in Deir az-Zor province] besides the al-Hisba headquarters within one month from the date of this statement for distribution.

1 Dhu al-Qi'da 1436 AH corresponding to 15 August 2015

All who violate this will be subject to Shari'a inquiry.

Islamic State

Diwan al-Amn al-Aam

Western area: al-Kheir

Specimen 7T: Expulsion of an official from the Islamic State

Islamic State

Diwan al-Amn al-Aam

No. 303

5 June 2015

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

As-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu...according to instructions of the General Supervisory Committee, the following has been decided:

1. Expelling the one called Abu al-Abbas al-Fadhli/Ali Muhammad al-Haj Muhammad- born in 1980, Maskanah; address/residency: Wilayat Halab, Muslimah (Maskanah)- from the ranks of the Islamic State after it was established that he exploited his position for personal gain.
2. This decision is to be spread on all official sides in the Islamic State to raise awareness and ensure no reception or dealings with him.

May God reward you best.

Diwan al-Amn al-Aam

Islamic State

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

The Amir: Dhu al-Qarnain

[Note from Dhu al-Qarnain]: We ask this to be distributed and put up in the education [Ta'aleem] offices' centres to be a reminder for the brothers.

Specimen 7U: Order to shut down wi-fi networks during prayer time in Deir az-Zor city (2014)

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Kheir: City Area

Diwan al-Hisba

Statement for distribution no. 1

"And when they saw a transaction or diversion, they rushed to it, leaving you standing. Say: 'What is with God is better than diversion and transaction. And God is the best of providers'" - al-Jum'a 11 [Qur'an 62:11]

All Internet shops must stop wi-fi network transmission during the designated prayer times. All must comply with this statement for distribution.

al-Hisba amir

Specimen 7V: Order to close shops in prayer time, Baza'a, Aleppo Province (late 2013)

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

Wilayat Halab

Eastern Area

Al-Bab Area, its Countryside and Surrounding

Important statement for distribution to owners of shops

The Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham in the town of Baza'a announces the issuing of this statement for distribution which requires closing all shops in general immediately on call to prayer and closing for a period of 25 minutes. Whoever violates will be referred to the Islamic Court to be held accountable.

Reminder:

In the time of our Prophet (SAWS), the shops were not open in Medina after the call to prayer in honour of this ritual. Ibn Marduyah narrated in his tafsir on the authority of

Abdullah ibn Abbas (may God be pleased with him): he said: "Men whom neither transactions nor sales distract from remembering God" - Surat al-Nur 37 [Qur'an 24:37]. They were men striving for God's grace in buying and selling, so when they heard the call to prayer, they left what was before them, went to mosque and prayed. God has granted us success to follow the program of our beloved, the Messenger of God (SAWS).

And may God reward you with all that is best.

Specimen 7W: Conditions of repentance, al-Bab, Aleppo Province (January 2014)

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

Wilayat Halab- Eastern Area- Al-Bab Area and its Surrounding

Conditions of Repentance for Members Fighting Against the Islamic State

1. Announcing repentance from fighting against the Islamic State and repenting to God from that.
2. Announcing disavowal of the 'Islamic Front' and what factions it encompasses.
3. Handing light and heavy weapons to the Islamic State alone.
4. No support for the 'Islamic Front' and what factions it encompasses is allowed in any form of support (weapons, opinion or consultation, or wealth...)
5. Attending a Shari'a session in rooting of tawheed and al-wala' and al-bara'
6. No bearing of arms against the Islamic State is allowed.
7. Violation of any of these clauses will lead to trial according to Shari'a.

Note: place of repentance: al-Imaan mosque in al-Bab.

Days: Friday-Saturday-Sunday (16, 17, 18/3/1435: 17-19 January 2014).

Specimen 7X: Hudud punishments, al-Bab, Aleppo Province (March 2014: pre-Caliphate era)



cf. Specimen 1C. This was issued by the Shari'i judge for the 'Islamic court for al-Bab town and its surrounding.'

Specimen 7Y: Prohibition on gender mixing, Manbij, Aleppo Province

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham Wilayat Halab- Eastern Area- Manbij Area

Prohibition on mixing between men and women

Praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds, and prayers and peace be upon the warning guider, his family, companions and whoso has followed them with ihsan to the Day of Judgment, as for what follows:

God has said: "And stay in your homes, and do not display yourselves in the manner of the former times of Jahiliya" [Qur'an 33:33]. Imam Qurtubi- may God have mercy on him- said: "The meaning of this verse is the order to stay at home. Even though it is addressed to the Prophet's women [SAWS], others besides them are also intended in meaning. This is so even if there were no evidence to show specification of all other women. For how is the Shari'a replete with evidence that women must stay in their homes and refrain from going out from them except for necessity?"

But also the Imam of tafsir, Mujahid ibn Jabar explained display here with what the heart of the verse has shown. He said: "The woman used to go out and walk among men, so that is the display of the former times of Jahiliya." Not one of the Ahl al-'Ilm has dissented from the point that the woman should stay at home and not go out from it except for necessity. This is on their going out from their home, so what then of their mixing with men?

It is forbidden all the more so and thus the Almighty has said: "When you ask them for something, ask them from behind a veil: that is more pure for your hearts and their hearts" [Qur'an 33:53] And in this verse is evidence that the principle is veiling women from men. Thus God has obligated that speaking with them be from behind a veil that keeps apart woman and man. This is evidence that mixing is forbidden.

Also He has forbidden them from flirting in speech, so that the corrupted should not covet them: the Almighty has said: "Be not soft in speech lest the one in whose heart is a disease should covet" [Qur'an 33:32]. Also He has ordered them to keep away from all that exposes them to what brings dishonour in their lives. The Almighty has said: "And may they not stamp their feet to make known what they are hiding from adornment" [Qur'an 24:31].

Thus we say: It is absolutely forbidden to mix in private and public schools, institutes, lessons and universities, whether between male and female students or male and female students.

And this is to be considered advice and warning to officials to institute separation between male and female with a week from the date of this statement and there will be a committee tracking and supervising. Whoever is shown to be indifferent, delaying or disdaining the honour of our daughters and sisters will be referred to the umbrella of the law.

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Wilayat Halab
Amir of the Manbij area and its surrounding.

28/4/1435 AH
28 February 2014

Abu Luqman

[Specimen 7Z: Evacuation notice to residents of some north Aleppo towns \(c. March 2014\)](#)

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
As-salam alaykum

As for what follows:

From the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham to the Muslim populaces in the following military areas:

Akhtar in and its surrounding
 Sawran and its surrounding
 Abla and its surrounding
 Turkoman Bareh and its surrounding

We give you a deadline of 48 hours to leave the aforementioned places and that is to protect your safety. But whoever falls into the hands of the Islamic State's soldiers and is proven to be providing cover for or cooperating with the other factions even if by half a word, the hadd punishment will be carried out on him publicly.

And the one who has warned has been excused.

NB: These towns became frontline zones following the ISIS withdrawal eastward amid infighting with rebels in early 2014. They have all since been captured from the rebels ([June 2014](#) for Abla; August 2014 for Akhtarin & Turkoman Bareh; late May 2015 for Sawran).

Specimen 8A: Warning to doctors not to issue false medical reports, Deir az-Zor province

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
 ١٤٣٨ هـ / ٢٠١٦ م / ١٠ / ٢٠١٦ م

الى الاخوة الأطباء في ولاية الخير

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله تعالى وبركاته

رقم
 1436/11/8

الأقضية الإسلامية

ولاية الخبير

مركز نهجان الصفاة

نحيط علمكم بأن التقرير الطبي هو بمثابة
 شهادة وأنه سوف يحاسب أي طبيب نكتش
 أن تقريره الطبي غير صحيح ويتم تعزيز
 بالسجن أو غرامة مالية كبيرة أو غلق
 العيادة نهائياً (حسب حكم القضاء) وذلك
 تعزيراً له.

والله ولي التوفيق

مسؤول الطبية

د. أبو آدم المصرى

Islamic State
Wilayat al-Kheir
Diwan al-Siha Centre
8/11/1436 AH [c. 24 August 2015]

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

To the doctor brothers in Wilayat al-Kheir
As-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu

We remind you that the medical report is tantamount to a witness statement and any doctor whose report we discover to be untrue will be held to account, and he will be reprimanded with imprisonment or a large fine, or definite closure of his clinic (according to the ruling of the judiciary) and that will be to reprimand him.

And God is the guarantor of success.

Medical Official
Dr. Abu Adam al-Masri

NB: [Via Deir az-Zor Under Siege](#), which says this statement comes amid IS members pressuring doctors to issue medical reports to get them exemptions from frontline duty.

Specimen 8B: Consultation on re-opening of schools, Syrian 'Euphrates Province', April 2015

ديوان التعليم
وفيلد روت وديان علماء
الدولة الإسلامية
خلافة على منهاج النبوة

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الحمد لله والصلوة والسلام على رسول الله وعلى آله وصحبه ومن آله أما بعد:

يعلم ديوان التعليم في ولاية الفرات عن دعوة مدراء المدارس والإداريين (لزما)
ومن يرغب بالحضور من المعلمين (اختيارا)

لحضور الاجتماع المقرر مع القائمين على ديوان التعليم في ولاية الفرات
يوم الأربعاء والخميس الواقع في ٢٠١٥\٤\٢٩ و ٢٠١٥\٤\٣٠ والموافق
١٤٣٦\٧\١١ و ١٤٣٦\٧\١٠ هـ

وفق الجدول التالي:

القاعة	مكان الاجتماع	اليوم	التاريخ	الساعة
البيوكمال + القبيرة + عشاير + السكرية	مسجد الرحمن	الأربعاء	٢٠١٥\٤\٢٩	١٠ إلى ٢:٣٠
الشامية من السيل شرق حتى الصالحية	مسجد محبي العائش (الطواطحة)	الأربعاء	٢٠١٥\٤\٢٩	١٠ إلى ١٢
الجزيرة من الباغوز حتى الشعفة	مسجد القلم (السوسة)	الخميس	٢٠١٥\٤\٣٠	١٠ إلى ٢:٣٠
هجين من أبو الحسن حتى البحرة	المسجد الكبير	الخميس	٢٠١٥\٤\٣٠	١٠ إلى ١٢

ولذلك ننظر في أمر فتح المدارس وتوزيع المناهج وتوزيع الطلاب على المراحل الدراسية ومن يتخلف
عن الحضور من مدراء المدارس والإداريين خاصة لأنه يعرض نفسه للمسائلة الشرعية

والله الموفق والمستعان

Islamic State

Caliphate on the Prophetic Methodology

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

And say: 'My Lord, increase me in knowledge.'

Wilaya: al-Furat

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Praise be to God and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God, his family, companions, and whoso is close to him. As for what follows:

The Diwan al-Ta'aleem in Wilayat al-Furat announces a call to school directors and administration officials (obligatory) and whoso of the teachers desires to attend (optional) to come to the set meeting with the overseers of the Diwan al-Ta'aleem in Wilayat al-Furat on Wednesday and Thursday corresponding to 29-30 April 2015 and 10-11 Jumada al-Akhir 1436 AH.

According to the following timetable:


Area	Meeting Place	Day	Date	Time
Albukamal & al-Ghabra & Ashair & al-Sakariya	Al-Rahman Mosque	Wednesday	29 April	1-2:30 p.m.
Al-Shamiya from al-Siyal al-Sharqi up to al-Salihiya	Mahya al-Ayesh Mosque (al-Tawahita)	Wednesday	29 April	10 a.m.- 12 p.m.
Al-Jazira from al-Baghuz up to al-Sha'afa	Al-Ghanam Mosque (al-Susa)	Thursday	30 April	1-2:30 p.m.
Hajin from Abu al-Hasan up to al-Bahra	The Grand Mosque	Thursday	30 April	10 a.m.- 12 p.m.

And that will be with a view to ordering the opening of the schools, distributing the programs, and distributing the students in the school stages. Whoever refrains from attending- in particular from the schools' directors and admin officials- he will expose himself to Shari'a inquiry.

And God is the guarantor of success and the One whose help is to be sought.

Age	Position	His stance on fighting the Islamic State: participated/did not participate	Handing over of weapons	Place of residence	Notes

Specimen 8D: Opening of recruitment office (Albukamal area)



In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Islamic State

Caliphate on the Prophetic Methodology

Diwan al-Da'wa wa al-Masajid in Wilayat al-Furat

Announcement

God Almighty says: "So fight in the path of God. Only you yourself are held responsible. And urge on the believers. Perhaps God will restrain the might of those who disbelieve. And God is stronger in might and punishment" [Qur'an 4:84]. So in response to the command of God, the Islamic State announces the opening of the Affiliation Office in

Wilayat al-Furat for whosoever wishes to join the ranks of the mujahideen and announce allegiance to the Amri al-Mu'mineen.

Registration will be in the da'wa offices in the wilayat's areas beginning from 3/3/1436 AH [25 December 2014]. And the conditions:

- . Age 15 and above.
- . No prior affiliation with the apostasy cadres. And God is the guarantor of success.

City of Albukamal: al-Rahman Mosque

Jazira of Albukamal: al-Rahbeen Mosque

Shamiya of Albukamal: opposite the Ali ibn Abi Talib Mosque


Applications will be accepted from 9 a.m. till 2 p.m.

Islamic State

Diwan al-Da'wa wa al-Masajid

Wilayat al-Furat Centre

Specimen 8E: Public regulations (Albukamal area)



Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham [sic.]

Wilayat al-Furat

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

As-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu

To the Muslim brothers in the town of Albukamal and its countryside, you are asked to observe the following matters and not violate them. Whoever violates them will have financial fines imposed on him according to the following matters. They are:

1. Whoever infringes on the alley or public street will face a fine from 5000 to 25,000 [Syrian pounds] according to the violation and its type.
2. Whoever infringes on the street in building- whether a shop, house or trees: the building will be subject to destruction, the trees will be cut, and the fines will range from 5000 to 250,000 [Syrian pounds].
3. Whoever infringes on the water extension by more than half an inch will face fines, and whoever draws water upon it, the fines will range from 5000 to 50000 [Syrian pounds] according to the violation and its type.
4. Whoever infringes on the electricity lines by pulling out two lines or takes from the lines of the water filtration plants, the fines upon him will be at least 5000 [Syrian pounds] and not exceed 50000 [Syrian pounds] according to the violation and its type.
5. Shop owners must place a barrel dyed in white colour in the middle of which is a black belt in front of every shop and not throw away garbage anywhere except in the barrel. Whoever does not comply with that will face a fine of at least 5000 [Syrian] pounds.
6. All Muslims who own houses must not throw away garbage anywhere except in the designated places. Whoever does not comply with that will face a fine of at least 3000 [Syrian] pounds.
7. All Muslims who destroy a house must dispatch the remains to the designated places. Whoever does not comply with that will face a fine according to the quantity of remains.

We ask you to comply and cooperate with us.

May God reward you best.

Specimen 8F: Regulations for clothes shop owners imposed by Diwan al-Hisba (Albukamal area): September 2015

- The owner of any shop must wear [kulabiya and taqiya](#)
- Shop owners must conceal their numbers from billboards and advertising cards.
- No selling to women without a mahram
- The price of every item to be sold in the shop must be fixed.
- No selling of tight clothes and those that bear photos and foreign expressions.

NB: Indirect testimony via Deir az-Zor under siege.

Specimen 8G: University application form


 لجنة القبول المركزي

استمارة التقديم إلى جامعات الدولة الإسلامية للسنة الدراسية ١٤٢٧ هـ - ٢٠١٥/٢٠١٦
 (لخريجي الدراسة الإعدادية)

١	الاسم الرباعي واللقب :	
٢	الجنس :	<input type="checkbox"/> أنثى <input type="checkbox"/> ذكر
٣	المواليد :	
٤	اسم المدرسة التي تخرجت منها :	
٥	الرقم الامتدادي :	
٦	الفرع :	<input type="checkbox"/> علمي <input type="checkbox"/> شرعي <input type="checkbox"/> أدبي <input type="checkbox"/> مهني
٧	سنة التخرج :	٢٠١ - ٢٠١
٨	رقم هوية الأحوال المدنية وتاريخ إصدارها :	
٩	محل السكن :	الولاية : العتلة :
١٠	المجموع (قبل الإضافة) :	
١١	الدور الناجح فيه :	<input type="checkbox"/> الأول <input type="checkbox"/> الثاني <input type="checkbox"/> تسريع
١٢	درجة اللغات (الفرنسية) :	الدرجة : (٠,١٦ x) <input type="checkbox"/> تتخذ إلى المجموع
١٣	المجموع بعد الإضافة :	(مراعاة مخرية وامتداد)

الملاحظات :

- ١- تكتب المعلومات بشكل واضح ومفروق.
- ٢- يرفق مع استمارة التقديم نسخة ملونة من هوية الأحوال المدنية بالإضافة إلى صورة شخصية للطالب.
- ٣- تُلغى الاستمارة غير الكاملة والتي يثبت عدم صحتها.
- ٤- تعلن الإختيارات كاملة وحسب تسلسل الرغبة.

توقيع الطالب : لجنة القبول المركزي :

Islamic State
Caliphate on the Prophetic Methodology
Central Admission Committee
[Top left: personal photo]

Application form to the universities of the Islamic State for year of study 1437 AH:
 2015/2016 (for graduates of preparatory study [high school]).

1	Full name and title	
2	Sex	Male/Female
3	Born in/on	
4	Name of school from which you graduated	
5	Exam number	
6	Division	Science/Shari'i/Humanities/Vocational
7	Year of graduation	201..-201..
8	Civil status ID number and date of its issue	
9	Place of residence	Wilaya: Locality:
10	Overall mark (before addition)	
11	Successful setting in	First Second Tasri'
12	Languages mark (French)	Mark: () x 0.16= (added to total)

13	Overall mark after addition	(mark to one decimal)
----	-----------------------------	-----------------------

Notes:

1. The information is to be written clearly and legibly.
2. The application form is to be provided along with a coloured copy of the civil status ID in addition to a personal photo of the student.
3. The incomplete form and the one whose veracity cannot be ascertained will be cancelled.
4. The choices are to be filled in full according to sequence of preference.

Student's signature: Central Admission Committee

NB: This document is interesting as it only makes sense in the Iraqi context. Note in particular the requirement for the [Civil Status ID](#), the ['settings' for exams](#), and one's mark in the French language exam as an addition to the overall/average mark. On the latter, consider this report from [al-Sumaria News in March 2015](#):

"Dozens of students protested on Monday in front of the Education Ministry in the middle of the capital of Baghdad to demand the addition of the French language subject mark to the overall/average.

The al-Sumaria News correspondent added: that more than 100 students demonstrated near the Education Ministry in the middle of the capital of Baghdad.

And he added that the students sought to add the French language subject mark to the general average.

The Higher Education and Scientific Investigation Ministry announced last July that it decided to compare between marks in additional foreign languages and in English, and to take into account the higher of the two for application to be admitted into universities and institutes for year of study 2014-2015."

Specimen 8H: Guide for applying to university



Guide for the student applying for admission to university

1. Conditions and restrictions on admission:**The student who is accepted into the colleges and institutes must:**

- Have a preparatory school diploma (science, Shari'a, humanities, vocational).
- Be born in 1993 and rising.
- Pass medical testing, and that will be sought on registering in the college into which one is admitted.
- Be freed up for study and not allowed to be employed and studying at the same time just as one cannot be admitted into two colleges at the same time.
- Be among the graduates of the current year and if one is among the graduates from the previous years it is required that one must not be admitted via central admissions and must be dealt with per a special standard of discretion.

2. General principles:

- Fill in all the choices according to order of preference.
- The student will be admitted according to the specified choices in the application form.
- The student's application per the application form does not guarantee one's admittance according to choices only, but also admission relies on comparison with the rest of the students.

3. Means of admission and registration:

- Appeals will be accepted within 10 days from the date of the announcement of the admissions' results.
- Registration begins in the colleges and institutes after a week from the announcement of the admissions' results.
- The student will be asked to undergo medical testing and for the school document certified by the education directorate on registering in the college.

Specimen 8I: Names of university colleges and institutes

رموز الكليات والمعاهد

ت	اسم الكلية او المعهد	الرمز	الفرع
١	جامعة العلوم الطبية / كلية طب الموصل	101	العلمي
٢	جامعة العلوم الطبية / كلية طب نينوى	102	العلمي
٣	جامعة العلوم الطبية / كلية طب الأسنان	103	العلمي
٤	جامعة العلوم الطبية / كلية الصيدلة	104	العلمي
٥	جامعة العلوم الطبية / كلية التمريض	105	العلمي
٦	جامعة العلوم الطبية / المعهد التقني الطبي	106	العلمي
٧	جامعة الموصل / كلية الهندسة	201	العلمي
٨	جامعة الموصل / كلية العلوم	202	العلمي
٩	جامعة الموصل / كلية علوم الحاسبات والرياضيات	203	العلمي
١٠	جامعة الموصل / كلية الطب البيطري	204	العلمي
١١	جامعة الموصل / كلية الزراعة والغابات	205	العلمي
١٢	جامعة الموصل / كلية التربية	206	العلمي / الشرعي / الأنبي
١٣	جامعة الموصل / كلية الإدارة والإقتصاد	207	العلمي / الشرعي / الأنبي
١٤	جامعة الموصل / الكلية التقنية	208	العلمي / الشرعي / الأنبي
١٥	جامعة الموصل / المعهد التقني	209	العلمي / الشرعي / الأنبي / المعني

No.	Name of the college or institute	Code	Division
1	Medical sciences university/Mosul medical college	101	Scientific
2	Medical sciences university/Ninawa	102	Scientific

	medical college		
3	Medical sciences university/Dentistry college	103	Scientific
4	Medical sciences university/Pharmacy college	104	Scientific
5	Medical sciences university/Nursing college	105	Scientific
6	Medical sciences university/Medical technician institute	106	Scientific
7	Mosul university/Engineering college	201	Scientific
8	Mosul university/Sciences college	202	Scientific
9	Mosul university/Accounting and Mathematical sciences college	203	Scientific
10	Mosul university/Veterinary college	204	Scientific
11	Mosul university/Agriculture and Forestry college	205	Scientific

12	Mosul university/Education college	206	Scientific/Shari'i/Humanities
13	Mosul university/Economics and Management college	207	Scientific/Shari'i/Humanities
14	Mosul university/Technical college	208	Scientific/Shari'i/Humanities
15	Mosul university/Technical institute	209	Scientific/Shari'i/Humanities/Vocational

Specimen 8J: Form to indicate order of preference for university college/institute application

الرمز	اسم الكلية او المعهد	ت
		١
		٢
		٣
		٤
		٥
		٦
		٧
		٨
		٩
		١٠
		١١
		١٢
		١٣
		١٤
		١٥


*تعلى هذه الصفحة من قبل الطالب ويكون ترتيب الرغبات حسب التسلسل.

Specimen 8K: Diwan al-Zakat wa al-Sadaqat Billboard (Deir az-Zor province)



"Brother, you who drive, ensure to have the zakat voucher with you. Otherwise you will not be allowed to pass the checkpoint."

Specimen 8L: Prohibition on wearing and selling tight clothes for men



Islamic State

Wilayat al-Furat

Al-Hisba Center

No. 35

Date: August 2015

Prohibition on wearing and selling tight clothes for men

Praise be to God and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God, his family, companions and whoso is close to him. As for what follows:

As-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu

Beginning from the hadith of the Prophet (SAWS)- "Whoso imitates a people is of them"- it is not hidden from you that imitating the disbelievers in dress is a type of imitation of them. So the wearing of tight clothes, and that which brings out man's body and makes clear his private parts is contrary to the law, as the wearing of these sorts of clothes is among the customs of the enemies of the religion, but also some of the fashions (skinny trousers and jeans) may corrupt man's prayer, because of the appearance of his private parts on bowing or prostrating. Thus we inform the youth of Islam to beware of and avoid imitating the enemies of the religion, and to embrace Islamic manifestations: and the appearance, garments and clothes of the Muslim must be what suits the conservative Muslim society.

According to this your brothers in al-Hisba will hold to account any person who violates this statement. Similarly shops will be prevented from selling clothes that offend modesty and are tight (tight fashions) and they will be confiscated from the shops 20 days after the date of this statement.

And God is the guarantor of success.

Specimen 8M: Da'wa Meeting Invitation: Albukamal



Islamic State

Al-Furat

Diwan al-Da'wa wa al-Masajid

Invitation to attend the weekly da'wa meeting every Saturday after evening prayer

Religious competitions

Recreational competitions


Seminars in 'Ilm

Lectures and lessons

Valuable prizes

The Grand Mosque in Albukamal

Specimen 8N: Notification to wanted person from Islamic Police, Albukamal



Islamic State

Wilayat al-Furat

Islamic Police

Albukamal area

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

As-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu

To the one called...

You are asked to come to the Islamic Police's headquarters in Albukamal. And that will be on date ...1436 AH

Time:

Claimant's name:

Case:

**Specimen 80: Ultimatum for owner of medical establishment to return,
Hasakah Province**



**Islamic State
Wilayat al-Baraka**

Diwan al-Siha Centre**Date: 11/11/1436 AH: 11 Dhu al-Qi'da 1436 AH [26 August 2015]****In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful****Warning of 15 days**

According to the decisions of the judiciary to confiscate medical establishments and houses of medical doctors travelling to the abode of disbelief outside the lands of the Islamic State, we warn the owner of this medical establishment to return within 15 days. Otherwise the medical administration will confiscate this establishment.

Whoever sees this warning, notify the owner of the establishment.

And may God reward you best.

Islamic State**Wilayat al-Baraka****Medical official**

NB: Via Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently

Specimen 8P: Lesson Invitation, Derna, Libya

H/T: Aaron Zelin

Islamic State

Wilayat Barqa: Derna

Diwan al-Awqaf [+ Da'wa wa Masajid]

Announcement

The Da'wa and Irshad office announces the establishment of a lesson in 'Ilm under the title:

The Effect of Establishing Hudud Punishments on Society's Stability

And that will take place with the attendance of a number of the mashayakh with opportunity for questions and discussion.

Thursday after evening prayer in the al-Rashid mosque

Date: 25 Rajab 1436 AH, corresponding to 14 May 2015.

Specimen 8Q: Closing of a barber shop in Albukamal for shaving beards



"Closed by order of the Hisba on account of its violation of the command of God and His Messenger on shaving the beard. Hisba of Albukamal."

Specimen 8R: Notice to locals in Albukamal on students who are taking exams, May 2013



**Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Statement from the Kata'ib Junud al-Haq in Albukamal
Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham**

God Almighty has said: "Oh you who believe, beware..." [Qur'an 4:71]

To our dear people in Albukamal:

Out of concern on our part for the safety of your sons and daughters among the students whose exams will begin tomorrow Deir az-Zor city, and after the governor rejected our request to move the exams to the town of Albukamal and his affirmation that they will be in Deir az-Zor city, and on account of the bad situation in Deir az-Zor city, we advise you not to send your sons and daughters to Deir az-Zor city out of fear that your sons will be arrested and your daughters raped- God forbid- just as is happening now in Deir az-Zor and happened in Homs and Baniyas before.

Hoping for a response from you to this call and may God reward you best.

Your brothers in Kata'ib Junud al-Haq

NB: Kata'ib Junud al-Haq was a Jabhat al-Nusra affiliate in Albukamal that pledged allegiance to ISIS after Baghdadi's announcement of ISIS in April 2013 but reverted to Jabhat al-Nusra after Zawahiri's call to dissolve ISIS.

Specimen 8S: Negotiations and ceasefire agreement with the regime over the thermal plant and surrounding in Aleppo, June 2013

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Statement

To whom it may concern:

Let it be known that the soldiers and troops of the taghut apostate state took prisoner and detained the employees working in the thermal plant in eastern Aleppo countryside, and that in response to the fact that the mujahideen of the Islamic State sniped two of them, killing one of them and wounding the other. So following on from that the besieged army present there detained and took prisoner the employees working inside the plant, exposing them to harassments and harm through vituperation, abuse, and threats, making clear that they would not be released except by allowing in the doctor for the wounded soldier.

Out of concern for the safety of the Muslim employees we allowed the doctor to enter and to diagnose the condition of the wounded apostate. After examining and diagnosing the

condition, it became apparent that he needed to go to hospital to be treated, but they refused to release the unarmed employees who had no connection with the fighting.

So after the call of the 'Aleppo Families Initiative' committee under the leadership of the engineer Tarif Atura, we undertook through him to negotiate with the besieged army, and with the governor of Aleppo, and the following was agreed:

1. Allowing the peasants and farmers who have lands around the plant to harvest their lands.
2. The apostate army has pledged not to harm the employees, to release them, and promised that in future they will not be exposed to any harm, evil or harassment. And the Islamic State relinquishes its responsibility for any nullifier of this pledge before God and then before the people.
3. The wounded apostate will be removed from the place according to the initiative of the families with his personal weapons, and his personal weapons will be handed to the Islamic State, and he will not come to risk of harm during the time he is moved from the places of influence and control of the Islamic State to the places and influence of the taghut state, and the Islamic State takes responsibility for embracing these conditions so long as the apostates do not relinquish this agreement.

The farmers are given a time of 48 hours to harvest their crops, during which there will be a ceasefire between the two sides. And in the event of the breaking of the ceasefire, the agreement will be nullified, and after that we will have the right to take action we consider appropriate to deal with the besieged soldiers, and God is the guarantor on what we say.

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

Wilayat Halab

Official for the eastern area

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

Wilayat Halab

Amir for the eastern countryside area

NB: On contact with regime governors in 2013, cf. Specimen 8R.

Specimen 8T: Notice to those who own harvest vehicles, Hasakah province



الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام
ولاية الرقة
الهيئة الشرعية العامة لولاية الرقة

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
شعيب
لأصحاب الإن الحصد



الحمد لله رب العالمين والصلاة والسلام على نبينا محمد وعلى آله وصحبه أجمعين أما بعد
إن من أركان وفروض هذا الدين التي أمرنا الله سبحانه وتعالى بها هي الزكاة فقال تعالى ((خذ من
أموالهم صدقة تطهرهم وتزكّيهم بها)) الآية: ١٠٣ وقال النبي -صلى الله عليه وسلم- ((بني الإسلام على
خمس شهادة أن لا إله إلا الله وأن محمداً رسول الله وإتية الصلاة وإيتاء الزكاة وحج البيت وصوم
رمضان)) رواه البخاري ومسلم

من قد يفرح المسلم من بيته ويرتد بسبب منعها وعدم إخراجها ومن هذا المنطلق نذكر أحوالنا أصحاب
الإن الحصد أن يتعاونوا معنا في طاعة الله على كافة هذا الفرص ويكونوا سبباً في تطبيق أحكام الله بين
الإن

الإن الحصد

الإن الحصد
الإن الحصد
الإن الحصد

الإن الحصد
الإن الحصد
الإن الحصد

والإن الحصد

الهيئة الشرعية العامة لولاية الرقة



**In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Wilayat al-Baraka
General Shari'a Committee for Wilayat al-Baraka**

**Statement for distribution
To owners of harvest vehicles**

Praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds and prayers and peace be upon our Prophet Muhammad and all his family and companions. As for what follows:

Among the pillars and obligations of this religion that God- Almighty and Exalted is He- commanded for us is zakat. For the Almighty has said: "And take from their wealth a portion of charity that you may purify them and increase them by it" - Tawba 103 [Qur'an 9:103]. And the Prophet (SAWS) has said: "Islam has been built on five things: bearing witness that there is no deity but God and that Muhammad is the Messenger of God,, establishing prayer, giving zakat, Hajj pilgrimage to the House, and fasting in Ramadan"- narrated by Bukhari and Muslim.

Indeed a Muslim may leave his religion and commit apostasy by preventing it [zakat] and not bringing it out. From this principle we call on our brothers who own harvest vehicles to cooperate with us in obeying God in implmenting this obligation, and be a cause in applying the rulings of God among the people.

So we urge them to embrace the following:

1. Bare and enclose all the land on which the harvest has been completed and record the area of the land, its owner and how much in kilograms was the yield of crops through the vehicle's apparatus.
2. It is forbidden to harvest from the lands of those whose owners are among the Christians who abandoned their lands, or whose owners are among the Free Army, the Jabha [Jabhat al-Nusra], Ahrar al-Sham and others besides them. Whoever violates this will be expose himself to reckoning.

Finally, we remind you to fear God, show regard for the peasants and not raise the prices of the harvest that may harm them, for this is a cause in the blessing of wealth and its increase if God wills.

And may God reward you best.

**General Shari'a Committee for Wilayat al-Baraka
Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Wilayat al-Baraka
Shari'i Official**

NB: Clearly dating back to the pre-Caliphate era. The issue of zakat tax on agricultural harvest would now presumably be dealt with by the Diwan al-Zakat wa al-Sadaqat and the Diwan al-Zara'a, with the Diwan al-Hisba and Diwan al-Qada holding violators to account.

Specimen 8U: Prohibition on wi-fi, western Raqqa (Tabqa area)



Islamic State

Date: 24 Shawwal 1436 AH [9 August 2015]

**Wilayat al-Raqqa
Markaz al-Amn
Amn al-Gharbiya**

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Statement for distribution

Owners of private and public Internet connections must remove wi-fi networks within 2 days, and use of the Internet must be limited to inside the shop only. Shop owners must register the name of the user whoever he is, in a special register in the shop with the exception of the brothers in the Dawla [Islamic State].

(Non-compliance will require Shari'i reckoning).

And may God reward you best.

Islamic State

Diwan al-Amn al-Aam

Amni al-Gharbiya [security official for the western area]: Raqqa

**Specimen 8V: Opening of schools for registration for the new school year,
Raqqa**



الرقعة تُذبح بصمت
Ragga is Beautiful Straightened Society
الرقعة تُذبح بصمت

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

يسر مدرستنا

رقية بنت محمد (ذكور)

(جواد أنزور سابقا)

ذي قنار (إناث)

بدء تسجيل الطلاب لأبناء هذه المنطقة من كافة المراحل

و ذلك اعتبارا من السبت 28 ذو القعدة

و لغاية يوم الخميس 5 ذو الحجة

التسجيل من الساعة التاسعة صباحا حتى الواحدة ظهرا

الأوراق المطلوبة :

- ثلاث صور شخصية للطالب
- صور عن صفحة الأب في دفتر العائلة
- صورة عن صفحة الطالب في دفتر العائلة

ملاحظة : العام الدراسي يبدأ بعد عيد الأضحى مباشرة

الرقعة تُذبح بصمت

Ragga is Beautiful Straightened Silently

و الله ولي التوفيق

الرقعة تُذبح بصمت

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

It pleases the two schools of Ruqayya bint Muhammad for boys ([Jawad Anzur previously](#)) and Dhi Qar for girls to begin registering for the children of this area from all stages.

That will begin from Saturday 28 Dhu al-Qi'da until Thursday 5 Dhu al-Hijja.

Registration from 9 a.m. till 1 p.m.

The required documents:

- . Three personal photos of the student
- . Photos from the father's page in the family register [a Syrian family ID document]
- . Photos from the student's page in the family register

Note: the school year begins immediately after Eid al-Adha

And God is the guarantor of success

Specimen 8W: Leave Permit Card for a Soldier

الجمهورية العربية السورية
وزارة الدفاع
مكتبة أمننا عالمنا

الاسم أو الكنية: محمد وعبد الرحمن
تاريخ النزول: ١٤/١٢/٢٠١٦ الموافق: / / ٢٠١٦ الساعة ١٠ صباحاً
تاريخ الإلتحاق: ١٤/١٢/٢٠١٦ الموافق: / / ٢٠١٦ الساعة ٨ صباحاً
مدة الإجازة: ٤ أيام
نوع السلاح ورقمه:
الملاحظات: التي قد است
٨ صباحاً

ديوان الجند الأمير
جيش دمشق / ١٠٠

Islamic State Caliphate on the Prophetic Methodology

Wilayat Ninawa: al-Jund Our Mother A'isha Battalion

Permit Card

Name or kunya: Omar Wa'ad Ismail

Leaving date: 21 Shawwal 1436 AH [6 August 2015]. Time: 10 a.m.

Joining date: 13 Shawwal 1436 AH [29 July 2015]. Time: 8 a.m.

Leave permit period: 2 days

Weapon type and number:

Notes: Rejoining on Saturday [23 Shawwal] at 8 a.m.

Islamic State

Diwan al-Jund: Ninawa

Dabiq Army: Amir

NB: Dabiq Army is the same as [Jaysh al-Khilafa](#)

Specimen 8X: Structure of Islamic State-controlled Mosul University



Islamic State University/Mosul

University administration

Agriculture and Livestock Group	Pure Sciences and Humanities Group	Engineering Sciences Group	Medical Sciences Group	Shari'i Sciences Group
Field Crops Division	Pure Sciences Colleges	Electricity Engineering Division	Mosul Medical College for girls	Muadh bin Jabal College for Shari'i Sciences
Gardening and Forestry Division	Chemistry Sciences Division	Electronic Engineering and Connections Divisions	Ninawa Medical College for males	Higher Judiciary Institute
Food Sciences Division	Physics Division	Computer and Software Engineering Division	Dentistry College	
Livestock Division	Biology Division	Mechanical Engineering Division	Pharmacology College	
Veterinary Medicine College	Earth Sciences Division (males only)	Oil Engineering and Mining Division	Nursing College	
(These colleges are for males only)	Computers and Programming [Computer Sciences] Division	(These colleges are for males only)	Medical Technician Institute	
	Humanities Colleges		(These are administered by the Diwan al-Siha	

			currently)	
	Arabic Language Division			
	History Division			
	Mathematics Division			
	English Language Division			
	Geography Division			
	Kindergarten Division (These colleges are segregated: males and females)			

NB: Muadh bin Jabal was one of the Companions of the Prophet. Note in particular the gender restriction of the engineering colleges to males only. Local information indicates that female students who had been enrolled in the last academic year to study engineering in Mosul University were ordered to be transferred to the medical colleges, beginning study from the first year. Practically, the Islamic State undoubtedly hopes that this move will make up for the shortage of female doctors in its territory, something it has previously touched upon in its [fatwas](#).

Specimen 8Y: Denial of expelling Kurds from Ninawa Province

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

التاريخ: ٢٧ / رمضان / ١٤٣٤ هـ
٢٥ / تموز / ٢٠١٤ م



الدولة الإسلامية
ولاية نينوى / المكتب الإعلامي

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

الحمد لله، والصلاة والسلام على رسول الله، وعلى آله وصحبه ومن والاه؛ أما بعد:

قال تعالى: ﴿وَإِنَّا جَاءَهُمْ أَمْرٌ مِّنَ الْأَمْنِ أَوْ أَلْوَجْهِ أَدَاعُوا بِهِ وَلَوْ رَدُّوهُ إِلَى الرَّسُولِ وَإِلَى أُولِي الْأَمْرِ مِنْهُمْ لَعَلِمَهُ الَّذِينَ يَسْتَنْبِطُونَهُ مِنْهُمْ وَلَوْلَا فَضْلُ اللَّهِ عَلَيْكُمْ وَرَحْمَتُهُ لَاتَّبَعْتُمُ الشَّيْطَانَ إِلَّا قَلِيلًا﴾، وقال (صلى الله عليه وسلم): «كفى بالمزء كذباً أن يُخَدَّتْ بِكُلِّ مَا مَنَع» رواه مسلم.

أما بعد؛

فلا زال أعداء الإسلام يكدون لهذه الدولة الفتية، ويسعون لتسويه صورة الخلافة الإسلامية، وكان آخر افتراءاتهم ما أشبح مؤخراً من أن الدولة الإسلامية تقوم بتهجير الأكراد من ولاية نينوى.

وللرد على هذا البهتان نقول:

لا أصل لهذه الإشاعة المغرضة، والأكراد السلة إخواننا في الله، لهم ما لنا وعليهم ما علينا، ولن نسمح بأن يُمن أحدٌ منهم بسوءٍ ما دأب على أصل الإسلام، ولم يتلبن بأحدٍ نواقضه.

والله على ما نقول شهيد..

٢٧ رمضان ١٤٣٥ الموافق ٢٥ تموز ٢٠١٤

والله الموفق والهادي إلى سواء السبيل



Islamic State

Wilayat Ninawa: Media Office

27 Ramadan 1434 [sic: 1435] AH

25 July 2014

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Praise be to God and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God, his family, Companions and whoso is close/loyal to him. As for what follows:

The Almighty has said: "And when a matter of security or fear comes upon them, they disseminate it. But had they referred it to the Messenger and those with greater authority among them, those of them who can understand it properly would have known it. Were it not for God's favour upon you, you would have followed Satan, except for a few of you"- [Qur'an 4:83]. And SAWS said "It has sufficed as a lie for man that he relate all that he has heard"- narrated by Muslim.

As for what follows:

The enemies of Islam continue to harm this young state, and defame the image of the Islamic Caliphate. The latest of their falsehoods that has been spread around recently is that the Islamic State is forcibly displacing Kurds from Wilayat Ninawa.

In response to this slander we say:

There is no truth to this tendentious rumour, and the Sunni Kurds are our brothers in God. What is for them is for us, and what is upon them is upon us. And we will not allow any one of them to be harmed so long as they remain on the principle of Islam and do not dress themselves in one of its nullifiers.

And God is witness upon what we say.

27 Ramadan 1435 corresponding to 25 July 2014.

And God is the guarantor of success and the One who guides to the straight path.

Islamic State

Wilayat Ninawa Media Office

Specimen 8Z: Cutting off Mobile Phone Networks, Mosul (November 2014)

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

الجمعة ٦ صفر ١٤٣٦ هـ



الدولة الإسلامية

المكتب الإعلامي لولاية نينوى

الحمد لله رب العالمين، والسلامة والسلام على إمام المهديين، وعلى آله وصحبه الطيبين الطاهرين، وعلى من جاهد
من بعدهم إلى يوم الدين! أما بعد:

فإلى أهالي ولاية نينوى المراضين..

قال تعالى:

﴿وَلَا تَحْزَنْ مِنْ قِتْلِهِ جِنَاةٌ قَائِلَةٌ إِلَيْهِمْ عَلَى سَوَاءٍ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يُحِبُّ الْمُكْفِرِينَ﴾

الطلاقاً من حرص الدولة الإسلامية على أمنها المهديين في ولاية نينوى،
وبعد التأكيد من وجود مندوبين داخل الولاية يتجسسون لصالح التحالف الصليبي الرافضي، الذين تكاثروا يكتفون
لهذه الدولة الفتية، وقد سحروا مختلف أجهزة الاتصال لتقوم أعداد الدولة الإسلامية، بهجمات شديدة تسببت بخسارة الدولة
للكثير من رسائلها، حينما تمكن الطيران الصليبي الرافضي من رصد هواتف المهديين وتعقب تحركاتهم لذلك قررت الدولة
قطع الاتصالات ومنع إعادةها،
فأضربوا وصبروا، إن الله مع الصابرين..

الجمعة ٦ صفر ١٤٣٦ هـ
وإنه للوئق والهادي إلى سواء السبيل



In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Islamic State

Wilayat Ninawa: Media Office

Friday, 6 Safr 1436 AH [28 November 2014]

Praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds, and prayers and peace be upon the Imam of the Mujahideen, and his good and pure family and companions, and whosoever wages jihad after them until the Day of Judgment. As for what follows:

To the peoples of Wilayat Ninawa keeping watch:

God Almighty has said: "If you fear betrayal from a people, throw it back to them on equal terms. Indeed God does not love traitors" - [Qur'an 8:58].

Beginning from the Islamic State's desire to preserve its mujahideen sons in Wilayat Ninawa, and after it was confirmed that there are agents inside the wilaya spying for the interest of the Crusader-Rafidite coalition who have come together harming this young state and have used various devices of connection to provide the enemies of the Islamic State with information that has brought about losses to the Dawla of many of its knights, while the Crusader-Rafidite aircraft has been able to monitor the phones of the mujahideen and follow their movements, the Islamic State has decided to cut off connections [mobile phone networks] and prevent their restoration.

So obey and take heed. God is with those who endure

Friday, 6 Safr 1436 AH

And God is the guarantor of success and the One who guides to the straight path.

Islamic State

Wilayat Ninawa Media Office

Specimen 9A: Suspension of Internet services, Albukamal



Islamic State

Wilayat al-Furat: Central Public Security Directorate

Praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds and prayers and peace be upon the Imam of those sent, the leader of the mujahideen, and on all his family and companions. As for what follows:

Subject: Statement for distribution to all Internet users and owners of halls:

Salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu:

It is absolutely forbidden to operate any Internet set-up or wifi network beginning from the morning of 6 Dhu al-Hijja 1436 AH corresponding to 19 September 2015 until further notice, and in any place inside the Albukamal area:

*This order encompasses all Internet users from:

1. All types of halls
2. All banking offices
3. Restaurants and petrol stations
4. Homes and private set-ups
5. All types of merchants' offices
6. Shops and industrial estates, as well as shops for medical necessities

*Whoever is found with an Internet connection inside his home, office or any private place will expose himself to severe reckoning.

**Islamic State
Wilayat al-Furat
Security Official**

**Islamic State
Wilayat al-Furat
Intelligence Services Official**

Specimen 9B: Prohibition on selling Islamic State books, western 'Euphrates Province' (Albukamal area)



**In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Islamic State
Caliphate on the Prophetic Method**

Diwan al-Da'wa wa al-Masajid


Statement for distribution

To all owners of offices and printing stations, the Da'wa and Masajid office in the western area announces the prohibition on selling all books issued by the Islamic State. But there is no objection to distributing them for free to the Muslim populaces.

And may God reward you best.

**Official for the centre
Abu Ibrahim al-Tunisi**

Specimen 9C: Prohibition on use of new Syrian banknotes



الدولة الإسلامية
 دار الفلاحية

رقم: ٢٩
 التاريخ: ٢٠١٤/١٢/١٦
 الترخيص: ٢٠١٥/٩/٢٧

تعميم إلى كافة محلات [الصيرفة]

الحمد لله . و الصلاة و السلام على رسول الله .. أما بعد
 فقد تقرر بعون الله تعالى منع تداول العملات الجديدة الصادرة عن
 النظام النصيري :

الأولى : العملة الورقية فئة 1000 ليرة سورية



الثانية : العملة الورقية فئة 500 ليرة سورية



وذلك في أراضي الدولة الإسلامية اعتباراً من تاريخ هذا البيان . فعلى محلات
 الصيرفة عدم صرفها أو تداولها . بل يتم استقبالها من الناس وإخراجها من
 أراضي الدولة الإسلامية . و سيتم بإذن الله تعالى محاسبة من يخالف ذلك
 اعتباراً من تاريخ ١٤٣٧/١/١ هـ الموافق ٢٠١٥/١٠/١٤ .

والله الموفق والهادي إلى سواء السبيل .





نيوان الحسبة
 نيوان الحسبة
 ١٤٣٤/١٢/١٦

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Islamic State

Diwan al-Hisba

No. 19

Date: 13/12/1436 AH (27 September 2015)

Statement for distribution to all (exchange) shops

Praise be to God, and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God. As for what follows:

It has been decided by God Almighty's help to prohibit the circulation of the two new currency forms issued by the Nusayri regime:

1. The 1000 Syrian pounds note.
2. The 500 Syrian pounds note.

And that applies in the lands of the Islamic State beginning from the date of this state, so all exchange shops must not exchange or circulate these notes. Rather they are to be received from people and removed from the lands of the Islamic State. And by God Almighty's permission all who violate this statement will be held to account beginning from 1/1/1437 AH corresponding to 14 October 2015.

And God is the guarantor of success and the guider to the straight path.

Islamic State

Diwan al-Hisba

Islamic State

Wilayat Halab

Specimen 9D: Military ID Card



Islamic State

ID card

Name: Abd al-Aziz al-Jaza'iri [the Algerian]

Work: Special Battalion

Expiry date: 1 Jumada al-Awla 1436 AH

Note: All Dawla [IS] checkpoints are asked to facilitate the brother's passing.

Islamic State

Al-Sadiq Special Battalion

Specimen 9E: Cancelling Friday prayers in some Raqqa mosques

الدولة الإسلامية
مركز الدعوة والفتوى
مكتب المدينة

رقم: 1436
تاريخ: 18 جمادى الآخرة 1436

إلى الأخوة جنود الدولة الإسلامية وأهالي الرقة الكرام
نفيدكم بأنه تم إلغاء صلاة الجمعة في المساجد التالية:
النور - النووي - الفردوس - العلو
حيث أن الطيران الروسي النصيري استهدف المساجد في
مدينة حمص ولذلك توجب علينا أخذ الاحتياطات
اللازمة حفاظاً على سلامة الجميع
وجزاكم الله خيراً

مكتب الدعوة والمساجد في المدينة

الرقة تُذبح بضمّت
Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently
الرقة التي بضمّت

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Raqqa

Da'wa & Masajid Centre

City Office

No.: N/A

Date: 18 Dhu al-Hijja 1436 AH [2 October 2015]

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

To the soldiers of the Islamic State and the noble people of Raqqa:

We inform you that Friday prayers have been cancelled in the following mosques:


al-Nur, al-Nawawi, al-Firdous, al-'Alu

As Russian-Nusayri aircraft have targeted the mosques in the city of Homs, requiring us to take the necessary precautions protecting everyone's safety.

And may God reward you best.

Da'wa & Masajid office in the city.

Specimen 9F: Required documents for new students at Mosul University



Required documents to register new students for year of study 2015/2016

1. Preparatory study document.
2. Medical test.
3. Six coloured current photographs.
4. The four required ID documents (a coloured photograph for each one and the originals)

for verification).

5. Residency approval from the nearest Islamic police centre for the place of residence.
6. Employee guarantor ID in one of the Dawla's offices (a coloured photograph of the ID and the original one for verification).

NB: On the four required ID documents, cf. Specimen 4F. Only makes sense in Iraqi context

Specimen 9G: Admission statistics for Mosul University: 2015-2016

ديوان الصحة
جامعة العلوم الطبية
مجلس القبول المركزي

الحدود الدنيا للمعدلات المقبولة للعام الدراسي 1437 هـ / 2015-2016 (الذكور)

الكلية	المجموع	المعدل	عدد الطلاب
كلية طب الموصل / جامعة العلوم الطبية	643	91.83	118
كلية طب الأسنان / جامعة العلوم الطبية	637	91	28
كلية الصيدلة / جامعة العلوم الطبية	631	90.14	44
كلية التمريض / جامعة العلوم الطبية	611	87.28	83
كلية الصيدلة / جامعة العلوم الطبية	553	79	206
المجموع الكلي			459

الحدود الدنيا للمعدلات المقبولة للعام الدراسي 1437 هـ / 2015-2016 (البنات)

الكلية	المجموع	المعدل	عدد الطلاب
كلية طب الموصل / جامعة العلوم الطبية	693	99	24
كلية طب الأسنان / جامعة العلوم الطبية	672	96	85
كلية الصيدلة / جامعة العلوم الطبية	667	95.28	46
كلية طب الأسنان / جامعة العلوم الطبية	666	95.14	28
كلية الصيدلة / جامعة العلوم الطبية	651	93	60
كلية التمريض / جامعة العلوم الطبية	617	88.14	228
المجموع الكلي			471

Diwan al-Siha

Medical Sciences University

Central Acceptances Committee

Minimum admitted boundaries for averages for year of study 1437 AH/2015-2016 (males)

No.	College	Overall mark	Average	No. of students
1	Mosul Medical College/Medical Sciences University	643	91.85	118
2	Dentistry College/ Medical Sciences University	637	91	28
3	Pharmacology College/ Medical Sciences University	631	90.14	44
4	Nursing College/ Medical Sciences University	611	87.28	63
5	Medical Technician College/ Medical Sciences University	553	79	206
			Combined total	459

Minimum admitted boundaries for averages for year of study 1437 AH/2015-2016 (females)

No.	College	Overall mark	Average	No. of students
1	Mosul Medical College/Medical Sciences University	693	99	24
2	Ninawa Medical College/Medical Sciences	672	96	85

	University			
2 [sic.]	Dentistry College/ Medical Sciences University	667	95.28	46
3	Pharmacology College/ Medical Sciences University	666	95.14	28
4	Nursing College/ Medical Sciences University	651	93	60
5	Medical Technician College/ Medical Sciences University	617	88.14	228
			Combined total	441

NB: cf. Specimen 8X for discrepancies, as here it seems Mosul Medical College is primarily for males and only exceptional female students are admitted. The average is the overall mark from Iraqi preparatory study exams divided by 7: cf. Specimen 8G.

Specimen 9H: Registration card for schools, 'Euphrates Province'

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

الدولة الإسلامية
خلافة على منهاج النبوة

Diwan al-Ta'aleem
وكل زيادة لسانها

الولاية : الفرات : عدد : التاريخ الهجري : ١٤٣٦ / /

صورة عن البطاقة العائلية

الاسم :
التسمية :
اسم الأب :
اسم الأم :
محل ورقم القيد :
محل وتاريخ الولادة :

الرقم العلم للبطاقة :
الجنس :
تاريخ القيد :
الوضع العائلي :
متضمن الاسم :

ملاحظات :
Deirezzore is Being Slaughtered Silent

أخرجت هذه الوثيقة عن بتاريخ / /

اسم وتوقيع موثق المعلومات :
الختم والتوقيع

Islamic State

Caliphate on the Prophetic Methodology

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

And say: My Lord, increase me in knowledge

Wilaya: al-Furat No. Hijri date

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Photo from family card:

Name:

Surname:

Father's name:

Mother's name:

Place and registration no.:

Place and date of birth:

Sex:

Date of registration:

Mental state:

Serial no.:


Notes:

This document was issued from....on date:

Name and signature of the affirmer of the information:

Seal and signature:

Specimen 9I: Temporary general amnesty for military deserters



Islamic State

General Supervisory Committee

No. 107

Date: 18 Dhu al-Hijja 1436 AH: 2 October 2015

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
 To: all Wilayas, Diwans and Committees
 Subject: Statement of Amnesty

Praise be to God alone, and prayers and peace be upon the one after whom there is no prophet. As for what follows:

As-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu:

To all our sons in the Islamic State from those whom Satan misled and incited evil between him and his amirs, such that he abandoned the front on which he was operating for the religion of God, and turned away from returning out of fear of consequence and blame, such that that led some of them to refrain from jihad in the path of God and shrink back from fighting the enemy, or homelessness in the wilayas and regions on the basis of difficult circumstances and scarcity of one's own means (and God is the One whose help is to be sought), we call on all of you to repent from this conduct. And we call on you to return to your brothers and amirs with the promise that no harm will come to you or evil touch you by God Almighty's permission, and so that you may begin with a new page from the pages of sacrifice and jihad, and a new pledge from the pledges to support the religion and undertake the heavy burden of faithfulness that God has entrusted us with entirely. Thus this amnesty lasts for a period of a month from the date of the issuing of this statement for distribution and every front must inform its soldiers of it.

Note: This amnesty will not include those who abandoned their work or jihad after the issuing of this document.

And may God reward you best.

Copy to:

General Supervisory Committee (Eastern Wilayas) for notification

**General Supervisory Committee
 Islamic State**

NB: The normal punishment for those who flee from battle (except for tactical manoeuvring or joining another contingent) is [execution](#)

Hisbah Centre
Southern Region
Hisba of al-Mayadeen

Shari'a Session Attendance Table

To the brothers in the Da'wa and Masajid Centre

We refer to you the one called...with the case of...


And that to attend a Shari'a session and we expect you to fill the following form:

Day	Hijri Date	Presenter's Name	Presenter's Signature
-----	------------	------------------	-----------------------

Place of attendance of session

Signature/stamp:

Specimen 9K: Electricity prices in Raqqa



Islamic State
Wilayat al-Raqqa
Raqqa Services Centre
Electricity Office
Date: 24 Ramadan 1436 AH

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Fixing the price of the ampere

- The price of the ampere per hour [ampere hour] is fixed at 8 Syrian pounds
- If there is no [public service] electricity, [private generator] usage is fixed at 9 hours [per day]
- Reckoning will be done according to the [number of] ampere hours instead of a week in terms of [number of] ampere[s]. This commitment is for a period of two weeks
- The price of the ampere hour will be reviewed in the event of the increase in the price of diesel

Specimen 9L: Call for precautions against regime airstrikes on Raqqa during Eid al-Fitr

ولاية البرز

الولاية الامتلاحيته

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

التاريخ: 6/9/29

الرقم: 68677

تعميمالى الاخوة أمراء المفاصل والدواوين حفظكم الله،

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته. نأمل أن يصلكم كتابنا وانتم بانتم حال.

لقد وردت بعض المعلومات الأمنية التي تشير إلى نية النظام لإرسال
سرباً من الطائرات لقصف مدينة الرقة (التجمعات - الأسواق -
المساجد) خلال أيام العيد لذا يرجى أخذ الحيطة والحذر والإقلال من
التجمعات واتخاذ أي إجراء لازم تقنياً للأضرار التي قد تحصل .

وجزاكم الله خيراً

ولاية البرز
مكتب الوالي

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Raqqa

Date: 29 Ramadan 1436 AH

No. 6867

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Statement for Distribution

To the brothers, amirs of the sectors and Diwans, may God protect you

As-salam alaykm wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu: we hope our document reaches you and you are in the best condition:

Some security information has arrived that points to the intention of the regime to send a squadron of aircraft to bomb the city of Raqqa (Gatherings-Markets-Mosques) during the days of Eid [al-Ftir]. Thus it is asked to take precaution and care, reduce the gatherings and take any necessary means to avoid the harm that may occur.


And may God reward you best.

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Raqqa

Wali's Office

Specimen 9M: Timetable of classes, Mosul Medical College



Medical Sciences University/Mosul Medical College/Registration

First Year Timetable- First Term

Second Set (female students of the second year according to the old program)

For year of study 2015-2016

Day	8-9 [a.m. etc.]	9-10	10-12
Saturday	Embryology	Physiology	-Practical Physiology E -Practical Chemistry F
Sunday	Physiology	Biochemistry	-Practical Physiology F -Practical Chemistry H
Monday	Medical Ethics	Physiology	-Practical Physiology

			H -Practical Chemistry K
Tuesday	Physiology	Embryology	-Practical Physiology K -Practical Chemistry E
Wednesday		Aqeeda	

Lectures will be held in al-Jalili Hall

This will take effect beginning on Saturday corresponding to 17 October 2015

Specimen 9N: Notice to last year's admitted medical students at Mosul University



Announcement

To all students admitted into the colleges for the University of Medical Sciences for year of study 2014/2015 who did not attend at their colleges in the past year, it has been

decided to consider their admission annulled in these colleges. So they must hurry to apply at the Central Admissions Committee.

And may God reward you best

Specimen 90: Medical Specializations Application Opening, Mosul University




Leadership of the University of Medical Sciences

Announcement

The Higher Learning Committee for Medical Specializations announces the opening of the door of application for the study program of the Board of Medical Specializations beginning from date 3 October 2015 until 20 October 2015. So those who desire to apply must register with the secretariat of the committee in Mosul Medical College.

Specimen 9P: List of fines for violations of Hisbah regulations, Homs Province



Islamic State
Wilayat Homs
Hisbah Centre

No.

Date: 4 Muharram 1437 AH

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Praise be to God and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God Muhammad bin Abdullah (SAWS). As for what follows:

As-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu

To the amirs of the offices and divisions, here is a list of fines for you with regards to violators:

- . Fleeing from the men of Hisbah: 39 lashes and a fine of 5000 [Syrian pounds] and imprisonment for 5 days with attendance of a Shari'a session
- . Avoiding prayers: 39 lashes and a Shari'a session
- . One packet [of cigarettes]: 2500 Syrian pounds
- . Packet with a woman: 5000 Syrian pounds
- . Adornment and wearing tight garments and not adhering to Shari'i dress: 5000 Syrian pounds.
- . Revealing the two eyes: 2000 Syrian pounds.
- . Not wearing gloves or stockings: 1000 Syrian pounds.
- . Shaving the beard and not adhering to the Sunna of the Prophet (SAWS): 2500 Syrian pounds.
- . Letting down the shawl: 1000 Syrian pounds
- . Forging ID: 10000 Syrian pounds and confiscation of the used ID.
- . The driver who carries violators: 5000 Syrian pounds for every passenger.
- . Not bearing ID: 1000 Syrian pounds.
- . Confiscation of every head of sheep with a bell on it.

May God grant you success and direct you to what He loves and is pleased with.

Your brother, servant of the Hisba:

Abu Julaybib al-Jazrawi

Islamic State

Wilayat Homs

NB: Thanks to Rasha Al-Aqeedi for assistance

Specimen 9Q: Zakat statistics for Aleppo province



Islamic State

Wilayat Halab

Table with names of those deserving zakat

Manbij Zakat Office

Names of the poor deserving zakat concerning two months

Number of poor families	2502
Number of individuals	12760

Deserving sum			142,691,600 [Syrian pounds]		
Seal of Statistics Official	Seal of Accountant	Seal of the office official	Seal of admin official of the wilaya centre	Seal of the finance official of the wilaya centre	Seal of the zakat official in the wilaya

NB: The total 'deserving sum' here is some \$755837.41 based on conversion rates as of 21 October 2015. This amounts to around \$29.62 per individual per month.

Specimen 9R: Military ID badge: Katibat al-Sarim al-Battar



Islamic State

Caliphate on the Prophetic Methodology

Jaysh Dabiq: Katibat al-Sarim al-Battar

Kunya: Abu Hamza

Name: Ahmad Hameed

Position: Fighter

Serial number: 152

Note: This badge is not to be considered an official [ID] document

Specimen 9S: Lack of observation of new moon to mark end of Ramadan 2014




Islamic State**Diwan al-Qada wa al-Mazalim****And judge between them by what God has revealed [Qur'an 5:49]****In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful**

Praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds and prayers and peace be upon the most noble of the Prophets and those sent. As for what follows:

The Diwan al-Qada wa al-Mazalim in the Islamic State announces the lack of establishment of the observation of the new moon of Shawwal, neither by itself or through true news concerning certainty besides that. Therefore, the Diwan al-Qada wa al-Mazalim in the Islamic State announces that tomorrow- Monday- is one of the days of Ramadan and one must fast for it. And God's peace, deliverance and blessings be upon our Prophet Muhammad and his family and companions.

Islamic State**Head of Diwan al-Qada wa al-Mazalim**

Specimen 9T: Blockade on regime-held areas and Afrin, Aleppo province (2013)



Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

Rule belongs only to God

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful


Wilayat Halab

General statement for distribution

All checkpoints of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham are to confiscate any commerce or cargoes from and to the areas controlled by the Nusayri regime, and similarly coming from and to the Afrin area (PKK). And they will be referred to the Islamic court to which the checkpoint is affiliated in the Islamic State.

And that decision is effective beginning from Sunday, 28 Muharram 1435 AH, corresponding to 1 December 2013.

Specimen 9U: Repentance Form, 1435 AH



In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Repentance Document

The one called...attended with the Shari'i brother...

And confessed to disbelief upon himself on account of being affiliated with the disbelievers, and he has promised not to bear arms against the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham with any faction, and members of the State are asked not to oppose him.

Shari'i official

Date: / /1435 AH

Specimen 9V: Mobilization recruiting form, Deir az-Zor province [October 2015]

الرقم :
 المهجري :
 الميلادي :

24
 DeirEzzor

الأمانة العامة
 لخدمة الحزب
 العلاقات العامة

استمارة متطوع في معركة الخيو

اسم المشارك :
 العمر :
 الحالة الصحية :
 الوضع الاجتماعي :
 عدد الزوجات :
 عدد الأطفال :
 المكان :
 نوع السلاح الذي يجيده :
 القاطع الذي يربط فيه :
 الرقم :

**Islamic State
Wilayat al-Kheir
Public Relations**

Number
Hijri date:
Miladi date:

Recruit form in the al-Kheir battle

- Participant's name:
- Age:
- Health state:
- Societal status:
- Number of wives:
- Number of children:
- Place:
- Type of weapons he is good at using:
- Area in which he maintains ribat [frontline duty etc.]:
- Number:

Specimen 9W: Timetable of classes for new first-year students, Mosul Medical College

المادة	اليوم	الوقت	الفصل
التشريحية الخلوية والنسيجية	الاثنين	8:00 - 10:00	الفصلين A B C D
الفسيولوجيا والنفسية والعصبية	الاثنين	10:00 - 12:00	الفصلين A B C D
الكيمياء البيوكيمياء	الاثنين	2:00 - 4:00	الفصلين A B C D
الميكروبيولوجيا والمناعة	الاثنين	8:00 - 10:00	الفصلين A B C D
الميكروبيولوجيا والمناعة	الاثنين	10:00 - 12:00	الفصلين A B C D
الميكروبيولوجيا والمناعة	الاثنين	2:00 - 4:00	الفصلين A B C D

جامعة العلوم الطبية / كلية طب الموصل / التسجيل / جدول الصف الأول - الفصل الأول
شعبة الأولى (المفردتين) للعام الدراسي 2016 - 2017

يبدأ اليوم يوم السبت الموافق 2016 / 10 / 21

**Medical Sciences University/ Mosul Medical College/ Registration/ First Year
Timetable- First Term**

First Set (Newly admitted students) for year of study 2015-2016


Day	8-10 [a.m.]	10-11	11-12	12-12:30 [p.m.]	12:30-1:30	1:30-2:30
Saturday	Practical Dissection A B Practical Physiology C D	Organic and Analytic Chemistry	Dissection	Break	Medical Physics	Medical Ethics
Sunday	Practical Physics A Practical Biology D Practical Organic Chemistry B	Physiology	Organic and Analytic Chemistry	Break	Practical Organic Chemistry C Practical Physics D	Practical Organic Chemistry C Practical Physics D
Monday	Practical Dissection A B Practical Biology C Practical Organic Chemistry D	Dissection	Medical Biology	Break	Physiology	
Tuesday	Practical Dissection C D	Dissection	Physiology	Break	Practical Biology B	Practical Biology B

	Practical Organic Chemistry A Practical Physics B					
Wednesday	Practical Dissection A B Practical Physics C	Medical Physics	Medical Biology	Break	Practical Physiology A B	Practical Physiology A B
Thursday	Practical Dissection C D Practical Biology A	Physiology	Organic and Analytic Chemistry	Break		

All visual lectures will be held in the al-Razi hall

Regular hours begin on Saturday, corresponding to 24 October 2015.

Specimen 9X: Notification to Raqqa Residents: January 2014




**In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Wilayat al-Raqqa**

To the Muslim brothers, we ask you to go and register at the Islamic State HQ in the water foundation bringing with you your supporting documents that show ownership of the shop/apartment. Also we ask you not to pay fees to any other faction.

For going and registering: from date 10 January 2014 till 25 January 2014, 8 a.m.-12 p.m.

And may God reward you best.

Specimen 9Y: Conditions for opening a new hall [for internet], Raqqa [October 2015]




Islamic State

Conditions for opening a new hall

1. Filling in a form to request to open a hall: copy no. 1
2. That it should be on a merchant street
3. The hall's area should not be less than 50 metres squared
4. People vouching from the Dawla as supporters for the owner of the hall
5. Placing partitions between seats
6. Placing an outside notice for the hall's name
7. Opening a special division for women by the women's administration
8. Copy of personal ID while bringing the original
9. Bringing four personal photos.

NB: Via Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently

Specimen 9Z: Prohibition on attacking Kurdish property in Raqqa



Islamic State

Wilayat al-Raqqa

Date: 18 Ramadan 1436 AH

No. 3

**In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Statement for Distribution**

**In the name of God, and prayers be upon the one whom God elevated as the
beacon of Islam by his sword and peace be upon the one by whose sending
God enlightened the hearts of His servants.**

And praise be to God as He has placed us and you in His blessing and favour, and has favoured us over people in bearing the message and fulfilling the covenant, and has increased favour upon us by making us mujahideen by His grace:

Thus and according to the directions of the General Supervisory Committee:

We inform our mujahideen brothers that it is absolutely forbidden for them to attack the homes and properties of the Kurds under any justification or pretext. And if news reaches us of any attack by any brother, we will- after rectifying the error and undoing the attack- hold him accountable whatever his excuse may be as follows:

1. The brother is obligated to undo the damage and aggression, rectify what he has corrupted, restore rights to its owners, and take responsibility for everything that must be restored to its original state.
2. Imprisonment for three days if he did it for the first time.
3. Imprisonment for an entire week while being flogged thirty times a day if he did it for the second time.
4. If he did it for the third time, he is to be transferred from the wilaya for good and removed from it, whatever his position of authority may be.

Asking God to make us and you responsible for obeying Him.

Specimen 10A: General notification from the Diwan al-Siha: October 2015

الدولة الإسلامية

ديوان الصحة

العدد: 255

التاريخ: 14 / 01 / 1437

2015 / 10 / 27

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

م / بيان استقدام الأطباء

الحمد لله مُعز من أطاعه ومُنزل من عصاه والصلاة والسلام على عبده ورسوله ومُصطفىه وعلى آله وصحبه ومن والاه:

في ظل الحملة الصليبية المسعورة التي ما فتئت تولب على الدولة الفتية عسكريا وسياسيا واعلاميا وحتى شرعيا بواسطة سحرة البيان من عبدة الطواغيت ممن يُسمون انفسهم زورا وبهتانا مشايخ وعلماء وهم جُنْد محضرون وتلامذة مخلصون لتعليمهم الأكبر وقائد حملتهم ضد الدولة الإسلامية شيخهم أوياما طاغوت العصر (لعنه الله) وانطلاقا من حديث الفسطاطين والذي حدث عنه الحبيب المصطفى (صلى الله عليه وسلم) وأخبر عما سبق من انقسام العالم الى فسطاطين لا ثالث لهما ، فسطاط ايمان لا نفاق فيه وفسطاط نفاق وكفر لا ايمان فيه وحرصا من دولة الخلافة على دين الناس ودخولهم في فسطاط الايمان فإنا ندعوا المسلمين جميعا الى الالتحاق بركب الدولة التي تمثل اليوم فسطاط الايمان والمسارعة في الهجرة الى دار الإسلام وترك دار الكفر والطغيان. ونخص بذلك اهل العلم والاختصاصات من قضاة ودعاة وأطباء ومهندسين وغيرهم وذلك امتثالا لقول الله تعالى: **{أَنعَمَا يُخْفَى اللَّهُ مِنْ عِبَادِهِ الْعُلَمَاءُ} [فاطر: 28]**

وقوله سبحانه: **{أهل يستوي الذين يعلمون والذين لا يعلمون} [الزمر: 9]**

فقد اتضح لجميع العقلاء ان هؤلاء الكفرة لا يحاربون الدولة لأنها متشددة كما يزعمون بل يحاربون الإسلام والتوحيد والايمان . قال تعالى : **{وَلَا يَزَالُونَ يَقَاتِلُونَكُمْ حَتَّى يَزُولُوا عَنْ دِينِكُمْ وَإِنْ أَسْتَقْبَلُوا مِنْكُمْ مَنْ يَزِيدُ مِنْكُمْ عَنْ دِينِهِ فَإِنَّهُمْ هُمُ الَّذِينَ يَخْلَدُونَ} البقرة: 217 .**

وهذا كله جحودا للحق وتعاليا عن الخضوع لشرع الله قال تعالى: **{فَأُولَئِكَ لَا يُكْفِرُونَ وَلَكِنَّ الظَّالِمِينَ بآيَاتِ اللَّهِ يَجْحَدُونَ} [الأنعام: 33]** وعليه توضيحا للسبيل والبراءة للذمة نقول للمغرر بهم ونخص بالذكر الأطباء ، اربعوا على انفسكم ولا تكونوا كمن شرى آخرته بكنياه واستبدل جنة الله ونعيمه المقيم في الآخرة بلعاعة الدنيا الفانية.



الدولة الإسلامية

ديوان الصحة

العدد:

التاريخ: / /

قال الصادق المصدوق صلى الله عليه وسلم: " لو كانت الدنيا تعبد عند الله جناح بعوضة ما سقى كافرا منها شربة ماء " ومن هنا ندعوا جميع الكوادر الطبية من الذين تركوا دار الإسلام بعد قيام الدولة وإعلان الخلافة أو القاطنين في ديار الكفر إلى العودة والهجرة إلى أرض الخلافة وديار الإسلام، أرض عز المؤمنين والالتحاق بالكوادر الطبية الموجودة في جميع ولايات الدولة الإسلامية اعزها الله لينعموا بالأمن والأمان والعزة تحت حكم الإسلام.

ولا يغفى عليكم دور الأطباء والمنظومة الصحية وأهميتها كلبنة أساسية من لبنات بناء الدولة الإسلامية فهلتموا ليكون لكم الشرف وتكونوا جزءاً من هذا البناء القائم بإذن الله شاء من شاء وأبى من أبى واعلموا ان الإسلام سينتصر بكم او بنوكم ولكنكم لن تعزوا ولن تنعموا ولن تنتصروا بدون الإسلام قال تعالى:

لَقَدْ أَنْزَلْنَا إِلَيْكُمْ كِتَابًا فِيهِ ذِكْرُكُمْ أَفَلَا تَعْقِلُونَ " (الأنبياء، آية: 10) قال ابن عباس (فيه ذكركم أي شرفكم) وان الله سيظهر هذا الدين بعز عزيز او بذل ذليل قال تعالى: (والله غَالِبٌ عَلَى أَمْرِهِ وَلَئِنْ أَقْبَرُ النَّاسُ لَا يَعْلَمُونَ) [يوسف: 21] .

وأخر دعوانا أن الحمد لله رب العالمين .



No. 255

Dtae: 14 Muharram 1437 AH/27 October 2015 CE

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Statement calling on doctors

Praise be to God who gives might to whoso obeys Him and lowers whoso rebels against Him, and prayers and peace be upon His servant, Messenger and Mustafa and on his family, companions and whoso is close/loyal to him:

In the shadow of the deranged Crusader campaign that has not ceased gathering against the nascent state militarily, politically, in media and even in the Shari'i sense by means of the magicians of statement from the servants of the idolatrous tyrants from those who falsely and wrongly call themselves mashayakh and 'ulama but they are soldiers brought forth and students devoted to their greatest teacher and leader of their campaign against the Islamic State- their sheikh Obama, the idolatrous tyrant of the age (may God curse him). And beginning from the hadith of the two camps that the beloved Mustafa (SAWS) told about and informed of regarding the arising of a division of the world into two camps with no third way for the two: a camp of faith with no hypocrisy in it and a camp of hypocrisy and disbelief in which there is no faith, and out of concern from the state of the Caliphate for the religion of the people and their entry into the camp of faith, we call on all Muslims to join the state convoy that represents today the camp of faith and strive to migrate to the land of Islam, abandoning the land of disbelief and tyranny. And in that we single out in particular the Ahl al-'Ilm and the professions of judges, callers, doctors, engineers and others besides them. And that is in fulfilment of God Almighty's words: "Indeed those from His knowledgeable servants fear God"- Fatir 28 [Qur'an 35:28].

And the Exalted's words: "Are those who are knowledgeable and those who are not knowledgeable equal?"- al-Zumar 9 [Qur'an 39:9].

So that it has been become clear to all of sound mind that these disbelievers are not waging war on the state because it is extremist as they claim, but rather they are waging war on Islam, tawheed and faith. The Almighty has said: "And they will not cease fighting you until they turn you away from your religion if they can. And whosoever of you apostasises from his religion and thus he dies and is a disbeliever: those people's deeds have been rendered worthless in this world and the Hereafter, and they are companions of the Hellfire, abiding therein forever"- al-Baqara 217 [Qur'an 2:217].

So this is all in opposition to Truth and turning away from subjecting to the law of God. The Almighty has said: "For indeed they do not declare you a liar, but the wrongdoers oppose the verses of God" - al-An'am 33 [Qur'an 6:33]. And thus in clarifying the path and exonerating the blame, we say to the misguided of them and we specify explicitly the doctors: reflect on yourselves and do not be as the one who has swapped his Hereafter for his worldly life and exchanged the Paradise of God and His blessing established in the Hereafter for the ephemeral illusion of this world.

The truth-teller to be believed (SAWS) said: "If this world were worth the wing of a mosquito with God, He would not have given the disbeliever a drink of water from it." And from here we call on all medical cadres who abandoned the land of Islam after the rise of the state and the announcement of the Caliphate or those residing in the abode of disbelief to return and migrate to the land of the Caliphate and the abode of Islam, a land of glory for the believers, and to join the medical cadres in all the provinces of the Islamic State- may God make it mighty- to enjoy security, safety and glory under the rule of Islam.


And the role of doctors and medical organization are not hidden from you, nor is its importance as one of the foundational bricks in the building of the Islamic State, so come, that the noble honour may be for you and you may be a part of this rising building enterprise by the permission of God-whether you like it or not - and know that Islam will be victorious with or without you but you will not be mighty, enjoy blessing or be victorious without Islam. The Almighty has said: "We have brought down to you a book in which there is mention of you. So will you not understand?" - al-Anbiya' - Ayah 10 [Qur'an 21:10]. Ibn Abbas said: "In it is mention of you- i.e. your noble honour." And indeed God will bring forth this religion with glorious might or lowly humiliation. The Almighty has said: "And God is predominant over His affair but most people don't know" - Yusuf 21 [Qur'an 12:21].

And our last call is that praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds.

Islamic State
Diwan al-Siha
The Amir

Dr. Omar (?)
14 Muharram

Specimen 10B: Notice on exchange of money, 'Euphrates Province'



Islamic State

Wilayat al-Furat

Diwan al-Zakat wa al-Sadaqat

Date: 22 Muharram 1436 AH/10 November 2015

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

(Statement for distribution)

To all owners of banking businesses and money/funds transfer offices:

It is requested that there be no transfer of any sum or handing it over to its owners except with a directive document from the Zakat and Sadaqat office: and that to ascertain that these sums of wealth are liable to zakat taxation. We ask for your cooperation with us as a service to the poor of the Muslims.

(We and you are entrusted by God to take zakat from this wealth)

Note: whoever violates this order bears all the consequences that follow on from this order.

Islamic State

Zakat and Sadaqat Office

**Specimen 10C: Prices to print some Islamic State primary school textbooks
(Mosul area)**

اسم المادة	عدد الاوراق	المسعر بالاسود والابيض	السعر بالملون
القران الكريم	42	2000	6750
المسيرة النبوية	19	1250	3250
الحديث النبوي	20	1250	3500
عقيدة المسلم	11	1000	2250
اللغة العربية	34	1750	5500
الخط العربي	20	1250	3500
الرياضيات	35	1750	5750
العلوم	46	2000	7500
الاعداد البدني	13	1000	2500
المجموع	240	13250	40500

المرحل الابتدائية / الصف الثاني

التجليد

الحجم / A4

أخبار الموصل

اسم المادة	عدد الاوراق	المسعر بالاسود والابيض	السعر بالملون
القران الكريم	35	1750	5750
المسيرة النبوية	19	1250	3250
الحديث النبوي	16	1000	3000
عقيدة المسلم	10	1000	2000
الادب الشرعية	16	1000	3000
اللغة العربية	52	2250	8250
الخط العربي	30	1500	5000
الرياضيات	31	1500	5250
العلوم	37	1750	6000
الاعداد البدني	13	1000	2500
المجموع	259	14000	44000

Primary Stages:

First grade Size: A4

Subject name	Number of sheets	Price in black and white	Price in coloured version
Noble Qur'an	42	2000	6750
Life of the Prophet	19	1250	3250
Prophetic Hadith	20	1250	3500
The Muslim Creed	11	1000	2250
Arabic language	34	1750	5500
Arabic handwriting	20	1250	3500
Maths	35	1750	5750
Sciences	46	2000	7500
Physical Preparation	13	1000	2500
Total	240	13250	40500

Primary Stages:

Second grade Size: A4 Bookbinding

Subject name	Number of sheets	Price in black and white	Price in coloured version
Noble Qur'an	35	1750	5750
Life of the Prophet	19	1250	3250
Prophetic Hadith	16	1000	3000
The Muslim Creed	10	1000	2000
Shari'i	16	1000	3000

Etiquette			
Arabic language	52	2250	8250
Arabic handwriting	30	1500	5000
Maths	31	1500	5250
Sciences	37	1750	6000
Physical Preparation	13	1000	2500
Total	259	14000	44000

NB: Prices presumably in Iraqi dinars: cf. [this report from Niqash](#) on Islamic State textbooks in Mosul area

Specimen 10D: Prices for printing Islamic State 5th grade primary school textbooks (Mosul area)

			
اسم المادة	عدد الاوراق	السعر بالاسود والابيض	السعر بالملون
القران الكريم	28	1500	4750
الحديث النبوي	24	1500	4000
عقيدة المسلم	19	1250	3250
الادب الشرعية	18	1250	3250
اللغة العربية			
القواعد	18	1000	3000
القراءة والاستيعاب	25	1500	4250
الاملاء	22	1250	3750
الخط العربي	21	1250	3750
الانكليزي	49	1750	8000
الرياضيات	35	1750	5750
العلوم	43	2000	7000
التاريخ	44	2000	7000
الجغرافية	23	1250	4000
الاعداد البدني	13	1000	2500
المجموع	382	20250	64250

Primary stages/5th grade Size A4 Bookbinding

Subject name	Number of sheets	Price in black and white	Price in coloured version
Noble Qur'an	28	1500	4750
Prophetic Hadith	24	1500	4000

Creed of the Muslim	19	1250	3250
Shari'i Etiquette	18	1250	3250
Arabic language			
Grammar	18	1000	3000
Reading and Comprehension	25	1500	4250
Spelling	22	1250	3750
Arabic handwriting	21	1250	3750
English	49	1750	8000
Mathematics	35	1750	5750
Sciences	43	2000	7000
History	44	2000	7000
Geography	23	1250	4000
Physical Preparation	13	1000	2500
Total	382	20250	64250

Specimen 10E: Prices for printing Islamic State 1st grade secondary school textbooks (Mosul area)

المرحلة المتوسطة / الصف الاول الحجم / A4

اختيار الموصل


ملون	اسود وبيض	عدد الاوراق	المادة
8000	2250	50	اللغة الانكليزي
10250	2750	65	الأحياء
2750	1250	18	الأدب الشرعية
4250	1500	25	الإعداد البدني
7750	2250	48	التاريخ
7250	2000	45	الجغرافية
11500	3000	74	الحاسوب
8000	2250	49	الرياضيات
8500	2250	54	الفيزياء
3750	1250	22	القران الكريم
6250	1750	39	الكيمياء
3500	1250	20	الصرف
7250	2000	44	النحو
3750	1250	21	الادب العربي
4000	1250	23	عقيدة المسلم
3500	1250	20	فقه الشريعة ذكور
4000	1250	23	فقه الشريعة إناث
104250	30750	640	المجموع

Secondary/middle stages: 1st grade Size: A4 Bookbinding

Subject name	Number of sheets	Price in black and white	Price in coloured version

English language	50	2250	8000
Biology	65	2750	10250
Shari'i etiquette	18	1250	2750
Physical preparation	25	1500	4250
History	48	2250	7750
Geography	45	2000	7250
IT	74	3000	11500
Mathematics	49	2250	8000
Physics	54	2250	8500
Noble Qur'an	22	1250	3750
Chemistry	39	1750	6250
Inflection	20	1250	3500
Grammar	44	2000	7250
Arabic literature	21	1250	3750
Creed of the Muslim	23	1250	4000
Shari'a Jurisprudence: Males	20	1250	3500
Shari'a Jurisprudence: Females	23	1250	4000
Total	640	30750	104250

Specimen 10F: Fatwa on pledging allegiance to the Caliph



In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Fatwa no. 003

15 Ramadan 1435 AH [c. 13 July 2014]

Ruling on allegiance to the Amir al-Mu'mineen Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi

Question:

What is the ruling on allegiance to the Amir al-Mu'mineen Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi?

Response:

Every Muslim must pledge allegiance to the Amir al-Mu'mineen and the Caliph of the Muslims Abu Bakr al-Husseini (Dr. Ibrahim bin Awad al-Badri)- may God protect and nurture him- whether he is in this abode or another besides it, whether as a muhajir or Ansari, male or female. And all must hear and obey him in what is not sin/rebellion.

On the authority of Ibn Omar (may God be pleased with them both): he said: "I heard the Messenger of God (God's peace and blessings on him and his family) saying: "...And whoever dies without a pledge of allegiance on his neck, has died in a state of ignorance"- (brought forth by Muslim).

And on the authority of Mu'awiya ibn Abu Sufyan (may God be pleased with them both): he said: "The Messenger of God (God's peace and blessings on him and his family) said: "Whoever dies and there is no Imam upon him has died in a state of ignorance"- (narrated by Ibn Abu Asem and others besides him).

And the Imamate has been convened for the Sheikh (may God make him mighty) by the Shura [consultation] directly, then by conquest and expansion over a wide expanse of land. The Imam of the Ahl al-Sunna Ahmad ibn Hanbal (may God have mercy on him) said: "...And whoever overcomes them by the sword such that he becomes a Caliph and is called Amir al-Mu'mineen, it is not allowed for anyone believing in God and the Last Day to remain and not see him as Imam, moral or immoral" (see: Rulings of Authority by Abu Ya'la: page 23). And in God is success.

Diwan al-Buhuth wa al-'Eftaa

Specimen 10G: Order to close shops during prayer time, Ramadi

Islamic State
Wilayat al-Anbar
Hisbah Centre: Ramadi Office

Notification no. 1

Day: Friday, Time: 12:00 [p.m.]

Date: 11 Sha'aban 1436 AH

Corresponding to 29 May 2015

Praise be to God who says: "Indeed prayer has been prescribed on the believers at times"- al-Nisa' 103 [Qur'an 4:103]; and prayers and peace be upon on His Prophet who says: "And I have intended to order for prayer so it should be established, then order for a man to lead the people in prayer, then I should go forth accompanied by men with bundles of firewood to the people not attending prayer, and then burn down their houses upon them" (narrated by Muslim on the authority of Abu Huraira).

And when God blessed the Muslims with victory and accomplishment, it became an obligation that they should undertake what God commanded. The Almighty has said: "Those who, if We have established them in power in the land, have established prayer, given zakat and ordered what is right and forbidden what is wrong. And to God belongs the outcome over matters"- al-Hajj 41 [Qur'an 22:41].

Therefore we have decided that shops should be closed and all must head to the mosques a quarter of an hour before the appointment of the call to prayer on the occasions of Friday and the five [daily] prayers. And the one who violates this order will expose himself to the consequence of his shop being closed for 48 hours and a document pledging not to repeat that. And this order is to be considered effective from date 11 Sha'aban 1436 from the Hijra of the beloved Mustafa (SAWS).

The Almighty has said: "And if only the people of the villages had believed and been pious, We would have opened upon them blessings from the sky and earth, but they considered it a lie, so We took them for what they were gaining" (al-'Araf 96- [Qur'an 7:96]).

We ask God the Great to bless the livelihood of the Muslims and their wealth. And God's peace and blessings be upon the best of His creation- Muhammad- and his family and companions.

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Anbar

Amir al-Hisbah

Amir of the Hisbah Centre

Specimen 10H: Prohibition on music, song and displaying photos on shops
(Raqqa: January 2014)



الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام
ولاية الرقة

بيان عن منع الموسيقى والغناء والصور على المحلات

الحمد لله معز عن أطاعه مدل من عساه و الصلاة و السلام على رسول الله و اله و صحبه و من الآله و بعده ،
أخي المسلم : اعلم برحمك الله أن المعازف والغناء حرام في الإسلام لأنها تأتي عن ذكر الله وعن القرآن وهي فتنة وسفينة
للقلب ، واستدل العلماء - برحمهم الله - على التحريم بالآتي :

أولاً : قال الله تعالى : (ومن الناس من يشكركم فهو الحديث لِيُضِلَّ عَنْ سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ بِغَيْرِ عِلْمٍ وَيَتَّخِذَهَا هُزُوًا أُولَئِكَ لَهُمْ عَذَابٌ
مُهِينٌ) . قال ابن مسعود رضي الله عنه : هو الغناء والذي لا إله إلا هو - يرددتها ثلاث مرات .

وقال ترجمان القرآن ابن عباس رضي الله عنهما : نزلت في الغناء وانشأه .

قال المفسر الواحدي : أكثر المفسرين على أن المراد بـ (فهو الحديث) : الغناء .

ثانياً : الأدلة من السنة النبوية المطهرة :

- 1- قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم : (لِيَكُونَ مِنْ أُمَّتِي أَقْوَامٌ يَسْتَحِبُّونَ الْحَرْ وَالْحَرِيرَ وَالخَمْرَ وَالْمَعَزِفَ)
صحيح البخاري) والمعنى يعنون هذه المحرمات خلال زيادات شبهات وأدلة وأهيات .
- 2- قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم : (صوتان ملعونان في الدنيا والآخرة : مزمار عند نعمة ، وورثة عند
مصيبة) - صحيح الجامع الصغير . قال شيخ الإسلام ابن تيمية : (هذا الحديث من أجود ما ينجح به على تحريم
الغناء كما في التفتة المشهور عن جابر بن عبد الله : (صوت عند نعمة : فهو ولعب ، ومزامير الشيطان) .
- 3- قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم (إن الله حرم على - أو حرم - الخمر ، والميسر ، والكوبة ، قال : وكأن
مسكر حرام) . قال سفيان : سألت علي بن زبير عن الكوبة ، قال : الطليل . وصححه أحمد شاكركم رحمه الله في
تحفته على مستدرك الإمام أحمد) .

- 4- قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم : (لِيَكُونَ فِي هَذِهِ الْأُمَّةِ خَسْفٌ وَقَتْفٌ وَمَسْخٌ ، وَذَلِكَ إِذَا شَرِبُوا الخَمْرَ ،
وَاتَّخَذُوا الْقِيَلَاتِ ، وَشَرِبُوا بِالْمَعَزِفِ) ، القيلات : المغنيات من الإماء . (صحيح الجامع الصغير للألباني) .

قال شيخ الإسلام ابن تيمية رحمه الله تعالى في رده على ابن المطهر الشيعي . لما نسب إلى أهل السنة إباحة الملاهي والغناء ،
فكفبه ابن تيمية وقال : هذا من الكذب على الأئمة الأربعة ، فبهم منقولون على تحريم المعازف التي هي آلات اللهو ، كالعود
ونحوه . وقال الحسن البصري رحمه الله : (ليس الذنوب من أمر المسلمين في شيء ، وأصحاب عبد الله (يعني : ابن مسعود)
كانوا يشقونها) . وقال الإمام أحمد رحمه الله : كان أصحاب عبد الله (يعني ابن مسعود) يأخذون الذنوب من الصبيان في
الأزقة فيخرفونها . (وعن إسحاق بن عيسى الطباع (ثقة من رجال الإمام مسلم) قال : سألت الإمام مالك بن أنس عما
يترخص فيه أهل المدينة من الغناء ، فقال : (إنما يقطع عننا الفساق) .

وبناءً على ما تقدم فإن الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام أصدرت قرار بمنع بيع أفراص الغناء و الآلات الموسيقية وتشغيل
الأغاني الماجنة في السيارات والحافلات والمحلات وجميع الأماكن . كما ندعو جميع المحلات إلى إزالة صور الرجال و
النساء عن واجهة محلاتهم فعن أبي الهياج قال قال علي ألا أبغضك على ما يعصى عليه رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم (لا تدعن
قبراً مشرفاً إلا سويته ولا صورة في بيت إلا طمسها) . وكل مخالف سيعرض نفسه للعقوبة الشرعية اللازمة

(يا أيها الذين آمنوا استجبوا لله ولرؤسول إذا دعاكم لما يحْيِيكُمْ واعلموا أن الله يخلو بين المرء وقلبه وآية إليه لحشرون)

إخوانكم في الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام



Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Wilayat al-Raqqa

Statement concerning the prohibition on music, singing and photos on shops.

Praise be to God who makes mighty the one who obeys Him and lowers the one who rebels against Him, and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God, his family, companions and whoso is close to him. As for what follows:

Muslim brother: Know, may God have mercy on you, that stringed instruments and song are forbidden in Islam because they detract from mention of God and the Qur'an, and they are a source of strife and corruption for the heart. And the 'ulama- may God have mercy on them- have pointed to the prohibition through the following:

First: God Almighty has said: "And among the people is the one who buys the amusement of speech to mislead from the path of God without knowledge and takes it in ridicule. Such people will have a humiliating torment" [Qur'an 31:6]. Ibn Mas'ud- may God be pleased with him- said: "It is singing, by the One besides whom there is no other deity"- he repeats it three times.

And the interpreter of the Qur'an Ibn Abbas- may God be pleased with them both- said: "It has been revealed concerning singing and the likes of it."

The interpreter al-Wahidi said: "Most interpreters have agreed that the meaning in 'amusement of speech' is singing."

Second: Lines of evidence from the purified Prophetic Sunna:

1. The Messenger of God (SAWS) said: "Certainly there will be from my Ummah peoples who will permit fornication, silk, wine and stringed instruments"- Sahih al-Bukhari. And the meaning is that they consider these forbidden things permissible with dubious arguments and flimsy lines of evidence.

2. The Messenger of God (SAWS) said: "There are two cursed voices in this world and the Hereafter: the wind instrument on the occasion of joy, and wailing on occasion of adversity"- Sahih al-Jam'I al-Saghir. The Sheikh of Islam Ibn Taymiyya said: "This hadith is among the best lines of argument on prohibiting singing as in the famous expression from Jaber ibn Abdullah: "A voice on the occasion of blessing: amusement and game, and the wind instruments of Satan."

3. The Messenger of God (SAWS) said: "Indeed God has forbidden wine, gambling, and al-kawba." He [also] said: "And everything intoxicating is forbidden." Sufyan said: "So I asked Ali bin Badhima about al-kawba, he said: 'The drum.'" And Ahmad Shaker- may God have mercy on him- authenticated this in his commentary on the chain of transmission of Imam Ahmad.

4. The Messenger of God (SAWS) said: "Certainly there will be in this Ummah shame, decadence and disfigurement, and that is when the drink wines, adopted female singers [al-qaynat] and struck instruments." Al-Qaynat: singers from the slave girls (Sahih al-Jami' al-Saghir by Albani).

The Sheikh of Islam Ibn Taymiyya (God Almighty have mercy on him) said the following in his response to Ibn al-Muthar the Shi'i, when he attributed to the Ahl al-Sunna permitting amusement centres and singing: Ibn Taymiya called him a liar and said: "This is among the lies against the four imams, for they are agreed on forbidding [stringed] instruments that are the instruments of amusement, like the oud and the like." And al-Hassan al-Basri- may God have mercy on him- said: "Tambourines are not among the affairs of the Muslims in anything, and the companions of Abdullah (i.e. Ibn Mas'ud) used to break them." And the Imam Ahmad- may God have mercy on him- said: "The companions of Abdullah (i.e. Ibn Mas'ud) would take the tambourines from the youths in the alleys and smash them up." And on the authority of Ishaq bin Eisa al-Tabba' (reliance from the men of Imam Muslim): he said: "I asked Imam Malek bin Anas about what the people of Medina take license in from singing: he said: 'The immoral do this in our view.'"

Thus according to what has been presented the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham has issued a decision prohibiting the sale of songs on disks and musical instruments as well as the playing of songs of amusement in cars, coaches, shops and all places. Similarly we call on all shops to remove photos of men and women from the display of their shops, for on the authority of Abu al-Haaj: he said: Ali said: "Am I not to entrust you on what the Messenger of God (SAWS) entrusted me?- 'Do not let a tomb remain overseeing anything unless you have levelled it, and do not leave a picture in a house unless you have erased it.'

And every violator will expose himself to required Shari'i consequence.

"Oh you who believe, respond to God and His Messenger when he calls you to that which gives you life. And know that God comes between man and his heart and to Him you will be called" [Qur'an 8:24].

Your brothers in the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

Da'wa Office

Specimen 10I: Note to the military police, Ninawa Province



Islamic State**Wilayat Ninawa: Abu Layth al-Ansari Sector****No. 892****Date: 22/11/1436 AH [6 September 2015]****In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful****To: the military police****Matter: disavowal of pact**

Praise be to God and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God, his family, companions and whoso is close to him. As for what follows:

As-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu:

We would like to inform you that the brother Yasir Ahmad Muhammad has disavowed his pact in the sector concerning the realm of arms and equipment. Let it be known that he abandoned work 7 months ago.

And may God reward you best

Islamic State**Diwan al-Jund****Abu Layth al-Ansari Sector****22/11/1436 AH**

Copy to:

Archive

NB: According to [Mosulyoon](#), which first published this document: "Information exists that Da'esh has allowed whoever wants to abandon working with it to hand over his weapons, shave his hair and go and pursue independent lines of work. And if this shows anything, it shows that it [Da'esh] is incapable of giving them alluring salaries firstly and likewise their [members who quit work] fear of being killed and expelled after liberation." On claims of salary cuts for fighters and members, cf. [here](#) and [here](#).

Specimen 10J: Notice on licensing for Internet places, Raqqa



Islamic State

Statement for distribution

To all Internet shops and halls as well as providers of Internet gear in Wilayat al-Raqqa, please head to the centre for the licensing of Internet halls to take out a license for the pursuit of Internet activity during a period not exceeding 20 days from date 15 Muharram 1437 AH [29 October 2015].

Note: All shops, halls and sellers of Internet gear that do not obtain licensing after the end of the defined period will be shut down.

Address: Raqqa- beside the al-Jaraksa mosque.

NB: cf. Specimen 9Y

Specimen 10K: Call on residents aged 14 and above in villages north of Raqqa to register their names



Islamic State

Wilayat al-Raqqa

Northern Sector

Date: 28/12/1436 AH [12 October 2015]

Police of the Northern Area

No. 22

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Subject: Statement from the Islamic Police in the Northern Sector

The brothers from the Muslim populace in the northern area whose ages range from 14 years old and above are requested to head to police divisions in the northern sector to register their names. And registration will begin next Saturday on 3 Muharram 1437 AH [17 October 2015] and will end on Friday corresponding to 9 Muharram 1437 AH [23 October 2015].

- And everyone who refrains from registering will expose himself to Shari'i reckoning.

[Names of districts and villages]

Note: There are also many small villages whose names have not been mentioned and are affiliated with the sector.

Note: From the northern side, the borders of the sector are all the villages under the control of the Dawla.

And God is the One behind the intention.


Islamic State

Wilayat al-Raqqa: Northern Area

Police Official [...]

NB: Allegedly for conscription purposes

Specimen 10L: Curfew in al-Shuyukh area, northeast Aleppo province (May 2014)



Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

Wilayat Halab: Manbij Sector

Jarabulus Area

(General statement for distribution)

The Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham announces a curfew in the al-Shuyukh area after 10 p.m. in order to safeguard the area's security and prevent the incidence of thefts.

And all who violate the instructions will be exposed to inquiry and consequence.

Islamic Police official

Specimen 10M: Early rulings imposed in Mosul (June 2014)

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

التاريخ: ٢٠ شعبان ١٤٣٥ هـ
العدد: ٢٨



الإسلامية العراقية
ولاية الموصل

قال تعالى: ﴿إِنَّمَا مَنَعَ ذُنُوبَكُمْ وَأَمَنَ دِينَكُمْ لِيَقُومَ عَلَيْكُمُ الْحَقُّ وَالْحَقُّ حَقُّكُمْ وَأَقْرَبُ إِلَيْكُمْ وَمَنَعَ لَكُمْ الْقَفْلَ كُلَّ الْقَفْلِ وَلِيَقْضَىٰ إِلَيْكُمْ أَمْوَالَكُمْ وَأَلْهَمَكُمْ الْبِرَّ وَالْإِتْقَانَ أَنْ تُبْلِغُوا إِلَىٰ أَهْلِهِمْ أَثْمَارَ هَيْبَتِكُمْ ذَٰلِكُمْ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَتَّقُونَ﴾

بعد أن من الله على المجاهدين في سبيلته من نصر في ولاية نينوى الصابرة وأعزنا على الجيش الصفوي والروافض والمشركين في عقر دارهم . بدأنا بحمد الله وعونه بتطبيق أحكام الشرع المبارك على من جهل السنة أو تناسها وابتعد عن نهج رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم وهي :

فرض النقاب على جميع النساء المسمات وغير المسمات .
عدم خروج النساء إلى الشوارع والأسواق وركوب السيارات إلا بوجود محرم .
وحرمة النساء غير المتزوجات إلى مشاركة المجاهدين من أبناء الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام في التصدي لقتال الروافض والجيش الصفوي .
يمنع على الشباب والفتيان ارتداء الزي الغربي الكافر والذي يمثل الانحطاط والفسوق ويمنع التنسبه بالزندقة في تسريحات الشعر وعلق الذقن .
إقامة المحاكم الشرعية في جميع أنحاء الولاية التي تخضع للدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام .
ويعاقب المعتاد بالجسد وعليه التوبة لله تبارك وتعالى .

الإسلامية العراقية
المكتب الإعلامي لولاية نينوى



**In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham**

Wilayat Ninawa

Date: 20 Sha'aban 1435 AH [c. 18 June 2014]

Statement no. 28

The Almighty has said: "Except the one who repents, believes and does good deeds: God will replace the evil deeds of such people with good ones. And God is forgiving, merciful"- Surat al-Furqan Ayah 70 [Qur'an 25:70].

After God blessed the mujahideen in His path with victory in enduring wilayat Ninawa and made us mighty over the Safavid army, the Rafidites and the mushrikeen in the heart of their abode, we have begun by God's commendation and blessing to apply the rulings of the blessed law on those who have been ignorant of the Sunna or neglected it and kept distance from the direction of the Messenger of God (SAWS). And these rulings are:

Imposition of niqab on all Muslim and non-Muslim women.

Women may not go out to the streets or markets or ride cars except with the presence of a mahrim.

Non-married women are called to participate with the mujahideen from the sons of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham in resistance efforts for the fight against the Rafidites and the Safavid army.

Youths and youngsters are prohibited from wearing kafir Western dress that also represents decadence and depravity. And it is forbidden to imitate the heretics in doing the hair and shaving the beard.

Shari'a courts are to be established in all the districts of the province that are subject to the control of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham.

And the violator will be punished by flogging and must repent to God the Blessed and Almighty.

**Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Media office for Wilayat Ninawa**

Specimen 10N: Notice on memorizing Surat al-Baqara [chapter 2] of the Qur'an (Aleppo province)



**Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Wilayat Halab**

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Statement for distribution:

To all the brothers in all the bases of the security officials:

All who memorize Surat al-Baqara will receive valuable financial recompense.

**Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Wilayat Halab**

Specimen 10O: Regulations on bread prices (Aleppo province)



In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

Diwan al-Qamah wa al-Makhabaz [Wheat and Bakeries Department]

Decision no. 1

10 February 2014

Statement for distribution


It is absolutely forbidden to sell a kilo of bread for more than 65 Syrian pounds in the private bakeries/ovens and displays, and that is imposed by the decision issued from the Diwan al-Qama wa al-Makhabaz, and whoever does not comply with this decision will be referred to the Shari'a court.

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

Wilayat Halab

Bakeries official

Specimen 10P: No weapons to be brought into Raqqa National Hospital



Mujahideen brothers:

It is forbidden to bring weapons into the National Hospital.

And may God reward you best.

Dr. Abu Muhammad


5 March 2014

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

Wilayat al-Raqqa

Amir of Medical Matters

Specimen 10Q: Call for staff of Raqqa National Hospital to return to work



Statement for distribution

All workers in the National Hospital in Raqqa (doctors, nursing, technicians, administrative staff, workers) must comply with the official schedule according to the timetables set by the hospital administration. Any refraining or absence from the schedule will require severe enquiry.


Medical official for the Islamic State

Dr. Abu Muhammad

Head of the National Hospital in Raqqa

Dr. Adel al-Haj Hassan

Specimen 10R: Regulations for shops in Raqqa province



**In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Wilayat al-Raqqa
Hisbah Squad**

Date**13 Rajab 1435 AH****12 May 2014****Statement for distribution**

Praise be to God...who gives victory to the religion through the people of jihad and the Sunna- He who suffices and has sufficed alone, and our prayers and peace be upon the Prophet al-Mustafa. As for what follows:

Indeed the nature of Islam that God has bestowed on mankind calls for all that is good and forbids all that is ugly, but the immoral regime strived to invert it and change it, making all efforts to do so, until the good became ugly, the condemned was allowed and what was right was condemned. And from that has arisen what has been witnessed and observed on shop owners with display of obscene photos, scandalous mannequins, selling of tight and ornamented clothes, and man selling that which concerns the woman. And the people of religion and manliness, as well as the inhabitants of the wilaya, have been vexed by all of that.

According to the complaints that have reached us, the Hisbah gives notification of the following:

- . It is absolutely forbidden to sell tight, transparent or ornamented garments.
- . All indecent photos on goods are to be removed.
- . It is absolutely forbidden to display mannequins in the shop.
- . It is absolutely forbidden for man to sell what concerns woman from undergarments [lit. internal garments].
- . It is absolutely forbidden for man to sell and the woman is in a shop at the same time, unless the woman is a mahrim to him.

And whoever violates the clauses of this statement for distribution will be exposed to Shari'i consequences.

And God is the guarantor of success.

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham**Wilayat al-Raqqa****Amir al-Hisbah**

Specimen 10S: Notification on banning operation of medical aid organizations in Raqqa province [May 2015]



In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful


Islamic State
Diwan al-Siha
Wilayat al-Raqqa
Tel Abyad Hospital

To whom the matter may concern:

According to the Diwan al-Siha's instructions to stop the work of the organizations inside Wilayat al-Raqqa, the brothers in the Tel Abyad medical administration are to inform the clinics with a detailed statement on things of medical apparatuses, cars, drugs, laptop apparatuses and Internet apparatuses, and what remains from things among them. Whoever violates this will be held accountable.

NB: i.e. The organizations must evacuate the clinics but leave behind all equipment, which will be confiscated by the Diwan al-Siha, in keeping with the co-optation principle.

Specimen 10T: Notification for al-Bab area, Aleppo province (February 2014)



Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Diwan al-Qada
Wilayat Halab- Eastern Area- Area of al-Bab and its Countryside
Statement for distribution


The Almighty has said: "Oh you who believe, if an immoral one comes to you with a report, verify it, that you may not harm people out of ignorance and thus come to regret what you have done" [Qur'an 49:6].

Thus the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham in the town of al-Bab and its countryside announces to the populace of its members in all the Diwans and the populace of its citizens that it is absolutely forbidden to arrest or search or [blank] any person, whatever the circumstances, unless one gets permission by an official stamped document from the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham.

And thus the Islamic State makes its members aware that whoever violates the statement for distribution will face Shari'i consequences, and it informs its citizens that they should refer the one is subjected to such treatment to the Diwan al-Mazalim in the judiciary and that it does not consider this conduct as not responsible [i.e. the individual who commits the injustice will be held to account, but there is no case against ISIS itself as a state/organization] beginning from 10 Rabi' al-Thani 1435 AH corresponding to 10 February 2014.

(And God is predominant over his affair but most people don't know it).

Specimen 10U: Sanitation regulations, northern Deir az-Zor province



Services
Northern Region

Announcement

The Muslim populace are asked not to throw rubbish onto the street except after placing it inside a nylon case, box or barrel earmarked for rubbish. And that is on account of what can result from harm to others, health illnesses and damage to the road.

And every violation will be curbed and the one responsible will be fined a sum of 10,000 Syrian pounds.

Services official- Northern Area

Specimen 10V: Prices of bread, northern Deir az-Zor province

1436/10-2
2015/10-20

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الاخوة اصحاب الافران تم رفع سعر الطحين في مطاحن الدولة الاسلاميه
لب اليكم تعديل مواصفات الخبز وذلك ابتداء من يوم الخميس
١٤٣٦/١٠ كما هو مبين بالجدول التالي:

٩٠٠٠٠٠ ليرة	سعر طن الطحين
٤٥٠٠ ليرة	سعر كيس الطحين (٥٠ كغ)
١٠٠ ليرة	سعر كيلو الخبز
٢ كيلو غرام	وزن ربتة الخبز
٢٠٠	سعر الربتة لعوام المسلمين
٢٢٠	سعر الربتة للمطاعم
لا يقل عن ١٣ ولا يزيد عن ١٤ رغيف	عدد الارشفة

مسؤول المنطقة السكنية

Islamic State

Wilayat al-Kheir

Diwan al-Zara'a wa al-Rayy [Agricultural and Irrigation Department]

No.

21 Shawwal 1436 AH

5 August 2015

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Brothers who own bakeries, the price of flour has been raised in the flour mills of the Islamic State, so [we present] to you the modification of specifications on bread that will come into effect beginning on Thursday [22] Shawwal 1436 AH [6 August 2015] as specified in the following table [all prices are specified in Syrian pounds]:

Price of a ton of flour	90000 pounds
Price of a case of flour (50 kg)	4500 pounds
Price of a kilo of bread	100 pounds
Weight of a bundle of bread	2 kg
Price of a bundle for the Muslim populace	200 [pounds]
Price of a bundle for restaurants	220 [pounds]
Number of rolls	No less than 13 and no more than 14 rolls

Northern Region Official

Specimen 10W: Kurdish language Shar'i session, Raqqa Province



Islamic State

Diwan al-Da'wa wa al-Masajid

Wilayat al-Raqqa Centre

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Good tidings to all Muslims

The Da'wa and Masajid centre in Wilayat al-Raqqa announces:

Shari'i session in the Kurdish language

Session length: 10 days

The session begins on Saturday, corresponding to 19 Sha'aban in the al-Sahaba mosque on al-Qitar street, every day after afternoon prayers. And at the end of the session there will be valuable prizes for those successful in the session and a certificate certifying the successful person's passing the session.

Diwan al-Da'wa wa al-Masajid

Wilayat al-Raqqa Centre

NB: Via Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently

Specimen 10X: Mosul University: Medical Technical Institute Exams (2014)

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

الدولة الإسلامية
خلافة على منهاج النبوة

المعهد التقني الموصل الأقسام الصحية

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

الإمتحان النهائي للدور الأول الصف الثاني للعام الدراسي ١٤٣٥ هـ (٢٠١٣/٢٠١٤)

الترتيب	مادة	الإشعة	التخدير	التعليقات	المسئلة	التاريخ	اليوم
١١	المصنع ٥٥	٥٠	٦٥	المرضية ١٤٥	١١٨		
	تثنية ولولت	لحوصات شعاعية	تخدير	علم المناعة	صيدلانيات	١٠/١٢	الأحد
	تعزيز التفسي والعقبة	الصحة والسلامة الذهنية	تصوير شعاعي	حاسبة	أمراض الدم	١٠/١٤	الثلاثاء
	أملاقيات المنه	تطبيقات العائنة	أجهزة تقنية	عناية مركزة	الفطريات الطبية	١٠/١٦	الخميس
	رعاية صحية أولية	التوليدات	طب باطني	علم الطفيليات	كيمياء صيدلانية	١٠/١٩	الأحد
	حاسبة	التغيش والرفقة والصحة		الحاسبة	تطبيقات علاجية	١٠/٢١	الثلاثاء

النتيجة تبدأ الإمتحانات في تمام الساعة التاسعة صباحاً

مع دعواتنا لكم بالنجاح والتفوق في الدنيا والأخرة

ديوان التعليم



Islamic State

Caliphate on the Prophetic Methodology

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

Say: Lord, increase me in knowledge

Mosul Technical Institute: health divisions

Final exam schedule for the first setting of the second year grouping for year of study 1435 (2013/2014)

Day	Date	Pharmacology 118	Pathology analyses 145	Anaesthesia 65	Radiology 50	Society health 55	Nursing 99
Sunday	12 October	Pharmaceutics	Immunology	Anaesthesia	Radiography tests	Epidemiology	Women's health and reproduction
Tuesday	14 October	Calculation [aka Computation]	Blood illnesses	Calculation	Radiography	Health, safety & professionalism	Psychiatric and mental health nursing
Thursday	16 October	Industrial pharmacy	Medical mycology	Intensive care	Technical apparatuses	Calculation applications	Professional ethics
Sunday	19 October	Pharmacological chemistry	Parasitology	Internal medicine	Professional conduct	Study of drugs	Primary healthcare
Tuesday	21 October	Therapeutic applications	Calculation			Inspection, oversight & health	Calculation

Note: exams begin at 9 a.m. sharp

With our prayers of success and excellence for you in this world and the Hereafter

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

Islamic State

Diwan al-Ta'aleem official

Specimen 10Y: Notification from Islamic police in Manbij (March 2014)

Praise be to God and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God, his family, Companions and whoso is close to him then. As for what follows:

In view of the sowing of corruption by some of the criminals, the fact that paths are being cut off in the town of Manbij, and the recurrence of incidents of theft, kidnapping and the like in the town of Manbij, the Islamic Police in the town of Manbij makes the Muslim populace aware of some of the instructions to protect their safety:

- . It is absolutely forbidden to tint windshields of cars with what is called "[fimia](#)."
- . There is a curfew on motorcycles on the streets after sunset prayers.
- . All shops are to be closed after 8 p.m., especially Internet halls.

And God is the guarantor of success.

6 Jumada al-Awal 1435 AH


7 March 2014

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

Wilayat Halab

Islamic Police official

Specimen 10Z: Notification from Islamic police in Manbij (April 2014)



In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

Wilayat Halab- Manbij area

Islamic Police

**Statement for distribution
Issued by the Manbij Police**

Praise be to God alone and prayers and peace be upon the one after whom there is no prophet, and on all his family and companions. As for what follows:

To all citizens of the Islamic State in Manbij, note the following:

1. General roads and alleyways are to be cleared of goods (displays) and likewise the line-up of cars and other vehicles besides them [i.e. traffic], and the alleyways are to be opened, in order for the Muslims' livestock to pass through and thus with the removal of all obstacles from them [the roads etc.]
2. The movement of motorcycles in the streets after 9 p.m. is prohibited. That is for security necessity.
3. Tinting of windshields of cars with black colour on all cars is prohibited. That is for security necessity.
4. Internet shop owners and workers must shut them from 12 a.m.
5. The Diwans and foundations of the Dawla, the shops and work offices are to be shut immediately after hearing the call to prayer.

We ask all to embrace, comply with and be bound by the instructions issued for what is of best interest and right for the Muslims. Let it be known that the violator will expose himself to inquiry and legitimate consequence if the matter requires.

"And praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds."

Islamic Police official in Manbij

Specimen 11A: Notification on Bustan al-Qasr crossing, Aleppo city (2013)



Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham Wilayat Halab

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Let all the people of Aleppo- may God protect them- know that the Bustan al-Qasr crossing is under the supervision of some of the fighting factions there that have no organizational link with the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, and that has been the case since Wednesday evening (10 August 2013), as the Islamic State left the crossing to re-evaluate the crossing situation and structure.

So the soldiers of the Islamic State have no link with what is published on media and social networks on Thursday concerning deeds attributed to members of the Bustan al-Qasr checkpoint. And the gowns and banners are not proof of the organizational link, for how many people from a checkpoint in the city of Halab al-Izz raise among them the banner of Tawheed out of love for Islam, but the members of the checkpoint have no link with the Islamic State organizationally.

We remind all those claiming neutrality and independence spreading lies against us through the media, that our Lord- Exalted and Lofty is He- says: "Be just, for it is nearest to piety." And He who is Exalted and Lofty says, "Except God's curse is on the wrongdoers."

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

Media office


Wilayat Halab

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

Wilayat Halab

Wali

Specimen 11B: On sighting of new moon for Ramadan (2014: pre-Caliphate era)



Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Diwan al-Awqaf wa al-Masajid

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Statement for distribution on sighting the new moon of Ramadan

Praise be to God alone and prayers and peace be upon the one after whom there is no prophet. As for what follows:

We call on all Muslims to undertake reconnaissance to sight the new moon of Ramadan as the Prophet (SAWS) ordered that, for it has been established on the authority of Abu Huraira (may God be pleased with him) who says: "The Prophet (SAWS) said: 'Fast according to its observation and break the fast according to its observation, but if the sky is cloudy for you, reckon by thirty days'" - issued by Muslim.

So whoever sees the new moon of Ramadan, let him hurry to the nearest Islamic court to register his bearing witness with it.

On sighting the new moon, observe the following:

1. The side of sighting the new moon is towards the side of the setting of the sun, slightly to the south.
2. The time of sighting the new moon is 5 minutes before sunset to 20 minutes after it.
3. The period of the appearance of the new moon is around 5 minutes.
4. The date of the sighting of the Ramadan new moon is next Friday, 29 Sha'aban 1435 AH.

May God entrust us and you with His grace and blessing.

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

Diwan al-Awqaf wa al-Masajid

Specimen 11C: Motorcycle ownership card, Ninawa province

Islamic State
Islamic Police
Wilayat Ninawa/Transit/[?]

**Specimen 11D: Notification from the Diwan al-Ta'aleem, Ninawa Province
(November 2014)**

<p>ديوان التعليم وقل رب زدني علما ٢٠١٤/١١/٢٩</p>		<p>لا اله الا الله الله ١٤٣٥</p>		<p>الدولة الإسلامية خلافة على منهاج النبوة</p>	
<p>التاريخ الهجري: 29 / 1 / 1436 ٢٠١٤/١١/٢٩</p>		<p>العدد: 45</p>		<p>ولاية نينوى</p>	
<p>بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم إلى // أقسام المديرية وشعبها وإدارات المدارس مكافئة والمعاهد ورياض الأطفال في ولاية نينوى الموضوع // تعميم السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته.</p>					
<p>قال تعالى في سورة النساء: (الذين يتبعون المكافئين أولياء من دون المؤمنين) أي يتبعون معتدماً العزلة فإن العزلة لله جميعاً (39)، وقد نزل علينا في المكاتب أن إذا سمعتم آيات الله يكفركن بها وتستوها بها فلا تكفروا معها حتى يكفروا في حديث شهر إنكم إذا مثلتم إن الله جامع المنافقين والمكافئين في جهنم جميعاً (140)...</p>					
<p>مقرر إبلاغ منتسبيكم الذين لم يلتحقوا بالدوام بعد الآن بضرورة الالتحاق الفوري بدوامهم وبخلافه يرسن تزويدها بالمعلومات لدولة في الجدول أدناه على أن تصل الإجابات إلى مكتب أربز الديوان في موعد أقصاه 2014/11/29 ويتحمل المدرس مسؤولية التأخير أو عدم الإجابة.</p>					
<p>ملاحظة 1: تتكون الإجابة على تعميمنا هذا حتى في حال عدم وجود مشمولين.</p>					
<p>2: في حال عدم توفر بعض المعلومات المطلوبة بالإمكان الرجوع إلى الأقسام المختصة.</p>					
<p>3: تتكون الإجابة على نفس هذه الوثيقة.</p>					
<p>اسم المدرس أو القسم</p>		<p>الموقع</p>		<p>اسم المدير</p>	
<p>الختم والتوقيع</p>					
ت	الاسم الرباعي واللقب	العنوان الوظيفي	عنوان السكن	رقم الدار	نقطة التقرب دالت
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					
7					

**Islamic State
Caliphate on the Prophetic Methodology
Diwan al-Ta'aleem
And say: Lord, increase me in knowledge**

Wilayat Ninawa

No. 45

Date: 29 Muharram 1436 AH/22 November 2014

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

To: divisions of the directorate and its people and all the administrations of the schools, as well as the institutes and kindergartens in Wilayat Ninawa

Subject: statement for distribution

As-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu

The Almighty has said in Surat al-Nisa': "Those who take the the disbelievers as allies besides the believers: do they seek honour with them? Honour is to God entirely (139). And it has already come down to you in the Book that when you hear the verses of God, they are disbelieved and mocked, so do not sit with them until they embark on another conversation. Indeed, you would be like them, and indeed God will gather the disbelievers and hypocrites in Hell entirely" (140)- [Qur'an 4:139-140].

It has been decided to inform your staff who have not taken up the official schedule until now that they must immediately take up the official schedule, while it is asked that we be provided with information entered into the table below such that responses should reach the office of the amir of the Diwan by 29 Noember 2014 at the latest and the director bears responsibility for delay or lack of response.

Notice

1. There should be the response to this statement of ours for distribution even in the event of there being no one included.
2. In the event of some of the sought information not being available, one can resort to personal dossiers.
3. The response should be on the same document.

Name of school or division: Place: Director's name: Stamp and signature:

No.	Full name and title	Employment address	Residence address	Abode no.	Nearest indicating point	Notes
1						
2						
3						
4						
5						
6						
7						

Islamic State

Amir of the Diwan al-Ta'aleem

Dhu al-Qarnain

Specimen 11E: Note from Omar al-Shishani (early 2014)



**In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Wilayat Halab- Eastern Sector**

Brother: Abu al-Layth al-Ansari, may God grant him success.

As-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu. As for what follows:

You have been commissioned with receipt of the [portfolio] of the town of al-Ra'i: fortifying it and concentrating [forces] inside it to cut off the [border] crossing for the apostates, as well as managing the town [e.g. implementing judicial functions] and seizing control of it.

And God is the guarantor of success.

Omar al-Shishani

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

General Military Commander

Northern Region

Specimen 11F: Note from the Da'wa Committee in al-Dana, Idlib Province (2013)



Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

al-Dana: Da'wa Committee

Praise be to God and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God (SAWS)

We inform all citizens of the town of al-Dana that selling and buying in all shops- save the hospitals- has been stopped during prayer time beginning from the call to prayer until the end of the prayer. **And in the event of repeated violation, the violator will be referred to the Islamic court.**

Note: the period of shutting the shop is 25 minutes.



Specimen 11H: Traffic violation, Raqqa province


 الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام
 ولاية الرقة
 هيئة الخدمات الإسلامية - الشرطة الإسلامية
 جهاز المرور

رقم ٦١٠٥
 اليوم الخميس
 التاريخ ١١ / ٨ / ١٤٣٥ هـ
 الموافق ٢٠١٤ / /

مخالفة سير
 رقم الضبط
 اسم المخالف: الميراد البقار الشريف
 رقم السيارة: ٥٠٤
 نوع السيارة: كيا
 نوع المخالفة: اتجاه مائل
 منظم المخالفة: سعيد الوائلي

الوثام

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

Wilayat al-Raqqa

Islamic Services Committee: Islamic Police

Transit Team

Traffic violation

Record no.:

No.: 6105

Day: Thursday

Date: 11 Shawwal 1435 AH

Corresponding to: / /201 [7 August 2014]

Violator's name:

Car number:

Car type: Kia

Type of violation: Opposite direction [i.e. driving on the wrong side of the road]

Violation regulator:

NB: This document comes from the Caliphate era, but the title in the document had not yet been changed from "Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham"

Specimen 11I: Full repentance form, Deir az-Zor Province

الدولة الإسلامية
ولاية الخيبر

لا اله الا الله
الله اعلى
الله اعلم

الصورة الشخصية

التاريخ:

الموافق:

تعهد و أقرار بالتبرؤ و التوبة

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الحمد لله رب العالمين و الصلاة والسلام على من لا نبي بعده

أقر أنا المدعو..... بالتبرؤ من القصيد

التابع ل..... و أقر بأن ما وقعت فيه من وقوف مع (الجيش الحر و الجبهة الإسلامية و جبهة النصرة و غيرهم) ضد الدولة الإسلامية هو محاربة لله و لرسوله و للمؤمنين. فأستغفر الله من هذا العمل و أتبرؤ من قتال الدولة الإسلامية و عدم محاربتها و الوقوف ضدها و أتعاهد بالشروط التالية:

أولاً: عدم تشكيل أو الانضمام لأي فصيل آخر إلا بعد علم الدولة الإسلامية.

ثانياً: أتعاهد بتسليم كافة السلاح (أي نوع) التابع للفصيل، و أتعاهد بتسليم كافة السلاح الشخصي من البارودة و المسدس فقط.

ثالثاً: أتعاهد بأن لا أذهب للمناطق التي تكون تحت سيطرة الصحوات (من جيش حر و جبهة إسلامية و نصرة و غيرهم) وعند عدم القدرة من العمل بالشرط الثالث يجب مراجعة الدولة في كل أسبوع.

و عند مخالفتي لأي إحدى هذه الشروط أكون معرض للمحاسبة و الله على ما أقول شهيد

اسم النائب:

التوقيع:

المسؤل الشرعي:

التوقيع:

Islamic State
Wilayat al-Kheir

Personal photo

Date:

Corresponding to:

Pledge and resolution for disavowal and repentance

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds and prayers and peace be upon the one after whom there is no prophet

I- the one called...- affirm disavowal of the faction...affiliated with...and I affirm that what I got involved with in standing with the Free Army, Islamic Front, Jabhat al-Nusra and others besides them against the Islamic State constitutes waging war on God, His Messenger, and the believers, so I seek God's forgiveness from this deed and disavow fighting the Islamic State and will not wage war on it or stand against it.

And I pledge to abide by the following conditions:

1. Not to organize or join any other faction except after the Islamic State's knowledge.
2. I pledge to hand over all weapons (any type) belonging to the faction and I pledge to hand over all personal weapons comprising the rifle or pistol only.
3. I pledge that I will not go to the regions that are under the control of the Shwa forces (Free Army, Islamic Front, Nusra and others besides them). In the event of not being able to implement the third condition, it is necessary to go and register with the Dawla [IS] in every week.

And in the event that I violate any of these conditions, I will exposed to accounting.

And God is witness to what I say.


Repenter's name:

Signature:

Shari'i Official:

Signature:

Specimen 11J: Notification from the Shari'a Court in Sirte, Libya



Diwan al-Qada wa al-Mazalim

The Shari'a Court in Wilayat Tarabulus: city of Sirte

Important notification

In the name of God, and prayers be upon the Messenger of God. As for what follows:

Every Muslim inside the abode of Islam (city of Sirte and what is affiliated with it) must ratify contracts of all his transactions (selling, purchase, leasing, trust, consolidation of debts, mortgage...) in the Katib al-'Adl office in the Shari'a court.

Let it be known that every operation that comes within this section but whose implementation occurs outside the Katib al-'Adl office and with documents not referring back to the Islamic State- beginning from the date of the issuing of this notification- means that its transactors will be exposed to inquiry by the concerned parties.

May God reward you best.

Islamic State

Transactions court judge

Wilayat Tarabulus: Sirte

Thursday 28 Safr 1437 AH [10 December 2015]

Specimen 11K: Note on times for call to prayer, Tripoli province, Libya [Sirte]

الدولة الإسلامية

ولاية طرابلس

مركز الدعوة والمسجد

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

تحذير

على الإحوية القيمين (المؤذنين) في مساجد الولاية ، الإلتزام
 بالوقت الأذان الصادرة من الهيئة - الشرعية للمواقيت -
 التابعة لمركز الدعوة والمسجد و إلا ستعرض للمسائلة من
 قبل المركز ، والله الموفق .

ولاية طرابلس - سورت

مركز الدعوة والمسجد

Islamic State
Wilayat Tarabulus
Da'wa and Masajid Centre

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Warning

The valued brothers (muezzins) in the mosques of the wilaya must comply with the call to prayer timings issued by the Shari'i Committee for Timings affiliated with the Da'wa and Mosques Centre, otherwise they will be exposed to inquiry by the centre, and God is the guarantor of success.

Specimen 11L: City charter, Sirte

وثيقة المدينة

الحمد لله ناصر المؤمنين وقاتل الكافرين، والسلام على إمام المعاهدين، وعلى آله وصحبه طمأنينة القلوب، ومن تبعهم بإحسان إلى يوم الدين، أما بعد:

فبسم الأمانة الإسلامية علماً بفتح الله الحين الذي من به سبحانه على عباده المجاهدين المستضعفين، إذ ما كنتم من فتح مناطق واسعة من أشرار الكافرين وطردهم منها، والرجوع ولا الرضوخ ولا الركوع، فغلبتكم واحدة لا غير وهي (الإنفاذ سلطان الله في الأرض، وسط نفوذ الشريعة وإزالة مظالم الشرك والفجور، والعدالة وإنصاف المظلوم والأخذ على يد الظالم... وهي عاقبة فيما أسلف الله لها حتى يتحقق كمال مشروع الخلافة الإسلامية المنشود على كماله، ليس الإسلام أبداً لله وبه).

فما علمنا وشيوخ عشائرتنا وأقربنا وعطائنا وما أهل السنة جميعاً أرباباً يتسلسلوا شيئاً وشيئاً، علموا إلى ولادة مشرفة بنصت لها الشرح وشرحتها فيما حيزاً، ثمها إلى إلقاء جملته صافية لتطبيق حجة إسلامية تحت ظل الشريعة، ولكن صفاً واحداً مرسوماً بوجه المصوبين والعلمانيين والمسلمين كما أمر ربنا بالشر.

ولما كان سبب الأرض وسياسة الناس وإدارة الشؤون العامة يتغلب تعريف أهل السنة وعشائرتنا الأصلية بالعلم، طبقاً إلى مشروع الإسلام وإيمانهم المعاهدين، وجب تعديد المعايير الشرعية والقواعد الإسلامية التي تكرم الراس والوجه، والتي أعلنها:

- 1- لقاتل أن يقول: من أنتم؟ الجواب: نحن جنود النبوة الإسلامية، أخذنا على عاتقنا إرجاع أجداد الخلافة الإسلامية ودفع الظلم والظلمة عن أهلنا وإخواننا المسلمين.
- 2- تعامل الناس بما ظهر لنا منهم وتكلم سرانهم إلى الله، فمن أظهر لنا شعائر الإسلام ولم يتنمى بناقص من نواقضه: عاملناه معاملة المسلمين، ولا تأخذ أحداً بالظن والتهمة بل بالبرهنة الفاضلة والحجة الساطعة، والتكلم عندنا إحساناً الظن في المسلم ما لم يكن ردماً للمعتدين وموتناً للمجرمين.
- 3- الناس في ظل حكمتنا آمنون مطمئنون، فوالله لا نرغب للعيش إلا في ظل حكم إسلامي يضمن للزعمية حقوقهم وينصف المظلوم من مضم حقه، ومن كان علينا بالأمس نالماً فهو اليوم رعية أمن، إلا من صدقاً وارتد.
- 4- الأموال التي كانت تحت قبضة الحكومة المرتدة (مالي المسلمين عامة) ترجع جميعها إليهم، وأمرها عائد إلى خليفة المسلمين وهو الذي يتولى تصريفها في مصالح المسلمين، وليس لأحد أن يمد لها يده بهيب أو سلب، أو يحوطها ولا عرض نفسه للمثول أمام القضاء الشرعي والمسائلة، ثم إنزال العقوبة الرادعة به، وكذلك للملك الغاص (من مالي وأثاثي ومناج) من شريك منها نصيباً من حيز لا يشبه له فيه كان عليه القطع، وتتعامل مع عصابات السطو المسلح على أنهم مفلسون في الأرض، وتوقع عليهم وعلى من يروج للمسلمين بالتهديد والابتزاز وأخذ المكوس (الأنكوات) أخذ المال من الناس قسراً بغير حق) أنكر المقويات الرادعة.
- 5- يحرم الاتجار والتعاطي بالخمر والمخدرات والدخان وسائر المحرمات.
- 6- المساجد بيوت الله، أم للزعميات، ورأس الحرمات، ترخص فيها الدعاء والبيع، والنفس والتفيس، ونحت جميع المسلمين على عمارتها وتآدية الصلوات فيها مع الجماعة بأوقافها.
- 7- حذر حذر من مراجعة العمالة ومعارضة الحكومات المرتدة والمطوائف، فقد بان الطريق والنصح، وراز الكفر والفسخ، ونحن أبناء اليوم والثابت من اللب كمن لا ذنب له، وأما المرتدون من الجند والشرطة وبقية الأجهزة

على الختام تقول: أيها الناس لقد مررت عليكم حلفاً زمنياً كثيرة، وبرهنت كل أنظمة الحكم، وقدمت مراتبها والتكوتت بناؤها وسعادتها، وما هي الآن حجة الخلافة على جناح النبوة وحكم الدولة الإسلامية ونهج الخليفة أي بكر القرشي، سمعته قد برز فبره، وسترون حول الله وتوفيقه مدى الفرق الواسع الشاسع بين الحكومات الكافرة الفاسدة التي صارت ملكات الناس وتحت أيديهم وأعدت، حطوهم وكراهم بين الخلافة الإسلامية التي أخذت الوحي العزل منح حيا.

اللهم إني أطلب الخلافة الإسلامية ونهجها وسعادتها، اللهم إني أطلب الخلافة الإسلامية، وأرجو أن يوفقني الله على ذلك، وأرجو أن يوفقني الله على ذلك، وأرجو أن يوفقني الله على ذلك.

City charter

Praise be to God who gives victory to the believers and abandons the criminals, and prayers and peace be upon the Imam of the Mujahideen, his family and companions- the

guardians of the path and the religion- and whoso follows them with ihsan to the Day of Judgment. As for what follows:

We congratulate the Islamic Ummah generally for the clear conquest of God that is a blessing from the Almighty on his oppressed mujahideen servants He enabled them to conquer wide areas [of Libya?] and rout and expel the apostates from them- humiliated an lowly- as well as free thousands of prisoners from the prisons of the criminal tyrants. And the Islamic State continues to attain its victories and conquests without interruption by the grace of God alone [?]...not knowing withdrawal, return, submission or bowing down. Our cause is but one: establishing the authority of God over the land, spreading the influence of the Shari'a, removing signs of shirk [?]...and supporting the one who is wronged and taking it up with the wrongdoer, and it is going forward in what God has realized for it until the entirety of the Islamic Caliphate project is realized, sought over the entire world of Islam, by God's power and strength.

Therefore, oh 'ulama of ours, sheikhs of our tribes, our imams and preachers, and oh Ahl al-Sunna entirely- men and women, young and old- strive for the ennobled stance history hearkens to and from which the dawn of prosperity: for a stance of excellence and truth to realize Islamic kinship under Shari'a, that we may be one built up rank in the face of the Safavids, secularists and Crusaders, as our Lord has desired and ordered.

And once there has been seizure of the land, politics of the people and management of general affairs, it is requires for the Ahl al-Sunna and our original tribes to get to know jurisprudence [....?] and their mujahideen brothers, and it has become necessary to outline the Shari'i and Islamic principles that cover male and female citizens, of which the most important are:

1. To the one who says: "Who are you?" The response: "We are the soldiers of the Islamic State. We have taken it upon our shoulders to revive the glories of the Islamic Caliphate and remove oppression and violence from our people and Muslim brothers."
2. We deal with people according to what has appeared outwardly to us from them and we refer their inner feelings/secrets to God. So whoever has displayed for us the outward signs of Islam and has not committed one of its nullifiers: we deal with him as Muslims are to be treated, and we do not take up anyone on the basis of thought and emotion but rather by the clear evidence and decisive proof, and the presentation among us is ihsan of thought in the Muslim as long as he does not aid the aggressors and help the criminals.

3. People in the shade of our rule live in security and peace. For by God there is no comfort to life except in the shade of Islamic rule guaranteeing citizens their rights and seeking justice for the one wronged from the one who infringed on his right. And whoever was hostile to us yesterday is a safe subject today, except the one who resists, flees and commits apostasy.

4. The wealth that was in the hands of the apostate government (wealth of the Muslims in general) will be restored entirely to the Bayt al-Mal, and its matter will be referred to the Caliph of the Muslims, as he is the one who is responsible for its being spent in the interests of the Muslims. And it is not for anyone to stretch his hands towards it to steal, plunder and the like. Otherwise he exposes himself to trial and inquiry before the Shari'i judiciary, then the bringing down of deterrence punishment, and likewise private possessions (money, vessels and furniture)- whoever steals from them a value liable to zakat from a safe place with no doubt as to what he has done, he must have his hand cut off. And we deal with armed robbery gangs on the basis that they are corrupters in the land, and we mandate for them and whosoever terrorizes the Muslims with threats, extortion and taking taxes (al-anawat: taking wealth from people by force without right) the most severe of deterrent consequences.

5. Producing and dealing in wine, drugs, cigarettes and the rest of the forbidden items is prohibited.

6. Mosques are houses of God: the base of observances, and head of sacred rites. Without them there is license for bloodshed, lifeblood, the soul and the precious. And we urge all Muslims to build them and undertake prayers in them with the congregation at its times.

7. Strong warning against seeking to engage in treachery and flirting with the apostate governments and tyrants. For the path has appeared and become clear, while disbelief has faltered and been exposed. And we are the sons of today, and the one who repents from sin is the same as the one who has no sin, and as for the apostates from the army, police and rest of the apparatuses of disbelief, we say to you that the door of repentance is open for whosoever wants it. For we have specified special places to receive those who wish to repent and the conditions and restrictions of repentance. As for the one who persists and remains on his apostasy, there is no choice for us but to kill him.

8. Parties, councils, gatherings and banners in all titles cannot be accepted in the final decision according to the words of SAWS: "Whoever comes to you when your affairs are all under one man and wants to split your solidarity and divide your gathering, kill him"

(narrated by Muslim). And in another narration by Muslim: "Strike him with the sword, whoever he may be."

9. God Almighty has ordered to come together, unite and do away with division and disagreement. And the dirt of the group is better than the purity of the division, and division is of the traps of Satan, as splitting the Muslims is a reason for weakness. And in unity under the pure banner of the creed, a pure movement, is much good, instead of a multiplicity of movements and desires leading to arrogance and disdain, while His blessing is removed from jihadi operation.

10. Our stance on idolatrous sights and shrines as well as idolatrous sanctuaries is what has been established on the authority of the Prophet (SAWS): "Do not leave a statue standing unless you have destroyed it, or a grave standing unless you have levelled it."

11. To the distinguished and noble women: God is God in modesty, covering, loose garment and veiling the head and face, while remaining in the house, embracing caution and not leaving except for need: this is the guidance of the mothers of the believers and the distinguished female companions (may God be pleased with them).

12. Go forth and enjoy Islamic rule, just and gentle as it is. And be happy in a land in which the Muslims have force, triumph, rulings and conclusion. For the Lord- Exalted is He- has enabled His allies going forth in His path and they have spread the authority of the Shari'a and lightened the burdens that have oppressed the people from rotten, temporary laws. And they are striving to implement the hudud, for a hadd applied is better for the people of the land than forty days of rain for them at dawn.

13. We listen to advice from young and old, free and slave. There is no difference in our eyes between red and black, and we apply righteousness on ourselves before others besides us, just as our Lord- Almighty and Exalted is He- has said: "Oh you who believe, be firm in justice, witnesses to God, even if against yourselves, parents or relatives" (Nisa 135) [Qur'an 4:135].

In conclusion we say: "Oh people, many eras have passed upon you, and you have tried all systems of rule, and you have tasted their bitterness and were burnt in their fire and voracity, And now is the era of the Caliphate on the Prophetic methodology and the rule of the Islamic State and the pledge of the Caliph Abu Bakr al-Qurashi (may God protect him), whose dawn has become preminent. And you will see by God's power and success the extent of the wide, extensive division as regards the unjust governments of disbelief

that have taken away the potentials of the people, muzzled their mouths and considered their rights and dignity invalid, as opposed to the Islamic Caliphate that has taken divine revelation as a life program."

Maktabat al-Himma

NB: Almost identical to the charter IS issued for Mosul in June 2014

Specimen 11M: al-Yarmouk Battalion ID card



Islamic State

Diwan al-Jund

Al-Yarmouk Battalion

Delivery date: 12 Dhu al-Hijja 1436 AH

ID Card

Kunya: Abu Khalil al-Khani

Personal number: 1200013136

This card is for ID purposes, not appropriate as an assignment card.

Specimen 11N: Work card, al-Qa'qaa' Battalion



Islamic State
Wilayat Halab
Assignment card

Brother's name: Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi
 Work entrusted with: Media guy
 Division affiliation: Idad al-Fatiheen Institute
 Issue of card date: 20 Safr 1437 AH
 Card expiration date: 20 Jumada al-Awal 1437 AH

Islamic State
Wilayat Halab
Al-Qa'qaa' Battalion: Admin official

NB: Idad al-Fatiheen Institute is in al-Bab, Aleppo province. From it comes the al-Qa'qaa' Battalion. Thanks to a local contact in north Aleppo countryside for this card.

Specimen 110: Unspecified school card



Islamic State

Caliphate on the Prophetic Methodology

Diwan al-Ta'aleem

And say: Lord, increase me in knowledge

School card

Name:

Specimen 11P: Order from General Committee on media production from battles and expeditions

اللجنة العامة

١٤ / ١١ / ١٤٣٥ للهجرة

تصميم رقم ١٠

الدولة
الإسلامية

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الحمد لله رب العالمين، والصلوة والسلام على إمام المجاهدين نبينا محمد وعلى
آله وصحبه أجمعين، وبعد:

قررت اللجنة العامة منع التصوير بالهواتف والكاميرات وغيرها أثناء الغزوات وما
يتعلق بالمعارك إلا من قبل الإعلاميين المسؤولين المكلفين بتوثيق وتصوير هذه
المعارك منعاً للاجتهادات غير المنضبطة، وستتم متابعة المخالفين.

وجزاكم الله عن المسلمين خير الجزاء... والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته.

والحمد لله رب العالمين

- يرجى نشر التصميم على كافة المقرات والمراكز الرئيسية والفرعية في الولايات.



بإقية - قها ام تنسود
بكتيب حرام أو تنسود
مشود

Islamic State

General Committee

14 Dhu al-Qa'ada 1435 AH [10 September 2014]

Statement for distribution no. 10

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds, and prayers and peace be upon the Imam of the Mujahideen, our Prophet Muhammad, and all his family and companions. As for what follows:

The General Committee has decided to prohibit photography with phones, cameras and other things besides them during expeditions and what concerns battles, except by the responsible media personnel authorized to document and photograph these battles, in order to prevent unregulated efforts. And violators will be tracked down.

And may God reward you best from the Muslims, wa as-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu.

And praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds.

- It is asked to publish this statement for distribution on all main and divisional bases and centres in the wilayas.

Islamic State

General Supervisory Committee

Baqiya, because it has not been polluted by forbidden gain or a distorted program.

Specimen 11Q: Further notice on media production

الدولة الإسلامية
اللجنة العامة المشرفة

الرقم : ٩٤
التاريخ : ١٢ / ١٢ / ١٤٣٦
٢٠١٥ / ٩ / ٢٦

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
إلى / كافة الولايات والدواوين والهيئات
م / تعميم

الخذُّ له وخذْه والصِّلاهُ والسلامُ على مَنْ لا بُدَّ لِيَّ بَعْدَهُ، أما بَعْدُ:
السلامُ عليكم ورحمةُ اللهِ وبركاته...

سبق وأن نشرت اللجنة تعميماً حول الاجتهادات الغير منضبطة في التعامل مع الإعلام، ورأينا بعض المخالفات لهذا التعميم مؤخراً، وعليه قررت اللجنة العامة المشرفة ما يلي:

١. يمنع الاجتهاد مطلقاً في عمل أو نشر إصدارات مقروءة أو مسموعة أو مرتبة باسم الدولة الإسلامية على شبكة الإنترنت.
٢. يُمنع التعاون بأي طريقة مع القنوات الفضائية والمؤسسات الإعلامية الدولية أو المحلية التي تتصل بأفراد الدولة أنها كانت صيغة التعاون والإجراءات التي تعرضها هذه المؤسسات، وينحصر التعامل معها على ديوان الإعلام المركزي في الدولة الإسلامية.
٣. تُمنع أي تصريحات أو مواقف تُنسب لأي جهة معروفة انتمائها للدولة الإسلامية كالثقراء العسكريين أو الإداريين أو الإعلاميين أو التشريعيين وغيرهم.
٤. يحذر على الأمراء والجنود وكل من كان معروفاً انتمائها للدولة الإسلامية فتح حسابات شخصية بأسمائهم على مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي، أو تبني مواقف تركية أطراف أو دعم جهات معينة، وستتم متابعة ومحاسبة أي مخالف لهذه التعليمات.
٥. على جميع الولاة وأمراء الجهات المعنية إيصال هذا التعميم لكافة الجنود التابعين لهم والله الموفق لكل خير. والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته

اللجنة العامة المشرفة

نسخة منه إلى
• اللجنة العامة المشرفة (الولايات الشرقية) لاتخاذ


اللجنة العامة المشرفة

Islamic State

General Supervisory Committee

No. 94

Date: 12 Dhu al-Hijja 1436 AH/26 September 2015 CE

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

To: all wilayas, diwans and committees

Subject: statement for distribution

Praise be to God alone and prayers and peace be upon the one after whom there is no Prophet. As for what follows:

As-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu:

Previously the Committee even published a statement for distribution about unauthorized efforts in dealing with the media, and we have seen some violations of this statement for distribution recently. Therefore the General Supervisory Committee has decided the following:

1. It is absolutely forbidden to undertake independent efforts in working on or publishing written, audio or visual releases in the name of the Islamic State on the Internet network.
2. It is forbidden to cooperate by any means with satellite channels and international or local media foundations that get in touch with members of the Dawla, whatever the form of cooperation or incentives these foundations offer. Dealing with them is confined to the central Media Diwan in the Islamic State.
3. It is forbidden to issue any statements or positions affiliated with any side known for their affiliation with the Islamic State, like military amirs, admin officials, media officials, Shari'i officials and others besides them.
4. Amirs, soldiers and all known for their affiliation with the Islamic State are warned against opening personal accounts in their names on social media sites, or taking positions vouching for sides or supporting specific sides, and any violator of these instructions will be tracked down and held to account.
5. All walis and amirs of the concerned sides must convey this statement for distribution to all soldiers affiliated with them.

And God is the guarantor of success for all good, wa as-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu

Islamic State

General Supervisory Committee

Copy to:

General Supervisory Committee (eastern provinces) for notice

Specimen 11R: Notice to those who own trucks and cars for goods, Deir az-Zor Province (2015)



In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Islamic State

Wilaya:

Diwan [al-Zakat]


Date

Statement for distribution

To the brothers who own trucks and cars for goods

It is forbidden for trucks and cars for goods to go outside the lands of the Islamic State except by an official document from the Diwan al-Zakat establishing that he has paid his Shari'i zakat (according to the nisab by silver standard). And whoever violates that will expose himself to Shari'i consequence. And may God reward you best.

Specimen 11S: Notice to doctors who leave Islamic State territory, Deir az-Zor Province (2015)



In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Islamic State

Diwan al-Siha

Wilayat al-Kheir
Medical administration

Praise be to God and prayers and peace be upon the one who was sent with the sword as a mercy to the worlds.

As-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu

God Almighty has said: "And We have not wronged them, but they wronged themselves."


To: the medical administration in Wilayat al-Kheir

To: all doctors and female doctors in Wilayat al-Kheir

Every doctor or female doctor who leaves the lands of the Islamic State for the land of disbelief without permission from the medical administration for more than 15 days will have his/her personal clinic confiscated.

And may God reward you best.

Specimen 11T: Notice to those who own combines, Deir az-Zor Province
(2015)



Islamic State


Wilayat al-Khair

Centre of the Diwan al-Zakat wa al-Sadaqat

Special instructions for owners of combines

1. Every owner of a combine must go to the zakat office, register in it and sign the attached pledge.
2. He must hand in his personal ID to the office for when the harvest ends.
3. He must receive the numbered document that shows he has gone and registered with the Diwan. And then he must bind it and hang it on the combine in a place where it can be seen with the eye.
4. He must receive the harvest timetable from the Zakat office.
5. The combine's owner and driver are responsible for the accuracy of the information, and in the event that the information is untrue, the matter will be referred to the judiciary.
6. Any violation of the aforementioned instructions will expose the one who commits them to Shari'i inquiry.

Specimen 11U: Notice to those who own combines (2)



In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Islamic State

Wilaya:

Diwan [al-Zakat]

Date

Statement for distribution

To the brothers who own combines

It is forbidden for any combine to operate within the lands of the Islamic State except after going and registering with the Zakat office within one's wilaya, and whoever violates that will expose himself to Shari'i consequence.

And may God reward you best.

Diwan al-Zakat wa al-Sadaqat

Specimen 11V: Notice to farmers and grain merchants, Deir az-Zor Province (2015)



In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Islamic State

Wilaya:

Diwan [al-Zakat]

Date**Statement for distribution**

To the brothers who are gain merchants and the brothers who are farmers:

Implementing the Almighty's words: "And give its due on the day of its harvest" [Qur'an 15:141]

It is absolutely forbidden to sell and buy grains and fruits that must be subject to zakat like wheat, barley, lentils, coriander, maize , pepper whether green or dried out, hummus, pistachio, olives, grapes and others besides them, except with a stamped document from the Zakat and Sadaqat office, so we ask you to be bound by and comply with the decision.

And that is in implementation of the words of God- Almighty and Exalted is He- "Oh you who believe, obey God and the Messenger and those in authority from you" [Qur'an 4:59].

And in implementation of the words of God- Almighty and Exalted is He: "And cooperate on the basis of piety and awareness of God, and not on the basis of sin and enmity" [Qur'an 5:2].

And whoever violates that will expose himself to Shari'i consequence.

Specimen 11W: Repentance call, Manbij area

Islamic State
Wilayat Halab

No. 1

Date: 10 Safr 1437 AH [22 November 2015]

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Announcement to the citizens of the amir al-mu'mineen (may God aid him):

Implementing the Almighty's words:

"Except those who repent, correct their actions and make evident, I will accept their repentance. And I am the Acceptor of Repentance, the Merciful" (al-Baqara 160) [Qur'an 2:160]

And continuing to implement the orders of the amir al-mu'mineen Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (may God protect him and cultivate him) in accepting the repentance of the apostates even if they killed thousands upon thousands of us when he said in a speech to the soldiers of the Islamic State: "Do not oppress or be treacherous, rather we advise you to refrain from the one whose hard cash is renounced and who throws away his arms from your face- the one of those who fought you from the battalions, whatever his crimes amounted to, however great his sin. And let forgiveness and pardon overcome, so that you may be free to take on an immoral enemy still lying in wait for the Ahl al-Sunna entirely." And implementing the recent speech by the mujahid brother Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani- may God protect and care for him- when he said in a speech to all the factions and battalions: "Whoever throws away his arms in repentance, he is safe, and whoever sits in the mosque in repentance, he is safe, and whoever enters his house and closes his door in repentance, he is safe, and whoever refrains from fighting us from the factions or battalions in repentance, he is safe: safe are they over themselves and their property whatever their enmity to the mujahideen previously and whatever their crimes amounted to..."

Therefore...

The public relations office in Wilayat Halab- Manbij area- announces the opening of the repentance office.

And accepting the repentance of members of the factions, battalions, brigades and all from these people who committed or touch upon one of the nullifiers of Islam like supporting, aiding and assisting America against the Muslims and fighting under its banner and orders, or fighting under the banner of the military council and national council that calls for democracy and secularism (meaning, the rule of the people for the people), and does not want the rule of God- even soldiers belonging to the Ahl al-Sunna who still fight with Bashar the Nusayri and members of the PKK.

And we warn all sheikhs of the tribes and seniors as well as those of the heard word and those who have pride in the religion of Islam and seek God's contentment that they must save the sons of their tribe and their brothers and their relatives from the apostasy that they have fallen upon as we have specified above, and they must connect with them until they come repenting towards God. Perhaps God will replace their evil deeds with good ones and they will live what remains of their age span as monotheists on the land of the Caliphate: for them is security and guarantee without exception.

To apply, connect and coordinate, go to the public relations and repentance office.

And God is the one behind the intention.

Islamic State

Wilayat Halab

Amir of Manbij

Specimen 11X: Da'wa meeting invitation, Sirte (Libya)

دعوة لحضور الملتقى الدعوي

طريق الدار

يدعوكم مركز الدعوة والمساجد لحضور الملتقى الدعوي

في ظلال الشريعة

الذي سيقام إن شاء الله تعالى
يوم الخميس الموافق 2015 / 11 / 19

المكان : منتزه سرت العائلي بجوار الملعب
التوقيت : بعد صلاة العصر مباشرة

جوانب الملتقى الدعوي

تلاوة عطرة - أناشيد - أسئلة وجوائز
موعظة - عرض مرئي - ألعاب - رسائل

حضوركم له أثر طيب في نفوسنا

**Invitation to attend the Da'wa meeting
Tarabulus**

The Da'wa and Masjid Centre invites you to attend the da'wa meeting:

Under the auspices of the Shari'a

Which will take place if God Almighty wills on Thursday corresponding to 19 November 2015

Place: Sirte family park in al-Mal'ab square

Time: directly after afternoon prayers

Aspects of the Da'wa meeting:

High-quality recitation, nasheeds, questions and answers, lecture, visual display, games, messages.

Your attendance leaves a good mark on our souls.

Specimen 11Y: Confiscation of a truck bearing medical goods, Sirte (Libya)

Document on matter of confiscation

It has been established among us that the cargo undertaken by the one called "Ramadan Attiyeh Masbah al-Usta" in transporting it from Tripoli to Benghazi and is a designation of "goods earmarked for dialysis " is the property of a tyrannical state and is to be placed in the "Benghazi Medical Centre."

Therefore we have ordered to confiscate the cargo and place it in the "Ibn Sina" hospital affiliated with the Islamic State so that the Muslims who live in the land of Islam in the shade of the Caliphate may benefit from it.

So the cargo will be confiscated and the one called "Ramadan Attiyeh Masbah al-Usta" will be released as he did not commit any crime. And his car will be released as it is property of a Muslim sinless as regards property.


Islamic State**Judge of the Injustices court****Wilayat Tarabulus: Sirte**

Edited and published on Wednesday

On 4 Rabi' al-Awal 1437 AH

Corresponding to 16 December 2015 CE

Specimen 11Z: Call for services employees to attend Shari'i session, Sirte (Libya)



Islamic State

Wilayat Tarabulus

Public Services Centre

Sirte city

Statement for distribution

To the brothers in the services centres in the town, we inform you that there will be a Shari'a session next Tuesday in the al-Waqaduqu halls complex at 5 p.m.

Thus all working employees are informed of the necessity of attending, and whoever refrains will be exposed to inquiry.

Islamic State

Public Services Centre

The Amir

Wilayat Tarabulus

Specimen 12A: Shari'i session with Hisba for violation



**Islamic State
Caliphate on the Prophetic Methodology
Diwan al-Hisba**

Shari'i session

Name:

Note:

Type of violation: forging travel [passes/passports]

No.:

The bearer of this card is subjected to a Shari'i session with the Hisba

From date: 9 Safr 1437 AH corresponding to / /201 CE

Until: 9 Rabi' al-Awal 1437 AH corresponding to / /201 CE

And after this date the card will be invalid

Signature

And may God reward you best

Specimen 12B: Travel permit for medical reasons



Sick person pass card

In cooperation with the Hisba

To the brothers in the Islamic State checkpoints..

After examining the condition of the sick person...

On milady date...

It was made clear that the sick person is suffering from

And that on examining the reports of the hospital

It is allowed for the sick person to travel for treatment to...

For the Hisba in particular

Person accompanying the sick person:


Date of issuance:

**Medical reports official
Abu Ahmad al-Samrawi
Pharmacist**

**Islamic State
Wilayat Raqqa: Health centre**

Note: In the event this cars is used by another person, his ID will be confiscated and the owner of the card will be exposed to inquiry and consequences.

Specimen 12C: Announcement for the colleges of Sirte University



Announcement

All students of the colleges in the university (males and females) must attend the lecture that the Diwan al-Da'wa wa al-Masajid will give on Tuesday corresponding to 8 December 2015 at 10:30 a.m. in the House of Wisdom theatre.

All students must comply with attendance in the specified place and time.

Specimen 12D: Prices for goods (incl. contraband) and exchange rates in Manbij (January 2016)

Exchange rates [from foreign currency to Syrian pounds]

Dollar: 396-397

Turkish lira: 133-135

Saudi riyal: 105

Jordanian dinar: 545

Gold: 11800 (21 carat)

Combustible fuels

Iraqi petrol: 200

Regime petrol [from Homs]: 425

Filtered oil: 150

[above per litre in Syrian pounds]

Gas: 225

Gas cylinder: 7500

Stoves/Heaters

Normal stove: 22000

Small Abdalia [local Aleppo brand] stove: 3500

Big Abdalia stove: 6500

Groceries [per kg in Syrian pounds unless otherwise stated]

Tomato: 350

Potato: 110

Cucumber: 400

Radish: 75

Cabbage: 200

Bunch of parsley: 75

Eggplant: 400

Thyme: 800

Basil: 85

Bucket of beef fat: 500

Kg of mutton fat: 500

Case of sugar: 11700

Kg of tea: 2100
 Kg of lentils: 400
 Split lentils: 250
 Kg of mutton meat: 2200
 Kg of beef: 1800
 Derbi potatoes for kids [[popular Syrian snack](#)]: 10 per small pack
 Seles natural juice [popular brand]: small (250), medium (350), large (450)
 Oranges: 100
 Apples: 225
 Bananas: 250
 Somali bananas: 350
 Animal butter: 6300
 Cooking oil: 6200 [presumably jerrycan]
 Jerrycan of olive oil: 11500
 Dates: 125
 Bread (12 rolls): 200
 Case of flour: 5000
 Chicken: 575
 Kg of wheat from 55 and barley from 80, also according to cleaning and every shop.
 Chaff: 35

Clothes [in Syrian pounds]

With regards to the winter weather, the most important thing is al-falat or the new blouse from 5000 to 8000 according to type.

The blouse on the bundle: from 1000 to 2500

And gloves for the one riding the motorcycle from 300 to 500

Stockings from 150 to 300

Building materials [Syrian pounds]

Bag of cement: 1600

10 blocks: 70

15 blocks: 77

20 blocks: 82

Motorcycles [Syrian pounds]

Observing their prices in approximation:

Magneto 125,000-150,000 used [?]

Magneto 150,000-200,000 new [?]

Birds [Syrian pounds]

Pair of pigeons from 100 to 75,000 and more depending on type of pigeon

Hen and rooster: 800-1000 approximately

Egg at 35 pounds and every 3 for 100

Cigarettes [Syrian pounds]

Box of Mu'asal al-Tuffahatain [e.g. [here](#)]: 6000

Box of Gitanes: 4500

Box of Gauloise: 4500

Box of Gitanes Light [?]: 2200

Box of Master: 2100

NB: Not an Islamic State document, but via a local news page for Manbij (Manbij Umm al-Dunya). Some of the references are a bit unclear and have been marked with [?]. In some cases the food prices are cheaper than rebel-held areas further west (e.g. Azaz), but the cigarettes, being forbidden contraband in IS-held Manbij, seem to be around double the price.

Specimen 12E: Zakat card from Ramadi belt area



Islamic Caliphate State

Wilayat Anbar

Ramadi Belt Area


Caliphate on the Prophetic Methodology

Diwan al-Zakat wa al-Sadaqat

a.

Name of the poor one:

Specimen 12F: General notification on satellite TV (November 2015)



**Islamic State
General Supervisory Committee**

No. 44

Date: 4 Safr 1437 AH/16 November 2015

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
To: All wilayas, diwans and committees
Subject: Banning the satellite [TV]

Praise be to God, and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God, his family...As for what follows:

As-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu

I ask God Almighty to protect you with His protection, and grant you success to His satisfaction: indeed, great He is as the Lord, and great He is as the supporter.

God Almighty has said: "And they will continue fighting you until they turn you away from your religion if they can..." (Surat al-Baqara Aya 217) [Qur'an 2:217].

And God Almighty has said: "Oh you who believe, protect yourselves and your families from the fire" (Surat al-Tahrim Aya 6) [Qur'an 66:6].

And it is not concealed from you that our enemies are exerting much effort in the path of devaluing this Ummah, especially in its manners and creeds. And that is being done by a number of means and among the most important and rapid of them is the media represented in the satellite [i.e. satellite TV], or, if you like, it is among the strongest weapons in this time as it is used to terrify the sons of this Ummah, instill education for decadent programs, creeds and manners, and strive to strip this Ummah of the pure creed and true direction. Therefore the following is decided:

1. Warning against the satellite and its danger in Friday sermons and da'wa lectures.
2. Urging the Muslims to get rid of this apparatus and renounce it, and to return to the Noble Qur'an.
3. Urging the Muslims that family sessions should return, sessions of 'ilm [Islamic knowledge] and remembrance [see [here](#)]
4. Urging the Muslims in the bases and reception rooms to abandon screens and nasheeds, and to embrace remembrance of God, Almighty and Exalted is He.
5. Affirming the lying nature of the apostate and collaborationist news channels, and the honesty of the Muslims' media news.

6. Spreading news of the likelihood of banning this apparatus within 6 months under the authority of the Caliphate, especially among dealers in this apparatus and shop owners.

May God reward you best.

Islamic State

General Supervisory Committee

Specimen 12G: Ban on satellite reception apparatuses [i.e. satellite TV]



In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
Islamic State
Diwan al-Hisba

No. 14

Date: 20 Safr 1437 AH/2 December 2015

Ban on satellite reception apparatuses

Praise be to God and prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of God...as for what follows:

God Almighty has said: "Indeed those who would like for immorality to spread among those who believe, for them is a painful torment in this world and the Hereafter, and God knows but you do not know" (al-Nur 19) [Qur'an 24:19]. Ibn Attiyeh said in al-Muharrar: "So their love for spreading immorality among the believers is firmly rooted in its own way in their hostility to the people of faith, and a 'painful torment' in this world is the hudud punishments, and the Hellfire in the Hereafter." And among the clearest reasons for the spreading of immorality in our times is the satellite reception apparatuses known as the "dish" or the "receiver", as they transmit day and night including war on God (Almighty and Exalted is He) and His Messenger (SAWS), as well as spreading doubts and inciting sinful desires and vices.

God Almighty has ordered to cut off the causes of corruption and not to follow Satan's footsteps, for the Almighty and Exalted has said: "Oh you who believe, do not follow Satan's footsteps, and whoever follows Satan's footsteps is ordering for immorality and vice" (al-Nur 21) [Qur'an 24:21]. Al-Alusi said: "Don't follow Satan in any of the deeds that include spreading immorality and liking it." And someone may assert that in these channels is something of use or benefit like the channels that falsely call themselves 'Islamic' or the news channels: but God- Almighty and Exalted is He- has said: "They ask you about wine and gambling. Say: 'In them are great sin and benefits for the people, but their sin is greater than their benefit'" (al-Baqara 219) [Qur'an 2:219]. Ibn Taymiyya said: "Indeed the Shari'a has brought realization and fulfillment of the interests, as well as obstruction and diminishment of corruptions according to capability, and its aim is to give preference to the better of two goods if they both cannot be together, and to repel the worse of two evils if they both cannot be repelled."

In the so-called "Islamic channels" is content including corruption of doctrines and waging war on the mujahideen- something not concealed from the one who has insight. And the news channels contain disbelief, false rumours, lies and calumnies that only God can count.

According to the preceding: it is decided to prohibit the selling, circulation, marketing, use or repair of satellite reception apparatuses (dish) in all the lands of the Islamic State.


This is to preserve our sons and daughters and protect the religion of the people from corruption. And all who violate this are rebelling against God (Almighty and Exalted is He) and His Messenger (SAWS) and the guarantor of the matter of the Muslims. They will be exposed to consequence and reprimand.

And God is the guarantor of success and the One who guides to the straight path.

Islamic State

Diwan al-Hisba

Specimen 12H: Leave permit, Ramadi area



**Islamic State
Wilayat al-Anbar**

Leave permit

It is allowed for the brother Abu Faruq who works in the 7 kilo sector to take leave on Wednesday corresponding to 9 Dhu al-Hijja 1436 AH [23 September 2015] at 12 p.m. The period of his leave will be three days on condition that he return to his work on Sunday corresponding to 13 Dhu al-Hijja 1436 AH [27 September 2015] at 9 a.m. The weapons the brother bears are of Kalashnikov type. Its number:

Note: this form can only be used inside Wilayat al-Anbar.


Islamic State

Wilayat al-Anbar

Ramadi sector: Amir

Stamp of the amir

Specimen 12I: Special instructions, Ramadi area (wider Anbar province?)



In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Instructions

1. Going to Abu Qasura's reception room is absolutely forbidden.
2. Going to al-Hajj Saleh's reception room is absolutely forbidden.

3. Going to the media guys' reception room is absolutely forbidden.
4. No going to the new admin centre except after obtaining an order from the amir of the sector who will send the brother after obtaining an order of agreement from the admin centre.
5. No going out to any place for any brother unless he is carrying weapons and is wearing an ammo pouch.
6. No using of anything except after obtaining agreement from the owner of that thing.
7. No leaving the reception rooms on approach of aircraft.
8. Phone connections from within the reception rooms are absolutely forbidden and the phone will be taken off the brother who violates this.
9. A special box for the media guys will be set up and placed in the new admin centre. And the requests of every sector will be placed in the box, and these requests will be placed on a form on which will be written the request, and the name of the reception room and sector. The brother coordinating this matter is Abu Hamza al-Jazrawi.
10. One must comply with the regulation on not going and registering with the hospital after 9 a.m. whether for treatment or visit, except in cases of emergencies.
11. All photos of brothers, killed or not, must be deleted, as well as videos from mobiles. If this contravened, the mobile will be confiscated and the brother will be held to account on the basis of his rebellion.

NB: Dating uncertain. Note that points 1-4 and 9-10 have been crossed out in pen, perhaps indicating that they were annulled.

Specimen 12J: Prohibition on using mobile phones



Islamic State

Caliphate on the Prophetic Methodology

General Supervisory Committee

No. 482

Date: 29 Rabi' al-Awal 1436 AH/ 20 January 2015 CE

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

To: all the wilayas

Subject: Prohibition on using the mobile

Praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds, and prayers, peace and deliverance be upon the Messenger of God, as well as his family. As for what follows:

As-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu...

The Truth (Almighty and Exalted is He) says: "Take your heed..." [Qur'an 4:71]. And for reason of taking up the causes and affirming our prior orders, it is decided to prohibit the bearing of the portable phone device (mobile) or use it in general or personal connections or any family/domestic connection. That is to protect the religion and souls.

Likewise it is forbidden to use mobile devices in Internet connections or any type of connections. Any brother seen with an open mobile device in his possession in the base or in the car will be held to account with 20 lashes, and it is not to be tolerated. May God reward you best.

Islamic State

General Supervisory Committee

"Clashing of the Swords"- New ISIS nasheed from Ajnad Media

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi • Jun 18, 2014 at 7:58 pm



As ever, my translation below. This [nasheed](#) was featured in ISIS' recent "Salil al-Sawarim 4" video featuring operations and outreach in various parts of Iraq.

"Clashing of the swords: a nasheed of the defiant.
The path of fighting is the path of life.
So amidst an assault, tyranny is destroyed.
And concealment of the voice results in the beauty of the echo.

Clashing of the swords: a nasheed of the defiant.
The path of fighting is the path of life.
So amidst an assault, tyranny is destroyed.
And concealment of the voice results in the beauty of the echo.

By it my religion is glorified, and tyranny is laid low.
 So, oh my people, awake on the path of the brave.
 For either being alive delights leaders, or being dead vexes the enemy.

Clashing of the swords: a nasheed of the defiant.
 The path of fighting is the path of life.
 So amidst an assault, tyranny is destroyed.
 And concealment of the voice results in the beauty of the echo.

Clashing of the swords: a nasheed of the defiant.
 The path of fighting is the path of life.
 So amidst an assault, tyranny is destroyed.
 And concealment of the voice results in the beauty of the echo.

So arise, brother, get up on the path of salvation,
 So we may march together, resist the aggressors,
 Raise our glory, and raise the foreheads
 That have refused to bow before any besides God.

Clashing of the swords: a nasheed of the defiant.
 The path of fighting is the path of life.
 So amidst an assault, tyranny is destroyed.
 And concealment of the voice results in the beauty of the echo.

Clashing of the swords: a nasheed of the defiant.
 The path of fighting is the path of life.
 So amidst an assault, tyranny is destroyed.
 And concealment of the voice results in the beauty of the echo.

With righteousness arise,
 The banner has called us,
 To brighten the path of destiny,
 To wage war on the enemy.
 Whosoever among us dies, in sacrifice for defence,
 Will enjoy eternity in Paradise. Mourning will depart.

Clashing of the swords: a nasheed of the defiant.
 The path of fighting is the path of life.
 So amidst an assault, tyranny is destroyed.
 And concealment of the voice results in the beauty of the echo.

Clashing of the swords: a nasheed of the defiant.
 The path of fighting is the path of life.
 So amidst an assault, tyranny is destroyed.
 And concealment of the voice results in the beauty of the echo."

"My Ummah, Dawn Has Appeared": Nasheed for the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi • Jan 28, 2014 at 12:19 pm



The following is a translation by me of the nasheed "Ummati, Qad Lāḥa Fajarun," which is dedicated to the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham [ISIS] and was released by Ajnad Media at the end of last year. Listen to it [here](#). It has become a quasi-official anthem for ISIS, as it can be heard in the background of this "[media patrol](#)" in the city of Raqqa and its vicinity ("The Islamic Province of Raqqa"), which ISIS recently conquered in its entirety (Update 31 October: suggested revisions in brackets below):

"My Ummah, Dawn has appeared (loomed/begun to appear), so await the expected (manifest) victory,
The Islamic State has arisen by the blood of the righteous,
The Islamic State has arisen by the jihad of the pious,
They have offered their souls in righteousness with constancy and conviction,
So that the religion may be established, in which there is the law of the Lord of the Worlds.*

My Ummah, accept the good news, and don't despair: victory is near.
The Islamic State has arisen and the dreaded might has begun.
It has arisen tracing out glory, and the period of setting** has ended,
By faithful men who do not fear warfare.
They have created eternal glory that will not perish or disappear.

My Ummah, God is our Lord, so grant your blood,
For victory will not return except by the blood of the martyrs,
Who have spent their time hoping for their Lord in the Abode of the Prophets.
They have offered their souls to God, and for the religion there is self-sacrifice.
The people of giving and granting are the people of excellence and pride.

My Ummah, accept the good news: the Sun of Steadfastness has risen.
Verily we have marched in masses for the hills: the time-honoured glory,
That we may return the light, faith and glorious might,
By men who have forsaken the *dunya**** and attained immortality.
And have revived the Ummah of glory and the assured victory."

*- The Shari'a

**- Metaphorically, the language of sunrise and sunset.

***- The material world.

Update (10 October 2014)

"in which there is the law of the Lord of the Worlds"- I ought to have made clearer that the 'which' (hā in fihā) refers back to ad-dawla al-islamiya (the

Islamic State), thus perhaps better to render the line: "So that the religion may be established in it: the law of the Lord of the Worlds."

The Local Defence Forces: Regime Auxiliary Forces in Aleppo

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

[Syria Comment](#)

May 23, 2016



Emblem of the Local Defence Forces. On top: "Homeland, Honour, Sincerity." Below: "Syrian Arab Republic. The army and armed forces- Local Defence Forces."

Besides the well-known National Defence Forces (NDF) that were set up in 2012 with oversight from Iran to act as a counter-insurgency force and auxiliary militia network for the Syrian army, there exists a similarly named but distinct set of militias specific to the Aleppo area known as the Local Defence Forces (Quwat al-Difa' al-Mahalli- LDF). In brief, the LDF consists of a variety of local militias such as Katibat al-Nayrab al-Maham al-Khasa (The Nayrab Battalion- Special Operations), Liwa al-Baqir (The Baqir Brigade), Fawj al-Safira (The Safira Regiment) and Fawj Nubl wa al-Zahara' (The Nubl and Zahara' Regiment). These names mostly refer to areas and towns in the vicinity of Aleppo city, but Liwa al-Baqir is named after the fifth Shi'i imam Muhammad al-Baqir.

A representative for Katibat al-Nayrab affirmed to me that the LDF totals 50,000 fighters (an obvious exaggeration), set up in 2012 by Iran as an auxiliary force for the Syrian army in the Aleppo area. Unsurprisingly, the LDF is linked with Hezbollah as well, though it is Liwa al-Baqir that advertises this connection more than the other LDF formations: something reinforced by the fact that the Lebanese singer Ali Barakat, most well known for his songs for Hezbollah, [put out a song dedicated to Liwa al-Baqir](#). Liwa al-Baqir also appears to be tied in particular to the al-Bekara clan in Aleppo that has [gained notoriety for its support for the regime](#), especially as it is predominantly Sunni (the evidence may suggest a degree of Shi'ification as well in relation to Liwa al-Baqir).



"Liwa al-Imam al-Baqir: al-Bekara clan." Note the portrait of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah on the left and Bashar al-Assad on the right. Also note one of the portraits featuring the Hezbollah and Syrian flags.



"The mujahideen of Liwa al-Baqir from the base of operations: God protect you, our mujahideen"- note the Hezbollah armpatch.



Social media graphic for Liwa al-Baqir, featuring the familiar moniker of "The Islamic Resistance" (*al-muqawama al-islamiya*).



Liwa al-Baqir posters. Note the central one: "Men of the Resistance." Includes Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamene'i, Assad and Nasrallah.

Describing itself as "the first auxiliary [/reserve]" for the Syrian army, Liwa al-Baqir seems to be the most prominent LDF formation. For example, most recently the militia's social media have advertised heavy involvement in fighting against the Islamic State (IS) focused around the village of Kafr Saghir and fighting against Jabhat al-Nusra and other rebel forces in south Aleppo countryside. Thus, on 20 March 2016, Liwa al-Baqir claimed at least 15 'martyrs' (fallen fighters) in [fighting on the Kafr Saghir front](#) to the [north-east of Aleppo city](#), followed by a claim of 5 more 'martyrs' two days later. In April, Liwa al-Baqir media mention coordination with Hezbollah in fighting in the south Aleppo countryside, focusing initially on the village of al-Eis. These south Aleppo operations have been advertised as being in coordination not only with Hezbollah (e.g. see [here](#)) but also the Iraqi Shi'i militia [Harakat al-Nujaba'](#). The accounts of these operations [include this short story](#):

"We, the men of Liwa al-Baqir, were in the company of the men of Hezbollah when they arrested dozens of the pigs of Nusra whom we wanted to kill but then one of the mujahideen reminded us saying: 'Oh youth, remember the words of Imam Ali- peace be upon him- who says: 'And don't kill those who surrender but rather grant them food and grant them protection.'"

[Prior to these engagements](#), Liwa al-Baqir claimed participation in the operations leading to the breaking of the rebel sieges of the Shi'i villages of Nubl and Zahara' to the north of Aleppo city, as well as operations in south Aleppo countryside as part of the series of Russia-Iran backed offensives that began in October of last year to allow the regime to regain the initiative against the rebels.

Unlike a number of pro-Assad militias whose total numbers of 'martyrs' since inception normally do not amount to more than a few or several dozen, Liwa al-Baqir claimed [246 'martyrs' as of 21 March 2016](#). This claim to a large number of 'martyrs' is corroborated to a certain extent by the displays of posters of these 'martyrs', samples of which appear below.



Dedicated to 'martyr' Muhammad Hussein Raslan, Top-right inscription: "Liwa al-Imam al-Baqir: Local Defence Forces." Note the faint Hezbollah imagery in the background.



Some more 'martyrs' of Liwa al-Baqir, though here the term used is 'Fawj al-Imam Baqir' (no real difference in meaning).



Large Liwa al-Baqir mural, likely dedicated to 'martyrs' in the militia or linked to it.

Just as the Syrian Social Nationalist Party has used its militia presence in Syria to push for political influence in the form of [candidates for the recent Syrian parliamentary elections](#), so too did Liwa al-Baqir throw its weight behind an ostensibly independent candidate called Omar Hussein al-Hassan.



"Vote for the independent candidate for membership of the People's Council. Aleppo countryside (group A). Omar Hussein al-Hassan. Offering from: al-Bekara clan, Liwa al-Baqir. The homeland will remain on high by our steadfastness."

The candidate in question is notable for having the same surname as the leader of Liwa al-Baqir: Khalid al-Hassan, who also goes by the name of Baqir. Khalid is linked to the Syrian state apparatus through the State Ministry for the Affairs of National Reconciliation, as per a post below from [January 2016](#):

"Syrian Arab Republic
State Ministry for the Affairs of National Reconciliation
Document no. 845

The leader of Liwa al-Baqir Khalid al-Hassan (Baqir)...and the distinguished members-members of the Committee of Reconciliation, National Accord and Social Coordination-are operating in the framework of the project of national reconciliation in Aleppo province. We request aid within the systems and laws and in cooperation with Mr. Governor of Aleppo in making their mission succeed. To connect with us in the Liwa al-Baqir centre in Tarkan [[a village in the Safira district](#)]."

In this context, it should be noted that Liwa al-Baqir was also involved in a [prominent conciliation event](#) at the end of 2015 involving two major families- Abu Ra's and Berri

(the latter also notorious for its support for the regime)- including an event involving military and security officials as well as 'ulama' in Aleppo.



Khalid al-Hassan

Interestingly, in March 2016 Liwa al-Baqir [claimed the 'martyrdom' of Khalid's brother](#). No specific details were offered as to the circumstances surrounding his death, though one page for Liwa al-Baqir seemed to [present it as a 'martyrdom' jointly claimed with Hezbollah](#). According to the Katibat al-Nayrab representative, he was actually assassinated in Lebanon.

The other LDF formations are less remarkable. For example, Fawj al-Safira, as its name suggests, operates in the Safira area of Aleppo, also renowned as a bastion of regime support. Fawj al-Safira, in repelling IS attacks in the Safira area, has notably coordinated not only with the Syrian army but also the **Erreur ! Référence de lien hypertexte non valide.**, [amilitia primarily based in Latakia](#) whose founder Ali Kayali has been declared by the Muqawama Suriya to have been 'disappeared' ([mughayyab](#)) in a possible cover-up of his death since his suspected killing in late March 2016.



LDF forces have had a role in fighting to the south of Aleppo city as IS has repeatedly harassed regime control of the supply line to Aleppo city via Khanaser. Among items captured by IS in an [assault in mid-April](#) were LDF ID cards as shown in this photo.

Instead of giving a chronological list of engagements by the LDF, it remains to note that on a wider level the LDF has a 'political direction' division that puts out newsletters, featuring political and military developments as well as excerpts from media outlets and political analysis. For example, [issue no. 81](#) that was recently put out opens with commemorations for the deceased Hezbollah commander Mustafa Badreddine (aka Dhu al-Fiqar), who was central to organizing Hezbollah's efforts in Syria. The political analysis section also gives a summary of Badreddine's life and accomplishments.

In comparison with many other pro-Assad militias, the LDF clearly amounts to much more than a seemingly 'exotic' name and brand. On the contrary, the LDF has been

important for organizing local pro-Assad support networks in Aleppo that transcend the sectarian divide to a degree. In part these networks explain the regime's staying power in Aleppo, rather than just foreign manpower influx in the form of Iranian personnel and Shi'i militias. At the same time, one should not forget the importance of Iran and Hezbollah in the organization and advising of local militia support networks- an analysis that clearly applies to the LDF.

Appendix update (24 May 2016): An account of the origins of Liwa al-Baqir is offered by the pro-opposition site alSouria.net in an [article from January 2016](#). According to this account, Liwa al-Baqir was set up as a distinct brand and formation by the LDF in 2015, initially working under Harakat al-Nujaba', which was responsible for the Shi'ification and arming of its fighters. This same report affirms that Liwa al-Baqir now operates separately from Harakat al-Nujaba'.

The LDF more generally, though having roots in and ties to predominantly Sunni 'shabiha' clan networks, is portrayed in this article as having come under the increasing influence of the foreign Shi'i militias that have come to the Aleppo area. There is likely something to this, for as I noted in the main article, the evidence from Liwa al-Baqir seems to suggest at least some Shi'ification among al-Bekara clan members. In any case the LDF was set up in the first place by Iran, so it is hardly surprising if Shi'i militias tied to Iran (which have made a prominent mark in Aleppo since 2013) have sought to influence the LDF even further in orientation.

The bulk of the article from alSouria.net is translated by me below:

"Aleppo has seen since the beginning of the protests in its formations affiliated with the LDF formation led by the Berri family a great part of which is known for its support for the regime and its participation in repressing demonstrations, but the feared status and importance of this formation has retreated with the beginning of the arrival of foreign militias to the regime's areas in Aleppo, and the Shi'a militias have managed to include the LDF through Shi'ification of its fighters.

The alSourianet correspondent in Aleppo, Muhammad al-Shafi'i, points out that the LDF formed Liwa al-Baqir last year, with its base in the village of Tarkan in south Aleppo countryside, clarifying that the brigade worked within the militia formation of the Iraqi Harakat al-Nujaba', which uses the al-Assad academy as a base for its military operations.

And special sources mention to alSouria.net that Liwa al-Baqir currently works separately and independently from Harakat al-Nujaba' to regain authority over Aleppo, and has portrayed itself as an auxiliary for the forces of Bashar al-Assad's regime. According to the same sources the brigade's numbers are around 2000 fighters, who have obtained their weapons previously from Harakat al-Nujaba', in addition to their receiving salaries of 25,000 Syrian pounds [per month].

The Iraqi militia supervised the formation of this brigade after the Shi'ification of its members and the establishment of special camps for them. They were trained in assault methods and were deployed in the recent south Aleppo battles, and Liwa al-Baqir is led by

"Khalid al-Hassan al-Aloush al-Baqir" and with protection from people in the Berri family. And the sources mention to alSouria.net that the number of those from the brigade killed in the recent battles of south Aleppo countryside reached 50 members, all of whom are from the 'Shabiha,' while the number of those killed from the brigade since its formation until the beginning of this year reaches up to 300 killed.

The brigade participates in frontline duty operations in the villages of south Aleppo countryside controlled by the regime and its militias since two months ago, in addition to the presence of military checkpoints of the brigade inside Aleppo. In addition Liwa al-Baqir has special training camps in the villages of Tel Shaghib, Issan, Ain Issan and Tarkan in south Aleppo countryside."

Update (24 September 2016): A slightly different account of Liwa al-Baqir and the Local Defence Forces is offered by a media account for Liwa al-Baqir on Facebook under the name of [Mohamad Hendawi](#), also using the moniker of the "Iranian Revolutionary Guard." This account from April 2016 portrays Liwa al-Baqir as an affiliate of Hezbollah and traces its formation back to the beginning of the 'crisis' in Aleppo (i.e. 2012):



"Liwa al-Baqir affiliated with Hezbollah: the announcement of the formation of Liwa al-Baqir was done from the beginning of the crisis in Aleppo and its siege at the hands of the terrorists. Liwa al-Baqir is among the strongest of the military formations in Syria and it is the strongest military formation in Aleppo, as they have participated in the battle to break the siege of Aleppo central prison, the battles of Aleppo city, the battles of Jama'ia

al-Zahara', the breaking of the siege of Nubl and Zahara', as well as their advancing in the south Aleppo countryside from al-Wadihi to Tel al-Eis and finally to Khan Touman. The first foot that was placed in Khan Touman was the feet of the mujahideen of Liwa al-Baqir who are spread on all the fronts of Aleppo from the Ramousa front to Salah al-Din, Ashrafiya, Jama'ia al-Zahara', the north, west and south Aleppo countryside, Aleppo's only supply route [artery] Khanaser and [the path] towards Raqqa. They have recorded deeds of heroism and have brought forth blood and martyrs: more than 251 martyrs. In every attack the terrorists undertake, they [Liwa al-Baqir] send reinforcements for the Syrian Arab Army."

Mohamad Hendawi elaborates in a [post from June 2016](#) on the leader and deputy leader of Liwa al-Baqir, attributing to them a role in setting up the Local Defence Forces, whose foundation the account dates to two years ago:

"Story of the two mujahideen: al-Hajj Hamza and al-Hajj Baqir:

The names: Hamza Baqir and Khalid Baqir.

The nickname of al-Hajj Hamza is al-Hajj Abu al-Abbas, as for al-Hajj Khalid (al-Hajj Baqir).

Biography:

Al-Hajj Hamza Baqir is the younger brother of the leader of Liwa al-Baqir al-Hajj Khalid Baqir. al-Hajj Hamza established a brigade from its beginnings with his elder brother al-Hajj Khalid as the brigade began from 13 fighters before becoming today 3000 mujahid fighters and endured what a brigade endured in its beginnings until it was able to attract hundreds of the strong teenage youth.

Al-Hajj Hamza worked as a fine gifts sculptor before the war in Syria but after the force of treachery assassinated his father and elder brother Ali, he and his brother al-Hajj Khalid decided to form Liwa al-Imam al-Baqir. And the training of many members on the path of jihad and defending the homeland began. al-Hajj Hamza and al-Hajj Khalid had the honour of participating in the July 2006 war that the heroes of Hezbollah waged against the occupying Zionist enemy as they undertook operations with Hezbollah in the midst of the gatherings of the Israel enemy and inflicted what they inflicted on it from losses.

The most important thing that distinguishes al-Hajj Hamza is strong silence and calm, together with the fact that he limits a response to any question with a word, and he is the leader of the special snipers division and he established the rapid reaction division, while al-Hajj Khalid Baqir participated greatly in the formation of the Local Defence Forces, which were formed in Aleppo two years ago. al-Hajj had the great role in many of the battles defending Aleppo, including the al-Ramousa battle, the battle to liberate Abu Jarin and Safira, and in the south, north and west Aleppo countrysides as well as inside the city.

Al-Hajj Hamza enjoys high quality leadership skills that allow him to draw up strategic plans for the brigade and its divisions around the city of Aleppo. As for al-Hajj Khalid his elder brother nicknamed Baqir, inside the brigade he is called protector of Aleppo, because he is always the person who knows how to close the entrances to Aleppo in the

face of the armed men, and on every occasion he has caused them great losses on all the fronts of Aleppo, the most important being: the south and west Aleppo countryside, and before them the north and east countryside. In short, the lions of Aleppo in the meaning of the word."

Can this account be reconciled with the ones presented in the main article and the initial appendix update? Did Liwa al-Baqir come first, or the Local Defence Forces? To begin with, it should be noted that the claim to have operated since the beginning of events in Aleppo (or more generally, from the beginning of the 'crisis' and 'revolution') can function as a rhetorical flourish to overstate one's role in the fighting: or one might exaggerate the length of existence of the more formal structure under which one operates to present a more cohesive fighting force from the outset.

References to both Liwa al-Baqir and the Local Defence Forces can be traced [at least as far back as 2014](#), with Liwa al-Baqir portrayed in one of the posts as being part of the Local Defence Forces. In a [post from July 2014](#), the Palestinian Aleppo-based militia Liwa al-Quds defined itself as fighting within the framework of "the Local Defence Forces affiliated with the Syrian Arab Army. More generally, a reference to the Local Defence Forces implying the structure is a new entity can be found in [late February 2014](#). The Local Defence Forces back then were described as "the sons of the south and east countryside of Aleppo city: large forces, equipped and trained, prepared to undertake new military operations in east Aleppo countryside."

What may well be the case is that the militias that are now formally part of the Local Defence Forces framework- including Liwa al-Baqir- can trace origins all the way back to 2012 but were more formally organized into that structure in 2014 under Iranian and Hezbollah direction, similar to the National Defence Forces' organization of many militias in 2012-2013. Liwa al-Baqir simply trumpets connections to Iran and Hezbollah more and perhaps has stronger ties, principally on account of ideological/religious affinity. In any case, the Local Defence Forces affiliation remains clear. Indeed, on 18 September, a Liwa al-Baqir account- calling itself 'Jum'a al-Baqir Baqir'- put up a post entitled 'Liwa al-Baqir' featuring a certificate of thanks offered by the Local Defence Forces leadership to one [Jum'a al-Ahmad](#) (who appears to run the Jum'a al-Baqir Baqir account) for his efforts. Jum'a al-Ahmad is identified as a Liwa al-Baqir fighter in a post by Mohamad Hendawi regarding the death of Jum'a al-Ahmad's daughter, killed by rebel mortar fire in Aleppo.

Update (29 April 2017): Just for clarity, as should become apparent in the posts above, Khalid Baqir has multiple siblings. Thus, the March 2016 'martyrdom' is presented as the death of a brother (Muhammad Hussein al-Hassan al-Aloush) of Khalid Baqir, not al-Hajj Hamza.

Saraya al-Muqawama: Latakia Local Defence Forces Affiliate

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi • Apr 5, 2018 at 6:25 pm



Previously I have examined Local Defence Forces (LDF) affiliates from the [Aleppo](#), [Damascus](#), [Idlib](#) and Hama sectors. This post examines Saraya al-Muqawama ("The Resistance Brigades"), an LDF affiliate of the Latakia sector.



In its *present form* (i.e. as an [LDF affiliate](#)), Saraya al-Muqawama was constituted in early 2017, though the group had existed as fighting contingents before 2017. The leader of the group is one [Asif Makhoulouf](#), who is originally from Jableh in Latakia province. Another leader of note is Kamal Fayadh, who is of Lebanese origin and describes himself as a "[researcher on security and political matters](#)." Indeed, Kamal has granted multiple interviews over the years, such as [this one with Dam Press](#) in March 2015 giving his assessment of the situation in Syria. In that interview, Kamal rejected the idea of the need for a new Yalta conference to resolve the present problems, arguing instead that "we need a great victory...through Syrian steadfastness and the steadfastness of the resistance line from Tehran to Beirut, we have created a new map in which we have altered Sykes-Picot and there has arisen a new map, with the borders from Tehran to Beirut open."

In official terms, the LDF sector affiliation of Saraya al-Muqawama is the "coastal region." The leader of this LDF sector is one al-Hajj Ayoub, whose name I remember hearing when I wrote about Saraya al-Ra'ad. It should be noted that al-Hajj Ayoub, like al-Hajj Asghar (his Idlib counterpart of similar name form), is an Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander. Below is a letter of commendation from al-Hajj Ayoub to Asif Makhoulouf, which I have translated in full.



"In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

The homeland is precious, the homeland is great, the homeland is lofty, and the homeland is steadfast because the homeland is our very essence.

The founding leader: President Hafez al-Assad.

Certificate of assessment

The mujahid hero: Abu Deya', Asif Hassan Makhlouf.

We, the family of the LDF command in the coastal region, congratulate and bless you for the great victory and divine victory over the enemy of God and enemy of the Messenger (SAWS) and collaborator of the Zionist entity and America- the Wahhabi Da'esh terrorist organization- at the hand of God and the hands of the believers, and we bless the resisting Syrian people, at the head of them his excellency the President Dr. Bashar Hafez al-Assad, on this blessed Eid.

Were it not for the sacrifices and shedding of the blood of the hero martyrs and efforts of our great youth, the resisting mujahideen and their patience for God's judgement and will, this victory would not have happened and this depraved enemy would not have been defeated. So may our martyrs enjoy Paradise with the Supreme Companion [i.e. the prophets and other outstanding persons] and we ask God the Exalted to grant urgent recovery for the wounded mujahideen and we ask for success for all resisters in all parts of the world and to liberate all the Islamic lands from the hands of the tawagheet [idolatrous tyrants] and at the head of that the liberation of Palestine, the blessed al-Aqsa mosque and noble al-Quds [Jerusalem] from the hands of the wretched Zionist enemy.

Wa as-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu

Leader of the LDF in the Sahel [coastal region].

al-Hajj Ayoub."

Like other auxiliary formations, Saraya al-Muqawama offers recruitment opportunities with the [opportunity to connect via phone numbers](#). The particular focus is on those wanted for military service, whether they have evaded conscription/call for reserve service or have deserted the armed forces. The LDF affiliation of Saraya al-Muqawama is advantageous in this case because, thanks to [administrative measures passed last year](#), the LDF can offer taswiyat al-wad' for such people and their service in the LDF will be considered as their military/reserve service. As [Kamal Fayadh wrote](#) in a warning against those who falsely claim they can undertake taswiyat al-wad' and other promises in exchange for money:

"This situation concerns in particular the military personnel who fled from service or reserve service and all who have been defrauded in the case of a kidnapped or missing person. It is my duty to write about it and the duty of all who read this to inform others to prevent the continuation of this disgusting phenomenon.

When one of them demands money from you and says about himself that he is 'supported' and 'a mediator'- that is, that he knows officials and knows the keys to resolve your problem, look into the case of a detained person, recover a kidnapped or missing person, do taswiya for you if you are in a state of fleeing from service or reserve service: you must know that this person is nothing more than a swindler and deceiver whose aim is to defraud the simple sons of his people in order to steal their wealth. All you must do is head straight to one of the security apparatuses and inform about him because it is a national duty, and destroying the internal Da'esh is among the most noble of national duties.

We in the leadership of the Saraya al-Muqawama forces, with all pride and in cooperation with one of the security apparatuses in Latakia, informed about the leader of a swindling gang and with him the members of his gang, and they were all detained. Even though they were one of the heavyweight gangs, we did not fear anything or anyone, and we participated in the operation to arrest these scum.

We met his excellency the brigadier general in the security branch in Latakia and informed him about members of the gang and the leader of the gang nicknamed the doctor and falsely bears the name of a noble family of the families of al-Qardaha and claims that he is the deputy minister of reconciliation for the affairs of kidnapped and missing persons.

This leader of the gang was able to swindle a number of those who fled from military service and reserve service by his claim that he could sort out their affairs [taswiyat al-wad'] and he took from them around 2,000,000 Syrian pounds.

We would like to notify all those who fled from military service and reserve service that there was a decision issued this year for sorting out the affairs of military personnel who join the ranks of the LDF and their service in the Local Defence is reckoned for them as though they are serving in their original units and sectors in which they were serving. They will also obtain a monthly salary and this means that we are the ones who will pay you in exchange for your service and you will obtain a card with which you can travel in the regions of Syria without fear of your being arrested, and we will sort out your affairs and there is no reason for you to pay money to others unless you are stupid to the point of being an utter imbecile.

We met with his excellency the brigadier general, we informed him about the situation, he was extremely responsive and we thank him for the speed of implementation. He sent his patrols immediately and this impostor doctor was arrested and with him the members of his gang. One of them was a musician previously, claiming that he was a colonel in the 4th Division. Another was working as an intermediary between the gang and the vulnerable. And regrettably there is a personality I don't want to reveal for public reasons but along with the others he became like terrified dogs during detention and verification in the security branch in Latakia.

If you were exposed to a fraud operation by this so-called doctor get in touch with me and I will tell you how to go to the security branch and recover your wealth from this so-called doctor who claims that he is the deputy minister of reconciliation for the affairs of missing

persons. I ask you to end this foolishness, there are national Syrian security apparatuses that will help you, so there is no reason to pay money for some to live off your back and wealth. Enough with this foolishness: I hope you will participate in informing and publishing this post for friends and acquaintances so all people will understand the truth of these folks."



Saraya al-Muqawama flag.

In addition to Iranian support that would be given as part of an LDF affiliation, Saraya al-Muqawama has received assistance from a number of people, [including the Syrian MP Abu Ali Naser](#) (Naser Suleiman) of Tartous and some unspecified "patriotic noble expatriates."

Saraya al-Muqawama has fought in a variety of locations in Syria (like other LDF formations, therefore, not necessarily confined to its place of origin). These locations include the [Latakia countryside](#), Hama and [more recently the Albukamal area along the border with Iraq](#).



Asif Makhoulf (left) with Kamal Fayadh (right) in the Albukamal countryside as part of a recent assignment.



Kamal Fayadh (far right) with Saraya al-Areen forces in Hama countryside.



A wounded Ali Kayali, leader of the Muqawama Suriya, with Kamal Fayadh.

In short, Saraya al-Muqawama matches other LDF formations in being on the registers of the Syrian armed forces and working with the IRGC.

Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas and the Republican Guard

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi • Mar 29, 2018 at 4:28 pm



Readers may remember that the first new 'Islamic resistance' formation in Syria that came to wider media attention was Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas. The group's founding is attributed to two individuals: one of the two is [Ahmad Kayara](#) (real name: Ahmad Hassan Nash'an al-Atwani), who was of Iraqi origin and had been involved in the Mahdi Army during the U.S. occupation of Iraq. After he was arrested by the Americans in 2007 and subsequently released, he is said to have migrated to Syria, where he was residing when unrest broke out in that country. He was killed on 29 December 2012. The other individual is [Hussein Ajeeb Jazza](#), who was killed on 1 January 2013 and was from the Shi'i village of Nubl in north Aleppo countryside.

Initially [operating in the National Defence Forces network](#) and led by Abu Ajeeb ([Maher Ajeeb Jazza](#), Hussein's brother), Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas was the name under which many of the first prominent Iraqis fighting in Syria gained renown, such as [Hayder al-Juburi](#) (Abu Shahed), who then went on to lead Liwa Dhu al-Fiqar, and Aqil al-Musawi, who established Liwa Assad Allah al-Ghalib. Even as new groups emerged, the original Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas under Abu Ajeeb endured, with the creation of an Iraqi wing led by Izz al-Din al-Darraji (Abu Amir).



Abu Ajeeb

It turns out that the original Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas became affiliated with the Republican Guard. Open evidence for this affiliation can be found from as early as the

first half of 2014, with the [group being described as part of 'Qadesh'](#) (Quwat al-Difa' al-Sha'abi: Popular Defence Forces), a [network of auxiliary forces established by the Republican Guard](#) that I had previously identified as being established at around the turn of 2014. A source from Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas, however, says that the affiliation of the group with 'Qadesh' dates back to 2013, and that 'Qadesh' was established around the beginning of 2013.

An ID card for a member of Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas found in 2014 further attests to the affiliation of the group with 'Qadesh':



"Syrian Arab Republic,
 General Command for Army and Armed Forces
 Republican Guard
 Quwat al-Difa' al-Sha'abi
 Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas

The mujahid: Muhammad Mustafa Shibli
 National no.: 02010126237
 Weapons no.: 257118

[Signature]
 Leader of Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas"

More recently, evidence shows that at least the 'elite' part of Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas has been [integrated into the Republican Guard's 105th brigade](#). In keeping with the Republican Guard affiliations, Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas has long been involved on Damascus frontlines where the Republican Guard has also fought, even prior to the [current East Ghouta offensive](#), in which Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas has eagerly advertised its role. The source from Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas clarifies that the group has also fought in Aleppo, Khanaser (Aleppo province), Kanassa (Latakia province) and Raqqa province.

Parallels with the integration of Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas into the Republican Guard include the integration of Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein into the 4th Division, and Hayder al-Juburi's role in the al-Bustan Association's Quwat Dir' al-Watan. As always, it is

important to see how groups develop over time and may become integrated into larger networks.

Marwan Zain al-Abidin: Key Figure in Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed?

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi • Mar 28, 2018 at 2:38 pm



In a scene from a video released by the Islamic State affiliate Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed in late February 2018, a masked man appears executing 'apostate Sahwa' by gunfire. That masked man is purportedly one Marwan Zain al-Abidin, and apparently among those executed in the scene are two of Marwan's cousins. It is said that this Marwan is a key figure in Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed.

I put a general caveat of caution on the information related concerning Marwan's life as Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed is (like many other jihadi groups) a semi-clandestine organization. For this piece, I have been assisted in retrieving information by a friend from Tasil, a locality in southwest Deraa countryside from which Marwan originates. This friend is not in Tasil at the moment but runs a media office covering events in the Yarmouk Basin.



Marwan Zain al-Abidin is purportedly the masked man executing 'apostate Sahwa' in this video scene by gunfire.

Marwan's full name is Marwan Muhammad Abd al-Fattah Zain al-Abidin. He is also known by the kunya of Abu al-Muthanna, though he is apparently not the 'Abu al-Muthanna al-Ansari' that appeared in a recent Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed video on education in the Yarmouk Basin, as the organization closed regime affiliated schools in its

areas of control and reopened them with curricula in accordance with the Islamic State's ideological outlook.*

Marwan was born in around 1983-1984. His hometown of Tasil fell under the control of Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed in an [offensive launched by the group in February 2017](#). The main families in Tasil are:

- al-Masri
- al-Salamat
- Zain al-Abidin
- al-Khalaf
- al-Khateeb
- al-Dakhl Allah
- al-Hayek
- al-Hafez
- Abu Khashreef
- Abu Nuqta
- al-Yunis
- al-Muqaddam

Prior to the fall of Tasil to Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed, the main factions in the locality were:

- Liwa Khalid Sayf Allah ([Southern Front](#))
- Liwa Saraya al-Karama ([Southern Front](#))
- Farqat al-Shaheed Ra'id al-Masri ([Southern Front](#))
- A local affiliate of Jaysh al-Islam
- A local affiliate of Ahrar al-Sham

Marwan was reputedly in Saydnaya prison together with his friend Ibrahim Yunis al-Muqaddam (also originally from Tasil). As will be recalled Saydnaya prison was notorious for housing Islamist and jihadist detainees. The two were said to have been imprisoned there in 2004 on charges of Islamist/jihadist affiliations. In Marwan's case, he had supposedly been recruiting people to fight the Americans in Iraq.

In early 2013 though, Marwan and Ibrahim were apparently released from prison. On their release, they set up base in their hometown and created a small faction called Kata'ib al-Tawheed wa al-Jihad. The group obtained some vehicles and light and medium weaponry, while also offering relatively high salaries of 30,000 Syrian pounds per month. Marwan and Ibrahim also emerged as critics of Jabhat al-Nusra. Indeed, they gave members of their own group Shari'i courses that included denunciations of Jabhat al-Nusra, which by April 2013 had emerged as Syria's official al-Qaeda affiliate as the dispute with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his newly declared Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) became public.

A somewhat amusing story related regarding Marwan is that he and his friend Ibrahim allegedly arranged with a rebel leader to have Marwan kidnapped in a staged incident in a

bid to gain popular support in Tasil. If this event actually took place, it certainly failed in its objective.

By early 2014, in light of the general failure of their project, Marwan and Ibrahim left Tasil and went to the bases of Liwa Shuhada' al-Yarmouk in Jamla and al-Shajra. Settling in the latter locality, they are then said to have begun promoting support for ISIS, even convincing Liwa Shuhada' al-Yarmouk's leader al-Khal to support ISIS. It will be noted that in my previous work that I identified one [Abu Muhammad al-Masalama](#) (an Afghan jihad veteran assassinated in November 2014) as a key link between Liwa Shuhada' al-Yarmouk and ISIS around the time of the declaration of the Caliphate and transition from ISIS to the Islamic State at the end of June 2014. This account regarding Marwan's influence on Liwa Shuhada' al-Yarmouk's ideological turn is alleged by Nibal Sa'ad al-Din al-Baridi, a brother of al-Khal who was imprisoned by Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed but is now outside the Yarmouk Basin and is currently detained by the Dar al-'Adl court in rebel-held parts of southern Syria. Nibal should not be confused with Nidhal Sa'ad al-Din al-Baridi, another brother of al-Khal who was executed by Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed last year.

The account from Nibal, if accurate, suggests that the ideological turn occurred even before the declaration of the Caliphate, though it does not necessarily exclude a role for Abu Muhammad al-Masalama in bringing about the shift towards ISIS/the Islamic State.

Currently, Marwan is allegedly head of the Hisba office in Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed, having received the position on 2 February 2018. At least two brothers of Marwan are with him in Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed: Abd al-Ghanni (a member of the Hisba apparatus) and Ibrahim (head of the da'wa office and a Shari'i official). Marwan's father, who had once lived in Kuwait but returned to Syria before the revolution, is also said to be a member of the organization, serving as a member of its Shura council. Of Marwan's other siblings, two of them (Muadh and Abd al-Fattah) currently reside in Jordan. Muadh was reputedly one of the followers of the Syrian preacher [Abu al-Qa'qa'](#), who was assassinated in 2007 and said to have been involved in encouraging and recruiting fighters to go to Iraq to combat the U.S. presence there.

 *(**Update 5 April 2018**): Contrary to what I had earlier thought, the [Abu al-Muthanna al-Ansari](#) who appears in the video on education in the Yarmouk Basin is Marwan Zain al-Abidin. See the photo below. In retrospect, it was logical that he should appear to discuss the matter of education, since the Hisba was responsible for gathering the regime curricula books and burning them.



The Life of Abu Hazim Tawheed of Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi • Mar 20, 2018 at 7:46 pm



For the lives of other deceased officials of the Islamic State-linked Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed:

- [Abu Qasura Kanakari](#)
- [Abu Hamza Tawheed](#)
- [Abu Tayyim Inkhil](#)

Abu Hazim Tawheed also went by at least two other kunyas: Abu Bakr al-Hazim and Abu Hazim Abdullah. Like many other notable figures in Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed, he was not originally from the Yarmouk Basin. In fact, he was originally from the town of Qasiba in Quneitra province. The town has approximately 6000-7000 inhabitants. The inhabitants, who mainly work in agriculture, are primarily from the al-Hazumin branch of the al-Nu'aim tribe. Families of note in Qasiba:

- al-Jafal
- al-Ghanam

- al-Sharida
- al-Hashish

Abu Hazim Tawheed's real name was Ahmad Shibli. His real name in full, according to a media activist from Qasiba, was Ahmad Shibli al-Awad, while a source from the nearby village of Qarqas relates that his full name was Ahmad Shibli al-Khamis al-Hashish. He was born in around 1986 according to the source from Qasiba. Prior to the civil war, he was involved with a brother of his in running a service taxi line between Khan Arnabeh (located in Quneitra province) and Damascus. The source from Qarqas adds that in addition to the service taxi business, Abu Hazim Tawheed was working in a vegetable market in Beirut prior to the civil war. As far as I have been able to ascertain, he was not Salafi prior to the civil war. There is no evidence that he studied at university or even completed high school.



Abu Hazim Tawheed

Abu Hazim Tawheed's path through various factions broadly seems to parallel the path of Abu Hamza Tawheed, to whom [Abu Hazim Tawheed paid particular tribute in the aftermath of his death](#). After the civil war broke out, Abu Hazim Tawheed initially became

involved with the Free Syrian Army (FSA)-brand group Liwa al-Sabteen. He was wounded in rebel battles against regime forces in Quneitra at the [end of January 2014](#), after which he went to Jordan to receive treatment, spending some 7-8 months there. When he initially returned to Syria following his treatment in Jordan, he had to rely on crutches to walk.

By late 2014 or early 2015, Abu Hazim Tawheed had joined Ahrar al-Sham, apparently becoming involved with the Ahrar al-Jowlan faction that had Islamic State sympathizers in its ranks. He subsequently joined Jama'at Bayt al-Maqdis al-Islamiya. It was around the beginning of 2016 that I first got to know of Abu Hazim Tawheed, as he sent me a friend request on Facebook under the name of Abu Bakr al-Hazim. I presume he found me via 'People You May Know' on Facebook.



A photo of Abu Hazim Tawheed posing in front of a Jama'at Bayt al-Maqdis al-Islamiya flag. Uploaded to a Facebook profile of his in January 2016

At the time, I had been looking into the question of whether Jama'at Bayt al-Maqdis al-Islamiya was linked to the Islamic State. Indeed, some observers, including some analysts in Israeli army intelligence, portrayed it as a Palestinian jihadist front group for the

Islamic State. These rumours were partly based on the group's name (referring to Jerusalem) and the similarity of the group's flag design to that of the Islamic State's flag.

When I initially communicated with Abu Hazim Tawheed (then a member of Jama'at Bayt al-Maqdis al-Islamiya) at the beginning of 2016, he denied that Jama'at Bayt al-Maqdis al-Islamiya was under allegiance to the Islamic State. He also denied that the group was Palestinian, pointing out that its ranks were primarily composed of people from Deraa and Quneitra. Indeed, the case of Abu Hazim Tawheed demonstrates that the rumours about Jama'at Bayt al-Maqdis al-Islamiya were largely wrong. By March 2016, Abu Hazim Tawheed had left Jama'at Bayt al-Maqdis al-Islamiya. Along with a contingent of fellow defectors, he had gone to the Yarmouk Basin to join what was then Liwa Shuhada' al-Yarmouk, which had links with the Islamic State since at least the latter half of 2014. A reader who has followed my reports may note that I cited a Jama'at Bayt al-Maqdis al-Islamiya defector in a [report I did on jihadist groups located near Israel's northern border in May 2016](#). That defector was Abu Hazim Tawheed. As he had explained, Jama'at Bayt al-Maqdis al-Islamiya suffered internal fragmentation in February 2016 over a decision by the leadership to join an operations room with some FSA groups. Much of the rank-and-file objected to this decision and threatened to leave if it was not reversed. The leadership did not change its mind. Of those who left the group, some like Abu Hazim Tawheed went to join Liwa Shuhada' al-Yarmouk. That Abu Hazim Tawheed went to the Yarmouk Basin did not really come as a surprise to me. In fact, I had already developed suspicions that he was an Islamic State sympathizer, given the mutual friends we had on Facebook.

Abu Hazim Tawheed became suspicious of me later on in spring 2016 (prior to the formation of Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed, as I recall). He was curious as to why I asked him many questions, and he had noticed various photos I shared on my Facebook page. He thus called me on Facebook messenger. He explained his own outlook, saying that he had been with Jama'at Bayt al-Maqdis al-Islamiya but left the group as it did not implement the ruling of God's law (*tahkim shar' Allah*), though he denied that he had an allegiance pledge to the Islamic State. It should be noted that this line of rhetoric was long employed by Liwa Shuhada' al-Yarmouk: namely, [denying an allegiance pledge to the Islamic State](#) while claiming to work towards implementing the ruling of God's law. Even so, Faruq al-Adel- a member of Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed- explained to me immediately after Abu Hazim Tawheed's death in August 2017 that Abu Hazim Tawheed had given allegiance to the Islamic State "one and a half years ago": that is, around the time that he left Jama'at Bayt al-Maqdis al-Islamiya and joined Liwa Shuhada' al-Yarmouk.

Abu Hazim Tawheed remained in Liwa Shuhada' al-Yarmouk and became a member of Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed, which was [formed in late May 2016](#). It is not wholly clear to me what exactly his role was. Though direct contact between me and him ended by mid-2016, he generally seemed to have a lot of time for posting on Facebook and other Facebook activities. Indeed, I vividly remember when he [clicked 'like' for a photo I took while on a trip to Japan in October 2016](#). The most frequent description of his role that I have heard is that he was a *مدير مسؤول* ('arming official') in Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed, suggesting that he was responsible for weapon procurement and distribution. Though Abu Hazim Tawheed frequently liked to post about the concept of *tawheed* (Islamic monotheism), Faruq al-Adel denied to me that Abu Hazim Tawheed

was a Shari'i official in Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed, explaining his posts about tawheed as follows: "This is our obligation: to spread tawheed and get people to know it." He also denied to me that Abu Hazim Tawheed worked in *ribat* (manning a frontline and being on the lookout for enemy movements, incursions etc.).



Abu Hazim Tawheed had a fondness for posing with his back turned to the camera. Photo uploaded to a Facebook page of his in summer 2016.



A photo of Abu Hazim Tawheed uploaded to a Facebook page of his in August 2016.



Abu Hazim Tawheed

Abu Hazim Tawheed was killed in the afternoon of 22 August 2017, in what was apparently a coalition and/or Israeli strike. At least two other members of Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed were killed in that strike: [Abu al-Abbas](#) and [Abu Ruqayya](#), who are otherwise unknown individuals to me so far.

The Story of al-Hajj Azra'il: From Nubl to Deir az-Zor

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi • Mar 16, 2018 at 6:05 pm



It may be recalled that al-Hajj Azra'il came to [limited media attention in 2016](#) as the leader of the Deir az-Zor formation Lions of the Eternal Leader (Arabic: *Usud al-Qa'id al-Khalid*), referring to Syria's 'Eternal Leader' Hafez al-Assad. This formation is affiliated with the military intelligence. However, by the end of 2017, al-Hajj Azra'il's tenure as head of the group had come to an end. Disgruntled, al-Hajj Azra'il moved to the Damascus area. Last month, I spoke to him at some length regarding his participation in the war effort on behalf of the Syrian government. His case not only provides some insight into how an individual can change his/her particular affiliations within a broad camp (in this instance, the side of the government and its allies) over time, but also into the war effort in Deir az-Zor when the government-held areas were besieged by the Islamic State.

The real name of al-Hajj Azra'il (aka [Abu Haydar](#)) is Hussein Ali al-Ahmad. Prior to the civil war, he worked as a car dealer. He was born in 1972 CE in the Shi'i village of Nubl, which is located in north Aleppo countryside and is closely paired with the neighbouring Shi'i village of al-Zahara'. Some families of note in the area:

- al-Ahmad
- al-Abras
- Sherbo
- Murad
- Qassab
- al-Basha
- Balawi

Like other Shi'i villages in Syria, Nubl and al-Zahara' stood firmly with the government. The two villages came under rebel siege from around mid-2012 until February 2016. Government forces and Iranian-backed groups then broke the siege of Nubl and al-Zahara' as part of the wider campaign to encircle and retake east Aleppo city- something that was accomplished by the end of 2016.



al-Hajj Azra'il. Note the 'Labbayk ya Hussein' insignia.

Nubl and al-Zahara' have suffered a very high level of casualties during the Syrian civil war. For example, Ali al-Abras, originally from the area, wrote in December 2017 (see photo below) that the two villages had "offered more than 1200 resisting martyrs and hundreds of wounded throughout the land of the homeland: the majority of them were martyred in the battles of Aleppo and its four countrysides during the past years to cleanse them from terrorism. The mujahideen of Nubl and al-Zahara' were the first who supported the Syrian Arab Army in Aleppo at the start of 2013, as they came out in hundreds under siege through helicopters to defend Aleppo and its people."



According to al-Hajj Azra'il, he first began operating as a fighter within Nubl itself, setting up a contingent of some 159 fighters under the name of *Ghuraba' Nubl*. Initially, this faction had no support to carry out training for its members, but then some aid came from the Syrian army. This aid was subsequently lost as the Syrian army withdrew its forces and support from Nubl, and asked al-Hajj Azra'il to dissolve his faction. However, al-Hajj Azra'il rejected this demand and his group came under the disposition of the *Qiyadat al-Taklif*, a senior local body in the Nubl and al-Zahara' area.

For some context on the *Qiyadat al-Taklif*, consider the life of one [Abbas Hussein al-Ahmad](#) (al-Hajj Abu al-Fadl), born in 1991 in al-Zahara' and killed in February 2016. He was studying in Tishreen University in Latakia when the civil war began. As life became more difficult, he returned to al-Zahara', which then came under rebel siege. On 29 May 2013, the *Qiyadat al-Taklif* was asked to nominate cultured youths between 18 and 25 years old to go to Lebanon to receive training from Hezbollah, so a helicopter came from Aleppo to Nubl to take 65 youths from al-Zahara' and 85 from Nubl to the al-Assad military academy. al-Hajj Abu al-Fadl was among those youths. al-Hajj Au al-Fadl and his companions were subsequently transferred to Lebanon, where Hezbollah gave them a 'Special Force' training course lasting 55 days in the al-Radwan camp, after which Hezbollah sent them back to Aleppo.

In addition, regarding the *Qiyadat al-Taklif*, it is notable that in the summer of 2016 the *Qiyadat al-Taklif* attempted to deal with [problems of banditry and mafia-like behaviour](#) at checkpoints on the route between Aleppo and Nubl.

It turned out that al-Hajj Azra'il continued to work under the *Qiyadat al-Taklif* until he received an offer to be recruited to fight in the Hasakah area, and so he left Nubl for Afrin

and then went through Turkey, entering into al-Darbasiya in Hasakah province in early 2014. In Hasakah province, al-Hajj Azra'il came to work as a commander and trainer of assault contingents in the *al-Maghawir* (The Commandos) formation, with financial support from Hezbollah and manpower support from the Syrian army. The *al-Maghawir* group is an [attested auxiliary formation](#) from Hasakah province, and it was [developed during late 2014](#). The project was eventually deemed to be a failure and was [dissolved by the end of May 2016](#).

For his part, al-Hajj Azra'il moved to Damascus at the beginning of 2015, fighting in both the city and its countryside. Initially, he worked with the National Defence Forces, and then Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, heading subsequently to the Latakia countryside and then Aleppo again, where he worked with Hezbollah. Finally, al-Hajj Azra'il moved to Deir az-Zor with a commission granted by the military intelligence. Initially beginning with just 3 members, al-Hajj Azra'il managed to develop a contingent of 250 fighters: thus, Lions of the Eternal Leader, most of whose fighters are from Deir az-Zor, though some members had been brought in from other places like Hasakah.



al-Haii Azra'il with journalist Hussein Mortada, director of the Syria office for Iran's al-Aalem channel.

According to al-Hajj Azra'il, life in Deir az-Zor under the siege was very difficult and corruption was widespread: "We would fight day and night with utmost preparedness. Our food was an egg and three loaves of bread only, there was no alternative and the corruption was very widespread." War profiteers- among them senior military officers- would carry out acts of extortion against the civilian population, as "nothing came in except via helicopter." As such, prices for goods soared. For instance, al-Hajj Azra'il says that a kilogram of tea reached a price of 30,000 Syrian pounds, while a kilogram of potatoes cost 3000 Syrian pounds, subsequently increasing to 5000 Syrian pounds. In greater abundance was "canned food...on account of the ease of transporting it by hovercraft." While al-Hajj Azra'il did agree on the suggestion that Issam Zahr al-Din (the Republican Guard general from Suwayda' who played a key role in the fighting on the government side in Deir az-Zor and was [killed in October 2017](#)) was among the 'honourable' ones in Deir az-Zor, he cautioned: "Don't tighten your hand [i.e. don't overplay it]: it is possible to be the most honest of the liars."

Under al-Hajj Azra'il's leadership, the Lions of the Eternal Leader operated according to a system of 3 days of work schedule and 3 days of rest, with the group maintaining an assault force of around 40 troops. In the event of an attack on the group's positions though, all members had to mobilize without days of rest. The monthly salary was only 40000 Syrian pounds.

Following the [breaking of the siege of Deir az-Zor in September 2017](#), the Lions of the Eternal Leader participated in a number of battles, including the opening of the Deir az-Zor airport road and the recapture and clearing out of al-Jafra, in addition to engagements in Mari'iya and Hawija Mari'iya, Hawija Sakr, Hawija Kati', Sater al-Tis'in, Hajiz Alburaslan and al-Rashdiya.



al-Hajj Azra'il posing with bodies of dead Islamic State fighters.



al-Haji Azra'il posing with the body of a dead Islamic State fighter.

A notable casualty incident for Lions of the Eternal Leader was the series of U.S. airstrikes that hit government forces near Deir az-Zor airport in September 2016, which the U.S. says had been intended to hit Islamic State positions. According to al-Hajj Azra'il, his group lost 8 fighters in that incident, with the total number of 'martyrs' for the government side amounting to 100.

The Lions of the Eternal Leader continues to exist under the leadership of another person, as al-Hajj Azra'il eventually fell out with the Deir az-Zor military leadership. As he put it: "I was demanding the rights of the personnel, and an increase in the salaries and the food. After the road opened, the demands revealed and exposed them, so they decided to overlook me." Of the other Deir az-Zor formations, al-Hajj Azra'il appears to have been closest to Liwa al-Imam Zain al-Abidin, which is presently under the disposition of the military intelligence. The group's former leader- Abu Aboud- is likewise disgruntled but hopes he can set up a new outfit in Deir az-Zor alongside al-Hajj Azra'il with the support of Hezbollah.



Certificate of commendation issued for al-Hajj Azra'il by the military intelligence:

"The Syrian Arab Army will remain the pillar of security and stability in the region, and the fortress that fences in the homeland, defends its sovereignty, and protects its dignity.

Homeland, Honour, Sincerity.

Syrian Arab Republic
General Command for the Army and Armed Forces

Intelligence Branch [military intelligence]
Branch 291 [[admin branch](#)]

Commendation

General Muhammad Mahmoud Mahla- head of the intelligence branch- commends the fighter Hussein Ali al-Ahmad from the auxiliary fighting groups of branch 243 [Deir az-Zor branch] and that is for his courage, steadfastness and ability to bear burdens during the time of the long siege of Deir az-Zor city.

Head of the intelligence branch.

Issued on 24 September 2017."

NB: All photos of al-Hajj Azra'il in this piece as well as photo of certificate have been provided to me by al-Hajj Azra'il himself.

... الاسديّة الاف رع عن المعلومات كل هي
ال نظام ل قوة الرئ يسي ال سد بب هي سوريا في المخاب رات اجهزة هيكله
وهي والمهام ال صلاحيات متداخلة مخاب رات اجهزة ارب عة هناك سوريا في
(ال سد يسي الأمن - (الدولة أمن) العامة المخاب رات - (ال عسكري الأمن) العسكرية المخاب رات - الجوية المخاب رات)
يعتبر بينما الجوية والمخاب رات والعسكرية المخاب رات جهازي حاسبة واثرة لمعية الاجهزة ت لك واشد
له ومراقبة الشعب بين وتغلغل ان تشارا الاجهزة اكر ال سد يسي الأمن جهاز
ل كل ي كون العامة والمخاب رات العسكرية المخاب رات حال تي في) فروع الى الاجهزة ت لك من جهاز كل وي نقسم
(باسمه الفرع في يعرف ال سد يسي والأمن الجوية المخاب رات حال تي في أما به معروف ثلاثي رقم فرع
الى وامام فارز الى اما ال تخصصات حسب قسم كل وي نقسم أقسام الى الفروع ت لك من فرع كل وي نقسم
مجموعات الى واما (الخارجي ال نشاط حالة في) خلايا
: ال تالي ال شكل على ل الأذنى الأعلى من الهرمي ال تقسيم ي كون وهكذا
(المهمة حسب) خلية أو مجموعة أو مفرزة - قسم - فرع - الاسد تخباري الجهاز
: ها أمديين مكن تدبين مع علاقة الاجهزة ول تلك
بالمك تب رسم ياوي (سمى) الرئاسة أمن مك تب - (الوطني الأمن مك تب حدي ثاي سمي وصار) القومي الأمن مك تب
(الخاص).

ال فروع مهام عن المعلومات وبعض وفروعها الأربعة الاجهزة

: (العسكرية المخابرات) العسكري الأمن - أولاً

: هي وفروع ثلاثية أرقام وفروعها هي كون

شرق شمال سعسع في الموجود الجبهة مخابرات فروعها ستثناء دمشق في وتواجد المركزية الفروع - أ (القنيطرة):

ملفات على يد تويديت لجهاز النابض القلب وهو المقر فرع أي ضاوي سمي الإداري الفرع: 291 الفرع - وي لعب الجهاز ضمن ثغرة لأي منعا لجهاز ضمن العامل بمراقبة يقوم كما الجهاز هذا ضمن العامل بين جميع الجهاز ضمن العامل بين قلا أو باعداد وترقية في دورا

الجيش ضد باطلات على يد تويديت جدا حساس فرع وهو الضباط أمن أو الضباط شؤون فرع: 293 الفرع - تعديرتهم أو الجيش ضد باطلات قلا أو باعداد وترقية في كيرادورا وي لعب الجيش ضد باطلات مراقبة وي قوم أن دتله تقاريره ورفع الجمهورية برئيس مباشرة الاتصال امكانية الفرع هذارتيس ويملك مراكزهم في المخابرات جهاز على تطلق العسكري الأمن تسمية ب ينما) العسكري الأمن فرع وسماه أخطأ البعض التواصل من تمكنه بسبب العسكرية المخابرات ادارة عن مستقل شبيه البعض وانه (عامب شكل العسكرية ادارة بأمر وي لتزم العسكرية المخابرات لجهاز يتبع فهو الحقيقية في بينما الجمهورية برئيس مع مباشرة امكانية قلا كما هو الفرع هذاميزة وكن له الموجهة الأوامر لتلكب الغاء الجمهورية برئيس قلا ما لجهاز الجمهورية برئيس مع المباشرة واصله

بأسثناء) المسلحة والقوات الجيش قطع كافة مراقبة عن المسئول وهو القوات أمن فرع: 294 الفرع - الجيش في العامل ضد باطلات لجنود خاصة ملفات على يد تويديت (الجوي والدفاع الجوية القوات مخبريه ويوزع ولانها ومدى استعدادها ودرجة القتالية وحالاتها العسكرية والقطع المعسكرات عن وملفات يد تويديت في تشكيلة كل أن وي ذكر هذا ختراق أو عصيان أو تمرد وادري لمراقبة الجنود ضمن ب شكل ومنسق امرت بطا الضابط هذا وي كون (الخ.. اللواء أمن ضابط أو الفرقة أمن ضابط) به خاص أمن ضابط يعمل الذي العسكري التشكيلة قائد ارتباطه من أكثر الفرع بذلك ويرتبط المذكور الفرع مع مباشر ل لقوات تحرك أي أن وي ذكر (التشكيلة قائد ذلك من أقوى التشكيلة أمن ضابط كلة يجعل ماما) لأنه ضابطا جهاز على اشراف مهمة يمارس الفرع هذاب أن أي ضاوي ذكر كما الفرع هذامع وت نسيق ب موافقة يتم أن يجب العسكرية بالتشكيلات الملحقه ووحداتها العسكرية الشرطة

جهاز بحجمه ي كون ي كاد جدا ضخمة فرع وهو وأقدمها الجهاز هذاف فرع أهم من وهو فلسطين فرع: 235 الفرع - ضدب النشاط تخصصا الفرع هذاي كون أن المترفرض من وكان وخارجي داخلي ونشاطه منذ فداستخباري نشاطه وشمل كثرات وسع حافظ عهد في نشاطه وكن فلسطينية بالحركات المتعلقة والأمراسل ين الأوامر تضى ان بها وال تحكم توجبهامحاولة واخذ تراقها الا سلامية الحركات مطاردة وهوية اسلامية حركات ان شاء أو

أن وي ذكر الا سلامية بالحركات غالبا وي تختص الارهاب مكافحة سمي سمي الفرع هذاف سلف أحد ذلك أول لنظام المعارضة منها سواء القطر وخارج داخل فلسطينية بالحركات مراقبة أي ضا فلسطينية وحدة تسمى وحدة الفرع وي تبع السورية الأراضية على المقيم بين فلسطينية بين اللاجئين مراقبة جيش شؤون وتختص المذكور الفرع تبيع وكنها مستقلة مبنى تملك وهي الفدائية الضابطة على رسمي بشكل بسلحها تواجدها تي المسلحة فلسطينية والحركات الفلسطينية التحريروالانتهكات التعذيب في الجهاز فروع أقر الفرع هذاي معتبر (جبريل أحمد جماعة مثل) السورية الأراضية

ويحوي له المذ تلة والدراسات ل جهاز العامة ب المعلومات ي تخصص فرع وهو المعلومات فرع: ؟؟؟ ال فرع- وسائل نشاط أي ضال الفرع ويراقب (السياسية والأحزاب للأديان ق سم منها) المذ تلة الأقم سام من ك ثيرا ب شكل أي ضامعاوي تعامل (الانترنت ف يها بما) والمرئية والمقروعة المسموعة والعلامة المدلية الاعلام ب جهاز عمل يهم ب مام باشر غير او م باشر

ك فاءات ف يهوي عمل الكم ب يوتر فرع أو الألي الحاسب ب فرع أي ضاوي سمي الفني الفرع: 211 ال فرع- الم تعلق ب الخدمات ويخ تص الألي والحاسب بالانترنت ويخ تص ج يذ قافي مس توي ونوي عالية ب شريفة ف يوي تدخل عليه والنشاط الانترنت مراق بة أي ضامهامه ومن ب الجهاز امرت بطة والانترنت ب الكم ب يوتر عنها الحجب رف ع أو المواقع حجب ق ضايا

ويخ تص ج يذ قافي مس توي ونوي عالية ب شريفة ك فاءات ف يهوي عمل الات صالات فرع: 225 ال فرع- م باشرة ال تحكم وي س تطيع ال فاكس أو المحمول أو الهاتف ف عبرت تم ال تي والخارجية الداخل بة ب الات صالات أحد عن القصد برة الرسائل خدمة تعطيل أو مكالمات قطع أو معيثة أرقام كحجب) سوري اداخل الات صالات ب كل مع ك ثيرا الانترنت مجال ف ي عمله وي تدخل عليها وال تنصت (الخ... وصولها ق بل رسالة اي قاف أو الارقام 211 ال فرع

عليها وال تنصت ال لاسلكية المكالمات وت تبع الراديو وموجات ب مسح خاص وهو ال لاسلكي فرع: 237 ال فرع- معها ال تدخل أو تشوي شها أو

أن رغم) العسكري الأمن لجهاز الرديسية ال تحقيق هيد بة م ثابته وهو العسكري ال تحقيق فرع: 248 ال فرع- ف ي فرع أفذر ثاني وي عبر (ب به خاص تحقيق ق سمي ملك والاقليمية المركزية الجهاز فرع من فرع كل ف لسط بين فرع ب عد الانتهاكات ديث من الجهاز

والاق تحام المداهة فرع: 215 ال فرع-

الدوريات فرع: 216 ال فرع-

ل جولان الاسد تخرارية ب الشؤون ي خ تص وهو سوسع فرع أي ضاوي سمي الج بة مخابرات فرع: 220 ال فرع- هناك ال عاملة الدولية الطوارئ قوات أي ضاوي راقب الج بة وقوات المد تل

له ي تبع وقد المحافطة مس توي على فرع ب معدل مذ تلة محافطات ف ي وت ت ن تشر) الاق ليمية ال فروع ب ال فروع أرقام من ونعرف (ال نواحي مس توي على وم فارز المناطق مس توي على أق سام ال حاجة حسب

(المنطقة فرع أي ضاوي سمي) دمشق محافطة فرع: 227 ال فرع-

حمص محافطة فرع: 261 ال فرع-

درعا محافطة فرع: 245 ال فرع-

حماة محافطة فرع: 219 ال فرع-

الاحسكة محافطة فرع: 222 ال فرع-

ادلب محافطة فرع: 271 ال فرع-

حلب محافطة فرع: 290 ال فرع-

الزوردي محافطة فرع: 243 ال فرع-

(تدمر فرع أي ضاوي سمي) ال بادية فرع: 221 ال فرع-

: الجوية المخابرات -ثانياً

السرية بالمهام وتكليفه موثوقية وأكثرها لنظام ولواء الأجهزة أكثر وهو الغموض شديد لجهاز وهو السرية للجهاز لطبيعة الأخرى الأجهزة عن المعروفة المعلومات من أقل عنه المعروفة والمعلومات والحساسية هذا ويعتبر خاصة حالات في الأثرية بل بالمدنيين احداً تكاها ونذرة الأخرى بالأجهزة مقارنة حجمه وصغر الذي الجهاز وهو والتقنية البشرية الكفاءات حيث من الأسديّة الاستخباراتية الأجهزة بين الأول الجهاز أي ضامن العسكري الأمن جهاز أن رغم) الأخرى بالأجهزة مقارنة العلويين غير من النسب أقل على يد توي الدولة وأمن السديسي الأمن يد توي بدنامة معاً والضباط المعاصر مستوى على علوية أغلبية على يد توي الحضور حيث من الأجهزة أكثر هو الجوية المخاطرات جهاز ولاكن الضباط مستوى على علوية أغلبية على أن وبمات ثلاثية أرقام لها وليس فقط بالأسماء تسمى وروعه (والضباط المعاصر مستوى على العلوي لمراجعة بحاجة بقى معلومات هيكلية عن ساعرضه ما فإن ذلك غير من أقل الجهاز هذا عن المعلومات هي وفي روعه وتصحیح:

: (دمشق في وتواجده) المركزية الفرع - أ

كما الجهاز هذا ضمن العامل بين جميع ملفات على يد توي حيث للجهاز النابض القلب وهو: الإداري الفرع - نقل أو باعداد أو ترقيفة في دوراويد لعب الجهاز ضمن ثغرة لأي منعا الجهاز ضمن العامل بين مراقبة يقيم قوم الجهاز ضمن العامل بين

من كثر اوي حوي له المختلفة والدراسات للجهاز العامة بالمعلومات ي تخصص فرعه وهو: المعلومات فرع - الاعلام وسائل نشاط أي ضامن الفرع ويراقب (السياسة والأحزاب للأديان قسماً منها) المختلفة الأقسام اومباشربشكل أي ضامن معاويد تعامل (الانترنت فيهاب ما) والمرئية والمقروعة المسموعة والعلامة المدلية الجهاز عمل يهيم بمامباشرب

فرع من فرعه كل أن رغم) الجوية المخاطرات لجهاز الرئية يد توي تحقيق هيئة بمثابته وهو: التحقيق فرع - الأسديّة المخاطرات فرعه وأقدر أشد من ويعد توي (به خاص تحقيق قسماً ملك والاقليمية المركزية الجهاز والاندتهابات التعذيب في

وربما الرئية الطائفة وأمن الرئية السديسي المطار أمن عن مسؤولاويد توي المزة مطار في الم تواجده: المطار فرع - في تنقلاته أنه ناء لرئية السديسي بالأمن الم تعلقة الاستخباراتية المهمة عن أي ضامن مسؤول الفرع هذا الخارج

الجوب سلاح الم تعلقة الأمور فيهاب مالم للجهاز والخارجية الداخلية الم عمليات عن مسؤول وهو: الم عمليات فرع - الاستخباراتية المهمة تادية أنه ناء المطار فرع مع يد نسق ورب ما خارج الاستخباراتية الجهود تطلب والتي الطيران مكاتب في الفرع هذا عملاء يندش كذلك تحركاته أنه ناء الرئية السديسي بالم تعلقة الخارجية السورية

الثورة هذه أنه ناء فيعلي بشكل عنه الحديث وبداق ليلية الفرع هذا عن المعلومات: الخاصة الم عمليات فرع - الموكلة المهمة بنفس تختص أنها في يرجح مهمات بيعة عن أما الم تظاهرين ضد النشاطات بعض في ل تورطه حساسية الأكثر الطابع ذات ولاكن وخارجياً داخلياً الم عمليات فرع

الدمت قديم عن مسؤولية كونها عن المعلومات بعض وهناك أي ضاق ليلية عنها المعلومات: الخاصة المهمة وحدة - تدريب ذوي لرجال الخارج أو الداخل في المهمة احدى نتجت حال في الخاصة والمهمة الخاصة الم عمليات ل فرعي المهمة ل تنفيذ الأكل فأل بشري بال كادر بامدادات قوم حيث عالي واستخباراتية قنالي

محافظة عن مسؤول فرعه هناك ي كون به حيث السورية المحافظات من عدد في وتندش) الاقليمية الفرع - القوات اليها تنقسم التي الجغرافية القطاعات من قطاعا الفرع يغطي به حيث محافظات لعدة شامل قطاع أو

وكل قطاعات لعدة القطر سميت الجوي والدفاع الجوية القوية (يأخذ أن المعروف من) الجوي والدفاع الجوية (القطاعات تلك من قطاع كل في له اقليم يافع الجوية المخبرات أن شأت وقد العسكرية ق يادته له قطاع فرع كل وي كون (الحاجة حسب الم فارز من عدد ق سمل كل وي تبع الحاجة حسب الأقسام من عدد فرع كل وي تبع حيث الجغراف في نطاقه ضمن الواقعة الجوي الدفاع واعد والمدنية العسكرية المطارات عن مسؤول اقليمي ف يهم بما) الجوي الدفاع واعد المطارات ضمن العامل بين والمجندين الضباط كل تضم ملقات على يد توي كل وي وزع الجوي الدفاع وك تائب المطارات عن ملقات (المدني بين العسكريين والملاحين الطيارين بما) الجغراف في نطاقه ضمن الجوي الدفاع واعد والمدنية العسكرية المطارات في العامل بين ضمن مخبريه به خاص أمن ضابط مندي أو عسكري مطار كل أن وي ذكر هذا (المدنية المطارات في الطيران مضدي في ضمن فيها هذا وي كون (م ثلاجوي دفاع ك تيدبة ل كل أمن ضابط هناك ي كون حيث) الجوي الدفاع ك تائب حوي وكذلك المطارف يه ي قع الذي القطاع عن المسؤول الجوية المخبرات فرع مع ما شرب شكل ومن سقامرت بطا الضابط أو لأمنه ضابطا ي عمل الي المطارب قائد ارتباطه من أكثر الفرع بذلك ويرتبط الجوي الدفاع تشكل أو الدفاع تشكل أو المطار أمن ضابط ك لمة ي جعل مما) لأمنه ضابطا ي عمل الذي الجوي الدفاع تشكل قائد ب موافقة ي تم أن ي جب لطائرة اقلاع أي أن وي ذكر (الجوي الدفاع تشكل أو المطار قائد ك لمة من اقوى الجوي الجوية للمخبرات الاقليمية الفروع أن وي ذكر المطارب ي يرتبط الذي الجوية المخبرات فرع مع وت نسبق الجوية القواعد من عدد داخل الخاصة واحد تجازها تحديقها مراكز تملك

: (العامية المخبرات) (الدولة أمن -ثالثاً

يسمى حيث) التسمية عن الناتج خلطهم نتيجة العام الأمن ادارة أو العام الأمن جهاز باسم خطأ البعض يه وي سم هي وفرع ثلاثة أرقام ل فروع وي كون (العامية المخبرات) ادارة الجهاز

: (دمشق في وت تواجد) المركزية الفروع -أ

هذا ضمن العامل بين جميع ملقات على يد توي حيث ل لجهاز النابض القلب وهو الاداري الفرع: 111 الفرع - أو اب عا أو ترقي في دورا وي لعب الجهاز ضمن ثغرة لأي منعا الجهاز ضمن العامل بين بمراقبة ي قوم كما الجهاز الجهاز ضمن العامل بين نقل

جهاز على تطلق الدولة أمن تسمية ب ينما الدولة أمن ب فرع خطأ البعض وي سم به الداخلي الفرع: 251 الفرع - قوات على تطلق الداخلي الأمن قوي ب ينما الداخلي ب الأمن خطأ البعض ي سم به كما كل العامية المخبرات ورصد المختلفة السياسة المجموعات بمراقبة الفرع هذا وي تخصص الداخلية وزارة تبع التي الشرطة ولذلك (الاسلامية التيارات من وخاصة) معارضة مسلحة أعمال ب وادري مراقبة الى اضافة الى سياسة الأذشطة الارهاب مكافحة ق سملط بيعة مشابهة ط بيعة ذوالارهاب مكافحة ب قسيمي سمي ق سملطه الا تابة الأقسام ف أحد الجهاز الأمن جهاز في ف لسط بين ل فرع التابع

وي حوي له المختلفة والدراسات لجهاز العامية بالمعلومات ي تخصص فرع وهو المعلومات فرع: 255 الفرع - وسائل نشاط أيضا الفرع ويراقب (السياسة والأحزاب للأديان ق سم منها) المختلفة الأقسام من ك ثيرا ب شكل أي ضامعها وي تعامل (الانترنت ف يهاب ما) والمرئية والمقروعة المسموعة والعالمية المدلية الاعلام والانترنت ب الكمبيوتر المتعلق بالخدمات ي خ تص أنه كما الجهاز عمل يهم بما مام با شر غير أو م با شر نو 255 الفرع أن ذكره والجدير العسكري الأمن لجهاز التابع الفني الفرع يشابه ب شكل ب الجهاز المرتبطة المعارضة مدعية المشبوهة المواقع أولا لنظام الموالية المواقع من ك ثير على وي شرف الانت في ك ثيف نشاط في هامة دورا أخرى فرع مع وي لعب الانترنت في والمشاركات المتعلقة اوقات ار سال في الدعاء في ل نشاطه اضافة الا لك تروني السوري الجيش ي سمي ما على الاشراف

مسؤولاً ال فرع هذا ويعد سوريا اخرج الا سد تخ بارية ال نشاطات عن المسؤول وهو الخارجي ال فرع : 279 ال فرع - أجهزة في خارج يان نشاطات مارس ال تي الأف رع من فرع أي من أكر سوريا اخرج الا سد تخ بارية الأند شطة معظم عن والعمل اخرج في ال سوري بين المغ ترب بين لمراقبة ال فرع هان شاطويم تد المخذ تلفة الأ سديّة المخابرات الأمانة المهام وتولي ال سورية الأدب لوماسديّة ال بعثات بمراقبة أي ضاي قوم كما اخرج في المعارضة ضد بالحج فيامهم أناء ال سوري بين مراقبة عن مسؤول ال فرع هذا أق سام وأحد الأدب لوماسديّة ال بعثات الم تعلقة والعمرة .

بممارسة تعلق وخارجية داخلية مهام وله ال تجسس مكافحة فرع أي ضاوي سمي ال تجسس فرع : 300 ال فرع - ال عرب ومن الأجناب من سوري ايدخل من كل بمراقبة ي قوم ال فرع هذا ب أن ويذكر المضاد وال تجسس ال تجسس ال سوري بين غير

الدورات واجراء المخابرات وعناصر ضد باطتدريب عن مسؤول ال فرع هذا ويعد تبر ال تدريب فرع :؟؟؟ ال فرع - دوره - أمانة دراسات دورة - اربل مكافحة دورة - واسد تجوابت تحقيق دورة - وثائق أمن دورة - معلومات أمن دورة) لهم أجهزة منذ تسببي أن بالذكر والجدير (الخ وت عقب مراقبة دورة - منشآت أمن دورة - هلمة شخصيات حمايه هذا وي قوم أجهزتهم في مهامهم تسلل مهم ق بل ال فرع هذا في دوراتهم بعمل ي قومون الأخرى الأ سديّة المخابرات اسد تعامل في نون على أي ضا ال تحقيق ضد باطوي درب مهامهم على والجلادين ال سجانين ب تدريب حتى ال فرع هلت عامل وقد المعتقد ن فسديّة تدميرو سبل والجسديّة ال ن فسديّة المخذ تلفة ال تعذيب أسال يبواب تكرار ساب قاورومان يا ال سوف يتي كالات حاد لنظام حلاي فة دول من سوري بين غير مخابرات ضد باطمع ال فرع المخذ تلفة الاخذ تصاصات على ال تدريب دورات في ل يعملو

من فرع كل أن رغم) الدولة أمن لجهاز الرئ يسديّة ال تحقيق هيثة بم ثابته وهو ال تحقيق فرع : 285 ال فرع - (ب.ه خاصت تحقيق سمي ملك والاق ليمية المركزية ال جهاز فرع

والاق تحلم المداهة فرع : 295 ال فرع -

مسد توى على وم فارز ال مناطق مسد توى على أق سام له ي تبع وقد محافظتة كل في فرع له) الاق ليمية ال فروع - ب : ال فروع أرقام من ون عرف (ال نواحي

حصص محافظتة فرع : 318 ال فرع

حلب محافظتة فرع : 322 ال فرع

الزوردي محافظتة فرع : 327 ال فرع

: ال سديسي الأمن - رابعاً

بين وان تشارب ال مدن يين واحد تكاكا المجمع في تغلغلا الأ سديّة الا سد تخ بارات ية الأجهزة أكر ثروه الأعمال ترخص يطل بات أو المواطن بين معاملات من وال كثر المجمع وتمع وشرايح القطر ل كامل وت غطية المواطن بين فهو المدن يين المواطن بين عن ال نظام لدى المعلومات خزان يعب تبر الذي ال جهاز ذلك موافقة تطلب والم منشآت ضد باط جعل ما وهذا المواطن على هنل وت سلطوي ن فوذولديه ال سوري ب المواطن وي حد تك ي تواصل جهاز أخطر نطاق على المواطن بين على الات باوات وفرض والارت شاء ال ن فوذاسد تغلغل عمل يات يمارسون ال جهاز هذا وعناصر من وال قمع ال تعذيب في شراسة أقل كونه رغم) ال نظام ورأس ال نظام ل سمعة مسيء أكر بر ال جهاز هذا وكان واسع ف لكل كافة ل لمواطن بين مرع باقمعا كما سرا وحشاً أصد بح حد يث (ال عسكري والأمن الجوية المخابرات جهازي عن بل ف حسب ال سديسيه آرائه عن ل يس معلوماتت ح توي قدوال تي ال جهاز هذا داخل الخاصة اضد بارت ه مواطن حتى تمس رب ما حدياته من مخ تلفة ومواقف ضعه فون قاط وأخلاقه تدي نه ومسد توى الاجتماعية وعلاقاته طباعه الداخليّة الزوجية حدياته الى تصل رب ما بل الأ سديّة علاقاته

تسمى وفروعها السابقة الثلاثة الأجهزة تمارسه كما خارجي نشاط أي يمارس ولا بد الكامل داخلية الجهاز هذا مهام : وهي ثلاثة أرقام لها أول يسقط الأسماء :

(دمشق في وقت تواجد المركزية الفروع - أ :

كما الجهاز هذا ضمن العامل بين جميع ملفات على يد حثي لجهاز النابض القلب وهو : الإداري الفروع - نقل أو إعادة أو ترقية في دوراوي لعب الجهاز ضمن ثغرة لأي منعا الجهاز ضمن العامل بين مراقبة في قوم الجهاز ضمن العامل بين

من كثر اوي حوي له المختلفة والدراسات لجهاز العامة بالمعلوماتي تخصص فروع وهو : بالمعلومات فروع - الاعلام وسائل نشاط أي ضا الفروع ويراقب (السياسة والأحزاب للأديان قسم منها) المختلفة الأقسام عمل يهتم بمباشرة غير او م باشرب شكل أي ضامعاوي تعامل والمرئية والمقروعة المسموعة والعلامة المدلية الجهاز

فروع من فروع كل أن رغم) السياسي الأمن لجهاز الرئسية التحقيقات هي ثمة بمثابة وهو : التحقيقات فروع - (به خاص تحقيقات قسمي ملك والاقليمية المركزية الجهاز

وأهدافه نشاطه تخدم والتي الجهاز في ن هذا التي العمل يات عن مسؤول وهو : العمل يات فروع -

الدوريات فروع -

سياسية نشاط أي ورصد نشاطاتها ومراقبة السياسة الأحزاب عن مسؤول وهو : السياسة الأحزاب فروع - معارض

وأذ شتتم الطلاب مراقبة عن مسؤول وهو الطلاب شؤون فروع أدياوي سمي : الطلابية والأندية الشطة الطلاب فروع - سوريا في الجامعات طلاب كل عن ملفات ولديه الطلابية

والمتابعة والمراقبة للملاحقة مخصص فروع وهو : والمراقبين المطلوبين فروع -

العامة والمؤسسات (الوزراء ورئاسة الوزارات) الحكومة مراقبة ووظيفة لها : الحكومة المؤسسة أمن شعبية - وعن عنهم المعلومات وتسجيل العام بين والمدراء الوزراء بمراقبة حثي وتقوم عليها والاشرف ل الدولة تحركاتهم

هواتف متجروا عقاري مكتوب كل ويترف تراخيص منح عن المسؤول الفروع وهو : التراخيص فروع - ع بره تراخيص على الحصول الخ... خضار محل أو خلية

الإداري لقسماضافة وله (المدنية السجن) المركزية السجن على الفروع هذاوي شرف : السجن فروع - السياسي لقسماضافة كالأدارة وظائف عدة لها المركزية السجن على موزعة أقسام التحقيقات ولقسما فروع في معه التحقيقات نتهي أن بعد السياسي المعقل أن المعروف من حثي) السجن داخل المغلق المركزية السجن أحدي المغلق السياسي القسم إلى واما عسكري السجن إلى اما تحوي له يتم المخبرات الشرطة جهاز ي تولى بينما السجن داخل المغلق السياسي القسم بإدارة سياسي أمن مفرزة وتقوم (المدنية) الأخرى الأجنحة داخل القضاء بين السجناء مراقبة إلى إضافة (القضاء بين بالسجناء الخاصة الأجنحة إدارة السجن إدارة ومراقبة (القضاء بين السجناء باقي على كمخبرين المهاجم داخل السجناء تجديدي تم حثي) السجن داخل المغلقة السياسية الأقسام إدارة الفروع هذا لقيام وإضافة ضمنه العامل بين الشرطة ومن تسبي العامل بين الدولة وموظفي الشرطة وعن القضاء بين بالسجناء خاصة ملفات يمتلك أي ضاف انه المركزية المركزية السجن ضمن

كل تغطي أف سام لهاوي تبع القطر محافظات كل في الاق ليمية ال فروع وت تذبذب (الاق ليمية ال فروع-ب
تغطية ي تم بد حيث المنطقة ضمن ال نواحي كل تغطي م فارز الأقم سام ل تلك وي تبع محافظتة كل داخل المناطق
ت واجدأب دايمكن ف لا (نادية كل في وم فرزة منطقة كل في وق سم محافظتة كل في ف رع) كامل ب شكل ال قطر
وت قوم القطر ام تداد على المواطنين مراقبة مهمة الاق ليمية ال فروع وت تولى (سياسي أمن م فرزة دون نادية
واس تلام ف يه ي قطن الذي المكان في كل المواطنين صد فوف ضمن المخبرين ب تجنيد وأقم سامهام فارزها
الأمن ف رع في ي وجد حيث ب المحافظتة ال خاص ال فرع الى وار سالها وت نظيمها وأرشفتها منهم ال تقارير
وم تجدد مس تمر ب شكل عنه الامعلومات ت دوين ي تم سكانها من مواطن ل كل ملف ب المحافظتة ال خاص ال سياسي
ب ينها ال عمل ت داخل حال في ل لجهاز المركزية ال فروع مع عملها الاق ليمية ال فروع وت نسق الامكانية حسب
المدية ب فرع ي سمى دمشق ب محافظتة ال خاص الاق ليمي ال فرع أن ي ذكر
.... قدراته جميع النظام ي فقد ال قمع به الاجهزة لهذه ال تحته ال بنية تدميري تم عندما
ضد باطو صف ضد باط من الاجهزة هه ضمن ال عاملين ال عناصر كافة اسماء وت وثيق جمع ف عمله ما يجب اهم من
الضعف ن قاطو هو ي سد تخدمونه الذي الا سلوب وب ن فس مكان كل في وملاحق تهم ومخبرين





Jihadism Transformed: Al-Qaeda and Islamic State's Global Battle of Ideas

by Simon Staffell and Akil Awan, eds.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. 296 pp. \$45.

Reviewed by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
[Middle East Quarterly](#)
Fall 2017



Jihadism Transformed contains eleven essays of varying quality, mostly focusing on the two main competing global Sunni jihadist movements: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The book examines, in particular, the narratives these groups have developed and exploited to attract recruits in different parts of the world, both in the Muslim-majority lands that represent epicenters of jihadism and in the West. The exception is an essay by Christopher Anzalone of McGill University that looks at Shiite militant mobilization in response to the perceived Sunni jihadist threat, especially in Syria.

Elisabeth Kendall of Oxford University, who has done extensive field work in Yemen, represents one of the better contributors, offering important insights into the contrasting narratives of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State's Yemen "provinces." AQAP, she shows, is more attuned to the local environment, making use of poetry and other local cultural material to attract an audience. In contrast, the Islamic State's less successful Yemen provinces have been too monochromatic, simply trying to exploit the Sunni-Shiite sectarian dynamic embodied in the civil war roiling in Yemen.

In contrast, an essay by University of Pisa's Valentina Bartolucci is a poor attempt to compare the narratives of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Islamic State. Besides reaffirming the obvious (e.g., that jihadists frequently frame events in terms of good vs. evil), the Islamic State material she chooses to examine—images from its former English language magazine *Dabiq*—appears superficial at best.*

Similarly unsatisfactory is the closing essay by Awan, one of the volume's editors, who attempts to provide a "more nuanced understanding" of the motivations of young Western Muslims to join jihadist groups. His attempts at "myth-busting" are not original and downright misleading. For example, he restates the common fallacy that religious motives are not of prime importance because many jihadists display ignorance of the details of their religion.

Overall, *Jihadism Transformed* presents some examples of solid research that could serve as a helpful primer, but the book's unevenness may obscure its value for the general reader.

* To elaborate on this point further (which did not make it into the final publication of this review because of word limits): The timeline of references in the volume extends beyond January 2016, so a much better point of comparison would surely have been the Islamic State video campaign directed at the Maghreb region that was released in that month. Besides this broader problem, the author also makes an error in claiming that AQIM praised the Islamic State for the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris. Looking at AQIM's statement on the attacks, there is no mention of the Islamic State at all, but rather just a general praise of the attackers for defending the honour of Islam while condemning France's broader role in the Muslim world.

ISIS Defectors: Inside Stories of the Terrorist Caliphate

by Anne Speckhard and Ahmet Yayla
McLean (Virginia): Advances Press, 2016, 372 pp., \$24.99

Reviewed by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

[Center for the Study of Narrative & Conflict Resolution \(George Mason University\)](#)

January 26, 2017



Unlike other books about ISIS on the market, Anne Speckhard and Ahmet Yayla have drawn exclusively for their original research on the extensive testimonies of Syrian defectors from the organization, Europeans who returned to their home countries, and the families of these people in an attempt to shed light on the inner workings of ISIS. By relaying these testimonies, the authors hope to dent ISIS recruitment through exposing the grim realities of life under the self-declared Caliphate that demands the allegiance of the world's Muslims and ultimately strives for global dominion.

To their credit, Speckhard and Yayla demonstrate a clear aptitude for interviewing their subjects, winning their trust and teasing out much information while showing clear awareness of issues of sensitivity and ethics surrounding this line of research, such as posttraumatic stress problems for those who underwent horrific experiences during their time in ISIS, whether in witnessing brutal executions or the phenomenon of sex slavery and mass rape.

In addition, the authors do not take all the testimony at face value, but rather compare different accounts to understand when an interviewee's testimony may be inaccurate or withholding the complete picture for whatever reason. For instance, when interviewing an ex-ISIS cadre going by the name of Abu Walid, the authors point out, based on other sources they have, that he only refers obliquely to joining ISIS and fighting for the group, leaving the details of the course of events rather murky (pp. 77–8). In a similar vein, Speckhard and Yayla assess that one of their other defectors- going by the name of Ibn Ahmed- is wrong in downplaying ISIS recruitment in the refugee camps in Turkey, relying on other accounts they have of the problem (p. 259).

Particularly interesting nuggets of information turn up occasionally in the interviews. For example, one of the Syrian defectors references the use of mannequins as decoys to mislead coalition aircraft as they are dressed to look like IS fighters (p. 130). As it so happens, this practice was reported only recently by Reuters in light of the ongoing operations to retake Mosul, ISIS' main holding in Iraq. Likewise, references turn up later on the controversy over whether ISIS uses females as suicide bombers (pp. 229–232). The testimony gathered by the authors suggests that this phenomenon exists. Its existence is corroborated by documentary evidence in an internally distributed propaganda series known as *Qisas al-Mujahideen* ("Stories of the Mujahideen") that attests to at least one female suicide bombing carried out in the Kobani area, whereas the externally distributed propaganda consisting of dozens of items released daily on the Internet does not advertise female suicide bombers.

Stylistically, the book's prose is easy to follow and at times makes for a highly compelling read, borne out above all in the tale of Laila, the French woman of Palestinian descent who joined ISIS along with her husband but then fled following his death while still

pregnant, making a perilous journey with local help from al-Bab in north Aleppo to Turkey.

However, these merits should not blind the reader to the book's multiple and considerable shortcomings. There are a number of serious errors in the book that primarily occur in the explanatory sections of the text. The estimate figure of 30,000 foreign fighters does not refer to the number of foreign fighters who have joined ISIS (p. 21), but rather the total number of Sunni foreign fighters that have entered the Syria-Iraq arena of conflict, many of whom will have joined other groups that feature foreign fighters in their ranks, such as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and the Turkestan Islamic Party. Haji Bakr-ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's right-hand man who helped plan the initial expansion strategy in Syria- was not killed by U.S. forces (p. 80) but rather local rebels in north Aleppo who did not initially appreciate his significance. The leaked ISIS personnel files do not consist of data on 22,000 foreign recruits (p. 87): 22,000 is rather the approximate size of the original data dump, consisting largely of replicated files.

The designation Khawarij- a common Arabic derogatory term used by Sunnis to denounce ISIS as extremist- does not refer to a renegade tribe from Prophet Muhammad's time (p. 90) but rather a sect that emerged in the decades after his death. Tel Abyad, a key town on Syria's northern border with Turkey that served as an important point of entry for supplies for ISIS, was not captured in June 2014 (p. 104), but rather in January 2014 from the rebels, with whom ISIS had previously worked to expel Kurdish militias from the town in August 2013. The account of the North Caucasian jihadi outfit Caucasus Emirate's relations with ISIS is very confused (p. 145). While large contingents of the Caucasus Emirate within the North Caucasus (which certainly did not have 15,000 members in total) have defected to ISIS, the Caucasus Emirate still survives and commands some loyalty among North Caucasian jihadis operating in Syria, not all of whom have joined ISIS.

Mistakes also arise in recording of the testimony: most notably, the authors translate the name of the powerful rebel group Ahrar al-Sham as "The Army of the Levant" (p. 91): in fact, the group's name means "Free Men of al-Sham." Moreover, in the main text the authors appear to confuse the term *mujahideen* ("holy warriors") with *muhajireen* ("migrants") (pp. 166 ff.): the former term is not used to refer in particular to foreign fighters, but rather any fighter within ISIS. The latter term is the one that is used to contrast with the *ansar* ("supporters"), referring to local Syrians and Iraqis who either support the group or are active members/fighters. That said, the distinction of terms is correctly made in the glossary provided by the authors at the end of the book (pp. 345-8).

Thematically, some of the issues raised are less original and in so far as they might be used to formulate a case against ISIS, they can be quite easily dismissed. Repeated reference is made to sale of oil by ISIS to the Assad regime (p. 161 and pp. 327-8), as though it were some deal of the devil. In fact, there is nothing surprising or unusual about this phenomenon in the environment of a war economy. Since ISIS controls the main oil reserves in Syria, it can generate significant revenue from sale of oil to territories controlled by all sides in the Syrian civil war, despite being at war with all other factions.

Indeed, the idea that sale of oil can occur outside of ISIS territory is sanctioned in an internal text known as Principles in the Administration of the Islamic State.

In this context, it should also be pointed out that the authors use references erroneously in stating that "three quarters of the oil wealth that ISIS is thought to have brought in during 2015, according to captured documents, came through trades with those close to the Assad regime" (p. 327). The Abu Sayyaf computer records captured by the U.S. actually suggest that over a period of six months ending in late February 2015, 72% of ISIS Diwan al-Rikaz ("natural resource department") revenues came from Abu Sayyaf's division of Syrian oil-producing areas, going by the Wall Street Journal's reporting on the records to which the references can be ultimately traced. The original source does not state that this 72% of revenue generated for the Diwan al-Rikaz came from sales to the Assad regime.

More generally, too much space is given for interviewees to indulge in unconvincing conspiracy theories where the biases become apparent. To be sure, the authors do not necessarily accept these ideas wholesale, like Abu Zafir's claim that ISIS is heavily infiltrated and manipulated by Shi'a (pp. 159–161), but for a book that is trying to dissuade people from joining ISIS, poorly grounded conspiracy theories only risk throwing the credibility of the defectors' testimony into doubt. At one point, the authors even speculate that "for those sectarian haters seeking to destroy each other, some Shia may want to use ISIS or any other means, to destroy Sunni populations" (p. 161). This sort of speculation is irresponsible, especially in light of the heavily sectarian charged atmosphere that pervades the Middle East today.

More than once, space is given to the notion that ISIS has somehow been deliberately yielding territory to Kurdish forces in a manner that suggests collusion (p. 104 and p. 164), an idea that is given more credibility than the Shi'a infiltration notions. In fact, the relatively quick loss of Tel Abyad is explained by the fact that ISIS cannot commit with intensity on every front at once, and simply has too many enemies arrayed against it. The campaign to conquer Kobani proved disastrous in the face of hundreds of coalition airstrikes, with ISIS effectively wasting considerable manpower and weaponry. This contributed to a weakening of the northern front against the Kurdish forces, and thus the rapid losses that culminated in the fall of Tel Abyad. A somewhat similar scenario has emerged in north Aleppo countryside, where fierce battles over Manbij with Kurdish forces meant that ISIS has not been able to withstand the Turkish-backed rebel offensive that began in late summer this year, effectively withdrawing from Jarabulus, a key border town, without a fight.

Although as mentioned above, the authors do engage in some critical analysis of the various accounts handed to them by defectors, there are occasions where such analysis is needed but lacking. Had the authors perused internal ISIS documentary evidence, they would have been able to check certain claims made in the testimonies that are simply incorrect. For example, one defector called Abu Ahmed asserts that "under ad-Dawla [ISIS], the girls don't go to school. There is no education for them. Only their mahrams can educate them" (p. 102). In fact, documentary evidence shows that girls can and do go to school under ISIS rule, albeit in a segregated environment.

Another defector called Abu Jamal is quoted as saying that "there is no Internet inside ad-Dawlah and it is not allowed" (p. 144). A parenthetical note inserted after these remarks to clarify that Internet is only allowed at ISIS "post offices." On the contrary, private Internet access in the form of wi-fi and satellite connections existed for a considerable period of time in a number of areas. The trend now is to ban such private access and restrict Internet access to licensed "Internet halls" and cafes, undoubtedly driven in part by ISIS concern that information has been leaked to the coalition through private Internet access, such that multiple high-ranking personnel have been taken out in coalition airstrikes and raids.

In conclusion, though the authors deserve praise for the impressive amount of original research in recording and compiling testimonies, with Yayla standing out as a particularly brave figure in light of the dangers he faced in southern Turkey with the threat of assassination at the hands of ISIS and his criticism of Turkish government policies, the book's flaws mean that it cannot be seen as the definitive refutation of ISIS propaganda it purports to be. In any case, the group's appeal has already been significantly diminished through territorial and other losses at the hands of the coalition that have undermined its statehood image, in addition to much improved Turkish border security. These developments have done more than any counter-narratives of interviews, discourse and books to undermine ISIS. Even so, regardless of whether this work fulfils its agenda, many of the accounts provided are well-worth reading from the perspective of general reader or specialist.

The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency

by Charles Lister

London: C. Hurst & Co., 2015. 520 pp. £15.99

Reviewed by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

[Middle East Review of International Affairs](#)

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The trajectory of the Syrian civil war has given rise to a flurry of books, which in relation to the Sunni jihadist component mostly focus on the Islamic State (IS). Charles Lister's new book The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency (2015, Hurst) attempts a more grand undertaking in trying to offer a granular account of the rise of the jihadist aspect of the insurgency against the Assad regime, following events chronologically from the period prior to the outbreak of the civil war and ending approximately at the time of the beginning of the overt Russian intervention in Syria in October 2015. While Lister's book may be a useful guide to military events, occasionally offering interesting insights, ultimately this work cannot be regarded as a definitive account.

The trajectory of the Syrian civil war has given rise to a flurry of books, which in relation to the Sunni jihadist component mostly focus on the Islamic State (IS). Charles Lister's new book *The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency* (2015, Hurst) attempts a more grand undertaking in trying to offer a granular account of the rise of the jihadist aspect of the insurgency against the Assad regime. He chooses to follow events in a chronological order over fourteen chapters, the first three of which aim to provide background on economic and political conditions in Syria as well as on the regime's facilitation of jihadist activity prior to the outbreak of the civil war. The remaining chapters then go through the timeline of the Syrian civil war in periods of a few or several months per chapter with an interlude covering the history of IS in the eleventh chapter. The book's chronology ends approximately at the time of the beginning of the overt Russian intervention in Syria in October 2015.

Of course, Lister's project entails considerable attention devoted to IS. Yet it also focuses on the al-Qa'ida-aligned part of the insurgency, chiefly embodied in Jabhat al-Nusra ("The Support Front"), which has, in the time since the book's publication, rebranded itself as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham ("Conquest of al-Sham Front") after ostensibly dropping links to al-Qa'ida in July 2016. Alongside Jabhat al-Nusra are some smaller "third-way" entities that are aligned ideologically with, if not explicitly linked to, al-Qa'ida. This category includes the coalition called Jabhat Ansar al-Din ("Supporters of the Religion Front"), North Caucasian-led groups, the Turkistan Islamic Party led by ethnic Uyghurs, and Jund al-Aqsa ("Soldiers of al-Aqsa"), which, like many other groups within this category, has by now formally joined Jabhat Fatah al-Sham.

Further, as part of his approach, Lister rightly chooses to examine the powerful movement called Ahrar al-Sham ("Free Men of al-Sham"), which appears to straddle a nebulous zone between the clearly jihadist groups and the more mainstream insurgency that may consist of many Islamist groups but operates within a clear national framework regarding Syria's future.

In principle, Lister's undertaking is an excellent idea. Too many of the books on IS, for example, do not really touch on the Syrian civil war with the kind of depth that might help the reader understand how it rose to such prominence inside Syria. Many only regurgitate basic chronological points of the war, sometimes confused in the basic facts. The author is a former fellow at the Brookings Doha institute in Qatar and currently a fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington DC. Having also done work as a consultant with the Shaikh Group, he has extensive experience in the Track II initiatives which have been going on behind the scenes in Turkey and Europe and which aim to foster understandings among parties on all sides for an eventual political solution to the Syrian civil war. Lister's work in Track II initiatives and his broader research have entailed extensive contact with a broad spectrum of Syrian rebel groups as well as jihadists in both the al-Qa'ida and IS camps. In theory, therefore, one would hope for a highly incisive account of the Syrian jihad.

The end product, however, is ultimately a disappointment. To be sure, there are interesting bits in the book that are worth the time of both the general reader and specialist. For instance, the author offers useful behind-the-scenes material, partly drawing on his inside contacts, as regards the agitations by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi—then

the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq—to bring Jabhat al-Nusra under his formal command in the run-up to his unilateral announcement of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in April 2013.^[1] These events constitute one of the most important episodes of the Syrian jihad, and of the jihad in a more global sense, in opening up the beginnings of the ongoing international rivalry between al-Qa'ida and IS. Noteworthy also is the back story on the formation of the Jaysh al-Fatah ("Army of Conquest") coalition in spring 2015 led by Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham, the most powerful rebel coalition in northern Syria today. Lister shows that the discussions and planning went far back as the winter of 2014, as Turkey stepped up its backing for Ahrar al-Sham, convening discussions that included U.S.-backed factions regarding the formation of a bigger operations room that would first dislodge the regime from its military bases of Wadi al-Daif and al-Hamidiya and then move to take Idlib city.^[2]

Yet it can be easy to miss these significant nuggets. In general, this book reads too much like an encyclopedic chronicle of various military developments that have taken place over the course of the Syrian civil war. The author frequently employs the adverb "meanwhile" in his narrative, using it to abruptly shift his focus to events occurring elsewhere geographically. As such, the various sections do not cohere together to produce a compelling account of the Syrian jihad through effectively connecting pieces of information.

Besides the book's lack of linkage of data points, Lister has devoted too much space to content of little analytical value, such as detailed summaries of the infamous IS beheading videos of foreign hostages, reproducing predictable threats to the West from IS executioner "Jihadi John,"^[3] recounting at length the kidnapping and execution of Japanese nationals by IS,^[4] and discussing whether or not aid worker Peter Kassig's beheading was staged through citation of readily available secondary material.^[5] In a similar vein, there is unnecessary reproduction of long chunks of easily accessible speeches by the likes of Abu Muhammad al-Adnani^[6] and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,^[7] much of which comprises rhetorical flourish which does not merit comment, or which could have been briefly paraphrased. One cannot help wondering whether the author has included so much of this material simply to fill a word count of some sort.

The result of these shortcomings is that the book is highly uneven. Many important events in the Syrian jihad are either omitted, referenced very briefly or dealt with inadequately in so far as there is a treatment of some length. Part of the problem may derive from lack of familiarity with Arabic source material. For instance, Lister's account of the development of IS-linked groups in southern Syria and the attending tensions that culminated in open clashes in late 2014^[8] is unsatisfactory. He mentions the assassination of the Afghan jihad veteran Ahmad Kassab al-Masalama in Deraa in November 2014, but does not explain what his position was or attempt to explain why the assassination might have taken place.

This is so despite evidence in Arabic source material at the time that showed Masalama was part of the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade (YMB), and that he was suspected of being a supporter of IS.^[9] Masalama was in fact one of the first links between YMB and IS, having gone to visit Raqqa after IS declared the Caliphate.^[10] YMB accused Jabhat al-Nusra both at the time of Masalama's death and in a subsequent video of being behind his

assassination. Rather than touching on this essential information, Lister suddenly throws YMB's name into his chronicle of events without any real explanation as to the background, leadership and power base of the group. In addition, he fails to mention the fact that YMB had abandoned the FSA Southern Front in summer 2014 and had clashed in that season with Harakat al-Muthanna al-Islamiya (HMI). HMI is a southern Syrian jihadist group mentioned repeatedly in Lister's book[11] without any real background account, despite concerns which began arising in spring 2015 that it too was connected with IS[12]—a development which is entirely omitted from the book. On top of all of these content deficiencies surrounding the development of IS affiliates in Deraa, no citations are given for this section.

Another event worthy of consideration here is Lister's treatment of the Qalb Lawze massacre of villagers at the hands of Jabhat al-Nusra in June 2015. The incident is of importance as it highlights the sensitive issue of how jihadists have treated populations of religious/ethnic minority origin under their rule in Syria.[13] The village of Qalb Lawze—originally Druze—is located in the Jabal al-Summaq area in the north of Idlib province. Important context for the incident is missing in Lister's account. How did Jabhat al-Nusra come to have a presence in the area, such that its Tunisian commander could be confiscating property? Unfortunately, the author has not tied the group's dominance of the Jabal al-Summaq area with its expulsion of the Syrian Revolutionaries Front from Idlib province in late 2014.[14] Nor does Lister even note the conversions to Sunni Islam forcibly imposed on the local population by Jabhat al-Nusra in January 2015, even though it was subtly referred to in Abu Muhammad al-Jowlani's interview with Ahmad Mansour of al-Jazeera Arabic in May 2015, a point which Lister curiously omits from his account of that pivotal interview.[15]

This point is highly relevant because Jabhat al-Nusra's approach towards local Druze inhabitants is identical to that of ISIS, which also imposed conversions to Sunni Islam on the population in late November 2013 when it had an extensive presence in Idlib province.[16] Besides not referencing the central context points, Lister does not adequately explain the confiscations of homes: they were occurring as Jabhat al-Nusra wished to confiscate property of people from the area serving in the Syrian army and other regime forces, distributing the property to internally displaced persons and to its own members. Finally, there is no mention of Jabhat al-Nusra's promise to hold the perpetrators of the Qalb Lawze massacre accountable,[17] and while the Tunisian commander was removed from his position, no trial was actually ever held against him.

Beyond these particular incidents, there are wider gaps in the book's content that are symptomatic of Lister's excessive focus on battles and estimated numbers of fighters. For example, there is no real consideration of how jihadist and rebel factions interact with the numerous local councils that have sprung up in areas outside of regime control.[18] The absence of substantive discussion of jihadist and rebel judiciary authority is particularly striking. The Dar al-Qada, a *de facto* judiciary wing of Jabhat al-Nusra which was formed in mid-summer 2014, and which represents a significant evolution towards greater unilateralism on law and order, receives just one passing mention,[19] thrown into the narrative without an account of its origins and development. In this passing reference, Lister offers no local context in his account of the particular moves by the Dar al-Qada's north Aleppo branch in January 2015 against the 'Free Police' structures in the area. In

fact, the Dar al-Qada in the area has enjoyed wider support, whereas in parts of Idlib province the Dar al-Qada's existence has simply been equivalent to where a Jabhat al-Nusra stronghold can be found. This dynamic also explains the implementation by Dar al-Qada in north Aleppo of harsh *hudud* punishments such as stoning to death for certain offences.[\[20\]](#)

To offer another example in the realm of judicial matters: Lister does not analyze Jabhat al-Nusra's machinations on Shari'a commissions at the macro and micro[\[21\]](#) level in Deir az-Zor in detail—a glaring fault considering that Deir az-Zor arguably once constituted the group's most important holdings in Syria before they were lost to IS by mid-summer 2014. And yet another case: there is no mention, let alone discussion, of Ahrar al-Sham-supported service and judicial bodies like the Islamic Commission to Administer the Liberated Areas.[\[22\]](#)

In terms of the book's factual accuracy, some errors crop up here and there, though their impact is not too grave. The official title of ISIS' immediate predecessor was *Dawlat al-Iraq al-Islamiya* ("The Islamic State of Iraq"), not *al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi'l-Iraq* ("The Islamic State in Iraq") as Lister has it.[\[23\]](#) The 'of/in' distinction may seem pedantic, but it is important in illustrating the ambiguity of the Islamic State of Iraq's relationship with al-Qa'ida, in that the name could be taken to imply an emirate project solely limited to Iraq's borders and working within the grander framework of al-Qa'ida's authority. The self-referencing was not always consistent, but once ISIS officially emerged, geography just became a matter of coincidence: the Islamic State happened to be in Iraq and al-Sham at the present time. The name change thus takes on greater significance since it can be seen as the first step towards a much more ambitious assertion of the desire to lead the resurrection of the Caliphate independent of al-Qa'ida's directives.

Moreover, it is not true, as Lister claims, that no reliable evidence ever emerged of sectarian misconduct by the rebels and jihadists who took over the Armenian Christian town of Kessab in north Latakia spring 2014.[\[24\]](#) While nothing points to large-scale massacres, journalist Ruth Sherlock reported desecration of the town's churches in a visit some time after the town had been retaken.[\[25\]](#) Contemporary evidence also suggested misconduct, such as Syria-based Saudi jihadi cleric Sheikh Muheissen's tweets on the Battle of Anfal (as the offensive was known), celebrating the smashing of crosses and bottles of wine.[\[26\]](#) This conduct fits into a pattern that suggested a plan to remake the town as one of Islamic identity—something reflected in evidence at the time of an initiative called "Islamic Kessab."[\[27\]](#) Another error of note is Lister's confusion regarding the FSA group Liwa Allahu Akbar of Albukamal.[\[28\]](#) Lister reports that this group clashed with ISIS in September 2013, when in fact, the main clash was with Jabhat al-Nusra.[\[29\]](#) In this case, verifying the facts is not helped by Lister's lack of citation of sources for the incident.

On the whole, Lister's book could serve as a useful guide at times for a quick reference on military events in certain months of the Syrian civil war leading up to October 2015 or so. It also has occasionally interesting insights as explained earlier in this review. However, his work cannot be regarded as a definitive account of the jihadist insurgency in Syria and is not worth slogging through from start to finish if this is what one is looking for. The

book certainly does not merit being considered a classic of jihadism literature, while comparisons of its writing style with that of Tom Clancy come across as sycophantic.[\[30\]](#)

There is certainly room for constructive suggestions for a future edition of the book that would lead to considerable improvement. Unfortunately, the potential to have reasonable public debate is often drowned out by *ad hominem* attacks on Twitter, deriding the author as a stooge of Qatar and engaging in simple name-calling like "armchair Blister" and "Jihad Lister."[\[31\]](#) The first step for improving the book is to reduce the amount of content that does not have much analytical value. Certain episodes should also be revisited with the view to exploring more Arabic source material from the time and perhaps looking for relevant local contacts to shed further light if possible. In the course of 2016, the author has shown he has valuable insights on the rebranding of Jabhat al-Nusra to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham[\[32\]](#): this development will of course have to be incorporated into any future account of the Syrian jihad.

In any case, reviewing this book provides an important lesson for those covering the Syrian civil war more generally. While the airwaves of social media have been flooded with streams of information about military operations, group statements, formations of new coalitions and the like, we do not really have a clear picture of how the various rebel groups operate on the ground on a day-to-day basis. Understanding the internal dynamics and how personal relationships work between the factions—especially at the local level, which is of paramount importance—is severely hampered by lack of opportunity for researchers to report and observe independently on the ground in rebel-held Syria. This fact became readily apparent over the course of reading this book, as Lister has not been inside Syria even once during the war. In other words, the lack of first-hand experience of the war shows in the book. Even so, that is not something that should be used to mock the author: there are rational fears for one's safety and practical obstacles to this kind of field work. In addition, it must be stressed that it is possible to be on the ground and be misled and get things wrong. This caution applies regardless of which side one chooses to embed with and cover during the war.[\[33\]](#)

Of course, it is possible to establish connections with sources on the ground through online means and personal meetings outside of Syria, but this approach also has problematic limitations. One's information on a group may only be as good as what is said by one's contacts in that group, but can we necessarily be sure that the information will not be spun according to what the source or sources may perceive to be the outsider's agenda (for instance, advocacy work in policy circles)?

In the end, it was difficult to come away from Lister's book with a sense of getting even remotely close to *the* inside story on the jihadist factions, but it is unlikely that an account will emerge anytime soon that will bring us much closer to this ideal. Considering that Lister is widely presented as an authority on the Syrian insurgency and is being paid to research the phenomenon, we should all be clear in acknowledging what we can and cannot know.

NOTES

[1] pp. 124-6 (all page numbers alone refer to Lister's book, *The Syrian Jihad* (2015, Hurst))

[2] pp. 341-3

[3] pp. 281-2, 309

[4] pp. 325-8

[5] p. 309

[6] pp. 289-91

[7] pp. 239-40

[8] p. 313

[9] "Assassination of an important leader from the supporters of the Dawla organization in Deraa, and eyes towards Jordan," STEP Agency, November 11, 2014 (<http://stepagency-sy.net/archives/23491>). It should be noted Masalama was a Shari'i (cleric/religious official) in YMB.

[10] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "The Jihadi Threat on Israel's Northern Border," MERIA, May 15, 2016 (<http://www.rubincenter.org/2016/05/the-jihadi-threat-on-israels-northern-border/>)

[11] pp. 169, 172, 223, 285, 313, 314, 324, 339

[12] "Harakat al-Muthanna supports the 'Islamic State and the Caliph' and Da'esh secretly threatens some of the Free Army factions in Quneitra," STEP Agency, March 8, 2015 (<http://stepagency-sy.net/archives/37383>)

[13] pp. 360-1

[14] pp. 301-2

[15] pp. 353-4

[16] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "Additional Notes on the Druze of Jabal al-Summaq," October 6, 2015 (<http://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/10/additional-notes-on-the-druze-of-jabal-al-summaq>)

[17] "Jabhat al-Nusra statement about the events of the village of Qalb Lawze in Idlib countryside," Syrian Press Center, June 23, 2015 (<https://syrianpc.com/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AB-%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%84%D9%88/>)

[18] An excellent study on local councils and interactions with armed actors has recently come out, looking at the case of Idlib province. See Sam Heller, "Keeping the Lights on in Rebel Idlib," The Century Foundation, November 29, 2016 (<https://tcf.org/content/report/keeping-lights-rebel-idlib/>)

[19] p. 322

[20] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "Archive of Jabhat al-Nusra Dar al-Qada Documents," March 3, 2015 (<http://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/03/archive-of-jabhat-al-nusra-dar-al-qaa-documents>)

[21] On the micro-level: e.g. in the important town of Albukamal bordering Iraq.

[22] "What is the Islamic Commission to Administer the Liberated Areas? What are its activities?" El-Dorar, August 22, 2015 (<http://eldorar.com/node/84377>)

[23] p. 143

[24] p. 212

[25] Ruth Sherlock, "Dispatch: Syria's rebels 'burned down churches and destroyed Christian graves,'" The Telegraph, January 3, 2015 (<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11323109/Dispatch-Syria-rebels-burned-down-churches-and-destroyed-Christian-graves.html>)

[26] Muheisseni's tweets collected on March 24, 2014 (<https://justpaste.it/marsad26>)

[27] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "The Latakia Front," Brown Moses Blog, April 26, 2014 (<http://www.aymennjawad.org/14706/the-latakia-front>)

[28] p. 166

[29] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "The Factions of Abu Kamal," Brown Moses Blog, December 18, 2013 (<http://www.aymennjawad.org/14161/the-factions-of-abu-kamal>). A clearer copy of Jabhat al-Nusra's statement issued on September 16, 2013 regarding its clashes with Liwa Allahu Akbar can be found here: <https://justpaste.it/jabhatnusraalbukamalstatementsep>. Thus, Lister's claim that Jabhat al-Nusra had grown close to Liwa Allahu Akbar is absurd.

[30] James Denselow, "The rise and rise of the Syrian jihad," The Huffington Post, November 12, 2016 (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-rise-and-rise-of-the-syrian-jihad_us_582731e1e4b057e23e3143f9?)

[31] A sample collection of these insults can be viewed here: <https://justpaste.it/insultsagainstcharleslister>

[32] E.g. Charles Lister, "The dawn of mass jihad: Success in Syria fuels al-Qa'ida's evolution," CTC Sentinel, September 7, 2016 (<https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-dawn-of-mass-jihad-success-in-syria-fuels-al-qaidas-evolution>)

[33] For example, the rebel group Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki, founded in Aleppo in 2012* and primarily operating in that area, has acquired a reputation as the archetype 'baddie rebels' since a video emerged of members beheading a child earlier this year. There appear to be attempts in light of this incident to project the group's role onto past events despite the lack of any real supporting evidence from the time. An example is the fall of the town of Harem in Idlib province in 2012 as related by regime supporters from the town who subsequently fled to Latakia. Nothing substantiates their claim that Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki played any meaningful role in the battle for the town. See Nour Samaha, "Internally displaced Syrians find shelter, but few friends, in Latakia," Al-Monitor, September 8, 2016 (<http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/09/syria-internally-displaced-latakia-idlib.html>)

*[**Note (4 January 2017)**]: see also [this al-Jazeera interview](#) with the group's leader in March 2014, in which he traces the establishment and beginning of military operations for his group more precisely to November 2011, even as explicit references to the group do not seem to come to light until 2012. In that interview, he mentions operations in the Sarmada area in response to a question about the most important successes that the group is proud of, but nothing about the town of Harem and its environs that are further out to the west. It is also possible Samaha's interviewees are playing on history, as Harem was the [site of an important battle between the historical Nour al-Din Zinki and Christian forces](#). Perhaps some of the rebels at the time saw the capture of Harem as a modern-day re-enactment of that battle and may even have written his name on walls, which could match a line of testimony in the article. Still, that does not corroborate the claim that Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki played a role in the capture of Harem in 2012, and as stated above, the reputation the group has acquired as archetype 'baddie rebels' seems to be at play here].

The Internationalization of ISIS: The Muslim State in Iraq and Syria

by Raphael Israeli

New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2016. 287 pp. \$79.95

Reviewed by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

[Middle East Quarterly](#)

Winter 2017



Israeli's book reads more like an attempt to cash in on interest in the Islamic State than a serious investigation into the phenomenon. Besides being a re-articulation of the author's own prejudices (e.g., there is no such thing as "moderate Islam"), much of the book comprises rambling disquisitions that provide no insight into the Islamic State; long paraphrases of single articles written and published by others; precious little by way of citations to support his arguments, and virtually no engagement of primary sources in Arabic.

On the subject of the Islamic State, basic errors immediately arise. Ansar al-Shari'a in Libya is aligned with al-Qaeda, and has not pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. The Islamic State did not begin "as a subordinate to [Syrian-based] Jabhat al-Nusra in early 2011." In fact, what was then "the Islamic State of Iraq" played a primary role in establishing Jabhat al-Nusra by dispatching operatives into Syria in mid-2011 with weapons and financial support. Considering that Israeli discusses Nigerian-based Boko Haram at some length, his lack of awareness that the terror group pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in March 2015 is baffling.

Stylistically, the book suffers from repetition of content and could have benefited greatly from an editor's clarifying red pen: In a discussion of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for example, several sentences suggest Mohamed Morsi is still president despite the author's also referring to his overthrow in the July 2013 coup.

This is not the book for readers looking for a good summary of ISIS's global dimensions.

Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate

by Abdel Bari Atwan

Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015. 256 pp. \$24.95

Reviewed by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

[*Middle East Quarterly*](#)

Fall 2016



Translations of this item:

Portuguese

At best, Atwan's book amounts to a rehash of common facts and knowledge associated with the Islamic State. Worse, it contains a large number of errors, ultimately rendering the account worthless.

For example, the author, former editor-in-chief of the London-based *al-Quds al-Arabi*, claims that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) "has already pledged allegiance to [ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-] Baghdadi." In fact, AQAP remains loyal to al-Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri and explicitly rejects ISIS's caliphate claim. Atwan claims that Libya's Ansar ash-Sharia declared allegiance to Baghdadi and announced an Islamic emirate in Derna in October 2014. No: Ansar ash-Sharia remains loyal to al-Qaeda while the group in Derna, which pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, is called the Islamic Shura Youth Council.

The author claims to draw on special contacts and sources that give him unique insights into the Islamic State. But one such source, allegedly close to the ISIS leadership, having spent time in prison with Baghdadi, speaks of the latter's release in 2006 while prison records document Baghdadi's release in 2004.

A number of books on the Islamic State, themselves flawed, offer useful information and perspectives. Berger and Stern's *ISIS: The State of Terror*^[1] is weak on ISIS's growth on the ground in Syria but has good detail on the exploitation of social media. Such redeeming features cannot be found in *The Digital Caliphate*, a work that is also littered with political prejudices such as the author's speculation, rooted in his anti-Israel sentiments, that the final trigger that galvanized the U.S. decision to invade Iraq was "Saddam's use of oil as a potent political weapon against Israel." Anyone interested in the Islamic State—general reader or specialist—should avoid this book.

^[1] New York: Ecco, 2015.

ISIS: The State of Terror

by JM Berger and Jessica Stern
HarperCollins [385 pp. (hardcover)]: \$27.99

Reviewed by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
[Syria Comment](#)
March 27, 2015



The ISIS phenomenon that has swept Iraq and Syria with global repercussions has produced a demand for information on the origins, rise, operations and future of arguably the most brutal jihadist movement yet. Following on from "[ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror](#)," Berger and Stern's book is the second major title to come out on the subject. In 11 chapters, the authors begin with the origins of ISIS through Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi and his predecessor groups in the days of the Iraq War, with the apparent fall of what then became the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in the aftermath of his death on account of the surge and Sunni Awakening movement in Iraq, to the rebirth of ISI under new leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi since 2010. This rebirth culminated in the renaming to the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), expansion through Syria, and the eventual lightning surge through northern and western Iraq that led to the further rebranding as just the "Islamic State" or the Caliphate, currently controlling a vast swathe of contiguous territory from Mosul in Iraq to northeast Aleppo countryside.

What follows- and this constitutes the main bulk of the book- is an in-depth analysis of ISIS' use of media techniques to advertise itself, including focus on video releases of military operations, recruitment of foreign fighters, manipulation of Twitter to inflate ISIS' presence and the pushback against the ISIS presence on social media. The authors then analyze the ongoing international competition between ISIS and al-Qa'ida for support, while also exploring the psychological impacts of ISIS' actions (e.g. child recruitment) and the apocalyptic nature of its ideology. The book concludes with a survey of Western policy responses, real and potential, to the ISIS phenomenon. There is also an appendix written by a doctoral student with a primer on Islam and notions of the

Caliphate, jihad and *takfir* (the practice of declaring others who say they are Muslim to be non-Muslims).

The main strength of the book and its most original contributions come in the sections on ISIS' exploitation of social media. Rather than simply stating the obvious that 'ISIS is on social media and is good at it' (a non-story), the authors explore in detail the manipulation techniques used, with a noteworthy account on the development of the "Dawn of Glad Tidings" application (p. 148f.), created by a Palestinian and designed to tweet out links to official ISIS media releases and promote hashtags ISIS wanted to use. The most notable result of this phenomenon- from April till June 2014- was to scare Iraqis in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Mosul with threats of an ISIS march on Baghdad to conquer the capital: [*qadimun ya Baghdad*](#), as one of the Arabic slogans went.

Incidentally, there are two things about this instance of inflation on social media not noted by the authors. The first is that this scare tactic has contributed in no small part to the mythology that endures to this day among Iraq's Shi'a (and also among many analysts) that had there been no mass Shi'a militia mobilization, Baghdad would have fallen. This mythology has helped to consolidate the sectarian paramilitary response ISIS wanted. Second, the particular slogan ISIS exploited is one widely known and used among Iraq Sunni insurgent circles in the belief that Baghdad should be under Sunni control. Indeed, it is most popular with ISIS' main insurgent rival in Iraq- the Ba'athist-Sufi *Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia* (JRTN). Arguably, this ISIS hijacking of a popular Sunni insurgent slogan helped it to gain the upper hand very rapidly over other factions in places like Mosul and Tikrit (where one thought JRTN might have been able to wield more influence), as locals and insurgents saw ISIS as the winning horse that would retake Baghdad, prompting defections to ISIS.

Besides the Dawn application, another notable strategy of online ISIS inflation highlighted by Berger and Stern is the use of so-called *mujtahidun*-supporters who would begin a process of obsessive retweeting with hashtags to further ISIS' reach on social media (p. 155). The authors further make a sound argument on the net benefit of terminating ISIS/pro-ISIS accounts to reduce online appeal: though they note it is not full-proof to stamp out ISIS completely from the world of the Internet, suspensions seem to reduce the overall reach of replacement accounts, and trump the argument of allowing complete free space to collect intel. Indeed, as Berger and Stern point out, no one ever makes a similar argument to allow child pornographers to operate online- let alone open access social media- without impediment, even as doing so would allow much intel to be gathered on their activities (p. 141).

The concluding section on policy recommendations deserves credit for some insightful thoughts. Rather than proposing a grand master plan to 'defeat/destroy ISIS' as has become so common in think-tank circles, the authors broadly suggest a policy of containment and online messaging disruption, noting that the present approach of trying to defeat/destroy ISIS via airstrikes and some training of native ground troops in Iraq and Syria likely cannot realize such an ambitious goal. Critics of the terrorism analysis field often accuse those who work within it of overhyping the threat for personal gain. This charge certainly cannot be applied to Berger and Stern, who affirm that "ISIS does not represent an existential threat to any Western country" (p. 236).

Indeed, they rightly note media overstatement of the threat of ISIS helps to reinforce the group's narrative of a cosmic clash between good and evil. The authors also wisely caution against simplistic policy solutions: for instance, an intervention in Syria that "simply removes Assad, as the Libyans removed Gadhafi, creates new and different problems for the Syrian people, and these new problems may be even more intractable" (p. 254). This does not mean the authors advocate the folly of forming an alliance with Assad (and/or Iran, for that matter), but rather there is sober warning here against monochromatic analysis and policy proposals, as Libya finds itself amid chaos post-Gadhafi engulfed with a significant jihadist phenomenon of varying stripes, including ISIS.

However, for all these merits, there are many substantial shortcomings to this book. When it comes to any book or extended dissertation on ISIS, one inevitably faces a problem of how much attention should be devoted to certain parts of the chronology tracing the group's origin and rise. This is a common issue for a range of historical and contemporary subjects: compare [Tacitus' affirmed approach in the Annals](#) of dealing with the lengthy reign of Augustus in brief and general terms (with focus on succession and the last days) with the year by year documentation of events in Tiberius' reign. Since the bulk of Berger and Stern's book deals with ISIS and its use of media, the group's history is only covered in summary form and the account presented is little more than a readable rehash of what is already common knowledge.

Worse still, some serious errors have crept into the chronology and historical narrative as a result of insufficient research. In the summary timeline, the authors put Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's release from the U.S.-run Camp Bucca prison in Iraq in "Fall 2009" [Timeline: XVII], and affirm that many of Baghdadi's allies "had spent several years with Baghdadi in Camp Bucca" (p. 37). This chronology is wholly erroneous: Baghdadi was captured in early 2004 and released in December of that same year. Not only do detainee file records demonstrate this, but Jaysh al-Mujahideen, a Salafi nationalist Iraqi insurgent group, affirms that [Baghdadi was among its ranks in 2005](#) following his release from Camp Bucca, rather than immediately joining al-Qa'ida in Iraq or its subsequent manifestations as the authors claim. Further, for "August 14, 2013," the authors write: "ISIS pushes Syrian rebels out of Raqqa" [Timeline: XIX]. Actually, ISIS in that month expelled the rebel group Ahfad al-Rasul from Raqqa city, but Ahrar al-Sham remained in the city, undoubtedly content to stand by and allow ISIS to expel what it saw as a greater non-Islamist threat. The [next month Jabhat al-Nusra marked its official return](#) to Raqqa city.

For the date "September 25, 2013," Berger and Stern write: "Rebel groups form the Islamic Front from eleven Western-backed opposition groups" [Timeline: XX]. In fact, the Islamic Front was not formed till November 2013, was initially composed of seven groups, and none of those constituents was ever Western-backed: on the contrary its constituents have been distrusted by the West because they are seen as too Islamist. The authors appear to have confused the Islamic Front with the *al-Tahaluf al-Islami* ("Islamic Alliance/Coalition") formed in September 2013 that was primarily an Aleppo-based phenomenon, formed in opposition to the Western-backed opposition-in-exile and including a number of groups opposed to the West, such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham. The Sykes-Picot agreement was in 1916, not 1906 [ibid.].

Nor did ISIS ever name Raqqa city the "capital of the ISIS emirate" [ibid.]. It is true there was talk of this notion on pro-ISIS social media following the seizure by ISIS of all major Raqqa province localities by the end of January 2014 and Raqqa city could be seen as *de facto* capital where new aspects of ISIS governance were tested, but there was never any official declaration: had it been the case, it would surely have been referenced in the [imposition of the dhimmi pact on the Christians of Raqqa by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi](#) in February 2014. Moreover, the term "emirate" was not applied to the totality of ISIS' territory at this stage (or from mid-2013 onwards, when ISIS began to acquire strongholds in Syria where it could advertise governance) but rather for individual towns they controlled/intending to seize by force (e.g. [Jarabulus](#), [Azaz](#) and [al-Bab](#)). It was this declaration of 'mini-emirates', together with the emergence of slogans like "[The Promised Project of the Caliphate](#)" in the fall of 2013 that really marked the beginning of ISIS' testing of messaging of the coming establishment of the Caliphate, rather than the Twitter campaign in March 2014 demanding that Baghdadi declare the Caliphate (p. 157).

Interestingly, mid-2013 onwards presents an [interesting discord in ISIS messaging by location](#). Though media output in Syria, given ISIS' control of meaningful territory and urban areas, meant emphasis on the state-building project and the coming of the Caliphate, Iraq operations statements still tended to present attacks as revenge/in defence of Sunnis, emphasizing perceived 'Safavid' government crimes against them such as ethnic cleansing in the Baghdad Belt area. This is not touched on by the authors.

Some other errors: the authors claim that ISIS "captured Fallujah in January [2014]" (p. 44). In fact, Fallujah fell to a number of insurgent factions including ISIS, which only came to dominate the city over its rivals (including the Islamic Army in Iraq, Jaysh al-Mujahideen and JRTN) after 5-6 months or so. At times, excess repetition leads to some more minor mistakes: "in early 2013, al-Qaeda in Iraq announced..." (p. 66) when the Islamic State of Iraq is meant; "in the spring of 2014, Zawahiri disavowed ISIS, which was at the time considered an al Qaeda affiliate" (p. 180) when February 2014 is meant.

The last of those aforementioned errors comes in the overview section of the competition between ISIS and al-Qa'ida. This section is generally adequate- and slightly outdated on Boko Haram out of no fault of the authors- but could have made for a more insightful discussion by e.g. delving more into cases of pledges of allegiance to ISIS that have not been officially acknowledged to lead to the creation of new 'provinces' (e.g. [Ansar al-Tawheed in India](#) and elements of Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines; for the latter, the scanty evidence does not suggest the whole group has pledged allegiance pace the authors' assertion in the glossary [Glossary IX], which may be one reason why ISIS has not created a 'Philippines province'). Though touched on briefly by the authors, more could have been said on the question of ISIS social media manipulation and allegiance pledges from (components of) other jihadist groups, such as [Jamaat Ansar al-Islam in Iraq and Syria](#)- a group whose predecessor Ansar al-Islam is only referenced twice in the entire book, once in the glossary and once in the main content (p. 17).

In sum, parts of this book can serve as a useful primer for the general reader or university courses on ISIS regarding the relationship between ISIS and media, particularly open access platforms such as Twitter- a welcome relief from repetitive and sensationalist conventional media coverage. The book can also be a tab on some of the more infamous

ISIS videos (such as the Saleel al-Sawarim/'Clanging of the Swords' series) for those who may have missed them when they were released, with worthwhile background for those unfamiliar with how jihadis before ISIS have tried to exploit the online world.

Yet the opening historical narrative on the rise of ISIS is too terse, too unoriginal and has too many mistakes. We are also given very little insight into how exactly ISIS is managing territories it controls. More generally, there is over-reliance on secondary sources in the sections that are clearly outside the authors' specialties, and the book is marred by lack of fieldwork and local contacts in Iraq and Syria. Hopefully the errors highlighted here will be corrected in a subsequent edition, but this work is by no means the definitive text on ISIS, which is still years, if not decades away from fruition- as the authors themselves implicitly acknowledge (p. 7).

ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror

by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan
£5.99; 1169p. (I-Phone Reading)

Reviewed by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
[Syria Comment](#)
February 3, 2015



The rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS, subsequently calling itself just "The Islamic State" since the Caliphate declaration of 29 Jun 2014) across Iraq and Syria will naturally provoke much questioning as to how this phenomenon came to such prominence. Overall, this book ably accomplishes the task in a concise manner, and is a valuable, compelling read for anyone- general reader or specialist- interested in ISIS. While minor errors exist here and there and one might disagree with some of the authors' analysis in the detail, the book is extremely well-researched, drawing on an array of sources including much original interview testimony, and the overall conclusions that emerge are hard to contest.

The authors begin by tracing the history of the most important forefather of ISIS: Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, including his early years in the Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) area in the closing days of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, his journey home to Jordan by 1992 and relationship with jihadi intellectual Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi that culminated in his imprisonment, and his subsequent return to Af-Pak in 1999 that first saw signs of tensions between Zarqawi and al-Qa'ida leader Osama bin Laden (OBL), where he nonetheless secured an alliance of convenience and ran a training camp in Herat, Afghanistan.

Following the invasion of Afghanistan, Zarqawi forged another alliance of convenience with Ansar al-Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan, moving there and throughout the region via Iran before his firm establishment on the scene of the Iraq War in 2003 with his Jamaat al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad and subsequent allegiance to OBL as the affiliated al-Qa'ida in Mesopotamia/Iraq. Where appropriate, Weiss and Hassan are keen to draw analogies in

Zarqawi's history and strategy with the present-day approach of ISIS, such as the same genocidal attitudes towards Shi'a designed partly to provoke murderous counter-responses and draw Sunnis further still towards the notion of Zarqawi/ISIS as 'protector of Sunnis', so to speak.

Indeed, one cannot really overstate the link between Zarqawi and ISIS, but it might also be worth noting that the tensions between OBL and Zarqawi (despite OBL's acceptance of Zarqawi's allegiance) and ISIS' break from al-Qa'ida do not stop ISIS today from attempting to appropriate OBL as one of their own, as well as the likes of [Abdullah Azzam](#).



The ISIS-run Osama bin Laden Mosque in Tel Abyad, Raqqa Province. ISIS also runs at least one school and training camp each named after OBL.

Another analogy drawn is the issue of tactical alliances between Zarqawi's men and Ba'athists and between ISIS and the latter today in the form of the Naqshbandi Army (JRTN). While JRTN and ISIS did cooperate in events such as the fall of Mosul in 2014, a significant difference now as opposed to the years of the Iraq War is the much greater dominance of ISIS, which meant that JRTN was in effect more trying to ride the wave of the ISIS-spearheaded offensives rather than there being a relationship of essential co-dependence between the two groups. This is why ISIS very quickly asserted itself as the dominant power in areas such as Mosul at the expense of the likes of JRTN, able to impose its most draconian measures and establish its 'diwans' (government departments) despite JRTN's objections. Indeed, the concept of "tactical partnering" with JRTN that is mentioned elsewhere is something liable to be overplayed.

A more original contribution deserving great credit is the rightful attention drawn to the jihadist text *Idarat al-Tawahhush* ("The Management of Savagery") by Abu Bakr Naji in 2004 and its importance to both Zarqawi's ilk and ISIS today as a means to justify acts of brutality in the context of jihad.

The authors then trace the local sparks in areas such as al-Qa'im (on the border with Syria in Anbar province) in 2005-6 where Zarqawi's AQI had overplayed its hand that would help give rise to the coordinated Sunni Sahwa movement in Iraq by 2007 against what had by then become the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), which had emerged after Zarqawi's death as an official umbrella including the AQI front-group Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC) in early 2006 that had been created in a bid to give Zarqawi's outfit a more Iraqi face. At the same time, the problems that had been created by sectarian Shi'a militias and their human rights abuses as well as Iran's not stopping the flow of al-Qa'ida operatives and funds through Iranian territory are not disregarded.

The authors also correctly identify traces of what would become the formal split between ISIS and al-Qa'ida in the deliberately ambiguous relationship maintained by ISI with al-Qa'ida during the years of Abu Ayyub al-Masri/Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (2006-2010). For al-Masri, who officially subsumed the MSC under Abu Omar al-Baghdadi's ISI, "was indeed trying to have it both ways: to remain the amir of AQI while also flirting with outright secession from it to command his own independent operation" (p. 291), bolstered by the pretensions to statehood in the name of ISI and its self-declared ministries.

Much of what follows on the U.S.-troop surge and the rolling back of ISI by the Sahwa in coordination with coalition forces is history that has been extensively discussed and need not be reproduced in too much detail, along with the marginalization of the Sahwa movement and Iraq PM Maliki-led crackdowns on Sunni politicians in the face of the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq that sparked the Sunni Arab protests in 2013, going right up to the fall of Fallujah at the beginning of 2014. One could argue for some differences in interpretation here. For instance, while it's certainly true Iran played an important role in bringing together the second Maliki-led government as the authors note, it is questionable whether Ayad Allawi and his Iraqiya-bloc could really have engaged in successful outreach to the other Shi'a political blocs to form a coalition. Further, the coverage of Maliki's response to the 2013 protests does not mention that he allowed for political concessions to be drafted by deputy premier Saleh al-Mutlaq and to be put to the parliament. The fact these reforms died in the parliament points to a broader failing on the Shi'a political spectrum to address Sunni grievances such as de-Ba'athification.

The book- now at chapter 7- then reverts in chronology to discuss in detail the Assad regime's extensive collaboration with jihadis during the Iraq War in facilitating the influx of foreign fighters into Iraq via Syria, as well as the regime's complicity in terrorist attacks aimed at destabilizing the first Maliki government. Chapter 8 discusses key personalities in ISI and its successors under the tenure of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, including a profile of the leader himself. Usefully correcting press reports that suggested Abu Bakr was released from the U.S.-run Camp Bucca prison facility in 2009, the authors rightly note that his time in Camp Bucca was [only in 2004](#), while also citing journalist Wael Essam who points out Baghdadi's stint in the Salafi group Jaysh al-Mujahideen (which would be in 2005,

besides founding his own Jaysh Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama'at in 2003) prior to his involvement with ISI.

Other figures profiled include Abu Ayman al-Iraqi and Abu Ali al-Anbari, both former officers in the Saddam regime's armed forces, and Abu Omar al-Shishani. On the subject of Shishani, some corrections need to be made. He did not first emerge in Syria in 2013 (p. 535) but [2012](#). Further, Shishani actually [pledged allegiance to ISIS in May 2013](#) and thus became ISIS' 'northern' amir for Syria, which is why his Jaysh al-Muhajireen wa al-Ansar (JMWA) outfit over the summer of 2013- including the fall of Mannagh airbase- was described as [affiliated with ISIS](#). A split occurred in the ranks in late November 2013, whereby some in JMWA would not pledge allegiance to Baghdadi because of a prior oath to the Caucasus Emirate, marked the split whereby Shishani and his loyalists dropped JMWA labels and solely became ISIS, while the remnants continued the JMWA name and banner under a new leader. All that said, the authors are right to point out the way in which Shishani's persona has been hyped somewhat by sensationalist Western media coverage- something that can be said for coverage of ISIS more generally.

Chapter 9 onwards deals with ISIS and the history of the Syrian civil war, and it is in these parts where the authors' most original contributions shine, relying on testimony from an array of ISIS members undoubtedly thanks in good part to Hassan's extensive connections in eastern Syria, much of which is now under ISIS control. The authors draw a particularly nuanced and insightful picture in their various categories of ISIS recruits: for example, one category are those "who already held Islamist or jihadist but had limited themselves to only orbiting takfiri ideology [NB: the practice of declaring other Muslims apostates to be killed]. The final gravitational pull...differed depending on circumstance" (p. 667). Thus some joined because ISIS overran their territories, thus being the only horse to back, others were impressed with ISIS' resilience and successes against rival rebel groups, while others had disputes with their original group affiliations and found ISIS a better organized, disciplined and capable body.

Contrary to what might be supposed, this tendency to defection was already under way during ISIS' early months inside Syria, most notably when Islamist groups issued a statement rejecting the opposition-in-exile (the text puts this as September 2014; actually 2013- a simple typo- p. 669). The authors also note in this context of ISIS recruitment how ISIS' emphasis on global conquest takes a sharp swipe at other Salafi-Jihadi and Islamist brands, including Jabhat al-Nusra (JN: Syria's al-Qa'ida affiliate), that try to steer clear of the notion. Indeed, in agreement with Weiss and Hassan, it must be noted how little JN has until 2014 talked about notions of establishing the transnational Caliphate, with hints of it generally coming from unofficial footage and testimonies from its foreign fighters. In light of that, the authors' characterization of JN as having positioned itself somewhat "as a 'nationalist' outcropping" (p. 673) makes perfect sense.

Other subtle categories of ISIS recruits noted by the authors range from those supporting ISIS as a political project- such as Arabs in Hasakah province who see ISIS as a bulwark against Kurdish expansionism (a serious dynamic often overlooked)- to opportunists such as Saddam al-Jamal, who originally commanded the local Supreme Military Council affiliate in the town of Albukamal on the border with Iraq before defecting to ISIS.

Weiss and Hassan further document in considerable and revealing detail how ISIS has been able to co-opt tribes in eastern Syria. Everyone by now knows of the Shaitat tribal uprising in Deir az-Zor province against ISIS in August 2014, but less observed is the fact that ISIS got members of the same tribe to put down the rebels by brute force (p. 842). ISIS' divide-and-rule strategies for individual tribes- together with its ability to act as mediator between other tribes- severely complicate efforts to stir a tribal backlash to roll back ISIS in the heart of its territories.

The final chapter (ch. 14) deals at great length with ISIS' running as a supposed state, with much new information to contribute. For instance, the "separation of powers" where those with various specialties affiliated with ISIS (whether a cleric, military commander, those in public services) do not know precisely what the others do or know, helping to protect against infiltration (pp. 865-6). The authors do not gloss over ISIS' harsher aspects of governance such as torture of detainees but in the case of the town of Manbij in Aleppo province- currently controlled by ISIS- it is clear there has been much local sympathy for ISIS as its rule stamped out lawlessness and corruption. This is one big advantage ISIS has in competing with other rebel groups: in offering a single-party model of governance in the context of years of ongoing civil war that will, inter alia, promptly answer complaints from a local about another person, apply its laws to its own members, disarm local communities etc., ISIS can bring a sense of order that Syrian rebel groups can't. Indeed, as the ISIS Ajnad Media nasheed "[The Shari'a of Our Lord](#)" puts it, ISIS' rule can indeed bring a "life of security and peace."

In the realm of public services and economics too, ISIS' public advertisement of itself- at least in Syria- has not been wholly divorced from reality, such as in forcing municipality personnel to work in contrast to prior groups that allowed them to receive salaries from the state while doing nothing (p. 952), while also introducing price controls on commodities such as oil by-products (p.954).

The book's epilogue offers a number of spot-on conclusions. First, one must be wary of Iran and the Assad regime's presentation of themselves as the solution to the ISIS phenomenon, as their own repressive approaches towards the original Syrian uprising especially have helped contribute to the problem. Iran in particular, with its ongoing strategy of cultivating sectarian proxy militias in Syria and Iraq that employ brute force, can only be seen as aggravating the situation, even as notions of cooperation with Iran amid the context of striking a grand bargain over the nuclear deal become ever more prevalent. Second, the ISIS split from al-Qa'ida, far from being a case of a 'let them fight each other and engage in jihadi blood-letting' bonus, actually presents a threat to the West as the two brands may look to compete as to who can pull off the better attack on Western soil.

Finally, when all is considered in the analysis, recent reported local gains against ISIS, such as in pushing the group out of the city of Kobani, or scoring hits with killing prominent members or destroying convoys in coalition airstrikes on ISIS, do not change the fact that ISIS has been ruling for quite some time the heartland of its territories and most important strongholds, from Manbij and al-Bab in Aleppo province to Mosul and Tel Afar in Ninawa province, without any significant local rivals to challenge its power.

There is no extensive ground force analogous to the U.S. troop presence at the height of the Iraq War to help coordinate local Sunni forces to 'roll back' ISIS this time around.

ISIS has a well-known official slogan: *baqiya wa tatamaddad* ('remaining and expanding'). ISIS may not be *tatamaddad* so much these days, but it is certainly *baqiyaw* and for the foreseeable future.

The Plain of Saints and Prophets: The Nusayri-Alawi Community of Cilicia (Southern Turkey) and Its Sacred Places

by Gisela Procházka-Eisl and Stephan Procházka
Wiesbaden, Ger.: Harrasowitz-Verlag, 2010. 404 pp. \$102.

Reviewed by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Middle East Quarterly
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Studies on Alawites (traditionally called Nusayris) have generally focused on the community located inside Syria with scant attention paid to their co-religionists in Cilicia in southern Turkey. This book provides an in-depth study of the Cilician community, which is distinct from the much larger Alevi community despite confusion in some media reports. It is highly recommended and accessible reading for anyone with an interest in the Alawites.

The coauthors, both of the University of Vienna, first offer a brief overview of terminology and Alawite identity, then provide a geographical overview of Cilicia, followed by a general survey of Alawites in Turkey. They touch on aspects such as population sites, Sunni Turkish perceptions of the community, not only in media but also academia, and a brief examination of the Alawite religion, including doctrines such as transmigration of the soul.

The focus of the book is an examination of various Alawite "sacred places," shrines, and sanctuaries of persons venerated by the Cilician Alawites, including the biblical prophet Jonah, some of Muhammad's descendants and companions, and sundry sheikhs - both historical and legendary. Members of the community still pay regular visits to these shrines for a variety of purposes, such as for redeeming of vows. The catalogue of "sacred places" is extensive, and the Procházkas supply plenty of attractive illustrations.

The principal conclusion the reader can draw from this wealth of data is that Alawites of Cilicia generally maintain their unique religious practices better than those in Syria. There, decades of rule under the Assad dynasty have transformed the conception of being Alawite in Syria into no more than a matter of ethnic identity, often with a general apathy toward religious observance. The outbreak of civil war has since turned this bloodline issue into a bloodletting.

In short, while the Alawite religion and traditions may be declining in Syria, they appear to be very much alive in southern Turkey.

Did Muhammad Exist? An Inquiry into Islam's Obscure Origins

by Robert Spencer
ISI Books, 2012. 254 pp. \$27.95

Reviewed by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
[The American Spectator](#)
May 25, 2012



Go to a high-street or online bookstore, and one can find numerous biographies written about Muhammad -- the reputed founder of Islam -- by the likes of [Karen Armstrong](#) and [Tariq Ramadan](#). These works -- generally apologetic in nature -- wholly rely on the traditional Islamic accounts of the Prophet's life, and if they ever delve into the question of the reliability of those sources, it is only in the hope of explaining away incidents in Muhammad's life that might come across as unsavory to modern readers.

Such an approach, however, simply will not do for genuine historical research. One cannot adopt a pick-and-mix method to determining what aspects of Muhammad's life actually occurred on moralistic grounds. It is in this respect that Robert Spencer's latest book differs from the writings of Armstrong and Ramadan.

Without indulging in polemics or pushing a partisan political agenda, the author simply investigates the question of whether we can really trust the traditional Islamic accounts for the life of Muhammad and the supposed early days of Islam during the Arab conquests.

To be sure, serious scholarship on Islamic historiography dates back to the latter half of the 19th century -- with the works of the Belgian Jesuit Henri Lammens and the acclaimed [Geschichte des Qorans](#) by Theodor Noldeke, to name just two pioneers of the field -- and Spencer makes no pretense to originality.

Yet a traditional problem with Islamic historiography has been the intended audience: that is, the academic specialist assumed to have extensive background knowledge, rather than the general reader. Thus, Spencer's book serves a useful purpose, for it flows nicely while providing the reader with a firm grounding for delving deeper into the subject.

Indeed, the author provides a handy "Further Reading List" (pp. 239-40) for anyone interested in consulting specialist works. Spencer also deserves credit for integrating his sources nicely into his writing, avoiding the practice of simply quoting *verbatim* large chunks from other authors.

SO WHAT ARE THE MAIN arguments against the historicity of the traditional Islamic accounts of Muhammad's life and the subsequent rise of Islam through the Arab conquests?

To begin with, contemporary non-Muslim sources of the 7th century do not corroborate the canonical story. For example, the *Doctrina Jacobi* (a document dating to 634-40 CE and probably written by a Christian living in Palestine; p. 20), an account of the Arab conquest of Jerusalem by Sophronius -- the patriarch who is said to have surrendered the city in 637 -- and a letter written in 647 by the patriarch of Seleucia make no reference to the Arab conquerors as Muslims, or show any awareness of a religion called Islam.

The earliest account that can reliably be taken to refer to Muhammad is a chronicle by the Armenian bishop Sebeos, dating either to the 660s or 670s but containing material that sharply diverges from the traditional Islamic accounts: thus he has Muhammad "insisting on the Jews' right to the Holy Land -- even if in the context of claiming that land for the Ishmaelites, acting in conjunction with the Jews" (p. 32).

Only by around 730 CE, nearly one hundred years after Muhammad's death in 632 CE according to the canonical story, do we see an account by John of Damascus make detailed reference to parts of the Qur'an, but even then he does not name the Qur'an or allude to the existence of a complete holy book for those he calls "Hagarians," "Ishmaelites" or "Saracens" (but not Muslims).

Instead, we have reference to Qur'anic chapter titles like "The Women" (this is the fourth Sura of the Qur'an today), implying that he was drawing on fragments of text that were later incorporated into the Qur'an.

Arabic epigraphic evidence from the 7th century similarly fails to validate the canonical account. An inscription attributed to the first Umayyad caliph -- Muawiya -- in 677 or 678 CE makes reference to belief in God but gives no indication of belief in Muhammad as his messenger or the Qur'an as revealed scripture.

On coins from this period, we do find the word "Muhammad" inscribed, but curiously the inscription comes under kingly figures bearing a cross, a symbol of Christianity that is totally antithetical to traditional Islam (pp. 43-4).

Bearing in mind that "Muhammad" can also mean "the chosen/praised one," the coins could well be conveying the idea that the ruler is praised or chosen in God's name (p. 45). Alternatively, they could be referring to Jesus -- at a time when the religion of the Arab conquerors was still a vague monotheism -- or a proto-Muhammad figure still very much unlike the man depicted in the traditional accounts of his life. Even the inscriptions on the Dome of the Rock -- completed in 691 CE and often thought to be the first elaborations on traditional Islamic theology -- could be referring to Jesus, explaining how he ("Muhammad") is a mere messenger and not divine as orthodox Christianity held (pp. 56-7).

IT IS ONLY TOWARDS the middle of the 8th century (735 CE onwards) that we begin to see very clear epigraphic evidence referring to Muhammad as we know him from the *Ahadith* (plural of hadith) and *Sira* (pp. 61-2). This observation leads nicely to an examination of the reliability of biographical material from the *Ahadith* and *Sira* concerning the *sunna* (i.e. example) of Muhammad. The centrality of the *Ahadith* and *Sira* in interpreting various Qur'anic verses, whose meaning would otherwise be entirely obscure, cannot be overstated.

However, as Spencer points out, it is notable that the invocation of Muhammad's example begins with the same caliph who had the Dome of the Rock built and issued the first coins invoking Muhammad as the Prophet of God: Abd al-Malik (p. 69), whose successors would do likewise.

Since Muhammad now became such an important figure as a paragon of moral virtue, there naturally arose a need for people to know what the Prophet said and did in various matters of life. The *Ahadith* in particular then became political weapons, liable to be completely fabricated. Even in the first half of the 8th century, one Islamic scholar wrote that the "emirs forced people to write hadiths" (p. 71).

Factionalism is an especially noteworthy phenomenon here behind the invention of *Ahadith*.

For example, in the midst of the dispute between the followers of the caliph Muawiya, who Shi'a believe usurped the place of Ali's son and designated successor Husayn, and

Ali's followers who would later become the Shi'a, a hadith arose in which Muhammad declared that Ali's father was burning in hellfire (p. 73), while Ali's partisans invented a hadith in which Muhammad declared, "I go to war for the recognition of the Qur'an and Ali will fight for the interpretation of the Qur'an."

It is little surprise that in light of all these disputes, the *Ahadith* are riddled with contradictions.

To be sure, Muslim scholars did try to devise criteria by which to separate forgeries from *Ahadith* they deemed to be authentic: for instance, how well a hadith is in accordance with the Qur'an. Yet however reasonable such a criterion may be, "it doesn't get us any closer to what Muhammad actually said and did" (p. 81).

Another devised standard was the supposed reliability of an *isnad* (chain of oral transmission from the Prophet to the narrator), but this is even more dubious.

While Arabia may well have had "an established practice of memorizing poetry" (p. 84), the *Ahadith* are not pieces of poetry, and in any event must have been plagued by "embellishment, clarification, or alteration of any kind until the hadiths were finally collected and written down in the ninth century" (p. 85).

In fact, I would add that even if we suppose that we are dealing with poetry in an oral culture, it is erroneous to think that oral poets can transmit verses with perfect recall, word-for-word. Oral poetry is constantly subject to reworking and improvisation.

Hence, for example, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were certainly *not* transmitted through generations of oral poets until they were finally written down. Rather, we understand each of these epics to be the work of a single poet, who would have picked up numerous "formulaic phrases" and stories and then improvised and reworked his material numerous times, while striving for an *artistic* structure.

In all probability, the poet had his work dictated to a scribe. If the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were subsequently memorized wholesale by bards, the bards were working from written texts, not via oral transmission of the poems.

If the *Ahadith* cannot be taken as a reliable guide to what Muhammad said and did, then what are we to make of Ibn Ishaq's *Sira*? It is often noted that Ibn Ishaq's biography, which does not in fact survive intact and is only partially preserved by later transmitters, dates over 100 years after Muhammad's death in 632 CE. Tradition tells of earlier

historians, but their purported works have not survived and little is known about their lives.

That Ishaq's work dates so long after the time in which Muhammad supposedly lived is not proof of the *Sira's* unreliability, but the fact is that Ibn Ishaq would undoubtedly have been working from oral material that would have been embellished and fabricated.

Many of the stories transmitted by Ibn Ishaq would have been tailored to convince the audience that Muhammad was a prophet of God, hence tales of Christians already recognizing him as a prophet in his youth before his prophetic career began (p. 96).

NOW COMES A CRUCIAL PART of the book. One of the key reasons many critics of Islam think that the traditional accounts of Muhammad's life are rooted in historical reality is the argument from embarrassment: that is, Muhammad is presented as doing things that might be deemed abhorrent to pious sensibilities. Ibn Hisham states that his own transmission of Ibn Ishaq's work omits "things which it is disgraceful to discuss" (p. 88).

Even in the traditional accounts, there are still events recounted that have embarrassed Muslim apologists of the modern era: perhaps most notably, Muhammad's marriage to his daughter-in-law Zaynab.

Yet as Spencer notes, "what constitutes a negative depiction is not necessarily constant from age to age and culture to culture" (p. 111). This is certainly true, for example, of the tradition that Aisha married Muhammad when she was six and consummated the marriage with him when she was nine: no one in the traditional accounts is shown having a problem with this betrothal (p. 112).

In any case, Spencer shows that the Zaynab incident is likely to have been a much later invention to explain the fact that there is an apparent doctrine in the Qur'an of a "prophetic bloodline": that is, "the prophetic office is handed down from father to son" (p. 115).

Since Muhammad is regarded as the final prophet, it had to be emphasized that he did not have any sons -- biological or adopted -- who reached puberty. Thus, the status of Zayd as Muhammad's adopted son had to be marginalized, hence the attendant Qur'anic doctrine delegitimizing adoption (Qur'an 33:4) and the emphasis that "Muhammad is not the father of any one of your men" (Qur'an 33:40).

Nevertheless, if the *Sira* and *Ahadith* are unreliable, the question arises of where the Qur'an came from. A superficial reading -- noting the consistent message of uncompromising monotheism -- might suggest that the book is the work of a single author.

On closer examination, however, there are good grounds to hypothesize that the Qur'an developed over the 7th and 8th centuries in the religious and cultural milieu of the Arab conquests, rather than just within Arabia itself during Muhammad's purported lifetime (570-632 CE).

For one thing, the Qur'an displays a lack of careful organization: frequently there is an abrupt shift in subject matter and grammatical persons, suggesting at the minimum a rather clumsy process of redaction.

Islamic tradition itself hints at early losses of parts of the Qur'an, with one hadith as follows: "Let none of you say, 'I have acquired the whole of the Qur'an.' How does he know what all of it is when much of the Qur'an has disappeared? Rather let him say, 'I have acquired what has survived'" (p. 137).

Also of interest here is the Qur'an's repeated emphasis that it is a work of "pure" Arabic. This could only be in response to claims that the Qur'an was not wholly Arabic. Indeed, there is evidence of a substantial non-Arabic substrate, as evinced by numerous loan words in both religious and cultural vocabulary. Even the word for God -- Allah -- is thought to derive from Syriac (p. 156). What follows in Spencer's book is a nicely summarized exposition of the arguments of recent scholars like Christoph Luxenberg who have theorized that the Qur'an was originally -- at least in part -- a Syriac Christian liturgical text. This hypothesis does explain many of the linguistic obscurities of the Qur'an.

I am still unsure what to make of this theory, but even if we suppose a text wholly derived from Arabic oral traditions, the canonical accounts of the Qur'an's origins are not vindicated, for reasons outlined above in this review as regards oral transmission and poetry.

In light of this research *vis-à-vis* the Qur'an, taken together with the fact that the conquered peoples had no idea of the existence of a Muslim holy book in the mid-7th century, it seems unlikely that the third caliph -- Uthman (579-656 CE) -- was responsible

for the compilation and distribution of the Qur'an as we know it today, despite the claims of Muslim orthodoxy.

There are reputed Qur'anic manuscripts dating back to the 7th century, but since they lack the diacritical marks that are integral to the Arabic alphabet, we cannot tell whether they were written as the Qur'an in the first place, or separate documents later adapted as part of the Qur'an (p. 192). There is also no complete Qur'an dating from the first century of the Arab conquests.

Moreover, it is possible that the Qur'an's second and longest sura (chapter) was originally a separate book. As late as 730 CE, John of Damascus referred to the "text of the Cow" (p. 196: "The Cow" being the name of the Qur'an's second sura), implying it was a separate text, which in turn suggests that the Qur'an "was not yet fixed in its present form" even towards the mid-8th century (p. 197). It was noted earlier that the first caliph to invoke Muhammad as a messenger of God was Abd al-Malik.

Thus, "from the historical records available to us, it makes sense that the Qur'an was not collected until Abd al-Malik's reign" (p. 197), as part of a collaborative effort between Abd al-Malik and Hajjaj ibn Yusuf, the governor of Iraq (661-714 CE). The work of Hajjaj in collecting the Qur'an is in fact attested in many *Ahadith*. The compilation was then traced back to Uthman in an attempt to give the project an authentic feel.

From all these findings, the most plausible conclusion to draw is that Islam as we know it emerged over a protracted period between the 7th and 8th centuries, developed in such a way as to (i) unify the vast empire created by the Arab conquests that conquered a vast amount of territory (stretching from Spain to Sindh by 750 CE) and (ii) justify the expansionism.

This "imperial theology" (to borrow Spencer's term; p. 208) was based on a monotheism that perhaps was more tolerant towards Judaism and Christianity in its very early days (hence Qur'anic verses such as 2:62 that include Jews, Christians and Sabaeans in the fold of salvation; p. 209). Yet from the end of the 7th century onwards, Islam takes on a much more distinct identity, with a separate prophet and holy book, supplanting Judaism and Christianity.

SPENCER'S EXPLANATION FOR THE ORIGINS and development of early Islam is significantly corroborated by analogy with the rise of the Roman imperial cult after Augustus' creation of the Principate.

Needing to hold the Roman state together with concentration of power in his hands, he made much of the reputed divine descent of his family line (the Julian line), and commissioned Virgil to write an epic celebrating the founding of the Roman race by his supposed ancestor Aeneas. In the same way, we have Muhammad as the founder of Islam and the Muslim *ummah*. For the first time, we see a coherent and emphatic articulation of an expansionist outlook:

tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento ^{SEP} *(hae tibi erunt artes), pacique imponere morem,* ^{SEP} *parcere subiectis et debellare superbos*

Remember, Roman, to rule the peoples with your power (these will be your skills), to impose *mos* on peace, to spare the subdued and war down the proud' -- *Aeneid* 6.851-3.

Here we have ideas that closely parallel Islamic expansionism in the concept of *jihad*, as articulated in the classical theology that developed from Muhammad's life and example as a warrior prophet: the notion of establishing peace through warfare and bringing civilization to the subdued.

Though the above lines are instructions from Aeneas' father Anchises to the hero, they have the force of emphasizing the Romans' destiny. The divine mandate to rule the world is corroborated by the chief god Jupiter's famous saying: "imperium sine fine dedi" ('I have given empire without end' -- *Aeneid* 1.279). Like Mohammed, Aeneas engages in fierce warfare, becoming master of Latium in central Italy.

While the *Aeneid's* borrowings from earlier epics are apparent, the text also drew on the value system promoted by Augustus and his inner circle (in particular Maecenas) that drew on Stoicism. Thus, the poem had a paradigmatic function, becoming a virtual school-text for Roman boys, and Aeneas himself soon became an [idealized figure](#) in the same way that Muhammad came to be seen as a moral paragon among Muslims.

The point of this comparison is not to say that the Arab conquerors borrowed ideas of expansionism and the like from the Romans (they didn't), but rather that Spencer's explanation of the rise of Islam should not be implausible from a historical perspective. It is therefore hardly shocking that Islam was bound with politics from the beginning (p. 214).

As for the question of Muhammad's existence, Spencer gives a concise answer to round off his book: "the full truth of whether a prophet named Muhammad lived in seventh-century Arabia, and if he did, what sort of a man he was, may never be known" (p. 216),

but for too long, the topic of Islamic historiography has been confined to highly specialized academia, with the growing problem of [Islamist intimidation](#).

Thus, an accessible primer on the subject as we have here is most welcome. In addition, the project of translating this book into Arabic is to be commended.

In the years to come, it would be good to see Spencer's book prescribed as introductory reading for courses on Islam in schools and universities. I myself have taken the step of donating his book to Brasenose College's library, and hope that others will similarly distribute the work upon reading it.

Update: It has been nearly two years since I wrote this piece (during which time I have had considerable opportunity to absorb more of the scholarly literature surrounding this debate). I stress that while this book is useful as a primer on the revisionist scholarship on early Islamic historiography and would still recommend it on this basis (and in the above review, I summarized their perspective and gave example arguments that might be put forward to strengthen the doubts; but I disown endorsement of the arguments), the author's subsequent attempts to argue that the Prophet did not exist are unsound. In particular, the Doctrina Iacobi, which explicitly references a 'prophet' among the Saracens, makes claiming he did not exist unreasonable.

When handling the seventh century non-Muslim sources, caution is needed over their biases, particularly so when it comes to early Christian attempts to equate Islam and Judaism (as is apparent in Sebeos' Armenian account, for example), which would be an unsurprising assumption on their part given the shared rejection of Jesus' divinity. Of further note in this whole debate are the Yemeni Qur'anic manuscripts that can be carbon-dated to no later than 660 CE: only very minor textual variations from what we call the Uthmanic copy exist, pointing to a relatively early codification of the Qur'anic text, without subscribing to the view of compilation and codification under Uthman. On this basis I think one should reject a revisionist view that claims codification as late as 800 CE: a safer view instead is to point to canonization by that date (i.e. firm elevation of the text to sacred status, which has to be distinguished from codification).

In short, postulating the question "Did Muhammad Exist?" is I think the wrong question. The answer is clearly 'yes': the debate should be rather over how much of a picture one can build of his life.

For some further reading:

"Writing the Biography of the Prophet Muhammad, Problems and Solutions"- Hoyland, [History Compass, Volume 5, Issue 2](#). Provides an overview of a range of scholarly views. Claims that revisionist claims are stifled in the academic debate- which I repeated above- are not quite right.

"The Chronology of the Qur'an: A Stylometric Research Program," Sadeghi, [Arabica 58](#) (2011). This work may yet present the greatest challenge to revisionists to date. Though difficult reading, it uses stylometric research statistics to argue for a basic soundness to the traditional Meccan and Medinan chronology of Qur'anic revelations, pointing to a stylistic evolution if we group the Qur'anic text by blocks. In turn the author says this tracing out of a stylistic development independent of looking at the Sira points to the basic veracity of the Sira. So far, I have seen no sound refutation of this reasoning, and perhaps statistical analysis really is the way to go.

Black Banners of ISIS: The Roots of the New Caliphate

by David J. Wasserstein
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017. 280 pp. \$26.

Reviewed by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
[Middle East Quarterly](#)
December 1, 2017



Wasserstein, a medieval historian, explains key components of the Islamic State's (ISIS) ideology and many of the group's practices, mostly through the lens of early Islamic history, an approach that produces interesting insights.

For instance, he offers a detailed analysis of the Islamic State's proclamation of the caliphate in June 2014, explaining the significance of the caliphate in Islamic history and why ISIS placed such emphasis on citing Qur'anic proof texts. In addition, he provides useful context to the apocalyptic traditions surrounding the Aleppo province town of Dabiq, which featured prominently in ISIS propaganda.

Other sections of the book are less original or lack detail. For example, the analysis on recruitment of children has little new. Wasserstein also devotes just twelve pages to Islamic State administration, though analysis of its government departments and in-depth comparisons with past and present models would have been useful.

The book is also outdated. The Islamic State no longer controls a territory the size of the United Kingdom. Despite useful historical background on the Dabiq tradition, references to Dabiq by ISIS have now faded since the group lost control of the actual town. Indeed, the group long ago ended production of its *Dabiq* magazine.

Further, Wasserstein makes sloppy errors. He devotes an entire sub-section to the *tarawih* (extended prayers in Ramadan) based on the erroneous claim that ISIS banned it. Similarly, he writes that the Islamic State's Sinai affiliate attacked a hotel in retaliation for the Egyptian government's imprisonment of "female IS fighters," but the *New York Times* report he cites and the original ISIS statement on the assault make no reference to "female IS fighters," only "Muslim women" arrested by the Egyptian army. Other errors reflect insufficient research: the "al-Badri" in Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's full name does not refer to the battle of Badr but rather is an Iraqi tribal name.

Wasserstein's book takes the Islamic State's religious ideology seriously and makes interesting comparisons with early and medieval Islamic history for insights into how the group thinks and operates. But its noteworthy approach is beset with multiple flaws.

Success for al-Qaeda in Syria?

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

[Perspectives on Terrorism](#)

December 18, 2017



Abstract

This article considers how far one can describe al-Qaida's experiences in Syria as a success. A common line of analysis has been that al-Qaida has been playing a more successful long-term game in Syria as opposed to its more aggressive rival, the Islamic State. This article examines that argument more closely through exploring the nature of the relationship between al-Qaida and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, the latest successor initiative to the original Syrian al-Qaida affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. The author considers the viability of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's project and the future of al-Qaida in Syria, reaching a negative long-term prognosis.

Keywords: Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, al-Qaida, Zawahiri, Jowlani, Jihadism

Introduction

One of the most common concepts to describe al-Qaida's presence in Syria has been that of 'playing the long game.'^[1] That is, whereas its rival the Islamic State focused on quickly defeating other Syrian insurgent groups and opponents, establishing a state project and imposing the harshest aspects of Islamic law (i.e. the hudud punishments for serious crimes), al-Qaida has chosen to embed deeply within the insurgency fighting the Assad regime. Thus, al-Qaida affiliates and al-Qaida-linked groups have generally proven themselves to be valuable military partners for other factions, while not working to

impose all aspects of Islamic law immediately on the populations in their zones of control and influence, but rather working to condition the locals to accept their imposition eventually.

The main group considered to represent this approach has been Jabhat al-Nusra, also known by the fuller name of Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham (translated: "the support front for the people of al-Sham"). Similarly-aligned groups ideologically, such as the Turkestan Islamic Party primarily consisting of Uyghurs from East Turkestan in China, have also used the slogan of nusra li-Ahl al-Sham. However, the focus here will be on Jabhat al-Nusra and its successor organizations, being much larger entities than the likes of the Turkestan Islamic Party.

Publicly announced in January 2012, Jabhat al-Nusra initially made its mark with high profile bomb attacks but soon became established as an important military actor in the insurgency. Its global jihadist orientation was clear in the distribution of its content on jihadi forums. However, no specific affiliation or links were publicly declared. This was in keeping with the approach of other jihadi groups that emerged in the wake of the Arab Spring, such as the Ansar al-Shari'a movements in Yemen, Libya and Tunisia.[2] It was only an audio message in April 2013 by Islamic State of Iraq leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who had helped set up Jabhat al-Nusra and wanted to subsume it unilaterally under his group, that prompted Jabhat al-Nusra's leader to declare an affiliation with al-Qaida. This was likely in the hope that al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri would rule in his favour in the dispute with Baghdadi.

However, the declaration of the al-Qaida affiliation did not generally lead to Jabhat al-Nusra's isolation from the broader insurgency, as many groups continued to cooperate with it on the battlefield. In the end, with the expansion of Baghdadi's Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra took the side of the insurgency against ISIS in the broader infighting that erupted across the north and east in early 2014, while al-Qaida central issued a formal statement denying that ISIS had any links with it. Al-Qaida's turn against ISIS reinforced a widespread line of defense of Jabhat al-Nusra as a vital military partner and part of the broader insurgency. This was so even as Jabhat al-Nusra lost its most valuable assets in the east of Syria to ISIS by summer 2014 and occasionally targeted groups for elimination, most notably the Western-backed Syrian Revolutionaries Front in Idlib province in October-November 2014. Indeed, in early 2015, Jabhat al-Nusra came together with the Salafi group Ahrar al-Sham to set up and lead the Jaysh al-Fatah alliance that drove out the regime from almost all towns in Idlib, including the provincial capital itself.

Hence, despite some severe bumps, Syria's al-Qaida affiliate had successfully affirmed its status by 2015-2016 as a leading actor in the insurgency, prompting warnings that the group could pose a bigger long-term threat to the United States than the Islamic State.[3] Today, warnings of a major al-Qaida threat emanating from Syria continue to be repeated, with U.S. diplomat Brett McGurk characterizing Idlib province, the main epicenter of the insurgency today and dominated by the Jabhat al-Nusra successor group Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, as the "largest al-Qaida safe haven since 9/11." [4] In an opinion article for the Daily Beast, Charles Lister argued that "al Qaeda stands to benefit the most" from continued instability in Syria deriving from Assad's remaining in power [5],

highlighting that "al Qaeda has embedded itself deeply within the anti-Assad movement, attaching its fate to that of the indigenous revolution." [6]

How justified are these fears of an al-Qaida threat emanating from Syria for the long-term? This article explores this question more closely by examining two issues. First, it is necessary to explore the nature of al-Qaida's relationship with Jabhat al-Nusra and its successor organisations, firstly embodied in Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and then Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. Second, this article looks at the current direction of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's project, its future viability that is connected to the wider fate of Syria's insurgency, and what that fate means for al-Qaida in Syria.

The Break from al-Qaida: The Plan All Along?

While Jabhat al-Nusra was able to form military alliances and joint administrations with many other insurgent actors, its explicit al-Qaida affiliation posed a problem for the often discussed aspiration of unity among the various factions. Understandably, other groups feared that a real merger with Jabhat al-Nusra would lead to being internationally blacklisted as terrorists, targeted in US airstrikes and losing support from foreign state patrons. For instance, in early 2016, talks for a merger between Jabhat al-Nusra and other factions - in particular Ahrar al-Sham - were raised, only for the idea to be rejected on the grounds of Jabhat al-Nusra's al-Qaida affiliation.

Ayman al-Zawahiri was clearly aware of the discussions, as illustrated in his speech "Go forth to al-Sham," released in May 2016 but recorded in February/March of that year (the time lag existing on account of the logistics of communication channels with the outside world). [7] In his speech, he portrayed the jihad in Syria as representing the best hope of the ummah for establishing an Islamic government, and emphasized that this jihad needed to be defended. On the issue of al-Qaida affiliation, Zawahiri appeared to be ambiguous: while he stressed that al-Qaida itself did not seek to rule and would go with the hypothetical Islamic government that goes above organisational ties, he also said that he did not think that international powers would be content simply with an end to Jabhat al-Nusra's ties with al-Qaida, but would rather seek to humiliate it further. [8]

Fresh impetus was given to the notion of breaking ties with al-Qaida when reports emerged around the beginning of July 2016 regarding proposals for a joint U.S.-Russia campaign to target Jabhat al-Nusra. On July 28, Jabhat al-Nusra was officially rebranded as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham ("Conquest of al-Sham Front"), declared to have no affiliation with any "external entity." The occasion of the announcement was the first time in which Jabhat al-Nusra's leader Abu Muhammad al-Jowlani revealed his face publicly, and stated that the change came in accordance with the "general guidelines and directives" of al-Qaida's leadership. Hours before the actual announcement, Jabhat al-Nusra's media wing al-Manara al-Bayda had released an audio message by Abu al-Khayr al-Masri, identified for the first time as Zawahiri's deputy. In this message, he was urging for the necessary steps to be taken to protect the jihad in Syria and strive for unity above organisational ties, replaying an excerpt from an old Zawahiri speech released in January 2014, which stated that unity should come above party affiliation. [9]

The media presentation by Jabhat al-Nusra on that day suggested a move coordinated with Zawahiri. For instance, the particular wording regarding affiliation implied that there could still be ties with al-Qaida figures who had come to Syria (e.g. Abu al-Khayr al-Masri), rather than a true break with al-Qaida. In addition, Jowlani stated in his announcement that Zawahiri and the al-Qaida leadership would continue to be an exemplar to follow. Some jihadi media outlets contributed to this impression, with the pro al-Qaida outlet al-Fustaat posting some days before the announcement that "Jabhat al-Nusra will soon sever ties with al-Qaida with the permission of Sh. Ayman al-Zawahiri." [10]

Compelling as this interpretation of a stroke of al-Qaida genius and guidance might seem, one to which this author also subscribed, it faces two problems. First, the short-term impetus for the rebranding, and the actual rebranding, occurred within the timeframe of approximately one month. Yet as noted with the Zawahiri audio recording released in May of that year but actually produced 2-3 months earlier, there is a considerable delay in the communication channels between Zawahiri and the outside world. While it is clear that Abu al-Khayr al-Masri, being based in Syria himself, gave permission for the rebranding and shift in affiliation, it seems implausible that the matter could have been relayed to Zawahiri and a response relayed back within the time-space of one month.

Second, there was by no means unanimous backing within the Jabhat al-Nusra leadership for the rebranding. For instance, the Jordanians Imad al-Toubasi (Abu Julaybib) and Bilal Khuraisat (Abu Khadija al-Shari'i) both refused to join Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. [11] Both men clearly rejected the idea of breaking ties with al-Qaida and the oath of allegiance to Zawahiri, and feared that the ideological project would be compromised by merging with more 'moderate' factions; the fear of 'dilution', it should be noted, is implied in Zawahiri's speech released in May 2016. If the rebranding had been approved and guided by Zawahiri, why would these men have refused to join the new entity? Surely they would have been aware of Zawahiri's supposed role in the whole matter?

When one takes into account these 'purist' concerns about the rebranding, another interpretation emerges behind the initial wording of not being affiliated to an "external entity": that is, that this phrasing was an attempt to address the 'purist' concerns, and reassure them that the rebranded entity would still remain an al-Qaida project in its ideological essence. Subsequent pronouncements moved away from this technical-sounding language likely in the realisation that the 'purists' could not be won over. In any case, these hardliners could not muster sufficient support to cause a serious split within the organisation, on account of the disagreement.

The rebranding as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham should not be seen as something that was in the works by al-Qaida all along. Rather, it was a response to a particular set of circumstances that probably threatened to fracture the group. There had likely been efforts going on for several months to push for a new non-al-Qaida-affiliated entity by the likes of Saleh al-Hamawi, a founding member of Jabhat al-Nusra who was expelled in summer 2015 for his criticisms of what he saw as the group's lack of pragmatism, but who still retained a network of supporters in the group. The threat of an American-Russian campaign to target Jabhat al-Nusra seemed to give those efforts additional force in July 2016, thus

prompting Jowlani to have serious consultations with Abu al-Khayr al-Masri and the leadership on the issue of the al-Qaida affiliation.

Following the formation of Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, one of the goals was to renew merger talks with other factions, in particular Ahrar al-Sham. Now that the al-Qaida affiliation was dropped, one could say that the ball was in the court of Ahrar al-Sham and other factions to merge. As was widely expected at the time by analysts, the shift to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham failed to give rise to new mergers. The outside world considered Jabhat Fatah al-Sham to be a mere front for al-Qaida, and so any mergers with the group would again risk seeing other factions blacklisted and losing outside support. Thus, the mainstream Ahrar al-Sham leadership, with its close ties to Turkey, refused to merge with Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, even as the pressure to merge intensified with the regime's recapture of Aleppo city in its entirety in December 2016, a major blow to the insurgency that gave rise to a sense of a wider crisis. Among those pushing for a merger with Jabhat Fatah al-Sham was a hardline faction within Ahrar al-Sham led by Hashim al-Sheikh, who formed his own Jaysh al-Ahrar subgroup in Ahrar al-Sham, and groups that had developed close working relationships with Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, such as the Islamist and opportunistic Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki, which once received CIA support through an operations room in Turkey that was cut off in 2015. The end of CIA's support was due to the group's criminal activities (e.g. kidnapping Italians in 2014) and a close working relationship developed with Jabhat al-Nusra.

Only a round of infighting helped bring about actual mergers though, as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, perceiving a conspiracy to isolate it but likely also wishing to seize control of some key supply routes, began by launching an attack on Jaysh al-Mujahideen, a CIA-backed group that had a presence in the west Aleppo countryside. The round of infighting in west Aleppo countryside and Idlib led several smaller, more 'moderate' groups to seek protection in Ahrar al-Sham by merging under its banner. On January 28, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham came together with Hashim al-Sheikh, Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki, the jihadist Jabhat Ansar al-Din and two other groups to form Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, just two days after the declaration of the merger of some factions under Ahrar al-Sham and probably a reaction to it. Within Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, Hashim al-Sheikh was designated the overall leader, while Jowlani became the military commander.

No evidence shows that Zawahiri had any role in the formation of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. As with the formation of Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, the speed at which the merger took place suggests that there would not have been enough time to consult with him on the matter. Following the formation of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, the Jordanian jurist and former Jabhat al-Nusra member Sami al-Oraidi resigned from the new entity. Oraidi had initially served as a religious official for Jabhat al-Nusra in the south of Syria before becoming the general Shari'i official for the organization. In October 2013, he outlined Jabhat al-Nusra's ideological outlook in an interview with the group's media wing.[12]

Oraidi likely stayed in Jabhat Fatah al-Sham - where he served as a member of the Shari'i council and the Shura council - for idealist reasons of unity among jihadists in contrast to the more vocal initial critics. With Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, however, he evidently did not feel compelled to stay silent. On February 10, 2017, the Telegram channel "Fans of Dr. Sami al-Oraidi" relayed the following statements by him:

"Among the reasons for the waste of the fruit of jihad is the delay of the counsel of the 'ulama and the people of benevolence. Delaying the statement beyond the time of need is not permissible. Among the greatest disobedience is disobedience to the mother group; after it raised them as children, they disobeyed it when one of them began to learn how to speak....What the experiences in the fields of jihad have established is that if alliances are not based on Shari'i foundations and restrictions with people who have in them the quality of sacrifice and steadfastness, the harm of these alliances is greater than their benefit." [13]

Although there is no mention of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham by name, it is clear, given the context of his resignation, that he is talking about the group, and the supposed disobedience of the parent organization al-Qaida. Oraidi continued this line of sub-tweeting-style criticism of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, writing a small treatise on the subject of the pledge of allegiance (bay'a) in jihadi groups. [14] The work features quotations from a variety of jihadi personalities, such as al-Qaida's Atiyatullah al-Libi and Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, in order to emphasize the need to fulfill one's pledge in giving the bay'a and not rebel against one's amirs and establish new groups. Atiyatullah al-Libi, for instance, is quoted as saying: "The establishment of new groups is not permitted except with a considered Shari'i justification that the jurists decide is a Shari'i justification." As Oraidi concludes, the bay'a can only be dissolved by "legitimate means and for legitimate reasons," meaning that there must be a clear affirmation of the dissolution by the "general amir of the group." Again, no reference is made to Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham by name, but the implication is that the breaking of the allegiance to al-Qaida was not done with the appropriate consultation of its general amir Zawahiri.

In October 2017, Oraidi began to become explicit in his criticisms [15], responding to leaked comments made by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham official Abu Abdullah al-Shami (Abd al-Rahim Attoun) regarding Zawahiri's speech "We shall fight you till there is no more persecution" released early that month. [16] In that speech, Zawahiri implicitly criticizes the breaking of ties with al-Qaida, warning that the Syrian jihad risks going to waste on "political games and ruses." Besides issuing a standard call to unity, Zawahiri outlined his view of the nature of an oath of an allegiance: "binding in its nature, its violation forbidden." While he does not explicitly reference Nusra's successors by name, the implication is that the breaking of ties constituted a violation of that oath of allegiance.

In his own criticisms, Oraidi offers more of the backstory to the formation of Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, saying that he had kept silent on the matters (i.e. not explicitly referring to them) for reasons such as "the interest of the field." According to him, for example, Abu al-Khayr al-Masri had no knowledge of the formation of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham except through the media. More importantly, Oraidi says that "some time after the formation of Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, the first message came from Dr. Zawahiri," in which he rejected the project and demanded a return to the prior status-quo. Oraidi further claims that Zawahiri had described what had happened as a "violation and act of rebellion." The separation of any branch of al-Qaida requires the correct consultation in the organization, and Oraidi claims that Abu al-Khayr al-Masri thus retracted his endorsement of Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, accepting Zawahiri's argument that it was not within his competencies to approve it.

On balance, therefore, the evidence suggests that the formation of Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and then Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham was not coordinated with Zawahiri. While one could see in Jabhat Fatah al-Sham an initial attempt to appease 'purists' and the idea of preserving al-Qaida's project while embedding the group even more deeply in the insurgency, the central leadership's rejection of Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and the incorporation of some non-jihadist elements into the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham merger means that the breaking of ties can no longer be viewed as a mere media game. Rather, it has become a very serious point of contention.

Strategic Divergence and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's Administrative Expansion

Besides the issue of breaking ties, there is also a rift in the approach to the war on the ground. In April 2017, Zawahiri issued an audio message that reflected a strategic divergence between him and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham regarding the situation in Syria.[17] Entitled "al-Sham will submit to none besides God," the message contrasted with the message released in May 2016 that portrayed the Syrian jihad as the best hope of the ummah. In this message, Zawahiri, alluding to the major setbacks suffered by the insurgency, emphasized that "victory comes with patience, ease with hardship, deliverance with affliction." As part of this message, Zawahiri offered three specific points of advice. First, there must be "critical reassessment and correction of mistakes." Second, the focus should be on guerrilla warfare rather than holding territory. Finally, the jihad in Syria must not be turned into a nationalist cause, but rather should be a jihad of the entire ummah, aiming to implement the rule of God.

The second piece of advice in particular illustrates Zawahiri's realistic understanding of the overall direction of the Syrian civil war and the trend against the insurgency. Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, however, has clearly not been following this approach suggested by Zawahiri. On the contrary, it has sought to expand its administrative capabilities. In part, this approach reflects a desire to become the face of Syria's insurgency with which outside powers must deal while insisting that the 'revolution' against the regime continues. Thus, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham seeks to dominate over all other administrative projects of other factions in what remains of insurgent-held territory in the epicenter of the northwest. For example, on May 11, the group announced the establishment of a new foundation to monitor the market of currency exchange and financial transfers.[18] On July 29, after inflicting major defeats on the Salafi group Ahrar al-Sham, which was forced out of the provincial capital of Idlib and the Bab al-Hawa border crossing between Idlib and Turkey, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's electricity administration (the General Foundation for Electricity) subsumed Ahrar al-Sham's electricity administration (the Electricity Foundation).[19]

Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's services wing is currently called the Civil Administration for Services, a successor to Jabhat al-Nusra's Public Administration for Services. Statements issued by the administration also reflect the administrative expansion particularly since the defeats inflicted on Ahrar al-Sham. For instance, the administration has issued a statement to establish a directorate for antiquities and museums, and another forbidding the ratification of contracts for mobile and Internet networks without approval of the administration.[20]

At the same time, this administrative expansion comes at an additional cost besides the strategic divergence from Zawahiri. The international community tends to regard Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham in the same way as it regarded Jabhat Fatah al-Sham: that is, an al-Qaida front project. Therefore, the permeation of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham into civil life in Idlib province risks jeopardizing the work of aid organizations in the area and flow of goods across the border from Turkey, for fears of abetting the growing rule of what is considered to be a terrorist organization. In turn, isolation and pariah status for Idlib are a threat to Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham financially. Thus, on July 30, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham issued a statement that addressed the issue of operation of humanitarian organisations amid its major gains against other factions in Idlib province, declaring that "we affirm the importance of the continuation of humanitarian work in the liberated areas, for what it brings from supporting and helping our people." [21] As part of this affirmation, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham asserted that "we will work to entrench the principle of the neutrality and independence of the humanitarian organisations, and we will push for this principle."

In this regard, an approach towards civil society has been adopted in at least some areas of its control that resembles the methods of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula when it controlled the important Yemeni port city of Mukalla. [22] Specifically, there is the issue of civilian local councils in areas controlled by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, and the Jabal al-Summaq area of north Idlib provides a useful case study. An originally Druze area controlled by Jabhat al-Nusra since the end of 2014, it has remained under the control of the group's successors to this day. Conversions to Sunni Islam were imposed on the local population at the beginning of 2015, in accordance with the jihadist view that the Druze are disbelievers who fall outside the framework of beliefs that can be tolerated. This policy has never been changed: a useful indicator for the question of whether the dropping of the al-Qaida affiliation has actually constituted a shift away from jihadist ideology itself.

In any event, while the Jabal al-Summaq area was controlled by Jabhat al-Nusra and its successors, services were actually being provided by civilian local councils. However, following the formation of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, the new organisation made clear its intention to force the local councils to become affiliated with its services administration. Otherwise, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham would form new councils to replace them. In Kaftin, one of the largest villages in Jabal al-Summaq [23], the local council, which was ultimately tied to the main opposition-in-exile, rejected becoming affiliated with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, and so Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham set up a new local council to replace it, sidelining the old local council. Yet according to Abd al-Majeed Sharif, who headed the old local council, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham "compelled the provincial council to register it [the new local council] with them or confer with them." [24]

The provincial council here refers to the Free Idlib Provincial Council that is tied to the main opposition-in-exile. In other words, while the new local council is actually affiliated with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, it appears to have been registered in the name of the Free Idlib Provincial Council. This point is supported by documents obtained by this author from a resident of Kaftin featuring water and cleaning bills from this new local council for July 2017 (see Appendix). Notably, the top of the documents reads "Free Idlib Province," a reference to the Free Idlib Provincial Council. This corroborates the testimony of Abd al-Majeed Sharif, who added "our provincial council is now doing everything the Jabha [Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham] wants in compliance." [25] This modus operandi is undoubtedly

intended to ensure that aid organizations work with the local council in Kaftin, which provides services to the population, subject to fees that constitute a source of income for Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham.

For comparison, a document emerged from May 2017 in which the head of a local council pledged to affiliate the council with the Hama division of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's services administration.[26] At the same time, the document specified that some relations with the Free Idlib Provincial Council could still be maintained such as in provision of relief and services support. This document lends further credence to Abd al-Majeed Sharif's interpretation.

The desire to expand and unify administrative capabilities while facing potential problems of international stigmatization and subversion efforts continues to prove a challenge for Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. As of the time of writing, the group appears to have had a hand in the formation of a "Salvation Government"[27] to rival the wider interim government linked to the main opposition-in-exile. This rival government notably declared in its covenant that "Islamic Shari'a" should be the sole source of legislation and that "it is necessary to preserve the identity of the Syrian Muslim people," much to the approval of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham officials like the Egyptian Abu Fatah al-Farghali.[28]

Conclusion: The Future

In sum, it can be seen that the relationship between al-Qaida and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham is more complicated than the latter being a simple front group for the former. Although the media circus on the day of the rebranding of Jabhat al-Nusra as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham gave the impression of a move coordinated with Zawahiri, the evidence that has since emerged does not support that idea. The al-Qaida loyalists, despite their complaints, do not seem to be numerous or influential enough to form a real rival faction to compete with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, which has barred the formation of new factions in the north anyway.[29] There is also the problem of strategic divergence between Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and Zawahiri. While the concerns about Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham supposedly being tainted with Syrian nationalism and the jihadist ideology being compromised seem to be overblown, particularly as more obviously non-jihadist elements such as Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki have defected, there is a clear contrast between Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's governance project and Zawahiri's advice to pursue guerrilla warfare.

Yet the viability of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's project in the long run is in doubt. Whatever the complexities of the group's relationship with al-Qaida, the external perception of the organisation as an al-Qaida front is important to bear in mind when considering how the outside world regards Idlib province. Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham may insist that it can maintain the apparent independence of civil society in its areas of control, but outside donors are increasingly likely to regard that as a mere ruse and pull out of aid efforts.

The Assad regime, meanwhile, will not leave Idlib province in insurgent hands indefinitely. While the insurgency cannot defeat the regime, an insurgent-held Idlib province remains a serious nuisance to cause disturbances in Hama and Latakia provinces. As of the time of writing, the priority of the regime and its allies is to secure the eastern areas from the Islamic State, partly to reclaim vital resources such as oil but also

to block US-backed actors from maximizing their influence in the area. Thus, a serious regime offensive to retake all of Idlib, which would not be an easy affair, is not imminent. But an offensive of some sort is ultimately to be expected. The scale of that campaign depends in part on how far Turkey decides to expand its intervention into northwest Syria. So far, Turkey has in fact cooperated with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham in western Aleppo countryside to deploy monitors to block any westward expansion by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces pocket in Afrin. Indeed, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham is publicly portraying the Turkish intervention as something that is limited.[30] There are also suggestions Turkey is trying to play a long-game against Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, initially cooperating with it over a shared aim while also working to undermine it from within by less confrontational methods like assassinations of officials and encouraging defections in the rank-and-file.[31]


Whatever scenario does play out, the long-term outlook is bleak for Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham as a governance project. As is the case with the contracting Islamic State, the logical outcome is resorting to guerrilla tactics. In this regard though, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham seems less well placed than the Islamic State, which has had far more lucrative financial resources to exploit for a long time since expelling Jabhat al-Nusra from eastern Syria in 2014.

The pursuit of guerrilla warfare in the end may help heal the rift between Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and the al-Qaida loyalists, who do not necessarily see Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham as an outright enemy in the way they view the Islamic State but rather as merely being severely misguided. However, the future picture hardly tells of a success story. The organisation and the al-Qaida presence in Syria more broadly are unlikely to die out completely, but the scenario is one of an insurgency operating in largely depopulated terrain of relatively small size, not exactly comparable to the larger safe havens enjoyed by al-Qaida in Afghanistan under the Taliban regime.

It may be argued that the problems al-Qaida has faced in Syria do not matter as only a few al-Qaida members are required to plot attacks against the West. However, these individuals are vulnerable to targeted counter-terrorism strikes. As for actual attacks conducted in the West at present, it is the Islamic State rather than al-Qaida claiming a higher success rate, whether through merely inspiring individuals or by communicating with sleeper operatives.

It is often tempting to impute strategic brilliance to one's enemy when it is not warranted. The evolution of Jabhat al-Nusra over time into Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham is a case-in-point.

Appendix: Documents from Kaftin for Water and Cleaning Services



Notes

[1] E.g. Charles Lister, "al-Qa'ida plays a long game in Syria," CTC Sentinel, September 11, 2015; URL: <https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaida-plays-a-long-game-in-syria> .

[2] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "al-Qa'ida uncoupling: Jabhat al-Nusra's rebranding as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham," CTC Sentinel, August 22, 2016; URL: <https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaida-uncoupling-jabhat-al-nusras-rebranding-as-jabhat-fateh-al-sham> .

[3] E.g. Pamela Engel, "Al Qaeda is revealing its long game in Syria," Business Insider, March 23, 2016; URL: <http://uk.businessinsider.com/al-qaeda-nusra-front-goals-in-syria-2016-3?r=US&IR=T> .

[4] "Assessing the Trump Administration's Counterterrorism Policy," Middle East Institute, July 27, 2017; URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UgzqabDYK7I&t=3986s> .

[5] Charles Lister, "How the Russians Suckered Trump in Syria, and Iran Comes Out the Big Winner," July 12, 2017; URL: <http://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-russians-suckered-trump-in-syria-and-iran-comes-out-the-big-winner> .

[6] Ibid.

[7] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "al-Qa'ida uncoupling."

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] "Jabhat Fatah al-Sham: Un-troubling defections," al-Modon, August 26, 2016; URL:<http://www.almodon.com/arabworld/2016/8/26/%D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A9-%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%BA%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%82%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A9> .

[12] "Our Manhaj and our Aqeeda: interview with Sami al-Oraidi," al-Manara al-Bayda, October 21, 2013; URL: <https://archive.org/details/Moqabla> .

[13] Collected and saved at URL: <https://justpaste.it/oraidi10feb2017> .

[14] "Responding to those asking about the ruling of fulfilling the pledge of allegiance to the groups striving to implement the ruling of the law of the Lord of the Worlds," Sami al-Oraidi, March 29, 2017; URL: <http://www.jihadica.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ijabat-al-sailin.pdf> .

[15] Sami al-Oraidi, "For God and then for history," October 2017.

[16] Ayman al-Zawahiri, "We shall fight you until there is no more persecution," al-Sahab Media, October 2017; URL: <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2017/10/dr-ayman-al-zcca3awacc84hiricc84-22we-shall-fight-you-until-there-is-no-more-persecution22-en.pdf>.

[17] "al-Sham will submit to none besides God," al-Sahab Media, April 2017; URL:<https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2017/04/dr-ayman-al-zcca3awacc84hiricc84-22al-shacc84m-will-submit-to-none-except-god22.pdf> .

[18] Copy of the statement can be accessed at URL:<https://justpaste.it/htsfinancialadminmay11> .

[19] Copy of the document can be accessed at URL: <https://justpaste.it/htsahrarelec29jul> .

[20] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "Archive of Jabhat al-Nusra Service Documents": Specimens N and O.

[21] "Commenting on the statement issued by Syrian organizations and committees concerning the recent developments," Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, July 30, 2017; URL:<https://justpaste.it/hts30jul2017> .

[22] Michael Horton, "The Hadramawt: AQAP and the Battle for Yemen's Wealthiest Governorate," Jamestown, July 10, 2015; URL: <https://jamestown.org/program/the-hadramawt-aqap-and-the-battle-for-yemens-wealthiest-governorate/>.

[23] A distinction is drawn between villages of Jabal al-Summaq on the plain (e.g. Kaftin) and those further up on the mountain. A body called "The United Mountain Council" was set up for local council services for the villages further up on the mountain. It appears to have been more compliant with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's demands than the Kaftin local council, despite an official claim to be independent. The United Mountain Council declared support for the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham-supervised "Civil Administration Initiative in the Liberated Areas" in August 2017, see URL: <https://justpaste.it/majlismuwahhidaug2017>. Cf. "Launching of the Civil Administration Initiative in the Liberated Areas," SMART News, August 24, 2017; URL: <https://smartnews-agency.com/ar/wires/239183/%D8%A5%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%85%D8%A4%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A5%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%A8> .

[24] Conversation, August 15, 2017.

[25] Ibid.

[26] "Archive of Jabhat al-Nusra Service Documents," Specimen P.

[27] The announcement of this government was reported on by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's 'Iba News Agency, November 5, 2017; URL: <https://justpaste.it/hts5nov2017e> .

[28] Abu Fath al-Farghali on his Telegram channel, November 2, 2017; URL: <https://justpaste.it/abufathfarghalinov2> .

[29] Statement issued July 27, 2017. Copy can be found at URL: <https://twitter.com/ajaltamimi/status/890903185044406277> .

[30] Sam Heller, "Tahrir al-Sham official on Turkey's intervention to implement Astana: 'That's not the reality,'" Sam Heller/Abu al-Jamajem, October 15, 2017; URL: <https://abujamajem.wordpress.com/2017/10/15/tahrir-al-sham-official-on-turkeys-intervention-to-implement-astana-thats-not-the-reality/> .

[31] Charles Lister, "Turkey's Idlib Incursion and the HTS Question: Understanding the Long Game in Syria," War on the Rocks, October 31, 2017; URL: <https://warontherocks.com/2017/10/turkeys-idlib-incursion-and-the-hts-question-understanding-the-long-game-in-syria/> .

After Islamic State, Middle East fissures will deepen

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

[Oxford Analytica](#)

December 12, 2017



Arabic press coverage after the defeat of Islamic State reflects governments' contrasting political concerns

Headings

- Saudi perspectives
- Iraqi flexibility
- Syrian obduracy
- Qatari overlap
- Egyptian battles
- Cairo ignores Tehran
- Saudi-Egyptian solidarity
- Qatari criticism

After Islamic State: Staying in Syria?

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

[The Jerusalem Post](#)

November 26, 2017



As the war against Islamic State as an entity controlling territory comes to an end, discussion is turning to the question of whether the US should retain for the long run its current troop deployments, that are mostly concentrated in areas held by the Kurdish- led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northern and eastern Syria.

Simply put, the answer depends on how the US interests behind retaining these deployments are defined.

One line of argument could be that it is in US interests to stabilize the SDF-held areas through continued training and development of forces as well as providing reconstruction aid, helping to ensure that Islamic State (ISIS) does not re-emerge in those areas where it first exploited a vacuum to develop its state project.

The US could be seen as owing an obligation to the SDF for its key role in fighting ISIS and thus required to protect it from adversaries such as Turkey, which regards the SDF as a terrorist organization by virtue of its links to the Kurdistan Workers' Party.

The US, it could be argued, should also not risk losing even more influence in the wider region by being perceived as abandoning its allies through a troop withdrawal.

These justifications, regardless of whether one endorses them, at least make some sense. Yet the focus is instead turning toward the notion that the US presence in the SDF areas can serve as leverage to bring about a transition away from the Assad regime in Damascus and counter Iranian influence in the arc stretching from Iran to the Mediterranean. Here, unfortunately, the logic collapses.

To begin with, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Kurdish authoritarian socialist party that is the main political power behind the SDF, has never been part of the regime-opposition dichotomy that has been the primary driver behind the civil war. While opposition forces (aka the rebels) still control territory in the northwest and south of the country, these are holdings of marginal importance compared to cities like Damascus, Aleppo and Homs. The regime, which refused to countenance a political transition even when its position was far more precarious, feels even less pressure to negotiate with the opposition on the matter.

For the PYD, the concerns have been much more limited: namely, establishing an autonomous zone of governance in its areas of control, a goal that does not necessitate regime change in Damascus.

It is certainly true that the SDF has some leverage over the Syrian government, such as through controlling important oil fields in part of the eastern province of Deir az-Zor. This leverage, however, is not such that the regime can be made to agree to do away with itself. Rather, at best, Damascus may concede some formal recognition of SDF autonomy. In other respects the SDF has failed to acquire further leverage that might guarantee that outcome. The recent race for the town of Albukamal on the eastern border with Iraq was won by the Syrian government and its allies. As a result, the Syrian government now has access to a crucial land trade route with Iraq.

In any case, the fact that the SDF faces a hostile neighbor to its north (Turkey) means that it is compelled to do business with Damascus and the Iraqi government if it wants to survive economically rather than depending indefinitely on handouts of American aid.

Further, the US presence in the SDF areas does not serve as an effective counterbalance to Iran, as it does nothing about the presence of Iranian forces and allied militias in regime-held areas.

Indeed, Iran's key means of supplying its allies in Syria and Lebanon – namely, the air corridor – remains wide open and fully functioning. In the unlikely event that this air corridor were to be fully disrupted (e.g. if a no-fly zone were to be imposed over all of Syria), there is still theoretical access to a long and arduous land route following the capture of Albukamal.

In sum, there is a reasonable argument to be made for the moral principle of standing by one's ally on the ground and taking responsibility for rebuilding places like Raqqa that have been largely destroyed by the campaign to retake them from ISIS. From the strict counter-ISIS logic, there is sense in staying in that the US presence can be seen as preventing an all-out war between the SDF and regime, which regards the SDF-controlled oil fields in Deir az-Zor (for instance) as occupied assets that ultimately need to be reclaimed. It is reasonable to argue that stopping a future SDF-regime war prevents the creation of a new security vacuum that might allow ISIS to return.

But claiming that a long-term presence will bring about a political transition in Syria and counter Iranian influence in the wider region lies in the realm of fantasy, unless the US wishes to expand the troop presence into the tens of thousands and encourage an active SDF campaign against the government and its allies to acquire far more territory. There is no sign though of such an option being seriously countenanced.

In the end, it needs to be recognized that the US has failed to link the counter-ISIS campaign to bringing about a fundamental shift in Syria's political environment. If the insistence is to focus on countering Iranian influence in the wider Middle East, then efforts should be directed elsewhere in the region.

The Archivist: Media Fitna in the Islamic State

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

[Jihadology](#)

September 28, 2017



The Islamic State has two main types of media departments that come under its media administration: central media institutions such as al-Furqan Media and al-Hayat Media, and the provincial media offices. The latter category includes areas of formally declared 'provinces' (e.g. Raqqa province in Syria and Diyala province in Iraq) and areas where the Islamic State operates on the ground but has not declared a 'province' (e.g. Somalia). In addition to these institutions, we have Amaq News Agency, which covers services provision and civilian life in Islamic State territories, military operations and even Islamic State terrorist attacks around the world, but has not been formally acknowledged to be a part of the Islamic State's media apparatus. In origin, Amaq News Agency is the foremost example of what was envisioned as an ['auxiliary' media agency for the Islamic State](#).

The internal documents I have obtained concern problems in media production in Raqqa province and disagreements between media departments. For example, in the first document, the Delegated Committee (the higher governing body of the Islamic State) reprimands the wali (provincial governor) of Raqqa for supposed shortcomings in media coverage of events. The Delegated Committee also asks the wali to get on with the issuing of Mawkab al-Nur ('Procession [/Convoy] of Light').

Those who track Islamic State propaganda will recognize Mawkab al-Nur as the name of a [nasheed released by Ajnad Media](#) and the name of a series embodied in two videos from

the Ninawa provincial media office, the [first released in January of this year](#) and the [second in April](#). The first issue displays operations against Iraqi forces in the battle for Mosul, including multiple suicide bombings from an aerial point of view and armed clashes. The second issue is similar in nature, and touches on themes like fathers following their sons in the path of carrying out 'martyrdom' operations (suicide bombings): for instance, one father who ends up becoming a suicide bomber in the Mosul operations narrates how two of his sons had previously carried out suicide bombings in Baghdad.

Despite the letter from the Delegated Committee on 22 April, the fourth document in this post illustrates that the matter of issuing Mawkab al-Nur for Raqqa province remained an unresolved problem as of 5 May, with the document noting the existence of an ongoing dispute as of that date between al-Furqan Media and Amaq News Agency in Raqqa province. In fact, to date, no video has come out from Raqqa province under the title of Mawkab al-Nur, though there have been other video series issued from Raqqa province in recent months like "[The Fertile Nation](#)" and "[Dust of The War](#)."

Many of the problems discussed in these documents seem to be traced to the appointment of Abu al-Hassan al-Iraqi as head of the Raqqa province media office, but three media workers in the province- all Syrian in origin- are named for having produced suspect video clips that show sensitive military positions, with requests made to the relevant parties to subject the three men to verification procedures. Unfortunately, I have no further documentation to shed light on the ultimate fate of the three media workers.

Two other points of interest stand out in the documents. First, the fourth document in this post is the only internal one I know of so far that mentions Amaq News Agency by name. Second, the third and fourth documents mention a certain Rayan Mash'al (aka Bara' Kadek). His name came to prominence at the [end of May 2017](#) when his brother announced on Facebook that he had been killed in a coalition airstrike on al-Mayadeen in Deir az-Zor province. Originally from Aleppo, Rayan Mash'al was said to have been one of the founders of Amaq News Agency, having previously been involved with Aleppo News Network.



Old photo of Rayan Mash'al posted by his brother.



Rayan Mash'al in a clip posted by Aleppo News Network in [September 2013](#).

Below are the documents translated, with any small explanatory clarifications in square brackets.

الإمارة
نصرة

Amr
Tammam

الرقم : ن ١٢ / ٧٢

التاريخ : ١٤٣٨/٧/٢٥

٢٠١٧/٤/٢٢

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

حفظه الله

الضوء على المعارك الجارية شمال الولاية والالتزام بإصدار موكب النور الذي كان من واجب
د بسلسلته بالتعاون مع المراكز الإعلامية الأخرى في الدولة الإسلامية.

براً في أداء مكاتبتكم وتهاوناً في تغطية الأحداث الدائرة في الولاية ومنها :

مبارك ضد المرتدين الأكراد.

٧ حدود شرعية نفذها الأخوة في ولاية الحسبة.

ية انغماسية في عين عيسى قتل جنود الخلافة فيها ٤٠ من المرتدين وأسروا خمسة.

لات ديوان الخدمات في ولاية الرقة والتي صرف عليها الديوان مبلغاً وقدره ٣٠ مليون ليرة سورية.

من تقصير مكاتبتكم ، وإنكم ترون أنهم لا موازاة بينهم وبين المكاتب الأخرى في ولايات العراق

بم أمانة عظيمة من استهان بها ذهبت ثمار جهاده هباءً ، ومن توانى عن نصرته أخوته بما أوكل إليه
خان الله ورسوله.

مع الموضوع بسرعة وإيفادنا بموجز.

م ورحمة الله.

Islamic State
Delegated Committee

No. N 12/72

Date: 25 Rajab 1438 AH/22 April 2017 CE

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

The brother, the wali of Raqqa (may God protect him):

Please highlight the ongoing battles in the north of the wilaya and comply with the issuing of Mawkab al-Nur that your media was obliged to produce in its series in cooperation with the other media centres in the Islamic State.

We have seen a shortcoming in your offices' undertaking and neglect in covering the ongoing events in the wilaya, including:

- The battles against the Kurdish apostates.
- The establishment of 7 Shari'i hudud punishments that the brothers in the realm of Hisba carried out.
- An inghimasi operation in Ayn Issa in which the soldiers of the Caliphate killed 40 apostates and took 5 prisoners.
- Initiatives of the Diwan al-Khidamat in Wilayat al-Raqqa for which the Diwan spent a sum of 30,000,000 Syrian pounds [c. \$54500-60000].

And this is what has come to us concerning the shortcoming of your offices, and that you consider that there is no equivalence between them and the other offices in the wilayas of Iraq and al-Sham.

And know that we are before a great trust: whoso disdains it, the fruit of his jihad goes in vain. And who so slackens from supporting his brothers in assignments that have been entrusted to him, has betrayed God and His Messenger.

Please deal with the matter quickly and inform us with an outline.

Wa as-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah

Islamic State
Delegated Committee

الدولة الإسلامية

ديوان الأمن العام

ولاية الرقة

التاريخ : ١٤٣٨/٧/٢٩

أبو

أحمد

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

كتب الأمنى بولاية الرقة قد أوعدنا للجنة المفوضة بكتاب أوضحنا فيه أن أبو الحسن يلتزم بالخطوط التي وضعها المكتب لسير عمل المكتب الإعلامي.

من الأشرطة المسجلة في الولاية وأريافها توضح لنا أن الفيديوهات المسجلة تظهر بيع الأول في المدينة القديمة والمسجل لديكم برقم ٠٣٢.

بعض الأشرطة حدود السور القديم في مدينة الرقة والتي بنى مقاتلو الدولة ليها تحصينات ومسائر للقناصة ضمن الخطة الموضوعة للدفاع عن المدينة.

من الأشرطة على القائد العسكري أبو محمد الخراساني أوكل المكتب الأمنى لدينا رطة أو تأجيل إصدارها لحين يرى القائد العسكري جوازاً في نشرها واستعمالها أو أرفيقاً للإصدارات.

لنا قد صادرنا الأشرطة "أمانة" لدينا، ووجهنا دعوة لثلاث من المراسلين في لامي بولاية الرقة وهم :

الخير الرقاوي
صفاء الأنصاري
بين الشهيد

من الوالى في التحقيق معهم واتخاذ الإجراء المناسب في تلك القضية.

Islamic State
Diwan al-Amn al-Aam

Wilayat al-Raqqa
Date: 29 Rajab 1438 AH [26 April 2017 CE]

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

We in the security office in Wilayat al-Raqqa have briefed the Delegated Committee in a letter in which we clarified that Abu al-Hassan al-Iraqi did not comply with the plans that the office put in place for the course of work of the media office.

And during the display of clips recorded in the wilaya and its countryside areas, it became clear to us that the recorded videos show the first manufacturing factory in the old city and the recording is with you as no. 032.

Some of the clips also showed the boundaries of the old enclosure in Raqqa city on which the fighters of the Islamic State have built fortifications and coverings for snipers within the plan put in place to defend the city.

And during the display of clips to the military commander Abu Muhammad al-Khorasani, the security office with us was entrusted to destroy the clips or delay their issue until the military commander considers it permissible to publish them or use them as photographic material or as an archive for issues.

Therefore, we have confiscated the clip as a 'trust' with us, and have issued a summons for three of the correspondents in Wilayat al-Raqqa's media office, and they are:

- Abu al-Khayr al-Raqqawi
- Abu Safa' al-Ansari
- al-Hussein al-Shaheed

And we are waiting for the wali's authorization to undertake a verification process with them and carry out the appropriate procedures in that case.

Abu al-Hikm al-Raqqawi
Security office/Eastern sector for Wilayat al-Raqqa

Islamic State
Diwan al-Amn al-Aam

Islamic State
Amni Aam official- Wilayat al-Raqqa

ولاية الرقة

Amr
Tamm

بیت
من

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

العفري مسؤول المتابعة للمكاتب الإعلامية في الدولة الإسلامية

أ بالتحقيق مع الإعلاميين :

الرقاوي : من مواليد الرقة ١٣٩٩ هـ ووالده علي البشير، انضم للدولة عام ١٤٣٥ بعد أن ترك العمل مع الصحوات.

الأنصاري : من مواليد حلب ١٤٠١ هـ ووالده أيمن الصايغ، انضم للدولة عام ١٤٣٥ بعد أن كان مع الصحوات.

بهيد : من مواليد البوكمال ١٤٠٥ هـ ووالده صالح الحسين، انضم للدولة عام ١٤٣٦ ولم يعمل مع أحد سابقاً.

بتصوير أشرطة فيديو مشبوهة تتضمن مشاهد واضحة للمجاهدين في نقاط في ولاية الرقة، كما لديهم تقصير كبير في أداء الواجبات التي أملاها عليهم لعراقي.

تاوي تواملاً مع أهله المقيمين لدى المرتدين في تل أبيض وقد هجروا ست شهور بعد عبورهم منطقة عين عيسى دون إذن شرعي للمغادرة.

ك العمل مع الأخ ريان مشعل إثر خلافات عقائدية حسب معرفتنا الخاصة.

بمتابعة ملف الإعلاميين الثلاثة وجزاكم الله خيراً.

Islamic State
Markaz al-Amn al-Aam

Wilayat al-Raqqa

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

To the brother Abu Ali al-Afari [name suggests he is from Tel Afar] the official for tracking the media offices in the Islamic State:

We ask you for authorization to carry out a verification process with the media workers:

- Abu al-Khayr al-Raqqawi: born in Raqqa in 1399 AH [1978-9 CE], his father is Ali al-Bashir. He joined the Islamic State in 1435 AH after abandoning work with the Sahwat.
- Abu Safa' al-Ansari: born in Aleppo in 1401 AH [1980-1 CE], his father is Aymenn al-Sayegh. He joined the Islamic State in 1435 AH after being with the Sahwat.
- al-Hussein al-Shaheed: born in Albukamal in 1405 AH [1984-5 CE], his father is Saleh al-Hussein. He joined the Islamic State in 1436 AH and had not worked with anyone before that.

These three filmed suspect video clips including clear scenes of the mujahideen at the points of their ribat [frontline points] and their fortification in Wilayat al-Raqqa, and they have displayed a great shortcoming in undertaking the obligations imposed on them by their amir Abu al-Hassan al-Iraqi.

Abu al-Khayr al-Raqqawi has contact with his family living with the apostates in Tel Abyad and they migrated from the land of the Caliphate 6 months ago after they crossed into the Ayn Issa area without Shari'i permission for departure.

As for Abu Safa', he abandoned work with the brother Rayan Mash'al following ideological disagreements according to our particular knowledge.

We ask for authorization from you to track the case of these three media workers, and may God reward you best.

Wilayat al-Raqqa- al-Amn al-Aam

2 Sha'aban 1438 AH/28 April 2017 CE

Islamic State
Amni Aam official- Wilayat al-Raqqa

[In handwriting]: To be referred to the media committee in the Diwan al-Amn al-Aam with the necessity of taking into account the office's current situation.

التاريخ : ٩-٨-١٤٣٨

الرقم : ١/١٣٣

Azra

Tamara

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

شعل حفظه الله.

تلافاً لحاصل بين مؤسسة الفرقان وأعماق في ولاية الرقة والتي على إثرها توقف نور الخاص بالولاية.

بأسماء الإعلاميين الذين كانوا السبب الرئيسي في القطيعة بين الطرفين والتي رشح أبو الحسن العراقي مسؤولاً عن المكتب الإعلامي في ولاية الرقة.

ويدكم بالتفويض الخاص لمتابعة عملكم وإرفاق أحد الأخوة الأمنيين لمتابعة مهمة إعلامية.



الرقعة
الوالي

Islamic State
Wilayat al-Raqqa

Date: 9 Sha'aban 1438 AH [5 May 2017 CE]
No. 133/1

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

To the brother Rayan Mash'al may God protect him.

Please track the ongoing disagreement between al-Furqan Media and 'Amaq in Wilayat al-Raqqa following which the issuing of Mawkab al-Nur particular to the wilaya came to a halt.

Please provide us with the names of the media workers who have been the main reason for the rift between the two sides that came about following the nomination of Abu al-Hassan al-Iraqi as official for the media office in Wilayat al-Raqqa.

And we will provide you with special authorization to track your work and the accompaniment of one of the security brothers to follow the investigation with you in a media capacity.

Please comply and implement.
Wilayat al-Raqqa office

Islamic State
Wilayat al-Raqqa
Wali's office

ISIS' Female Suicide Bombers Are No Myth

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
[Foreign Affairs](#)
September 22, 2017



In recent months, a controversy has emerged among outside analysts regarding the role of women in [the Islamic State \(or ISIS\)](#), especially after unconfirmed reports from the battle for Mosul suggested that the group had begun using large numbers of female suicide bombers. Some analysts, such as the terrorism researchers Charlie Winter and Devorah Margolin, argue that ISIS' position on women in combat has [recently evolved](#) from prohibition to encouragement—as illustrated by some writings in the group's official magazine, *Rumiyah*, and newsletter, *al-Naba*, which in their view call on women to take up arms. On the other hand, [Mia Bloom and Simon Cottee](#) argue that this is a misreading of the relevant passages and that ISIS has consistently prohibited women from fighting and continues to do so.

Both sides agree, however, on a supposed evolution from the time of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, when the group (then called al Qaeda in Iraq, or AQI) openly used female suicide bombers, to the era of ISIS and its [self-proclaimed caliphate](#), when it is not thought to have engaged in the practice, focusing instead on women's role in the home and society. In other words, they draw a contrast between Zarqawi, the supposed innovator, and ISIS, which allegedly returned to more traditional gender roles. "While the precursor to ISIS, al-Qaeda in Iraq, found a more proactive role for women," Bloom and Cottey write, "ISIS, in marked contrast, has strongly opposed any such innovation."

Although both sides make valid points, the debate between them is characterized by ongoing misconceptions and errors. There is no need to posit an evolution in thinking from the days of Zarqawi up to the present. Rather, the evidence suggests that ISIS and its predecessors have always considered a combat role for women to be undesirable but permissible when necessary.

Islamic State and the Kurds: The Documentary Evidence

by Anwar al-Jawad Al-Tamimi

[online](#)

October 21, 2017

Drawing in part on internal Islamic State documents, this article aims to provide a new and more nuanced understanding of how the Islamic State has dealt with Kurds. Though the Islamic State is often characterized as being inherently anti-Kurdish, the organization has recruited Kurds and directed messaging toward Kurdish audiences. At the same time, internal documents in particular show the tensions between realities on the ground for Kurdish communities that lived under Islamic State rule and the organization's ideology that is, in theory, blind to ethnicity.

The controversy over how the Islamic State has treated Kurds is often colored with sensationalist language, with the suggestion that the Islamic State, an entity whose ranks consist primarily of Sunni Arabs, maltreats Kurds simply on the basis of their ethnicity. This stems partly from conflating Kurdish experiences with the Islamic State with the organization's genocide against the Yazidi minority in Iraq, which does not necessarily identify as ethnically Kurdish but speaks the Kurdish language. For example, an article in *The National Interest* claims that with the rise of the Islamic State, "the Kurds also began to make headlines, first as victims of the barbaric hordes of the self-proclaimed caliphate, then as its most capable and willing adversaries."¹ Similarly, a 2014 article in *Financial Times* spoke of the Islamic State's "targeting of the Kurds."² Ranj Alaaldin, in an opinion piece in *The Guardian*, goes even further in generalization, asserting that "jihadi groups such as ISIS view Kurds ... and other minorities as enemies."³

A direct counterpoint to these claims of Islamic State persecution of Kurds merely for being Kurds is that such behavior is consistent with the organization's ideology. While the Islamic State's main means of functioning and communicating is the Arabic language, the Islamic State's worldview is, in theory, based on the dichotomy of Muslims and non-Muslims. Thus, when it comes to Muslims, their ethnicity should not matter. This line of thought has been expressed with consistency. For instance, when announcing the establishment of the caliphate, the organization's then spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, drew on the precedent of the acceptance of Islam by the Arabs that supposedly resulted in eliminating distinctions based on ethnicity. "By God's blessing, they became brothers ... and they united in faith ... not distinguishing between non-Arab and Arab."

eastern and western, or between white and black."⁴

le seeks to provide a more nuanced understanding between the narrative of Islamic State persecution of Kurds simply Kurdish and the theoretical ideal of no discrimination among Muslims on the basis of ethnicity. This subject will be explored through internal Islamic State documents, though some of the organization's external propaganda will be taken into account as well. As part of the investigation, this article will particularly focus on Islamic State recruitment of Kurds and the impact on Kurdish communities and Kurds living in its areas.

State Recruitment of Kurds

presence of Kurds in jihadi groups is by no means a new phenomenon. Most notably, prior to 2003, the history and background of the Kurdish group Ansar al-Islam (Partisans of Islam), which was led by Mullah Krekar, illustrate Kurdish involvement in salafite groups in the Iraqi Kurdistan area for decades.⁵ Beyond Iraqi Kurdistan, Brian Fishman has highlighted the case of Abu al-Hadi al-Iraqi, a Kurd from Mosul who was a veteran of the Iran-Iraq War.⁶ Abu al-Hadi al-Iraqi migrated to the Afghanistan area and became a leading figure in al-Qa'ida by the end of the 1990s. Among the training camps for residents of the area was a training camp run by Abu al-Hadi al-Iraqi was a 'Kurds Camp,' which, as its name suggests, was intended to train Kurds in jihad.⁷

These precedents, it should not be surprising that the Islamic State would recruit Kurds who are ideologically committed to jihad. In this regard, there have been multiple propaganda items from the Islamic State featuring Kurds in the organization's propaganda. At the time of the caliphate announcement, one such item was the 26th video in the series "A Window Upon the Land of Epic Battles" released in November 2013 by what was then the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham's al-Itisam media. The video, entitled "A Window Upon the Land of Epic Battles: Kurds and a Martyrdom Operation," features a Kurdish speaker threatening the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq and Syria that "by God's permission, we will return to Kurdistan with the arms we have placed on our shoulders."⁸ The speaker continues, "By God's permission we will defeat you just as we have defeated the apostates of the PKK and the shabiha of the Kurdistan Regional Government despite the force of their arms and their large numbers."⁹ The speaker is thus making a clear distinction between fighting the Kurds merely for being Kurdish and fighting Kurdish political entities that are deemed apostate (i.e., Muslim by origin but have abandoned Islam) for espousing a heretical, nationalistic outlook.

Since the declaration of the caliphate, propaganda appeals to Kurds emerged in productions such as "The Kurds – Between Islam and Atheism" from the Raqqa province media office. The video, which has Kurdish subtitles where necessary, features the Islamic State fighters for the Islamic State while highlighting a contrast between Kurdish forbears portrayed as having performed heroic deeds for the Islamic cause—such as Salah al-Din, who fought the Crusaders and brought about the end of the Shi'i Fatimid Caliphate—and modern-day Kurdish nationalist causes, such as Mustafa Barzani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, portrayed as enemies of Israel.¹⁰

and Northern Iraq (Rowan Technology)

from the internal propaganda series Qisas al-Mujahideena and some external media reporting point to the existence of a Kurdish-speaking unit within the Islamic State's fighting forces known as the Salah al-Din Battalion.¹¹ According to Qisas al-Mujahideena,¹² the battalion takes its name from a certain Salah al-Din al-Kurdi, who was originally from Halabja and took up arms during the U.S. occupation, forming his own contingents of operatives. Arrested by U.S. forces in 2008, he supposedly spent time in military prison, but was then released on grounds of ill health. By late 2011 or early 2012, Salah al-Din al-Kurdi had returned to Iraq, joining the Islamic State of Iraq and then sent to conduct a suicide operation in the run-up to the Arab League summit in Baghdad at the end of March 2012. (See Exhibit 1.)

There is evidence of significant Islamic State recruitment in Turkey among the Kurdish minority. As Metin Gurcan notes, this "reflects the fact that many Kurds live in southeast Turkey, the most religious part of the country."¹³ Many of the Islamic State jihadis, coming from a historically marginalized minority in Turkey, appear to believe that the Islamic State would grant them equal rights.¹⁴

As far as recruitment is concerned, the evidence is clear that the Islamic State willingly accepts fighters and members of various ethnic origins. The criterion of acceptance that matters here is the ideological commitment to the Islamic State.

Communities Living under the Islamic State

The Islamic State has no problem in recruiting Kurds willing to serve and fight for the organization, most people in the towns, and villages that have fallen under Islamic State control do not become members of the Islamic State. Rather, they remain civilians. Many of these civilians might have ended up working in various administrative offices and aspects of governance by the Islamic State (e.g., teachers in schools), but that does not mean that they became members of the Islamic State.

Kurdish communities and populations are known to have existed in many areas that were seized by the Islamic State, including in north and east Aleppo countryside, the cities of Raqqa and Tabqa along the Euphrates in central northern Syria, and Mosul. According to Islamic State maxims, the theory is that the group should deal with these Kurdish communities solely on the basis of their religion. If they are Muslims who outwardly follow the rules and rituals of Islam, then there is no reason to t

... differently than Sunni Arabs abiding by the dictates of the religion and living under Islamic State control. The principle is articulated in a statement distributed by the Islamic State's Ninawa province media office in Mosul in late July 2014, denouncing the forcible displacement of Kurds from the province. The statement affirms, "The Sunni Kurds are our brothers in God. Islam is for us, and what is upon them is upon us. And we will not allow any one of them to be harmed so long as they remain on the principle of Islam."¹⁵ In practice, however, the widespread suspicions and associations of Kurdish communities with Kurdish nationalist parties have led to discriminatory treatment in many areas under Islamic State control.

The evidence for discriminatory treatment of Kurdish communities primarily comes from internal documents from Syria. Closer to the front line between the U.S.-led coalition and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which includes the Syrian offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)—the Democratic Union Party and its armed wing the Popular Protection Units (YPG)—has been pushing back the Islamic State in the north and northeast of the country. In June 2015, the Islamic State issued a notification in Raqqqa province requiring Kurdish inhabitants to leave for the Palmyra area in Homs province.¹⁶ The decision was justified as a result of the "alliance of the Kurdish parties" with the U.S.-led coalition and that there were some among the Kurdish inhabitants of the Islamic State who had "cooperated with the Crusader alliance." Thus, on the grounds of alleviating tension, the stipulation in Raqqqa province was imposed. At the same time, the Islamic State was careful to emphasize that the properties of those who were to leave but considered to be Muslims would not be confiscated, and the group made arrangements for their properties to be dealt with the real estate bureaucracy. A subsequent statement was issued by the emir of Raqqqa city, warning Islamic State inhabitants that they could not infringe on those properties.¹⁷ This prohibition was reaffirmed the following month,¹⁸ suggesting that such actions had taken place. It is not clear, in the end, how far these stipulations against seizing Kurdish properties were enforced.

Additional documentary evidence suggests that not all Kurds who were living in Raqqqa province under the Islamic State ultimately left. It appears that it subsequently became possible to obtain an exception to the requirement to leave. From the Raqqqa province, a document dated December 2015 emerged from the ruins of the aftermath of the Islamic State's defeat there by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The document noted that those Kurds who still wished to reside in Raqqqa province had to go to the office of the Raqqqa affairs.¹⁹ Many Kurds, of course, would have fled Islamic State territory entirely, and the Delegated Committee (a governing body for the Islamic State) issued a directive in mid-August/mid-September 2015 requiring confiscation of properties of those who fled to "the land of kufr" (land governed by those deemed to be non-Muslims).²⁰ It should be noted, however, that the confiscation of property of those who fled the Islamic State was not unique to the Kurds and other ethnic minorities. A similar confiscation of the properties of medical professionals who fled the Islamic State,²¹ as well as those accused of working with other factions opposed to the Islamic State like the Free Syrian Army.

The persecution of Kurdish communities in Syria was not limited to Raqqqa province. In Aleppo province, a number of villages with large Kurdish communities came under the control of the Islamic State. Internal documents obtained by this author reveal a security report issued by the al-Bab office of the public security department in July 2016 and addressed to the higher public security department in Aleppo (See Exhibit 2.) The report gives a detailed description of "some of the Kurdish villages in the province that represent a threat to the Islamic State because of the loyalty of the majority of their inhabitants to the Syrian Democratic Forces, and the presence of members of the Dawla [Islamic State]." Among the charges leveled in the al-Bab report are that the Kurdish communities were deceiving members of the Islamic State about "places of the presence of the atheists" (referring to the Syrian Democratic Forces), "receiving and welcoming the atheists;" videos disseminated on the Internet featuring complaints about impositions and norms such as payment of zakat taxation and the dress code for women; and informing Kurdish forces in advance of Islamic State advances into their territory. For context, the reference to welcoming the SDF and the displays of rejecting "Islamic" moralism are attested in reports at the time of the sense of liberation felt by many locals (not necessarily just Kurds) as the Syrian Democratic Forces were capturing the Manbij area in east Aleppo countryside from the Islamic State.²²

The al-Bab report proceeds to give some specific cases, such as the village of Qibat al-Shih to the north of al-Bab town. According to the report, 99% of the village is Kurdish, with 70% having been with "the atheist party" (presumably referring to the Democratic Union Party/PKK). The Islamic State, the report claims, "killed many of the sons of this village for their loyalty to their Kurdish community, as in the battle of Ayn al-Islam [Kobani], they were going to Turkey and from there to Ayn al-Islam to fight with

another case, about a village called Haymar Labadah on the route between Manbij and al-Khafsa with a population of 100 people. The report claims that "the majority of them are from those who hate the Islamic State." More specifically, the report states that by night the people of the village attacked the Hisba [Islamic morality enforcement] base in the village 10 days after it had been opened, stealing 50,000 Syrian pounds (\$90-100), a laptop, and some confiscated cigarettes. Moreover, the report states that the people from the village who have been participating in the SDF campaign to capture Manbij.

On the basis of the various cases presented, the report concludes with the suggestion to "displace the people of these villages as soon as possible in order to avoid the cases of treachery that happened in the similar villages that have now fallen under the control of the Islamic State."

Conclusion

Based on the recommendations of the security report, it is not clear whether the suggested policy of displacement was actually implemented, as opposed to the documents from Raqqa province where the evidence of implementation of forced displacement was more numerous. At least some Kurdish communities continue to reside in areas of north Aleppo countryside retaken from the Islamic State by Turkish-backed Syrian rebels.²³ However, the fact that recommendations for displacement were put forward at all, together with the displacement that took place in Raqqa province, illustrates that Islamic State policies toward many Kurdish communities in areas under its control were tainted with suspicion and hostility. As one anti-PKK Kurdish activist currently living in an Aleppo countryside area of Akhtar in explained to this author, more fieldwork will be required to track specific villages and cases of displacement, but in the general sense, the "proportion of [Islamic State] oppression on the Kurds was more" than on Sunni Arab communities.²⁴

From a counterterrorism perspective, highlighting the internal documentary evidence of Islamic State suspicion and hostility toward Kurdish communities, despite the theoretical ideal of only discriminating among people on the basis of their religion, may be useful in an attempt to split Kurdish fighters from the ranks of the Islamic State, who may have joined the group believing that the Islamic State treats Kurdish Muslims fairly. **CTC**

Jawad al-Tamimi is the Jihad-Intel Research Fellow at the Middle East Forum, a U.S.-based think-tank, and an advisor at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence at King's College, London. He has testified before the Islamic State before British parliamentary committees. Follow @ajaltamimi

Appendix: Previously Unpublished Internal Documents Referenced in This Article

دَوْلَةُ الدَّعْوَةِ وَالْمَسَا

الدَّوْلَةُ الْإِسْلَامِيَّةُ

قِصَّةُ مُجَاهِدٍ

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

صَلَاحُ الدِّينِ الْكُرْدِيِّ

من مجاهدي خلیجة الأوائل الذين انتفضوا ضد الغزو الصليبي للعراق ١٢٢٤ للهجرة، قلوبم
الغزو الأمريكي بعد سقوط نظام الطاغية صدام حسين الذي ترك البلاد للعبة سائفة أمام أمريكا
وحلفائها والصليبيين الذين بدأوا بالتكديس بأهل السنة.

تكلل مع رفقاءه مجموعات عمل ضد الاحتلال الأمريكي وكانت مؤلفة من سرية قناصين وسرية
هندسة للغام وحيوات ناسفة.

تمكنت سرية صلاح الدين من قتل الكثير من جنود الاحتلال الصليبي وتدمير العشرات من
الناقلات وقيل عجلانهم في بغداد وكركوك.

اعتقلته القوات الأمريكية مطلع عام ١٤٢٩ ولفي في سجن أبو غريب أسوأ المعاملة من
الروافض والصليبيين الحاقدين.

أخرج صلاح الدين من السجن بعد سوء حالته الصحية وظن الصليبيون أنه سيموت في أي
لحظة، لكن كان له أمراً في إيقاده حباً.

عاد صلاح الدين إلى نشاطه الجهادي عام ١٤٢٣ مع مجموعات الدولة الإسلامية في العراق
حيث أتم البيعة للدولة الإسلامية في العراق وأربيل في عملية استشهادية لضرب صلاء أمريكا
بعد مباشرتها الانسحاب من العراق تحت ضربات المجاهدين.

وضرب صلاح الدين جموع الروافض خلال تحضيرهم لما يسمى "القمة العربية" التي باركت
الغزو الأمريكي وقتل مع رفقاءه أكثر من خمسين رافضياً.

ولانتزاع كتيبة صلاح الدين الكردي عاملة في صفوف الدولة حتى اليوم وهم من المسلمين
الاكرد، وكانت طلائعهم في مقدمة جنود الدولة الذين غزو عين الإسلام وقتلوا وشرّدوا
مليشيات الكفر والإلحاد pyd.

ولا يزالون على خطى المجاهدين السابقين حتى اليوم.

نسال الله له القبول والإخلاء فيما مضى عليه.

By
...

الدولة الإسلامية
ولاية حلب
بركة الأئمة العظام

الرقم : 190

التاريخ : 13 / 10 / 2017

الموافق : 18 / 07 / 2016

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

الأخ المكرم : أمير ديوان الأمن العام حفظه الله
السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته. أما بعد:

فلنأنا نحمدُ إليكم الله تعالى. ولسأله سبحانه أن يجعلكم ممن يخدمُ دينه. وينفع بكم الإسلام والمسلمين.

ترفع إليكم تقريراً مفصلاً عن بعض القرى الكردية الموجودة في الولاية والتي تشكل خطراً على الدولة الإسلامية بسبب ولاء معظم القوات السورية الديمقراطية. وبعضهم لعناصر الدولة. وقد لفت ذلك في عدة مظاهر منها:

- 1- الكيد لعناصر التوتة وخدماتهم والكذب عليهم عن أماكن تواجد الملاحدة
- 2- استقبال الملاحدة والترحيب بهم وإظهار مظاهر الفرح والبهجة بتدويمهم
- 3- ظهور بعضهم في مشاطع قديروا نشرت على الإنترنت وهم يتدعمون من حماية الرزقة التي كانت تؤخذ منهم. وإرخاء الخبئة. وإلباس التمزيقي للنساء
- 4- عند محاولة الإغوة للمنزل على بعض القرى للانعماس بالملاحدة. قام أهل القرى بالصراخ والفرار إلى مناطق تواجد الـ PKK ببعض الدولة
- 5- انتشار التبرج بين النساء في القرى الحدودية والتي ما زالت تحت سلطان الدولة وعدم الاكترت لأي أخ بأمرهم بمعروف أو بيبا منكر حيث أن الإغوة قاموا بمراسلتنا وأخبرونا أنهم لا يأمنون على أنفسهم من العوام في القرى التي تقع خلف خط الرباط مباشرة

أولاً: قرية قباسين:

- تقع شرق مدينة الباب نسبة الأكراد فيها 35% تقريباً. يحمل معظمهم أفكار الأحزاب الكردية وينتهي لها
- منهم من قام بتسليم سلاحه عند سيطرة الدولة على القرية ومنهم من لم يسلمه ومنهم من يقاتل مع الـ PKK حتى الآن ومنهم من لفترة قصيرة وأغلب الموجودين في القرية ينتظرون عودة الـ PKK ليقاتل معهم
- وقد وردت معلومة من أكثر من مصدر أن جهة الـ PKK القادمة لقباسين ووجود لديهم خلايا نائمة فيها (إضافة أن للمدينة أعداد بالنسبة للأكراد. حيث أنها تجمع سكان لا بأس به وموقعها المتوسط بين منبج الباب وهو موقع مهم لهم لافتقاره من مناطق الأكراد الشمالي
- تضم هذه القرية عدد لا بأس به من القبايدات المعروفة ضمن الحزب المجدد منهم
- 1- صبي العارف الشعبي للمحمد: كان من وجهاء العشائر في بيت الشعب عند قدوم الـ PKK إلى قباسين أمام الصحوات (قدم أسد
- 2- مصطفى العبادو قائد عسكري موجود في عفرين

ثانياً: قرية النعينة:

- تقع لمنطقة مسنمة

الدولة الإسلامية
ولاية حلب
بركة الأئمة العظام

الرقم :

التاريخ :

الموافق :

تتكون من حوالي ٥٠ عائلة كردية

أغلب شباب وبنات القرية خارجياً (سافرهم إلى المعازل الكردية في تركيا ، شمال العراق ، وكويان)

يشهر أهل القرية بتعلبهم الشديد بقوميتهم الكردية

عند حدوث مشكلة بين شخصين كردي و آخر غير كردي تقوم القرية ولا تفعد

وهي من القرى الكردية الداعمة لحزب ال pkk

في سنة ٢٠١٣ قام أهل القرية بالتوقيع على وثيقة لخروج قائد الحزب الملحد عبد الله أوجلان من السجن التركي

على أيام الجيش الحر في بداية الثورة قام أهل القرية بنصب حاجز تابع للحزب فيها وعليه راية الحزب بحجة حماية القرية

بقي الحاجز حوالي السنة وكانوا يلبسون الزي الخاص بالحزب إضافة إلى الرايات مع وجود السلاح

كان المختار هو المسؤول عن تجديد وتوفير مستلزمات الحاجز وجلب الرواتب ودفعها

عند دخول الدولة الإسلامية إلى المنطقة أنكروا انتمائهم للحزب ، وشكيت الدولة منهم لتسليم سلاحهم

إلا أنهم لم يسلّموا إلا جزء بسيط منه ، ويتوقع وجود سلاح مخبئ أو مدفون

ثالثاً : قرية حيمر لاينة :

تقع على الطريق الواصل بين منبج والحفسة

يبلغ عدد سكانها خمسة آلاف نسمة

أغلبهم من المبعوضين للدولة الإسلامية

قام أهلها قبل الحملة بشهر تقريباً باقتحام مقر الحسبة ليلاً بعد افتتاحه بعشرة أيام حيث سرقوا مبلغ خمسين ألفاً ليرياً

وبعض الدخان المصادر

يوجد من أبنائها مشاركين في حملة الملاحدة على منبج

قام أهلها بالترحيب بالملاحدة عند سيطرتهم على القرية

أثناء تسلك الإخوة للقرية قاموا بسؤال أهلها هل يوجد pkk فقالوا لهم لا وبعد أن تقدمت الإخوة تم زعيم بالترصاص من الدخان

تعتبر الآن الخط الأول للجيبة من جبهة الجنوب

رابعاً : قرية الشبيح :

تقع شمال مدينة الباب نسبة الأكراد فيها ٩٩% كانوا مع الحزب الملحد بنسبة ٧٠%

يوجد سلاح في القرية وهم ينتظرون ال pkk

قتلت الدولة من أبنائها هذه القرية الكثير لولا أنهم لقوميتهم الكردية حيث أنهم في معركة عين الإسلام كانوا يذهبون إلى تركيا

يدخلون إلى عين الإسلام للقتال مع ال pkk وعند إنشاء القبض وقفها على مجموعة مؤلفة من ١٤ شخص منهم وجدنا أحدهم من

ساعده وعند سؤاله أجاب أنه ضرب نفسه !!!



الدولة الإسلامية
ولاية حلب
مركز الأمن العام

الرقم : / /
 التاريخ : / /
 الموافق : / /

- الجبل الثام بأمر دينهم فكثير منهم لا يعرف الصلوات المفروضة عليه
 خامساً : برشاهيا :

- أغلب سكانها من الأكراد
 - نسبة كبيرة منهم ينسب لحزب ال Bağdad
 - لديهم سلاح تم تسليمه للدولة وبعضها أرجعت الدولة لهم السلاح
 - أغلبهم ينتظر عودة الحزب للانضمام إليه
 سادساً : الكعبية :

- تقع جنوب الرامى بـ ٨ كم
 - كل أهلها Bağdad وهم تابعين لعين الإسلام
 - قسم كبير منهم مهجرين ويزيدون الشباب إلى عين الإسلام وأغلب هؤلاء من عائلة ديمو
 - قبل قدوم الدولة كان يوجد فيها أشخاص يعملون بتجارة الحشيش والمخدرات حيث كان يعد مصدر تمويل للأحزاب الكرد
 التحالف الصليبي .

- وجود بيوت خاصة بالدعارة في هذه القرية والتراقصات أيضاً حسب شهود كثير من المنطقة
 - حصلت عدة حوادث في هذه القرية أثناء تقدم الأحزاب إلى منح منها نكثراً أهل القرية على أحد الإخوة الأميين عند لحاقها
 حيث لجأ المهرب لبيت ناصر الدين ديمو الذي قام بإخفائه
 - عند ذهاب أحد الإخوة لتجهيز مقر في القرية كانت العفارات قد صادته هجم على الأخ عدة أشخاص من القرية على رأس
 - عند ذهاب الأميين إلى القرية لتفقد الوضع في رمضان وجدوا أن أغلب أهل القرية مسلمين
 - صعوبة الاختراق الأمني لهذه القرية لعدم وجود أي شخص يعمل مع الدولة فيها

سابعاً : قرية نعمان :
 تقع شمال مدينة الباب بـ ١٠ كم ويبلغ عدد سكانها ٢٠٠٠ نسمة
 لديهم تمسك شديد بالقومية الكردية
 قبل دخول الدولة كان كامل شباب أهل القرية منتسبين لكتيبة يوسف العظمة التابعة للأحزاب الكردية
 وكان لديهم حاجز في القرية عدد الأشخاص الفاتنين عليه أكثر من ٢٥ شخص كهم مسلحين باليواريد
 تم اعتقال ٨ منهم فقط ولم يعترفوا سوى على يارودتين
 تم اعتقال خلية مهرب سجناء من هذه القرية حيث كانت تعمل على تهريب السجناء الأكراد الذين فروا من معسكر الباب في وقت

الرقم :
 التاريخ :
 الموافق :

الدولة الإسلامية
 ولاية حلب
 مركز الأمن العام

القرية مؤلفة من أربع عائلات كلهم أولاد عم وهم بيت بلج بيت حمدك بيت أحمد بيت حش
 يوجد شخص في هذه القرية اسمه محمود اسماعيل حمدك معروف أبو شورو يعتبر قائد إداري لمقاطعة سد الشهداء كما يدعون
 ويوجد شخص آخر اسمه بهجت بلج يكون داعم للحزب بعشرين
 صعوبة اختراق هذه القرية استخباراتياً كون كلهم أبناء عمومة وولادهم لقوميتهم الكردية

فبناء على ما تم ذكره في التقرير نقترح تيجور أجل هذه القرى في الفترة الحالية تجنباً لحالات العدا التي حدثت في القرى المتماثلة
 الآن تحت سيطرة النظام

وجزاكم الله خيراً

مركز الأمن العام
 15 / 1 / 2017

نسخة منه إلى :
 الأخ أمير ديوان الأمن العام
 الأخ الوالي ✓

Amir

(cont.): Security report on Kurdish communities issued by the al-Bab office of the public security department, July 2017.

Conclusive Notes

As a source for information, the series needs to be treated with a degree of caution. The stories related are designed to boost the morale of Islamic State fighters, and as such they are open to considerable embellishment and perhaps even total fabrication.

the documents were obtained through an intermediary via the Syrian rebel group Ahrar al-Sharqiya, which is based in the north Aleppo countryside. Its members, who originate in the eastern Deir ez-Zor province, participated in battles against the Islamic State in the north Aleppo province and have taken Islamic State members as prisoners. In addition, they continue to maintain connections in eastern Syria and thus, have multiple avenues for obtaining Islamic State documents. The study obtained documents from the Islamic State's security department in the provinces—that is, to investigate anything that may be considered a threat to the Islamic State.

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Jihad Wins in Idlib

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

[Foreign Affairs](#)

August 10, 2017



Translations of this item:

Arabic

Greek

Most media coverage of Syria focuses on two aspects of the country's civil war: first, the [campaign against the Islamic State \(or ISIS\)](#) in northeastern Syria—including the battle by U.S.-backed Syrian forces to retake ISIS' de facto capital, Raqqa—and second, [the broader Russian involvement in the country](#).

In northwestern Syria, however, an overlooked but important battle has been taking place, pitting Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a successor to the [Syrian al Qaeda affiliate known as Jabhat al-Nusra](#), against Ahrar al-Sham, a rival Salafist group aligned with Turkey and Qatar. The two have been engaged in heavy fighting for control of Idlib Province, the epicenter of the remaining anti-Assad insurgency, and HTS has acquired important gains. It has seized the provincial capital, Idlib city, and forced Ahrar out of Bab al-Hawa, the main border crossing with Turkey. HTS, in other words, has already scored a major strategic victory against Ahrar and will likely dominate Idlib from now on.

HTS control of Idlib means that the province will increasingly be viewed as a pariah internationally. Although the group claims to be independent, the United States and the international community at large [see it as an al Qaeda front](#). One result of this perception is that while HTS may claim that it can preserve NGO independence, fewer and fewer NGOs will be willing to work in Idlib, leading to a further deterioration in the province's humanitarian situation. Moreover, the Assad regime and its allies will likely have greater international support for an offensive to retake the province.

But how did this disastrous turn of events come about, and who is to blame for it? Largely, the fault lies with Ahrar itself.

Syria: Assessing the CIA Program

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

[*American Spectator*](#)

August 7, 2017



Recent news of the Trump administration's decision to end the CIA program of assistance to select Syrian rebel groups has sparked debate about the decision-making process and its soundness. In a report for the *Weekly Standard*, [Thomas Joscelyn](#) highlights that a centerpiece for the discussion was the infamous video from last year featuring members of the Nour al-Din al-Zinki movement, a rebel group with Aleppo origins, beheading a youth accused of fighting for the regime. The group had been a recipient of aid under the CIA's program but was cut off from the program in 2015, likely on account of allegations of criminal behavior and its particularly close working relationship with Syria's al-Qa'ida affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. Yet this fact did not stop Trump from demanding to know why the U.S. was backing supposed extremists.

The focus on the beheading video seems to illustrate a case of decisions being based in significant part on emotional reactions to single incidents. In reality, beheadings are a widespread phenomenon in the wars in Iraq and Syria and have been committed by militias fighting for the Assad regime, Shi'a militias in Iraq, and Iraqi Sunni tribal forces. By itself, a beheading is not a useful criterion for determining a group's supposed extremism.

A [closer look at Zinki's own conduct](#), meanwhile, points to an opportunistic faction that latched onto Jabhat al-Nusra as a "strong horse." Indeed, the group joined but recently left the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham merger movement that was mainly a successor to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, the rebranded Jabhat al-Nusra of summer 2016 that officially dropped its al-Qa'ida affiliation despite remaining committed to jihadist ideology.

Going beyond the simplistic focus on Zinki, however, does not demonstrate that the CIA program was a success. Rather, it was a resounding failure. As it was originally conceived, the program was not designed to bring about a military overthrow of the regime, but rather to bring about enough pressure on it to agree to a political transition with the opposition, thus preserving the Syrian state to prevent a total collapse into anarchy while securing Assad's departure.

The problem with this rationale is its vagueness. At what point exactly would the regime, which regards Assad as its indispensable head, have agreed to a transition? Where instances of pressure were felt, as in late 2012-early 2013 and mid-2015, the result was only more extensive intervention by the regime's main allies: Iran and Russia. In fact, pushing for a more rapid military overthrow would have made more sense, which would

have required much more extensive intervention that was never forthcoming, such as a no-fly zone and provision of anti-aircraft MANPADs.

So much then for the problems with the original goals. The other main point brought up as the logic for the CIA program was that the program was necessary at least to defend and bolster the "moderate" opposition against the influence of extremists. For the "moderate" factions — particularly those under the moniker of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) — a key weakness from the outset, despite CIA support, has been an inability to achieve meaningful unity. Instead, these factions have had a tendency to function as very local and divided outfits, contrasting with the much better organization of the jihadists. Thus, the question of whether CIA support could help to defend and bolster the "moderate" opposition depended considerably on the border policies of the two main countries out of which CIA support was provided: Jordan and Turkey. The former pursued tight border policies, partly out of a desire to limit fighting in the south and prevent large-scale refugee flows. The result is that while FSA factions in the south remain divided into dozens of groups despite the broad coalition of the Southern Front, the jihadist influence has been limited, though not negligible. In the north of Syria, however, the opposite picture emerged, as Turkey's negligent open border approach over the years helped jihadists to penetrate thoroughly the ranks of the rebel forces, which themselves broadly justified the idea of military cooperation with the jihadists on the grounds of necessity. The problem has become especially apparent in the northwest province of Idlib, where Jabhat al-Nusra's successor organization — Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham — is now by far the strongest and dominant rebel actor.

Unfortunately, these bigger picture points have tended to be obscured in the debates on account of an obsessive focus on data-gathering, compiling infographics and lists of factions with estimates of numbers of fighters. Certainly, one could give a list of the multiple CIA-backed factions in Syria's northwest, but a list by itself is of little use in explaining the dynamics of power. The signs were already very alarming back in late 2014 when Jabhat al-Nusra easily wiped out the largest FSA coalition in Idlib — the Syrian Revolutionaries Front (SRF).

In its move against SRF, Jabhat al-Nusra had partly been abetted by its allies in more Islamist-leaning groups, whose links with Jabhat al-Nusra were subsequently strengthened in the formation of the Jaysh al-Fatah alliance in early 2015 that captured all major towns in Idlib province from the regime. The only long-term result of this alliance, though, was the enabling and empowerment of Jabhat al-Nusra and its successors. The FSA groups, lacking powerful coalitions, played little more than auxiliary roles in the military advances that year. Unable to develop major contiguous zones of influence or control key supply routes, these groups remained as highly local outfits, liable to be picked off by Jabhat al-Nusra individually or forced to seek protection in a larger group such as the Salafist Ahrar al-Sham, which at the same time was Jabhat al-Nusra's main enabler and partner in the Jaysh al-Fatah alliance.

In fact, it is arguable that in so far as some FSA groups have been allowed to exist in the northwest, it is only to ensure the continuation of an aid and arms flow from which Jabhat al-Nusra and its successors have almost certainly taken a slice. This point is now also applicable to many of the more Islamist groups that were closely allied with Jabhat

al-Nusra in Idlib. The current marginal role of the northwest FSA is further apparent in the lack of any major role for these groups in the recent infighting that principally took place between Ahrar al-Sham and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, in which the former has suffered major defeats.

In short, therefore, the common points of debate such as whether the CIA-supported groups were really "moderate," or whether the Trump administration's decision to end the program was a concession to Russia, are misplaced. In the northwest in particular, now the main epicenter of the insurgency against the regime, the relations of power on the ground meant the program could not act as a bulwark against the jihadists. More broadly, the CIA program failed to achieve the original objectives.

Nonetheless, simply cutting off the CIA program with no thought as to an alternative is a mistake. In the south, management of relations with the rebel groups through the Pentagon, as has now become the new status quo, is the way forward. Rebel-held Idlib on the other hand is likely going to be subject to a major offensive by the regime and its allies. If the desire is simultaneously to counter Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's influence while preventing a new humanitarian crisis and more large scale refugee flows into Turkey and Europe, then a Turkish intervention on the model of the "Euphrates Shield" project in the north Aleppo countryside pocket is the only viable option at this stage. Though the situation in the north Aleppo countryside pocket is far from perfect, the Turkish presence has broadly helped keep out Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, which refuses to cooperate with the Turkish army, while creating a de facto safe zone for the native civilian population and large numbers of IDPs. The same benefits could be conferred to Idlib in the event of a direct intervention.

The Archivist: The Islamic State's Security Apparatus Structure in the Provinces

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

[*Jihadology*](#)

August 2, 2017



Introduction


Like any state-like governance project, it is hardly surprising that the Islamic State (IS) should have bureaucracy dedicated to the maintenance of internal security in the territories under its control. This field of responsibility falls broadly under the Diwan al-Amn al-Aam (Public Security Department), one of a series of *diwans* set up by IS in the wake of its Caliphate declaration in June 2014. Little, however, has come to light regarding the internal structure of IS' security apparatus. The exclusive IS documents discussed in this piece, obtained by Syrian rebels from the former north Aleppo IS stronghold of al-Bab, should help to illuminate this issue in much more depth than ever

before. The documents raise a number of questions relating to our understanding of IS, which will be explored as part of this analysis.

Centralized control vs. Provincial autonomy

As mentioned in the introduction, the Diwan al-Amn al-Aam is one of a number of *diwans* set up as part of the Caliphate system of IS, arguably representing the most sophisticated stage of governance that has ever existed on the ground for a jihadist organization controlling territory. IS territory has been divided into a number of *wilayas* ('provinces'), with each province under the stead of a governor (*wali*). Within IS documents, the *wilayas* in Iraq and Syria seem to be broadly classified into two halves: the eastern *wilayas* and western *wilayas*, the former presumably referring to Iraqi provinces and the latter to Syrian provinces. The documents explicitly refer to the western *wilayas* in defining the security centre of a given province. The concept of the security centre in a province though is also found in many documents from Iraq such as the *wilayas* of Ninawa and Fallujah.[1]

Each province should have more local departments of the various *diwans* of IS, such as offices for services, education, and public security. These departments should exist both at the wider provincial level (e.g. the central education office for a given *wilaya*) and sub-provincial level (e.g. the education office in a sector of a *wilaya*). The diagram below should help the reader visualize this broad framework for public security in a sample *wilaya* X with sample sectors A, B and C.



One of the most important questions for any researcher looking into IS is how far there is centralized control of administration and bureaucratic functioning. Is there a system in which central ministries- the greater *diwans*- exert tight control over the policies, functioning and composition of their provincial and sub-provincial offices, or are the more local institutions more or less left to their own devices in terms of day to day

management and appointments of officials and personnel with only some very general policy dictates and guidelines from the central ministries? The concept of decentralization, for instance, has been espoused by Iraqi researcher Hisham al-Hashimi, who told Niqash that "each offshoot of the IS group has a lot of autonomy." [2] In these documents, an impression of a high degree of autonomy might arise at first sight when one notices that the organizational connection of the amir of the security centre is described as being with the provincial governor. One should compare with a document found in Fallujah that mentions the formation of a number of Diwans (i.e. sub-departments) within the *wilaya* that should be connected with the *wali*, his deputy or the general administration official of the province. [3]

Yet the documents under consideration indicate that the central Diwan al-Amn al-Aam decides not only on the general policies, but also the internal system of organization, with which the provincial administration must comply. Further, while the amir of the public security centre in a given province must be mutually agreed upon by the provincial governor and the greater Diwan (with the higher body of the Delegated Committee intervening in the event of a disagreement), the amir of the public security centre cannot simply appoint whosoever he likes for the positions of his deputy, heads of the administrative divisions in the centre and heads of the sectors. The appointments must all be submitted to the greater Diwan for approval (with the position of deputy also being submitted to the provincial governor). Similarly, transfers and removals for these officials cannot be done without the greater Diwan's approval. The central Diwan can also issue orders for arrest and tracking that the provincial security centre must comply with, and has a right to order for cases (presumably of a much more serious type) to be transferred to it by the provincial security centre. Regular central oversight is another notable aspect of these documents, with the provincial security centre required to submit monthly reports to the greater Diwan. Meanwhile, the provincial administration is barred from redistributing certain equipment handed to the provincial security centre by the greater Diwan, as well as electronic devices in the security centre. In events of military crisis where mobilization of administrative personnel is required, limits are placed on the provincial administration as to the proportion of security personnel that can be mobilized (20%).

In short, going by these documents, it can hardly be said that the greater Diwan adopts a policy of *laissez-faire* towards provincial and sub-provincial affiliates.

A Ba'athist Hand?

It has become a common theme to attribute the rise of IS since 2010-2011 and its apparent success for a time to the role of former officers from the military and intelligence services of Iraq's Ba'athist regime. [4] It may thus be tempting to look at the security structures outlined in these documents, be impressed by the apparent sophistication, and then attribute this supposed sophistication to former Ba'athist officer influence. Superficially, one may want to compare the structures with the intelligence services under Saddam Hussein and try to find parallels.

In reality though, this narrative is only intuitive, rather than supported by evidence. The concept of an internal security apparatus is actually well established in jihadist

organizations. In its cabinets of ministries declared in 2007 and 2009, IS' predecessor-the Islamic State of Iraq- counted a public security department among its ministries.[5] In a similar vein, the concept of a security committee features in traditional frameworks for the al-Qa'ida organization, and a security committee was also a part of Ansar al-Islam's emirate project in Iraq prior to the U.S. invasion in 2003.[6] More recently, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, a jihadist entity comprising former al-Qa'ida affiliate Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, reported on its own security apparatus activities through its Iba' News Agency, documenting a widespread campaign of arrests and crackdowns on IS terrorist cells in Idlib.[7]

Global jihadist organizations, by nature, are always likely to attract the hostility of many if not most nation states, which normally realize that these groups in the long-run intend to overthrow the modern order of nation states. In addition, rivalries can develop between these groups and with other non-state actors. These jihadist organizations, therefore, need to be especially aware of the risk of infiltration and leaking of sensitive information to their enemies. Having a security apparatus is the logical way of addressing this problem. For IS, the imperative to have an effective security apparatus has been all the more paramount on account of the vast U.S.-led international coalition arrayed against it, and the control of large swaths of territory and important population centres spanning the Iraq and Syria borders.

Even so, it is questionable how successful the IS security apparatus has actually been in counter-espionage/counter-intelligence. It is true that there have been no successful internal revolts in IS territories that have driven the group out of areas under its control. Retaking territory from IS has required forces to enter from outside. Yet such a measure of success for IS primarily comes down to IS' monopoly on force over would-be armed opponents inside the territories it controls, having disarmed many rivals in conquered areas through imposition of repentance programs, and inspiring terror through brutal executions of accused spies and collaborators with the coalition and other enemies, with some cases broadcast in IS propaganda. On another level, IS has not been able to prevent many senior cadres from being killed in raids and airstrikes intended to target the leadership, suggesting a considerable degree of intelligence penetration and leaking of valuable information to the coalition by locals, the very thing counter-espionage is supposed to stop.

Within the documents, one particular department identified as part of a provincial security centre's structure is the security of the mujahideen administration, intended to track cases of doctrinal corruption. This issue has in fact been a serious problem for IS, particularly on the issue of *takfir* (declaring someone/something to be of disbelief in Islam) and how widely it should be applied.[8] In the realm of the use of the Internet, no evidence has yet emerged to show that IS was able to develop software and tools to wiretap and monitor communications by civilians over local Internet networks. Instead, the introduction of measures that gradually banned personal Internet connections in people's homes suggests a reactive approach that fell short of a technological breakthrough.[9]

In light of these considerable failings, the narrative that former Ba'athists were able to create a highly effective security apparatus in IS seems less convincing once examined

more closely. Along with the 13 documents found that detail the security structure was a brief document, in the form of a letter from the greater Diwan al-Amn al-Aam to the amir of the security centre Aleppo *wilaya*, providing notice on a new framework for the security apparatus. The structures detailed in the 13 documents appear to reflect this new framework, notice of which is dated to June 2016. If the framework for the security apparatus had to be revised, the implication is likewise a reactive approach to security problems facing IS, not a highly successful security apparatus to begin with.

The Future

As IS continues to lose territory, the security apparatus structures as detailed are unlikely to persist, as they are intended for a situation of real territorial control and governance. Instead, there will probably be simplification as the organization reverts more and more to insurgent and terrorist tactics.

Limitations

One must bear in mind what these documents do *not* tell us as much as what they do tell us. For instance, given that there was a change in the security framework in 2016, no documents have yet turned up that can describe the exact changes that took place. We only seem to have the security structure as described in these documents without a detailed comparison with past models. Did the previous frameworks allow for greater autonomy for the provincial security centres, or did the central Diwan have even more powers over the provincial security centres? Can we say with certainty that the framework in the eastern *wilayas* was/is exactly the same as the western *wilayas*, despite similarities noted in the security documents that have turned up from Iraq?

Two documents from May 2016 in my raw archives are intelligence reports from the "intelligence division" of the "general [/public] police" addressed to the overall security official of Aleppo province.[10] Do the "general [/public] police" and its intelligence department as detailed in these documents constitute sub-sections of the security offices in the sectors? What exactly is the relation with the "Islamic police" if any? The documents we are examining in this piece do not shed light on this matter.

These are just some questions relating to the limitations of our findings and the documents under consideration that are worth pondering. We should also note that we do not yet have a detailed outline of the internal structure of the greater Diwan al-Amn al-Aam.

In any case, below are the documents translated in full. Any particular comments will be given in the endnotes.

Letter from the Diwan al-Amn al-Aam to the public security centre head in the Aleppo *wilaya*

الدولة الإسلامية
ديوان الأمن العام

الرقم: ١٠٥٦
التاريخ: ١٤٣٧/٨/٢٤
٢٠١٦/٦/١

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

إلى / ولاية حلب

م / الهيكلية الجديدة

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]

بسم الله وحده والصلاة والسلام على من لا نبي بعده أما بعد:
خ أمير مركز أمن حلب - حفظه الله -

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
بِسْمِ اللَّهِ وَرَحْمَةِ اللَّهِ وَبَرَكَاتِهِ

أ. العمل بالهيكلية الجديدة بمجرد اطلاع الأخ الوالي حيث أنه أرسلنا له نسخة عن
يق البريد الرسمي.

وَجَزَاكُمْ اللَّهُ خَيْرًا

ديوان الأمن العام



ديوان الأمن العام
الأمني العام

Islamic State
Diwan al-Amn al-Aam

No. 1056
Date: 24 Sha'aban 1436 AH/1 June 2016 CE

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

To: Aleppo wilaya
Subject: New framework

Praise be to God alone and prayers and peace be upon the one after whom there is no prophet. As for what follows:

The brother the amir of the Aleppo security centre, may God protect him.
As-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu
Work on the new framework will begin as soon as the wali reviews it as we have sent him a copy through the official post.
May God reward you best.

Diwan al-Amn al-Aam

Islamic State
Diwan al-Amn al-Aam
The public security official

Documents outlining the internal system

النظام الداخلي لمراكز الأمن في الولايات




عامة
 فقات
 لتنظيمي لمركز الامن
 مركز الأمن بالولايات
 مركز الأمن بالولايات
 لتنظيمي لمركز الأمن بالولاية.
 كتب الأمن في القواطع
 تنظيمية لمكاتب الأمن بالقواطع
 تنظيمي لمكاتب الأمن بالقواطع
 الرسمية للديوان ومراكزه:
 فقات الرسمية للديوان
 وان بالولاية.
 ان الأمن بمراكز الأمن في الولايات.
 ان الأمن بديوان الجند
 لاقية الرسمية لمركز الأمن بالولاية.
 ز الأمن بالوالي.
 ز الأمن بأمرء القواطع والمناطق
 ز الأمن بمكتب الاستنابة

The internal system for the security centres in the *wilayas*.

Index:

Chapter One: General definitions

-Section One: Definitions

Chapter Two: The organizational guide to the security centre

-Section One: Security centres in the *wilayas*

-Firstly: Framework of the security centres in the *wilayas*

-Secondly: The organizational composition for the security centre in the *wilaya*

-Section Two: The security offices in the sectors

-Firstly: The organizational framework for the security offices in the sectors

-Secondly: The organizational composition for the security offices in the sectors

Chapter Three: The official relations for the Diwan and its centres

-Section One: The official relations for the Diwan

-Firstly: The Diwan's relation with the *walis*

-Secondly: The Diwan al-Amn's relation with the security centre in the *wilayas*

-Thirdly: The Diwan al-Amn's relation with the Diwan al-Jund[11]


-Section Two: The official relation for the security centre with the *wilaya*

-Firstly: The security centre's relation with the *wali*

-Second: The security centre's relation with the amirs of the sectors and regions

-Thirdly: The security centre's relation with the repentance office

الباب الأول (تعريف عامة)



الآتية في هذا النظام المعنى الوارد بجانب كلٍ منها:

ولة الإسلامية

من

في الولايات الغربية في الدولة الإسلامية

الإدارية: مجموعة من الأفراد تقوم بمهام متشابهة ومحددة تظهر بشكل مستقل على الهيكل التنظيمي وتكون على شكل
عينة أو فرع أو مكتب... الخ.

في الديوان من الممكن أن تحتوي على مجموعة أقسام أو مكاتب.

في الديوان تتبع مستوى تنظيمي أعلى منها وهو "إدارة"، ومن الممكن أن تضم مجموعة شعب".

ة في الديوان تتبع مستوى تنظيمي أعلى منها وهو "القسم".

ة على الوحدات الإدارية بمختلف أحجامها إنما في مكان جغرافي مستقل أو لنشاط مستقل.

ديوان صغيرة يتم إنشاؤها في مجالات الأعمال الإدارية أو المكتبية أو الرقابية. أو كبيرة وغالباً ما تتبع الإدارة العليا.

التنظيمية: إطار يوضح التقسيمات الإدارية التي يتكون منها الديوان مرتبة على شكل مستويات فوق بعضها البعض

يم وهو الإطار الذي تنساب من خلاله الأوامر والتعليمات من المستوى الأعلى إلى الأدنى وتتضح فيه صلاحية اتخاذ

لسؤولية.

تنظيمي الرسمي للديوان، الذي يوضح توضع البنى التنظيمية الأساسية والفرعية وكيفية ارتباط

تويات العليا والدنيا والأفقية بما يخدم تنفيذ المهام المحددة

الوظيفية: التسلسل الهرمي للوظائف بمستوياتها الإدارية كماً ونوعاً والمتشابهة من حيث الخصائص والمسؤوليات ضمن

توزيع الوظائف على أجهزة (إدارة، مكتب، قسم، إلخ) الهيكل التنظيمي.

غير عن غرض وجود الوظيفة وتكون غالباً من كلمتين تمثل الكلمة الأولى التخصص الأساسي والثانية تعبر عن التخصص

أساسي (إيرادات) و (مدير الإدارة المالية) و (أمير الإدارة العامة للرقابة والتفتيش)

يجي لكيفية عمل الجهة الرسمية يُظهر توزيع وترابط أنشطتها من أجل تحقيق المهام والأهداف التي أنشأت من أجله

الإداري.

Chapter One: Definitions

The definition of the following technical expressions in this system is given alongside each one:

- . Diwan: Diwan al-Amn in the Islamic State.
- . Amir of the Diwan: Amir of the Diwan al-Amn
- . Centre of the Diwan: Subdivision of the Diwan in the western wilayas in the Islamic State.
- . Organizational unit/Administrative unit: group of personnel who undertake identical and defined assignments that independently appear on the organizational framework and exist at the level of a sector, administration, division, branch, *far'* or office etc.
- . Administration: organizational administrative unit in the Diwan that may comprise a group of divisions or offices.
- . Division: organizational administrative unit in the Diwan affiliated with a higher organizational unit than it: the administration. It may comprise a group of branches.
- . Branch: organizational administrative unit in the Diwan affiliated with a higher organizational unit than it: the division.
- . *Far'*: a technical term used to indicate the admin units in their different sizes, either in an independent geographic place or for independent activity.
- . Office: small organizational unit in the Diwan established in the fields of administrative, officer or oversight jobs; or it is big and for the large part affiliated with the highest administration.
- . Organizational framework: the structure that clarifies the administrative divisions of which the Diwan is composed- organized in the form of levels on top of each other- and the authority and responsibility of every division. And it is the structure through which orders and instructions flow from the higher level to the lower level and in which the competency of taking decisions and the centres of authority and responsibility become clear. Also defined as: the official organizational form for the Diwan, which clarifies how the basic organizational and divisional structure has been put in place and how the job positions relate to the higher, lower and horizontal levels in what serves the implementation of the defined missions.
- . Job positions framework: The pyramidal structure for job positions in their identical administrative levels quantitatively and qualitatively from the perspective of the specialities and responsibilities within the one organizational unit. Also defined as follows: representation of the distribution of job positions in the organizational framework apparatus (administration, office, division etc.).
- . Job position designation: technical term expressing the purpose of the existence of the job position and it is mostly composed of two words: the first word expresses the fundamental speciality and the second the unit speciality that arises from it like accountant of imports and director of financial administration and amir of the general administration for oversight and inspection.
- . System of course of work: outline clarifying how the operation of the official party shows the distribution and connection of its activities to realize the missions and aims for which the organizational unit or administrative apparatus was established.

Chapter Two[12]: Organizational guide to the security centre

الباب الثالث

الدليل التنظيمي لمركز الأمن



مراكز الأمن بالولايات

مركز الأمن بالولايات



تنظيمي لمركز الأمن بالولاية.

الإدارية	أمير المركز
الديوان	الوالي
مسؤول عن الوحدة الإدارية	أمير مركز الأمن بالولاية..
	كافة إدارات ومكاتب مركز الأمن
	الإشراف على عمل الجهاز الأمني بالولاية

مركز الأمن

يراف على أعمال الوحدات الإدارية في المركز وأعمال المكاتب

يراف على تنفيذ الخطة الأمنية العامة ضمن الولاية وفق السياسات المقررة من الديوان

يسدق على الموازنات والميزانيات الخاصة بالمركز ومكاتبه

يراف النائب إلى أمير الديوان والوالي.

يراف أمراء الإدارات والأقسام والمكاتب وأمير الديوان

التقارير الشهرية للديوان والولاية عن عمل المركز ومكاتبه وأطلاعهم على واقع الأمن في الولاية.

يراف للولاية في الحالات المستعجلة أو في حالة الإشكالات الإدارية مع المسؤولين

يراف المستمرة والزيارات الدورية لمكاتب الأمن والمتابعة الحثيثة لسير عملها

يراف الدائم والمستمر مع الولاية والديوان


يراف في الشكاوى المرفوعة ضد منسوبي مركز الأمن أو تشكل لجان داخلية للنظر فيها

يراف على الخطط التنفيذية على المدى القريب والمتوسط

يراف لأمير الديوان أو من ينوبه في النوازل وأخذ التوجيهات حيالها

Section One: Security centres in the wilayas

First: Framework of the security centres in the wilayas



Second: The organizational structure for the security centre in the wilaya:

1. The amir of the centre

Name of the administrative unit	Amir of the centre
Organizational connection	The wali
The job position designation for the official of the administrative unit	Amir of the security centre in a wilaya
Points of oversight	All administrations and offices of the security centre
General aim	Oversight of the work of the security apparatus in the wilaya

. Tasks of the amir of the security centre

- Oversight of the works of the administrative units in the centres and works of the offices.
- Oversight of implementing the general security plan within the wilaya according to the policies decided by the Diwan.
- Certifying the balances and budgets for the centre and its offices.
- Submitting to the amir of the Diwan and the wali a candidate for the position of deputy [amir of the centre].
- Submitting to the amir of the Diwan candidates for the positions of amirs of the administrations, divisions and offices.
- Referring monthly reports to the Diwan and wilaya concerning the work of the centre and its offices and their review of the security situation in the wilaya.
- Writing to the wilaya in urgent matters or in the event of administrative problems with



the officials.

- Continual inspection and persistent visits to the security offices and quick tracking of the course of their work.
- Continual and lasting contact with the wilaya and Diwan.
- Verifying complaints raised against those affiliated with the security centre or forming internal committees to review them.
- Certifying the implementation plans in the short and medium term.
- Writing to the amir of the Diwan or whoso represents him in mishaps and taking up the directives regarding them.
- Receiving those assigned to the security centre and knowing the extent of the possibility of benefiting from them and directing them.

إدارة التعاميم والقرارات الخاصة بمركز الأمن
 بكافة المهام والمسؤوليات المنوطة به كأمر لمركز الأمن بما يضمن تقدم وتحسن وتطوير وضع المركز بشكل عام ودائم ومستمر.
 كافة القرارات اللازمة لضمان الالتزام بالسياسات العامة المعتمدة وضمان العمل على تحقيق الأهداف الاستراتيجية وتطوير الأطر العامة

م وتوزيع المهام والمسؤوليات والصلاحيات والوظائف حسب الكفاءة ومن هو أفضل للمصلحة العامة. وذلك لقول النبي صلى الله عليه
 (من ولي من أمر المسلمين شيئاً فولي رجلاً وهو يرى من هو أصلح منه للمسلمين فقد خان الله ورسوله). رواه الحاكم في مستدركه.
 كافة الإدارات والمؤسسات والهيئات بأنظمة العمل المعتمدة من الديوان وذلك لضمان كفاءة وجودة العمل وعدم وجود أي ثغرات في نوع
 نواع التسيب أو الترهل الإداري
 حسن أداء العاملين.

المشكلات التي تعيق حركة العمل ووضع الحلول لها واقتراح اساليب تطوير العمل
 مع الدوري بأمراء الإدارات والأقسام والمكاتب
 مدى التزام الإدارات والأقسام والمكاتب بالخطط والبرامج الكفيلة بنجاح وتطوير العمل في المركز
 اللوائح التنفيذية الخاصة بكيفية تطبيق أنظمة العمل المعتمدة من الديوان.

المركز	الإدارية
نائب أمير المركز	إدارية
أمير المركز	إدارية
نائب أمير مركز الأمن	مسؤول عن الوحدة الإدارية
كافة إدارات ومكاتب مركز الأمن	
انابة أمير المركز	

أمير المركز
 كافة أعمال الوحدات الإدارية في المركز وأعمال المكاتب.
 من مهام الأمير الخاصة في حال توكيله بأدائها من قبله ونيابته نيابة كاملة في جميع المهام في حال غيابه.
 على الملفات والمجالات التي يخول بها من أمير المركز
 أمير المركز في الإشراف على أعمال المركز وفق ما يفوضه له من صلاحيات
 على سير عمل الخطط والأنظمة المعمول بها في مركز الأمن والمعتمدة من الديوان
 مدى التزام الإدارات والأقسام والمكاتب بالخطط والبرامج الكفيلة بنجاح وتطوير العمل في المركز
 أي مهام أخرى يكلف بها من قبل أمير المركز

المركز	الإدارية
إدارة أمن المجاهدين	إدارية
أمير المركز	إدارية
أمير إدارة أمن المجاهدين	مسؤول عن الوحدة الإدارية
كافة الأقسام التابعة لإدارة أمن المجاهدين	
حفظ أمن المجاهدين بالولاية	

- Issuing statements for distribution and decisions concerning the security centre.
- Undertaking all the tasks and responsibilities entrusted to him as amir of the security centre in what concerns progress, improvement and development of the centre's situation in a general, lasting and continual sense.
- Taking all the necessary decisions to ensure compliance with the general authorized policies and ensuring work to realize the strategic goals and develop general outlines of action for the centre.
- Dividing and distributing tasks, responsibilities, powers and job positions according to competency and who is more preferable for the general interest, and that is in accordance with the words of the Prophet (SAWS): "Whoso has been entrusted with something from the affairs of the Muslims and has appointed a man even as he sees one who is more competent than him for the Muslims, has betrayed God and His Messenger"- narrated by al-Hakim in his Mustadrik.
- Making all the admins, foundations and committees comply with the systems of work authorized by the Diwan and that is to ensure competent, high quality work and that there should be no trace of any of the types of administrative neglect or flabbiness.
- Oversight of the good performance of the workers.
- Investigating problems that hinder the movement of work and putting in place solutions for them and suggesting methods of developing work.
- Regularly meeting the amirs of the administrations, divisions and offices.
- Tracking the extent of the compliance of the administrations, divisions and offices with the plans and programs ensuring the success and development of the work in the centre.
- Issuing implementation notices regarding how to apply the systems of work authorized by the Diwan.

2. Deputy amir of the centre

Name of the administrative unit	Deputy amir of the centre
Organizational connection	Amir of the centre
Job position designation for the official for the administrative unit	Deputy amir of the security centre
Points of oversight	All administrations and offices of the security centre
General aim	Deputy role of the amir of the centre

. Tasks of the deputy amir of the centre:

- Tracking all the works of the administration units in the centre and the works of the offices.
- Carrying out some of the special tasks of the amir in the event of being entrusted to do them by him and total representation of him in all tasks in the event of his absence.
- Overseeing the files and fields he is entrusted with by the amir of the centre.
- Representing the amir of the centre in overseeing the works of the centre according to the powers delegated to him by the amir.
- Overseeing the course of work of the plans and systems implemented in the security centre and authorized by the Diwan.
- Tracking the extent of the compliance of the administrations, divisions and offices with

the plans and programs ensuring the success and development of the work in the centre.
 – Undertaking any other tasks entrusted to him by the amir of the centre.

3. Administration of the security of the mujahideen

Name of the administrative unit	Administration of the security of the mujahideen
Organizational connection	Amir of the centre
Job position designation for the official for the admin unit	Amir of the administration of the security of the mujahideen
Points of oversight	All divisions affiliated with the administration of the security of the mujahideen
General aim	Protecting the security of the mujahideen in the wilaya

Tasks of the administration of the security of the mujahideen:

– Preventive security

لائحة التجسس

أقبة الافراد المشبهين والسلبين (مخللين، مرجفين)

معة قضايا فساد العقائد

ة:

أمن المجاهدين على مستوى مراكز الدواوين والهيئات في الولاية، وأمن الجيش في حال كان الجيش يتبع للولاية

لاستخبارات

إدارة الاستخبارات	إدارة
امير المركز	تنظيمي
امير إدارة الاستخبارات	وظيفي للمسؤول عن الوحدة الإدارية
كافة الأقسام التابعة لإدارة الاستخبارات	راف
إدارة مجموعات الاستخبارات والحصول على المعلومات المطلوبة بشئى ا	ام

إدارة الاستخبارات

رة المجموعات الاستخبارية الخاصة بها

مع وتحليل المعلومات وتقديمها لأصحاب القرار

مل على الملفات التي يؤمر بالعمل عليها أصولاً

نيد العيون

سة الظواهر السلبية التي تمثل خطر على امن الدولة ورفعها للتعامل معها

حقة شبكات التجسس واستعمال كل السبل الشرعية المتاحة لكشفهم

جري والدراسات





معلومات والأرشيف

قسم المعلومات والأرشيف	إدارة
إدارة الاستخبارات	تنظيمي
امير قسم المعلومات والأرشيف	وظيفي للمسؤول عن الوحدة الإدارية
كافة الأقسام التابعة لقسم المعلومات والأرشيف	راف
إدارة المعلومات وتحليلها وحفظها	ام

قسم المعلومات والأرشيف

ارة المعلومات وتجميعها وتحليلها وحفظها وتأمينها حسب الأصول.

مع المعلومات من مكاتب الأمن في القواطع.

لبيق اليات العمل الموضوعة من قبل الدewan.

ابعة واستقبال المعلومات من وسائل الاعلام، وجمعها على شكل تقارير يومية.

تنيف المعلومات حسب الأصول التي يجب أن تتعامل معها.

ويل المعلومات الى الجهات المعنية مع كتابة توصية او ملاحظة عن مدى صحة المعلومة وخطورتها.

- Counter-espionage
- Monitoring suspect and bad members (disappointingly and agitated)
- Following cases of the corruption of doctrines

Note: the administration of the security of the mujahideen works on the level of the centres of the Diwans and committees in the wilaya, and the security of the army in the event that the army is affiliated with the wilaya.

4. Intelligence administration

Name of the administrative unit	Intelligence administration
Organizational connection	Amir of the centre
Job position designation for the official for the admin unit	Amir of the intelligence administration
Points of oversight	All divisions affiliated with the intelligence administration
General aim	Administration of the intelligence groups and obtaining the desired information in different [types][13]

. Tasks of the intelligence administration:

- Administration of the intelligence groups in its purview.
- Gathering and analyzing information and submitting it to those with the power of decision-making.
- Working on the files that are ordered to be worked on with due process.
- Studying negative phenomena that represent a danger to the security of the Dawla and referring them to be dealt with.[14]
- Catching espionage networks and using all Shari'i means available to uncover them.
- Investigation and studies.

4/a: Information and archive division

Name of the administrative unit	Information and archive division
Organizational connection	Intelligence administration
Job position designation for the official of the administrative unit	Amir of the information and archive division
Points of oversight	All divisions affiliated with the information and archive division
General aim	Administration of information, analyzing it and preserving it

Tasks of the information and archive division:

- Administration of information, collecting it, analyzing it, preserving it and securing it in accordance with principles.

- Gathering information from the security offices in the sectors.
- Applying means of work put in place by the Diwan.
- Tracking and receiving information from the media, and bringing it together in the form of daily reports.
- Classifying information according to principles that must be dealt with.
- Transferring information to the relevant parties with the writing of a suggestion or notice concerning the extent of the truth of the piece of information and its danger.
- Establishing a secure archive for the wilaya.

الإدارية	إدارة التحقيق والسجن
مليحي	امير المركز
مسئول عن الوحدة الإدارية	امير إدارة التحقيق والسجن
ب	كافة المكاتب التابعة لإدارة التحقيق والسجن
	القيام بمهام التحقيق وما يتعلق به من حبس وتحقيق وادعاء

Tamara

إدارة التحقيق والسجن

- ✓ إدارة المسجون التابعة للولاية
- ✓ متابعة قضايا المسجون
- ✓ فرز القضايا وتمييزها (قضايا غير امنية او لا نحتاج التوقيف)
- ✓ مباشرة التحقيق في القضايا الامنية
- ✓ الاستدراك على الاحكام الصادرة من القضاء
- ✓ اصدار طلبات اعتقال بحق من تورط في قضايا تم التحقيق فيها
- ✓ اصدار طلبات تفتيش او تتبع.
- ✓ الادعاء امام القضاء على الموقوفين

بنية والمعلوماتية

الإدارية	إدارة التقنية والمعلوماتية
مليحي	امير المركز
مسئول عن الوحدة الإدارية	امير إدارة التقنية والمعلوماتية
ب	كافة المكاتب التقنية التابعة له
	التعامل مع الأجهزة الإلكترونية للمعتقلين والعمل على الحد من الخروقات الإلكترونية للأجهزة المستخدمة (الاتصالات والأجهزة والإنترنت)

بنية والتقنية والمعلوماتية

استرجاع والصيانة:

- جاع: استعادة واسترجاع الملفات والبيانات المحذوفة واستخراج المخفية والمشفرة منها من كافة الأجهزة الإلكترونية.
- صيانة كافة الأجهزة الإلكترونية وتجهيزها للعمل الآمن ونزع أجهزة التعقب وصيانة الأجهزة النالفة
- نظمة والشبكات:

على تجهيز أنظمة التشغيل الآمنة للأجهزة الإلكترونية المستخدمة

وحماية الأجهزة المتصلة بالإنترنت من خلال التوصية ببرامج أمنة

خطط تشفير وأرشفة البيانات الحساسة لحمايتها من التلغ والتجسس.

شبكات الإنترنت وإنشاء سيرفرات وشبكات محلية وإدارتها وتأمين اتصالاتها وتشفير بياناتها

سبب الاتصالات:

اتصالات الإنترنت

وتراخيص الإنترنت للفئات المسموح لها باستخدامه

البيع والشراء لأجهزة الإنترنت ومستلزماته

المراقبة للأماكن المرخص لها وإرسال دوريات منتظمة لمراقبة سير العمل والتأكد من التزام المرخص لهم بالتعليمات والشروط

5. Verification and prison administration.

Name of the administrative unit	Verification and prison administration
Organizational connection	Amir of the centre
Job position designation for the official for the administrative unit	Amir of the verification and prison administration
Points of oversight	All offices affiliated with the verification and prison administration
General aim	Undertaking tasks of verification and what concerns it from detention, verification and prosecution

. Tasks of the verification and prison administration:

- Administration of the prisons affiliated with the wilaya.
- Tracking cases of prisoners.
- Sorting and distinguishing cases (non-security cases or those that don't need detention).[15]
- Undertaking verification in security cases.
- Supplementing the rulings issued by the judges.
- Issuing arrest requests against whoso has been involved in cases in which verification has been done.
- Issuing requests for inspection and tracking.
- Bringing cases against detainees before judges.

6. Technology and informatics administration

Name of administrative unit	Technology and informatics administration
Organizational connection	Amir of the centre
Job position designation for the official of the administrative unit	Amir of the technology and informatics administration
Points of oversight	All technology offices affiliated with it
General aim	Deal with the electronic devices of detainees and work to stop electronic penetrations for devices that are used (connections, devices and Internet)

. Tasks of the technology and informatics administration:

- Recovery and maintenance division:
 - Recovery: restoring and recovering deleted files and data and extracting the hidden and encrypted from them from all electronic devices.
 - Maintenance: maintenance of all electronic devices and preparing them for security work, removing tracking devices[16] and repairing broken apparatuses.

- Systems and networks division:
 - Working to prepare safe operating systems for electronic devices that are used.
 - Securing and protecting devices connected to the Internet through recommending safe programs.
 - Applying plans to encrypt and archive sensitive data to protect them from damage and espionage.
 - Programming Internet networks and establishing local servers and networks and managing them and securing their connections and encrypting their data.
- Office to regulate connections:
 - Regulating Internet connections.
 - Issuing Internet licenses to the parties allowed to use it.[17]
 - Regulating the selling and buying of Internet apparatuses and its necessities.
 - Tracking and monitoring the licensed places and sending regular patrols to monitor the course of work and make sure those licensed are complying with the instructions and conditions.

Amir T. T.

الإدارة الاقتصادية	إدارة الأمن الاقتصادي
المركز	امير المركز
المسؤول عن الوحدة الإدارية	امير إدارة الأمن الاقتصادي
	إدارة الأمن الاقتصادي
	العمل على حفظ الأمن الاقتصادي

الأمن الاقتصادي

في القضايا ذات الصلة

عن القضايا المتعلقة بالأمن الاقتصادي

تحقيق في قضايا الفساد المالي والاختلاس ووضع المتهمين فيها قيد الاعتقال أو الوضع تحت التصرف دون اعتقال لأوضاع المالية جنود الدولة والتدقيق وجمع المعلومات عن أسباب زيادة أموال جندي الدولة إذا كانت ناتجة عن وجوده في الدولة أم لا مع المشتبه به من جنود الدولة في قضايا الفساد المالي الناتج عن عمله أو عن أعمال أخرى ترتبط بعمله في القضايا والمشاكل الواردة من المفاصل والقطاعات واتخاذ ما يلزم من إجراءات تدقيق وتفتيش وضبط الموجودات وتحريرها واعتقال تورطه بدليل

زوير العملة والمعادن الثمينة حيث يتم التحقيق بها وتحويل المتهمين أما للقضاء العادي أو الأمني حسب كمية المزور ونوعه هرب الآثار ومواد الركاز التي يكون للدولة خمسها أو التي تصدر تعليمات بمنع تداولها أو التنقيب عنها بدون إذن الدولة لاحتكار التي من شأنها التأثير على الوضع الاقتصادي للبلد وعلى معاش المسلمين

لسلع الاستراتيجية في الأسواق وتقديم المقترحات اللازمة للجهات الوصائية لاتخاذ الإجراءات المناسبة بشأن توفرها ابتداءً من تشجيع توفيرها وانتهاءً بقيام الدولة باستيرادها أو التدخل بالمعابر الحدودية للضغط على الانظمة المجاورة لمبادلتها بسلع أخرى تخرج من أراضي مثال مستلزمات الانتاج الزراعي من سماد ومبيدات ومعدات أخرى

يون الإدارية

الإدارة	إدارة الشؤون الإدارية
المركز	امير المركز
المسؤول عن الوحدة الإدارية	امير إدارة الشؤون الإدارية
	كافة الأقسام التابعة للإدارة
	تلبية احتياجات المركز الادارية والمالية

الشؤون الإدارية

مقدرات المركز حسب الأصول المتبعة.

الإدارة المالية

الموارد البشرية

احتياجات العمل

م بكافة الأعمال المساندة للأعمال الأساسية للمركز.

7. Economic security administration

Name of administrative unit	Economic security administration
Organizational connection	Amir of the centre
Job position designation for the official of the administration unit	Amir of the economic security administration
Points of oversight	Economic security administration
General aim	Working to preserve economic security

. Tasks of the economic security administration:

- Verification in relevant cases.
- Investigating cases concerning economic security.
- Assuming responsibility for verifying cases of financial corruption and embezzlement and arresting the accused in those cases or placing them under disposition without arrest.
- Monitoring the financial situations of the soldiers of the Dawla, verifying and gathering information about the reasons for the increase of the wealth of a soldier of the Dawla whether it derives from his presence in the Dawla or not.
- Verifying with the suspect from the soldiers of the Dawla in cases of financial corruption deriving from his work or other actions connected with his work.
- Verifying in cases and problems coming from the areas and sectors and taking the necessary procedures in verification, inspection and controlling those problems and cases found, taking hold of them and arresting the one shown to be involved by evidence.
- Cases of forging currency and precious metals through verifying in them and referring the accused either to the ordinary judiciary or the security one according to the quantity of forgery and its type.
- Cases of smuggling antiquities and *rikaz* resources[18] of which a fifth part belongs to the Dawla and which issues instructions banning their circulation and excavation without the license of the Dawla.
- Cases of hoarding that impact the economic situation of the land and the Muslims' livelihood.
- Monitoring strategic commodities in the markets and submitting the necessary suggestions to the authorized parties to take the appropriate measures on the matter of their availability, beginning from encouraging the merchants to make them available, and concluding with the Dawla's importation of them or intervening in the border crossings to pressure the neighbouring systems to exchange them for other commodities coming out of the lands of the Dawla like necessities of agricultural production from fertilizer, pesticides and other goods.

8. Administration of administrative affairs.

Name of administrative unit	Administration of administrative affairs
Organizational connection	Amir of the centre
Job position designation for the official of the administrative unit	Amir of the administration of administrative affairs

Points of oversight

All divisions affiliated with the administration


General aim

Heeding the administrative and financial needs of the centre

. Tasks of the administration of administrative affairs:

- Administration of the centre's capabilities according to principles followed.
- Financial works of the administration.
- Administration of human resources.
- Addressing work needs.
- Undertaking all actions that help the centre's foundational works.

الفصل الثاني: مكاتب الأمن في القواطع
أولاً: الهيكلية التنظيمية لمكاتب الأمن بالقواطع



ملاحظات:

1. بعض المكاتب يكون فيها قسم التقنية والمعلوماتية حسب الحاجة التي يحددها أمير مركز الأمن.
2. بعض المكاتب لا يكون فيها قسم التنفيذ حسب الحاجة التي يحددها أمير مركز الأمن.

ثانياً: التكوين التنظيمي لمكاتب الأمن بالقواطع

1. أمير مكتب الأمن

اسم الوحدة الإدارية	أمير مكتب الأمن
الارتباط التنظيمي	امير المركز
المسمى الوظيفي للمسؤول عن الوحدة الإدارية	أمير مكتب الأمن
نطاق الإشراف	كافة الأقسام التابعة للمكتب
الهدف العام	الإشراف على العمل الأمني بالقاطع


مهام أمير مكتب الأمن

- ✓ الإشراف على أعمال الوحدات الإدارية في المكتب
- ✓ الإشراف على تنفيذ الخطة الأمنية العامة ضمن المكتب واستعمال السياسات المقررة من الديوان
- ✓ الإقرار على الموازنات والميزانيات الخاصة بالمكتب
- ✓ ترشيح نائب أمير مكتب الأمن وأمير المركز.
- ✓ رفع التقارير الشهرية للمركز عن عمل المكتب وإطلاعهم على واقع الأمن في القاطع.
- ✓ الكتابة للمركز في الحالات المستعجلة أو في حالة الإشكالات الإدارية
- ✓ المراجعة المستمرة والزيارات الدورية لأفراد الأمن والمتابعة الحثيثة لسير عملهم
- ✓ التواصل الدائم والمستمر مع المركز
- ✓ استقبال المفروضين للمكتب ومعرفة مدى إمكانية الاستفادة منهم وتوجيههم
- ✓ القيام بكافة المهام والمسؤوليات المنوطة به كأمر لمكتب الأمن بما يضمن تقدم وتحسن وتطوير وضع المكتب بشكل عام ودائم ومستمر.
- ✓ إلزام كافة الأقسام بأنظمة العمل المعتمدة من الديوان.
- ✓ مراقبة حسن أداء العاملين.
- ✓ بحث المشكلات التي تعيق حركة العمل ووضع الحلول لها واقتراح أساليب تطوير العمل
- ✓ الاجتماع الدوري بأمرء الأقسام والمكاتب
- ✓ متابعة مدى التزام الإدارات والأقسام والمكاتب بالخطط والبرامج الكفيلة بنجاح وتطور العمل في المركز.
- ✓ إصدار أوامر الاعتقال في الحالات المستعجلة.

2. نائب أمير مكتب الأمير

Section Two: Security offices in the sectors

1. Organizational framework for the security offices in the sectors



Notes:

1. Some of the offices may have in them a technology and informatics division according to the need defined by the amir of the security centre.
2. Some of the offices will not have in them an implementation division according to the need defined by the amir of the security centre.

Second: organizational structure for the security offices in the centre.

1. Amir of the security office

Name of the administrative unit

Amir of the security office

Organizational connection

Amir of the centre

Job position designation for the official for the administrative unit

Amir of the security office

Points of oversight

All divisions affiliated with the

General aim	office Overseeing the security work in the sector
-------------	------------------------------------------------------

Tasks of the amir of the security office:

- Overseeing the works of the administrative units in the office
- Overseeing the implementation of the general security plan within the office and making use of the policies decided by the Diwan.
- Deciding on the budgets and balances concerning the office.
- Nominating the candidate for deputy amir of the security office to the amir of the centre.
- Referring monthly reports to the centre concerning the office's work and its review of the security situation in the sector.
- Writing to the centre in urgent matters or in event of administrative problems.
- Continual inspection and persistent visits to security personnel and quick tracking of the course of their work.
- Lasting and continual connection with the centre.
- Receiving those assigned to the office and getting to know the extent of the possibility of benefiting from them and directing them.
- Undertaking all the tasks and responsibilities he is entrusted with as amir of the security office in what ensures the progress, improvement and development of the office's situation generally and in a lasting and continual sense.
- Making all divisions comply with the systems of work set by the Diwan.
- Monitoring the soundness of the workers' performance.
- Investigating problems that impede the movement of work and putting in place solutions for them and suggesting methods of developing work.
- Regular meetings with the amirs of the divisions and offices
- Tracking the extent of the compliance of the admins, divisions and offices with the plans and programs that ensure the success and development of work in the centre.
- Issuing arrest orders in urgent matters.

اسم الوحدة الإدارية	نائب أمير مكتب الأمير
الارتباط التنظيمي	امير مكتب الامن
المسعى الوظيفي للمسؤول عن الوحدة الإدارية	نائب أمير مكتب الأمير
نطاق الإشراف	كافة الأقسام التابعة للمكتب
الهدف العام	انابة امير مكتب الامن في مهامه

مهام نائب أمير مكتب الأمن

- ✓ متابعة كافة أعمال الوحدات الإدارية في المكتب
- ✓ أداء بعض مهام الأمير الخاصة في حال توكيله بأدائها من قبله ونيابته نيابة كاملة في جميع المهام في حال غيابه.
- ✓ الإشراف على الملفات والمجالات التي يخول بها من أمير المكتب
- ✓ الإشراف على سير عمل الخطة والأنظمة المعمول بها في مركز الأمن والمعتمدة من الديوان
- ✓ متابعة مدى التزام الإدارات والأقسام والمكاتب بالخطة والبرامج الكفيلة بنجاح وتطوير العمل في المكتب
- ✓ القيام بأي مهام أخرى يكلف بها من قبل أمير المكتب

3. قسم الاستخبارات

اسم الوحدة الإدارية	قسم الاستخبارات
الارتباط التنظيمي	امير مكتب الامن
المسعى الوظيفي للمسؤول عن الوحدة الإدارية	امير قسم الاستخبارات
نطاق الإشراف	كافة المكاتب التابعة للقسم
الهدف العام	إدارة مجموعات الاستخبارات والحصول على المعلومات المطلوبة بشئ الطرق

مهام قسم الاستخبارات

- ✓ إدارة المجموعات الاستخبارية الخاصة به
- ✓ جمع وتحليل المعلومات ورفعها
- ✓ العمل على الملفات التي يؤمر بالعمل عليها أصولاً
- ✓ تجنيد العيون
- ✓ دراسة الظواهر السلبية التي تمثل خطر على امن الدولة ورفعها للتعامل معها
- ✓ ملاحقة شبكات التجسس واستعمال كل السبل الشرعية المتاحة لكشفهم
- ✓ التحري والدراسات


1/3. مكتب المعلومات والأرشيف

اسم الوحدة الإدارية	مكتب المعلومات والأرشيف
الارتباط التنظيمي	امير قسم الاستخبارات
المسعى الوظيفي للمسؤول عن الوحدة الإدارية	امير مكتب المعلومات والأرشيف
نطاق الإشراف	المكاتب التابعة للقسم
الهدف العام	إدارة المعلومات وتحليلها وحفظها

مهام مكتب المعلومات

- ✓ إدارة المعلومات وتجميعها وتحليلها وحفظها وتأمينها حسب الأصول.
- ✓ تطبيق آليات العمل الموسوعة من قبل الديوان.
- ✓ تصنيف المعلومات حسب الأصول التي يجب أن تتعامل معها.
- ✓ تحويل المعلومات إلى الجهات المعنية مع كتابة توصية أو ملاحظة عن مدى صحة المعلومة وخطورتها.
- ✓ انشاء أرشيف ثابت للمكتب

4. قسم التحقيق والسجن


T

2. Deputy amir of the amir's office.

Name of administrative unit	Deputy amir of the amir's office
Organizational connection	Amir of the security office
Job position designation for the official for the administrative unit	Deputy amir of the amir's office
Points of oversight	All divisions affiliated with the office
General aim	Role of deputy of the amir of the security office in his tasks

Tasks of the deputy amir of the security office:

- Tracking all works of the administrative units in the office.
- Undertaking some of the amir's special assignments in the event of being entrusted to undertake them by him and comprehensive representation of him in all missions in the event of his absence.
- Overseeing the files and fields entrusted to him by the amir of the office.
- Overseeing the course of work of the plans and systems implemented in the security centre and authorized by the Diwan.
- Tracking the extent of the compliance of the admins, divisions and offices with the plans and programs ensuring the success and development of work in the office.
- Undertaking any other missions entrusted to him by the amir of the office.

3. Intelligence division

Name of administrative unit	Intelligence division
Organizational connection	Amir of the security office
Job position designation for the official for the administrative unit	Amir of the intelligence division
Points of oversight	All offices affiliated with the division
General aim	Administration of intelligence groups and obtaining the desired information through different means

Tasks of the intelligence division:

- . Administration of the intelligence groups in its purview.
- . Gathering, analyzing and referring information.
- . Working on files ordered to work on with due process.
- . Recruiting eyes.[19]
- . Studying negative phenomena that represent a danger to the security of the Dawla and referring them to be dealt with.
- . Catching espionage networks and using all available legitimate means to uncover them.
- . Inquiry and studies.

3a: Archive and information office

Name of the administrative unit	Information and archive office
Organizational connection	Amir of the intelligence division
Job position designation for the official of the administrative unit	Amir of the information and archive office
Points of oversight	Offices affiliated with the division
General aim	Administration of information, analyzing it and preserving it

Tasks of the information office

- Admin of information, collecting it, analyzing it, preserving it and securing it according to principles.
- Applying means of work put in place by the Diwan.
- Classifying information according to the principles that must be dealt with.
- Referring information to the specific parties with writing of a suggestion or notice regarding the extent of the truth of the piece of information and its danger.
- Establishing a secure archive for the office.

اسم الوحدة الإدارية	قسم التحقيق والسجن
الارتباط التنظيمي	امير مكتب الامن
المسمى الوظيفي للممسؤل عن الوحدة الإدارية	امير قسم التحقيق والسجن
نطاق الإشراف	المكاتب التابعة للقسم
الهدف العام	القيام بمهام التحقيق وما يتعلق به من حبس وتحقيق وأدعاء

مهام قسم التحقيق والسجن

- ✓ إدارة السجون التابعة للمكتب الامني بالقامع
- ✓ متابعة قضايا السجناء
- ✓ فرز القضايا وتمييزها (قضايا غير امنية او لا تحتاج التوقيف)
- ✓ مباشرة التحقيق في القضايا الامنية
- ✓ الاستدراك على الاحكام الصادرة من القضاء
- ✓ اصدار طلبات اعتقال بحق من تورط في قضايا تم التحقيق فيها
- ✓ اصدار طلبات تفتيش او تتبع
- ✓ الادعاء امام القضاء على الموقوفين

5. قسم التنفيذ

اسم الوحدة الإدارية	قسم التنفيذ
الارتباط التنظيمي	امير مكتب الامن
المسمى الوظيفي للممسؤل عن الوحدة الإدارية	امير قسم التنفيذ
نطاق الإشراف	...
الهدف العام	الاعتقالات والمداهمات

مهام قسم التنفيذ

- ✓ تنفيذ أوامر الاعتقال والتفتيش الصادرة من الجهات المخولة وما يتعلق بعملية الاعتقال من إجراءات
- ✓ الحواجز الطيارة

6. قسم الشؤون الإدارية

اسم الوحدة الإدارية	قسم الشؤون الإدارية
الارتباط التنظيمي	امير مكتب الامن
المسمى الوظيفي للممسؤل عن الوحدة الإدارية	امير قسم الشؤون الإدارية
نطاق الإشراف	...
الهدف العام	تلبية احتياجات المكتب الادارية والمالية

مهام قسم الشؤون الإدارية

- ✓ ادارة مقدرات المكتب حسب الأصول المتبعة.
- ✓ أعمال الإدارة المالية
- ✓ إدارة الموارد البشرية
- ✓ تلبية احتياجات العمل
- ✓ القيام بكافة الأعمال المساندة للأعمال الأساسية للمكتب.

4. Verification and prison division

Name of administrative unit	Verification and prison division
Organizational connection	Amir of the security office
Job position designation for the official for the administrative unit	Amir of the verification and prison division
Points of oversight	Offices affiliated with the division
General aim	Undertaking tasks of verification and things related to it from detention, verification and prosecution

Tasks of the verification and prison division

- Admin of prisons affiliated with the security office in the sector.
- Tracking cases of prisoners.
- Sorting and distinguishing cases (non-security cases or not requiring detention).
- Undertaking verification in security cases
- Supplementing the rulings issued by the judges
- Issuing arrest requests against those involved in cases in which verification has been done.
- Issuing inspection and tracking requests
- Bringing cases against detainees before judges.

5. Implementation division

Name of administrative unit	Implementation division
Organizational connection	Amir of the security office
Job position designation for the official for the administrative unit	Amir of the implementation division
Points of oversight	...
General aim	Arrests and assaults

Tasks of the implementation division

- Carrying out the orders of arrest and inspection issued by the authorized parties and what concerns the arrest operation from procedures
- Flying checkpoints.

6. Administrative affairs division

Name of administrative unit	Administrative affairs division
Organizational connection	Amir of the security office
Job position designation for the official for the admin unit	Amir of the administrative affairs division
Points of oversight	...
General aim	Heeding the administrative and financial

needs of the office

Tasks of the administrative affairs division:

- Administration of the office's capabilities according to principles followed
- Financial administration works
- Administration of human resources
- Heeding work needs
- Undertaking all actions that help the foundational works of the office.

الباب الرابع:

العلاقات الرسمية للديوان ومراكزه

من الأول العلاقات الرسمية للديوان

علاقة الديوان بالولاية.

- للديوان حق وضع الخطة والسياسات العامة للديوان والمراكز وعلى الولاية تطبيقها.
- للديوان الحق في وضع النظام الداخلي كاملاً، ووضع آلية التعديل عليه، وعلى الولاية الالتزام بتطبيق النظام الداخلي كاملاً بالنسبة للتعيين:

- تعيين أمير المركز يتم بالاتفاق بين الوالي والديوان واللجنة المفوضة تفصل إذا لم يتفقا على شخص والذي يعترض عليه تقديم البديل.
- لا يتم تعيين كلاً من (الأمني ومسؤولي الإدارات الرئيسية في مركز الأمن وأمني القواطع) إلا بعد موافقة الديوان.
- وبالنسبة لبقية أفراد الجهاز يتم بإشعار الديوان.

بالنسبة للعزل:

- لا يتم عزل كلاً من (الأمني ومسؤولي الإدارات الرئيسية في مركز الأمن وأمني القواطع) إلا بعد موافقة الديوان، وبالنسبة لبقية أفراد الجهاز يكون بإشعار الديوان بأسباب العزل.
- يحق للديوان عزل أحد العاملين في مركز الأمن عن طريق الوالي.

بالنسبة لإعادة الفرز: (النقل خارج مركز الأمن) يحول المعاد فرزه للديوان بأمر الوالي مع التوصيات للتحقيق ومعرفة أسباب إعادة فرزه واتخاذ القرار النهائي.

بالنسبة للتنسيب:

الوالي الأفراد ليخضعوا لدورة في الديوان الذي له قرار القبول من عدمه

- للديوان مكافأة أحد العاملين في المراكز.
- ليس للديوان تعزيز أحد العاملين في المركز إلا عن طريق الوالي.
- للديوان دعم المركز بنثرية إضافية لصرفها على تطوير العمل الأمني والاستخباري وليس في بنود الصرف الاعتيادية، على أن يرسل خطاب للوالي بما تم صرفه للمركز.
- ليس للولاية إعادة توزيع الأجهزة الإلكترونية (حواسيب، كاميرات أجهزة تنصت) إلخ لخارج مركز الأمن وذلك لما فيه من سلبيات ومخاطر فيما أن هذه الأجهزة فيها معلومات يمكن استرجاعها حتى بعد حذفها.

العهد التي يسلمها الديوان للمراكز من سيارات ومسدسات لا يحق للولاية إعادة توزيعها لخارج مركز الأمن

ليس للولاية تسليم أحد العاملين في الولاية من مركز الأمن وغيرهم كوائم إلا بعد موافقة الديوان

علاقة ديوان الأمن بمراكز الأمن في الولايات.

على مركز الأمن الالتزام بنظام العمل والتوجيهات التي يسدرها الديوان،

تبادل المعلومات بشكل دائم ومستمر،

على المركز رفع التقارير الشهرية للديوان وإطلاعه بعمل المركز

على مركز الأمن الرد على استفسارات الديوان.

مركز الأمن ملزم بتنفيذ أوامر الاعتقال والتعقب والرصد الصادرة من الديوان.

مركز الأمن ملزم بتنفيذ طلب الديوان بتمديد مدة حبس لأحد السجناء على ألا تتجاوز المدة كحد أقصى أسبوع بعد قرار إخلاء سبيله.

يحق لمركز الأمن التواصل والتراسل مع الديوان دون المرور على الوالي

صلاحية إطلاق سراح:

○ للديوان طلب إطلاق سراح أحد السجناء وللولاية الامتناع شرط اعلام الديوان بالاسباب

Chapter Three[20]: The official relations for the Diwan

Section One: The official relations for the Diwan

First: The Diwan's relation with the walis

. The Diwan has the right to put in place the general plans and policies for the Diwan and centres and the wilaya must apply them.

. The Diwan has the right to put in place the internal system in its entirety, and put in place the mechanism for modifying it, and the wilaya must comply with applying the internal system entirely.

With regards to appointment:

. The appointment of the amir of the centre is done by agreement between the wali and the Diwan and the Delegated Committee decides if the two don't agree on a person and the submission of a replacement is put forth in opposition to that person.

. The appointment of the security official and officials of the main administrations in the security centre and the security officials of the sectors is not to be done except after the agreement of the Diwan.

. Concerning the rest of the personnel of the apparatus, the Diwan is to be notified.

With regards to removal:

. The removal of the security official, officials of the main administrations in the security centre and the security officials of the sectors is not to be done except after the Diwan's agreement. With regards to the rest of the personnel of the apparatus, the Diwan must be notified of the reasons for removal.

. The Diwan has the right to remove one of the workers in the security centre through the wali.

With regards to reassignment (transferring outside the security centre): the one to be reassigned is to be referred to the Diwan by order of the wali with the recommendations for the purpose of verification and knowing the reasons for reassignment and the adoption of the final decision.

With regards to placement:

The wali is to send the personnel to submit to a course in the Diwan which has the decision to accept or not.

. The Diwan may reward any of the workers in the centres

. The Diwan is not to rebuke any of the workers in the centre except through the wali.

. The Diwan can support the centre through additional cash for it to be spent on developing the security and intelligence work and is not in the usual stipulations of spending, provided that a letter is sent to the wali concerning what has been spent for the centre.

. The wilaya may not redistribute the electronic devices (computers, cameras, eavesdropping devices) etc. to outside the security centre because of the negative consequences and risks from it as the devices may have information in them that can be recovered even after being deleted.

. The wilaya has no right to redistribute to outside the security centre cars and pistols handed by the Diwan to the centre as an entrustment.

. The wilaya may not hand over silencers to any of the workers in the wilaya from the security centre and others besides them except after agreement of the Diwan.

Second: the Diwan al-Amn's relation with the security centres in the wilayas

. The security centre must comply with the system of work and directions issued by the Diwan.

. Lasting and continual exchange of information.

. The centre must refer monthly reports to the Diwan with its review of the centre's work.

. The security centre must respond to the Diwan's inquiries.

. The security centre is obliged to implement the orders of arrest, tracking and observation issued by the Diwan.


. The security centre is obliged to implement the Diwan's order to extend the period of detention of any of the prisoners so long as the period does not exceed at most a week after the decision to release him.

. The security centre has a right to contact and correspond with the Diwan without going through the wali.

. Power of release:

– The Diwan can request for any of the prisoners to be released but the wilaya may refuse on condition of informing the Diwan of the reasons.

- لا يحق لأمير المركز عزل أو نقل أو إعادة فرز مسؤولي الإدارات الرئيسية وأمني القواطع إلا بعد موافقة الديوان. وبالنسبة لقبية العاملين في المركز يكون بإشعار الديوان مع تبيان السبب.
 - يحق للديوان سحب وتحويل إحدى القضايا والسجناء المتعلقين بتلك القطبية من مركز الأمن للديوان
 - التواصل المستمر مع مراكز الأمن بالولايات وزيارتهم دورياً والاطلاع على عملهم
 - الاجتماع الدوري بأمراء المراكز وتوجيههم.
 - الرقابة والمتابعة المستمرة على عمل مراكز الأمن
 - استقبال التقارير الشهرية من المراكز ومناقشتهم فيها
 - بل الثاني: العلاقة الرسمية لمركز الأمن بالولاية.
 - علاقة مركز الأمن بالوالي.
 - يتبع مركز الأمن في الولاية للوالي إدارياً ومالياً.
- بالنسبة للنقل:

- يحق للوالي نقل أحد الأمنيين داخل المركز بالتنسيق مع أمير المركز. ماعدا (الأمني ومسؤولي الإدارات الرئيسية في مركز الأمن وأمني القواطع).
- على المركز رفع التقارير الشهرية للولاية وإطلاعها بعمل المركز وعلى الوالي المحافظة على سرية التقارير فلا يطلع عليها احداً بلا ضرورة وتتلفها بأسرع وقت.

ضوابط استنفار أفراد الأمن

- على الولاية أن تستنفر الأمن في آخر مرحلة من مراحل الاستنفار
 - على الولاية عدم استنفار مسؤولي الإدارات الرئيسية وأمني القواطع
 - في الاستنفار العام يتم استنفار عدد مقبول (٢٠%) بما لا يعطل عملهم من استخبارات وتنفيذ وتحليل معلومات وحراسة سجون إلخ.
 - يحق للوالي الاطلاع على كافة المعلومات الأمنية وليس له أن يفوض أحداً بالاطلاع عليها ماعدا نائبه.
 - على المركز تقديم أي تقرير يطلبه الوالي على أن يصنف المركز مراسلاته مثل أن يكون هناك تقرير لا يمكن لغير الوالي الاطلاع عليه فيكتب سرياً. وهكذا. ويقدم الديوان ضوابط المراسلات وعلى الولاية الالتزام به
 - يحق لغير المركز نقل أو عزل أو إعادة فرز أحد الأمنيين العاملين في المركز ماعدا مسؤولي الإدارات الرئيسية وأمني القواطع فتكون بعد موافقة الديوان.
 - يحق لأمير المركز تنسيب أفراد جدد لمركز الأمن وفق ضوابط ديوان الأمن.
 - الوالي هو من يحدد طريقة تنفيذ أحكام القتل (علناً أو سراً) ومكان التنفيذ.
 - ليس لغير الجهاز الأمني الإشراف على تنفيذ أحكام القتل الصادرة بحق السجناء في القضايا الأمنية.
- علاقة مركز الأمن بأمراء القواطع والمناطق:
- لا يتبع مكتب الأمن بالقاطع ال أمير القاطع في كافة المسائل الإدارية والمالية.
 - ليس لأمير القاطع استنفار أو نقل أو عزل أو تعيين أو تعزير أفراد الجهاز الأمني بالقاطع.
 - يحق لأمير القاطع المراقبة والمتابعة بنفسه ولا يحق له تفويض أحد بذلك. ويرفع توصياته لأمير مركز الأمن أو للوالي
 - يحق لأمير القاطع الاطلاع على السجون بنفسه ولا يحق له تفويض أحد بذلك
 - لأمير القاطع الاستفسار عن وضع أحد الموقوفين وعلى مكتب الأمن بالقاطع الرد بالمعلومات المتاحة والمسموح بها.
 - لأمير القاطع طلب دراسة أمنية ميدانية من المكتب الأمني.
 - ليس لأمير القاطع طلب جرودات أو أسماء أو نسخ من القضايا أو المعلومات الأمنية.
 - لأمير القاطع رفع اعتراض على طرق العمل الأمني في قاطعه لأمير المركز أو للوالي وليس له تعطيل العمل الأمني
 - ليس لأمير القاطع تصدير أمر اعتقال أو إخلاء سبيل للمكتب الأمني.

. The amir of the centre does not have the right to remove, transfer or reassign officials of the main administrations and security officials of the sectors except after the agreement of the Diwan, and concerning the rest of the workers in the centre, the Diwan is to be notified with statement of reason.

. The Diwan has the right to withdraw and transfer any of the cases and prisoners detained in that case from the security centre to the Diwan.

. Continual connection with the security centres in the wilayas and visiting them on a regular basis and reviewing their work.

. Regularly meeting with the amirs of the centres and directing them.

. Continual oversight and tracking of the work of the security centres.

. Receiving monthly reports from the centres and discussing with them the reports.

Section Two: The official relation of the security centre with the wilaya

Firstly: The relation of the security centre with the wali:

. The security centre in the wilaya is affiliated with the wali administratively and financially.

With regards to transfer:

The wali has the right to transfer any of the security officials inside the centre in coordination with the amir of the centre, except the security official and officials of the main administrations in the security centre and the security officials of the sectors.

. The centre must refer monthly reports to the wilaya with its review of the centre's work and the wali must safeguard the secrecy of the reports, so no one else must review them without necessity, and he is to destroy them as soon as possible.

Conditions for mobilizing security personnel:

. The wilaya must mobilize the security in the last stage of the stages of mobilization.

. The wilaya must not mobilize the officials of the main administrations and security officials of the sectors.

. In the event of general mobilization there is to be mobilization of an accepted number (20%) in so far as it does not hinder their work in intelligence, implementation, analyzing information, guarding prisons etc.

. The wali has the right to review all security information but may not delegate anyone to review it except his deputy.

. The centre must submit any report the wali demands provided the centre classifies its correspondences like there is a report that only the wali can review so it writes 'secret', and so on. And the Diwan puts forth the regulations of the correspondences and the wilaya must comply with it.

- . The amir of the centre has the right to transfer, remove or reassign one of the security officials in the centre except the officials of the main administrations and the security officials of the sectors, which must be done only after the agreement of the Diwan.
- . The amir of the centre has the right to affiliate new personnel to the security centre according to the regulations of the Diwan al-Amn.
- . The wali is the one who defines the means of implementing rulings of death penalty (publicly or secretly) and the place of implementation.
- . Only the security apparatus is to oversee the implementation of the rulings of death penalty issued against prisoners in security cases.

Second: the security centre's relation with the amirs of the sectors and areas:

- . The security office in the sector is not affiliated with the amir of the sector in all administrative and financial issues.
- . The amir of the sector is not to mobilize, transfer, remove, appoint or rebuke members of the security apparatus in the sector.
- . The amir of the sector has the right to monitor and track by himself and does not have the right to delegate anyone with that, and he is to refer his counsels to the amir of the security centre or the wali.
- . The amir of the sector has the right to review the prisons by himself and has no right to delegate anyone with that.
- . The amir of the sector may inquire about the situation of one of the detainees and the security office in the sector must respond with the available and allowed information.
- . The amir of the sector may request a basic security study from the security office.
- . The amir of the sector may not request inventories, names or copies from the cases or security information.
- . The amir of the sector may raise opposition to the means of security work in his sector to the amir of the sector or the wali but may not obstruct security work.
- . The amir of the sector may not issue an order of arrest or release to the security office.



- . The amir of the sector and security official of the sector must work together to safeguard the security in the sector.
- . The security official of the sector must coordinate with the amir of the sector in the most important cases that concern the sector.

Third: the security centre's relation with the repentance office

- . The repentance security division has the right to enter all repentance centres and review all files of those who repent, verify with them and take all information particular to them.
- . There is the right to take a copy of the archive of those who repent.
- . It [the security centre] has the right to place a means of securing the information and the office must comply.
- . The security centre has the right to arrest suspects from those present in the repentance centres.

Notes

- [1] E.g. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents (continued)," aymennjawad.org (Specimens 17J and 18V), January 11, 2016 (<http://www.aymennjawad.org/2016/01/archive-of-islamic-state-administrative-documents-1>).
- [2] "Newsletters Found in Anbar Indicate How Extremist Group Organizes Itself," Niqash, June 16, 2016 (<http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/security/5294/Newsletters-Found-In-Anbar-Indicate-How-Extremist-Group-Organises-Itself.htm>).
- [3] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents (continued)," aymennjawad.org (Specimen 16W), January 11, 2016 (<http://www.aymennjawad.org/2016/01/archive-of-islamic-state-administrative-documents-1>).
- [4] E.g. Liz Sly, "The hidden hand behind the Islamic State militants? Saddam Hussein's," Washington Post, April 4, 2015 (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-hidden-hand-behind-the-islamic-state-militants-saddam-husseins/2015/04/04/aa97676c-cc32-11e4-8730-4f473416e759_story.html?utm_term=.c892c1a31f38).
- [5] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "The Evolution in Islamic State Administration: The Documentary Evidence," Perspectives on Terrorism, August 5, 2015 (<http://www.aymennjawad.org/17687/the-evolution-in-islamic-state-administration>).
- [6] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "A Complete History of Jama'at Ansar al-Islam," aymennjawad.org, December 15, 2015 (<http://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/12/a-complete-history-of-jamaat-ansar-al-islam>).
- [7] "The security office for Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham arrests a cell comprising 7 members of the Dawla organization in Idlib city, bringing the number of khawarij arrested by the Hay'a today to 32 members," Iba' News Agency, July 12, 2017 (<https://justpaste.it/iba12july2017>).
- [8] Bryan Price and Muhammad al-'Ubaydi, "CTC Perspectives: The Islamic State's Internal Rifts and Social Media Ban," CTC, June 21, 2017 (<https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/ctc-perspectives-the-islamic-states-internal-rifts-and-social-media-ban>).

[9] For a sample of the most recent Internet regulations, see e.g. regulations introduced in the Mosul area in July 2016. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents (continued), aymennjawad.org (Specimens 18V and 18Z), January 11, 2016 (<http://www.aymennjawad.org/2016/01/archive-of-islamic-state-administrative-documents-1>).

[10] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents (continued...again)," aymennjawad.org (Specimens 32G and 32O), September 17, 2016 (<http://www.aymennjawad.org/2016/09/archive-of-islamic-state-administrative-documents-2>).

[11] A section by this title does not turn up in the subsequent pages. Appears to be a clumsy error as there is a section on mobilizing personnel, a matter tied of course to the Diwan al-Jund.

[12] Typo in the original has this marked "Chapter Three." The error has been corrected in the translation.

[13] Typo in the original. "Types" is the additional word meant here. Added in as a correction.

[14] E.g. From other documents I have obtained, in July 2016 the security centre in Aleppo province submitted a report to the greater Diwan. This report constituted a study of some of the Kurdish villages in Aleppo province and the supposed danger they represent to the Islamic State on account of PKK/SDF loyalties among the populations.

[15] E.g. Mere violations of Islamic morality by civilians- such as smoking cigarettes- will not be considered security cases.

[16] E.g. Removing GPS from phones, a measure introduced early on after the declaration of the Caliphate (December 2014). See Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents," aymennjawad.org (Specimen X), January 27, 2015 (<http://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/01/archive-of-islamic-state-administrative-documents>).

[17] This matter has also been regulated at times by the Diwan al-Hisba.

[18] E.g. Precious metals.

[19] i.e. Recruiting spies.

[20] Original text reads Chapter Four. Typo corrected in the translation.

The Myth of ISIS's Strategic Brilliance

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

[The Atlantic](#)
July 20, 2017



As Mosul is finally freed in its entirety from the Islamic State (ISIS) and the offensive in Raqqa continues, the predictable question becomes: What's next for the group? Without control of territory, its complex state administration project cannot function. This project was probably ISIS's biggest selling point in relation to its rivals in the global jihadist movement.

The end of ISIS as a functioning state project on the ground clearly does not herald the end of ISIS as an entity. In many areas long since cleared of ISIS control, the organization has continued to function as an effective insurgency with both small and large-scale attacks. Around the world, ISIS will remain a terrorist threat, as illustrated by events from Europe to the Philippines. The ISIS footprint on the internet is large and unlikely ever to be removed in its entirety. The group's [ideals will still appeal to some segments of society](#), whether out of disillusionment with the established order and a search for meaning in one's life, or on account of identity crises, or all of these factors combined.

Yet these caveats do not indicate some sort of strategic brilliance on the part of ISIS, even in the losses it is facing. In a recent article, [Charlie Winter](#) asserts that losing Mosul "has long been part of [the Islamic State's] global plan." Based on this reading, ISIS has been planning for the loss of territory and decline of its statehood project since 2014.

But is that really the case? It is certainly true that ISIS messaging over the past year or so has tried to address the group's contracting control of territory. Notable examples include the now-deceased spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani's speech released in May 2016, which mocked the idea that the loss of Mosul, Raqqa, and the Libyan city of Sirte would mean the end of the caliphate. Instead, Adnani argued, the only real defeat would come with the end of the will to keep fighting. An [editorial in the ISIS newsletter al-Naba' in June 2016](#) reflected similar ideas to Adnani's speech.

In reality, though, this shift in messaging reflects damage control and a response to the overall tide turning against ISIS, not a stroke of genius in which ISIS strategists foresaw all of this, even at the height of the group's power. It is by no means evident that ISIS could have foreseen these losses back in 2014. While memories may fade quickly, I remember widespread predictions in 2014 that many if not most of the Sunni areas controlled by ISIS in Iraq would never return to Iraqi government control. Some of these arguments were based on the supposed unwillingness of Shiite fighters to take the fight to areas that were not their hometowns. This particular claim even had considerable resonance in late 2015, as the [French professor Olivier Roy declared in The New York Times](#) in November 2015 that "the Shiites of Iraq, no matter what pressure they face from America, do not seem ready to die to reclaim Fallujah," only for that city to be retaken through the extensive participation of Shiite fighters several months later.

Others said that Iran had an interest in [keeping Iraq as a rump state with ISIS advances stalled to exert maximum influence](#), and thus retaking places like Mosul would not be a concern. Proclamations of the "end of Iraq" were frequent. The tendency to rush to judgment based on developments of the day persisted after 2014, as ISIS gained control of [Ramadi](#) and [Palmyra](#) despite the coalition campaign against it. Proclamations that the Islamic State was winning and on the march quickly took hold.

The belief in the necessity of a "Sunni force" to retake Mosul [has long been popular](#), as though the grueling, destructive fight to take parts of the city, street by street, would have been vastly different simply on the basis of sect affiliation of the forces fighting ISIS. For a time, I myself partly bought into the "Sunni force" idea in suggesting in 2014 that [one would have to co-opt elements of Iraq's other Sunni insurgent groups to take on ISIS](#). In fact, as quickly became evident, those groups have long been weak and ineffectual, often deluded with notions of "revolution" against the government in Baghdad.

If the claims that Mosul and other Sunni towns that fell to ISIS would be unlikely to return to Iraqi government control gained such widespread currency, what makes one believe that ISIS, which based its main selling point on its ability to control territory and run the ideal governance project, did not actually think it had a serious chance of at least enduring in a state form, even if it could not indefinitely expand and take over the world?

In fact, the presumption that the rise and fall of the group were foreseen all along ignores the internal ISIS debates over strategy that were not publicized in the waves of propaganda broadcast on the internet. For example, [Abu al-Faruq al-Masri](#), a dissident ISIS member who was based in Raqqa and even had connections with the Shura Council that advised Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, saw many of the battles being waged by the organization as pointless incineration of its fighters. On the ground, such an observation is well borne out in the case of Kobani. ISIS [tried](#) to take the Syrian border town of little value, in the face of hundreds of coalition airstrikes concentrated in a small area, all in an attempt to show defiance. The effort led to little more than losing [hundreds](#) of fighters, and eventually substantial portions of a northern border with Turkey that had until then provided easy access to war materials, commodities, and foreign recruits. In Masri's view, one could not simply be hostile to the entire world, as that would kill the caliphate project in its cradle. Just as the Prophet Muhammad had non-Muslim allies, so too would ISIS need non-Muslim allies and to conclude treaties with non-Muslim states in accordance with the principle of "Sharia politics." This idea of alliances and treaties with certain non-Muslims appears in at least one other internal text: [Principles in the Administration of the Islamic State](#).

One could dismiss these ideas as unrealistic, but it's implausible that the internal debate was a mere ruse in a master plan of intentional victory and defeat. Even though notions of alliances with non-Muslims never came to fruition, ISIS clearly tried to adapt in a bid to survive as an entity controlling territory, rather than simply go down in an epic fight that would be remembered through the ages. This involved issuing mobilization calls in attempts to defend certain areas, [reducing](#) benefits for fighters, transferring administrative personnel to military roles, introducing a new administrative framework for at least part of its security apparatus in mid-2016, and gradually [restricting](#) internet access and use for both fighters and the civilian population.

On the international stage, ISIS similarly adapted to problems it faced, eventually abandoning the model of declaring "provinces" (*wilayat*) in places where groups had declared allegiance to it. The last declaration of a province outside Syria and Iraq was in the [Caucasus](#) in June 2015, even as ISIS media advertise a presence in countries like Bangladesh and the Philippines. Masri had been a critic of declaring provinces, on the grounds that not all places have an environment favorable to the flourishing of a statehood project. But even Masri was overly optimistic in this regard, considering Libya to be one place outside of Iraq and Syria where *wilayat* could flourish—today, ISIS has no formal territorial control or governance in Libya. Again then, we see an evolution that tries to respond to challenges faced by the group, not something ingeniously planned from the outset.

It's important to be realistic about the challenges posed by ISIS as its statehood project collapses. The whole saga of its rise and fall can be invoked as propaganda points both for and against the organization, much depending on a person's own biases and sympathies. For the critics looking at ISIS from an Islamist and jihadist perspective, the experience shows the folly of ISIS's own hastiness, hubris, and extremism. They will likely note [Adnani's appeal to God in an April 2014 recording](#) that if his group were a state of "Khawarij"—referring to an early group in Islamic history and now a common term for extremists—then the state's back should be broken and its leaders killed (indeed, many of the leaders have been killed). For the supporters and those sympathetic to ISIS, the experience will be put down to tribulations from God and the like, echoing the group's current propaganda line.

But it's a mistake to impute strategic brilliance to ISIS rather than acknowledging that it is an entity run by humans capable of grave errors. Otherwise, we risk becoming inadvertent propagandists for the group.

Islamic State Treatise: Ruling of Shari'a on the Shi'a Sects

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
aymennjawad.org
 July 18, 2017



That the Islamic State (IS) detests the Shi'a- both the main body of Shi'a and the smaller sects and offshoots- is well known. But how exactly does IS classify those it deems the 'Shi'a sects'? This small treatise, an output from the Office of Investigations and Studies (part of the Diwan al-'Iftaa' wa al-Buhuth: Fatwa Issuing and Investigations Department), helps clarify this issue.

This treatise was not in fact published by IS' official media wings online, but was rather distributed on the ground. For a time, Cole Bunzel and I had been looking for this work but to no avail. Bunzel recently found it though and drew my attention to it. I have translated it in full as part of this post, with occasional explanatory clarifications in square brackets. The figure who is most likely the "amir" of the office that wrote the introduction to this treatise is the deceased Bahraini cleric Turki Binali. No official announcement of

his death or eulogy has been published by IS for Binali, and this absence of an official announcement or eulogy has been taken as a suggestion that his [internal critics now have the ascendancy in IS' main bodies of authority such as the Delegated Committee](#), with an apparent document even calling for the removal of textbooks likely written by him, such as the [Course in Tawheed](#).

The central argument of this treatise, which going by some of the remarks in the conclusion appears to have been aimed at clarifying some doubts within the ranks of some younger members of IS about the status of the Shi'a and related sects in Islamic law (Shari'a), stipulates that the Shi'a, Alawites, Ismailis and Druze are not 'original kuffar' (i.e. original disbelievers in Islam like Jews and Christians), but are rather apostates: that is, people who have abandoned Islam. Note that the treatise makes an exception for Druze who do not claim to be Muslims, as many of them do not identify themselves as a sect of Islam, while others among them do. If there is no claimed affiliation with Islam, one cannot be an apostate.

The stipulation of apostasy for the Shi'a and related/derived sects goes against an arguably intuitive stream of thought that might posit that with the passing of generations from the time of their ancestors' original apostasy from Islam, today's Shi'a are simply original disbelievers like the Jews and Christians, since they were not born into Islam. The conception of Shi'a as apostates is notably consistent with the line in the 'Islam 101' pamphlet issued by IS and published online by its 'al-Himma Library', called '[This is our Aqeeda and This is our Manhaj](#)', which explicitly classifies the Shi'a as an apostate sect among the Muslims.

Since apostasy is regarded as worse than original kufr (disbelief), then fighting apostasy and its adherents in their various forms is accorded priority. An illustration of this line of thinking comes in an extended quotation in this treatise from Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's speech "Have you heard of the Rafidites?" Zarqawi, speaking during the time of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, invoked a supposed precedent from the time of the Crusades to justify the idea of waging war on the Shi'a. Just as Salah al-Din did not retake Jerusalem from the Crusaders until after the end of the Shi'i Fatimid dynasty in Egypt, so today's jihadists will not defeat the Crusaders of this era until they destroy the Shi'a first. Zarqawi's view of history is simplistic, to say the least, but the reasoning is clear.

As far as the citations and influences go, the Wahhabi concept of 'nullifiers' of Islam unsurprisingly comes up, a key foundation on which IS conceptions of falling into kufr and apostasy are based. Both the founder of the Wahhabi trend and subsequent scholars like Suleiman bin Sahman are cited in this work. The medieval Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyya, known for his virulently anti-Alawite views in particular, also features in this treatise on multiple occasions, just as he features in other IS theology books. At the same time, however, one of the main points this treatise invokes to support its central argument that the Shi'a are apostates is that the view of Shi'a as apostates was held by the traditional Sunni jurists and theologians, whereas the view of them as original disbelievers is an innovation deviating from tradition. Some sayings on the Shi'a quoted in this work are traced back to some of the early imams and hadith narrators in Sunni Islam, like Muhammad bin Yusuf al-Faryabi and Talha bin Masraf. These sayings were quoted in later Sunni theology works such as *Sharh Usul 'Itiqad Ahl al-Sunna wa al-*

Jama'at ("Explaining the principles of the doctrine of the Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama'at: a work by Imam al-Lalika'i) and *al-Ibana al-Sughra* (a work by Ibn Batta, a Hanbali jurist of the 10th century CE). The renowned Persian theologian al-Ghazali, a Shafi'i, is also quoted in this work with regards to his views on adherents of 'Batini' thought, in particular referring to the Ismailis. Ibn 'Abidin, a Syrian jurist of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence, is cited with regards to the Druze in particular. It should be noted though that this treatise gives a somewhat misleading picture of Ibn 'Abidin's view of the Druze. While he did consider them outside of the fold of Islam, he [also wrote in the same work quoted by this treatise](#): "It is not hidden that their [Druze et al.] establishment on the two Shahadas with this evil doctrine does not place them in the ruling of the apostate for lack of credence."

The IS notion of not deviating from tradition also explains the attempt to give an overview where necessary of differing views of the four main schools of Sunni jurisprudence (Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanbali and Hanafi), as part of the background on the general concept of apostasy and the subject of definitions. This approach again illustrates that one cannot claim that IS rejects the four schools of jurisprudence.



حكم الشريعة في طوائف الشيعة

((الرافضة، النصيرية، الإسماعيلية، الدرّوز))

مكتب البحوث والدراسات

الطبعة الأولى

Islamic State
Office of Investigations and Studies
Ruling of Shari'a on the Shi'a sects
(Rafidites, Nusayris, Ismailis, Druze).
Office of Investigations and Studies
First printing



بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

مقدمة أمير مكتب البحوث والدراسات

الحمد لله معز من أطاعه، مدلل من عصاه، والصلاة والسلام على رسوله ومصطفاه، وعلى آله وصحبه ومن والاه، أما بعد:

فإن فرق الشيعة كثيرة، وكلها فرق تنسب للإسلام، وتدعي مشايعة علي بن أبي طالب رَضِيَ اللهُ عَنْهُ، لذلك سموا بالشيعة.

قال الإمام ابن بطة العكبري رَضِيَ اللهُ عَنْهُ عن الشيعة: "أشدُّ الناس اختلافًا وتباينًا وتطاعًا، فكلُّ واحدٍ منهم يختارُ مذهبًا لنفسه يلعنُ من خالفه عليه، ويكفرُ من لم يتبعه". ١. [الإبنة الكبرى ٢/٥٥٦].

وهذه الفرق بعضها أختب من بعض، وأشهر تلك الفرق وأختبها:

أولاً: الشيعة الإمامية، الاثنا عشرية، الجعفرية، الرافضة، سموا بالإمامية لأنهم جعلوا من الإمامة القضية الأساسية التي تشغلهم، وسُمُّوا بالاثني عشرية لأنهم قالوا باثني عشر إمامًا دخل آخرهم السرداب بسامراء على حد زعمهم، وسموا بالجعفرية نسبة للإمام جعفر الصادق رَضِيَ اللهُ عَنْهُ، وسموا بالرافضة لأنهم رفضوا إمامة الشيخين ومن ثم رفضوا الإسلام.

ثانياً: الشيعة النصيرية العلوية وهم فرقة باطنية ظهرت في القرن الثالث للهجرة، سموا بالنصيرية نسبة لمؤسس الفرقة محمد بن نصير البصري الحميري (ت ٢٧٠هـ)، وسموا بالعلوية نسبة لعلي بن أبي طالب رَضِيَ اللهُ عَنْهُ.

Introduction of the amir of the office of investigations and studies

Praise be to God who makes mighty the one who obeys Him and lowers the one who rebels against Him, and prayers and peace be upon His Messenger and Mustafa, and on his family, companions and whoso is close to him. As for what follows:

The sects of the Shi'a are numerous, and all of them are sects that claim affiliation with Islam, and claim loyalty to Ali bin Abi Talib (may God be pleased with him), therefore they are called Shi'a.

Imam Ibn Batta al-'Ukbar- may God have mercy on him- said about the Shi'a: "The people strongest in disagreement, divergence and attacking each other, for each one chooses a madhhab for himself and curses the one who disagrees with him on it, and declares takfir on the one who does not follow it" (al-Ibana al-Kubra: 2/556).

And of these sects, some are worse than others, and the most well-known and worst of those sects:

1. The Twelver Imamate, Ja'afari Rafidite Shi'a, called the Imamate because they have made the Imamate the foundational cause that drives them, and they are called Twelver because they have said that there were twelve Imams, the last of whom entered the cave in Samarra according to their claim. They are called Ja'afaris in derivation from Imam Ja'afar al-Sadiq (may God have mercy on him), and they are called Rafidites because they rejected the Imamate of the two sheikhs and then rejected Islam.

2. The Alawite Nusayri Shi'a and they are a Batini sect that appeared in the third century of the Hijra, and they are called Nusayris in relation to the founder of the sect Muhammad bin Nusayr al-Basri al-Numayri (died in 270 AH), and they called Alawis in relation to Ali bin Abi Talib (may God be pleased with him).

حكم الشيعة في طوائف الشيعة

ثالثاً: الشيعة الإسماعيلية وهم فرقة باطنية، سموها بالإسماعيلية نسبة لإسماعيل بن جعفر الصادق.

رابعاً: الشيعة الدرروز وهم فرقة باطنية تولّاه الخليفة العبيدي الحاكم بأمر الله، أخذت جل عقائدها عن الإسماعيلية، وسموا بالدرروز نسبة لشتكين الدرزي.^(١١) وكل هذه الفرق تركب نواقض عظيمة من نواقض الإسلام؛ كتأليه البشر، والقول بالحللول، وإنكار المعاد، والتناسخ، والاستغاثة بغير الله، وتكفير عموم الصحابة، والظعن في عرض أم المؤمنين عائشة رضي الله عنها، والقول بتحريف القرآن... وغيرها من المكفرات المبسوطة في كتب الفرق.

وصدق الإمام الشعبي رضي الله عنه - حين قال عنهم: "لو كانت الشيعة من الطير لكانوا رخماً، ولو كانوا من الدواب لكانوا حمراً".^{١١} أخرجه الألباني في شرح السنة [١٢٦٧/٧].

عقيدة الكفر والتضليل والفتن عقيدة السرفض للإسلام والسنة
دين السرافض يسمى في إقامته بين البرية عبد القبر والسوثن

ولشيع ما قالوا، وقبيح ما فعلوا، ظن عدد من المعاصرين أن هذه الفرق كفار أصليون، وليس الأمر ما ظنوه، بل هي فرق مرتدة.

^{١١} لا يخفى أن الدرروز حل فسبين؛ فسم بتسيون إلى الإسلام وهم المعنيون في هذه الرسالة، وقسم لا يتسيون للإسلام أصلاً فهؤلاء كفار أصليون بلا خلاف.

3. The Ismaili Shi'a and they are a Batini sect, called Ismailis in relation to Ismail bin Ja'afar al-Sadiq.

4. The Druze Shi'a and they are a Batini sect that deifies the Caliph al-Obeidi al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah, having adopted most of its doctrines from the Ismailis, and they are called Druze in relation to Nashtakin al-Darazi.[\[i\]](#)

And all these sects commit great nullifiers from the nullifiers of Islam, like deifying humans, professing the doctrine of hulul [divine incarnation], condemning the concept of the Resurrection, transmigration of souls, calling for help in one besides God, declaring takfir on the mass of the companions, attacking the honour of the Mother of the Believers A'isha (may God be pleased with her), and professing that the Qur'an has been distorted, and other things from plain acts of kufr in the books of these sects.

And Imam al-Sha'abi- may God have mercy on him- spoke the truth when he said about them: "Had the Shi'a been from among the birds, they would have been vultures, and had they been from the riding animals, they would have been donkeys" - (brought out by al-Lalka'i in Sharh al-Sunna 7/1267).

A doctrine of kufr, error, and strife, a doctrine of rejecting Islam and the Sunnas. The religion of the Rafidites strives in its establishment among men for the worship of the grave and idols.

And for the repulsiveness of what they have said, and the ugliness of what they have done, many of the contemporaries have thought that these sects are original kuffar, but the matter is not what they have thought, but rather they are apostate sects.

حکم الشريعة في طوائف الشيعة

وليتضح أمرها بجلاء، ويزال اللبس الحاصل، قمنا بكتابة هذه السطور التي
وسمناها بـ "حکم الشريعة في طوائف الشيعة".^(*)

وآخر دعوانا أن الحمد لله رب العالمين، وصلی الله وسلم على أشرف الأنبياء
والمرسلين.



(*) المعنى بـ (طوائف الشيعة) في هذه الرسالة هم: (الرافضة، والتضيرية، والإسماعيلية، والدروز)، أما
الشيعة الزيدية وهم أتباع زيد بن علي زين العابدين، فليسوا داخلين في كلامنا.

In order for their state of affairs to be become utterly clear, and for the present confusion to be removed, we have written these lines that we have called: "The ruling of Shari'a on the Shi'a sects."[\[ii\]](#)

And the last of our calls is praise be to God the Lord of the Worlds, and God's blessings and peace be upon the most noble of the prophets and those sent.

فصل

تعريف الردة لغة واصطلاحاً

لقد جاءت النصوص من كتاب الله وسنة رسول الله صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم بذكر الردة والارتداد.

والردة مأخوذة من الرجوع في لغة العرب، ولذلك أجمع العلماء رحمهم الله على أن الردة في اللغة هي الرجوع، فمصادر اللغة كلها متفقة على أن مادة الردة راجعة إلى مادة الرجوع عن الشيء.

وأما في الاصطلاح: فاختلقت عبارات العلماء رحمهم الله في حقيقة الردة والمرتد، فيعض العلماء يقول: الردة هي الرجوع عن الإيمان كما يعبر فقهاء الحنفية رحمهم الله.

قال الإمام أبو بكر الكاساني الحنفي - رَحِمَهُ اللهُ -: "أما ركن الردة فهو إجراء كلمة الكفر على اللسان بعد وجود الإيمان؛ إذ الردة عبارة عن الرجوع عن الإيمان". ١. هـ [بدائع الصائغ ١٣٤/٧].

وبعضهم يقول: كفر المسلم، كما عبر به طائفة من العلماء ومنهم فقهاء المالكية.

قال أبو العباس الصاوي المالكي - رَحِمَهُ اللهُ -: "الردة كفر مسلم بصريح من القول، أو قول يقتضي الكفر، أو فعل يتضمن الكفر". ١. هـ [الشرح الصغير ١٤٤/٦].

Section: Defining apostasy as a word and technical term

The precepts from the Book of God and the Sunna of the Messenger of God (God's peace and blessings be upon him and his family) have brought mention of apostasy and committing apostasy.

Apostasy is taken from 'going back' in the Arabs' language, and therefore the 'ulama- may God have mercy on them- agreed that apostasy in the language is 'going back', so all the sources of the language agree that the notion of apostasy goes back to the notion of going back on something.

As a technical term: the definitions of the 'ulama- may God have mercy on them- have differed on the truth of apostasy and the apostate, for some of the 'ulama say that

apostasy is going back from the faith as some of the Hanafi jurists- may God have mercy on them- define it.

Imam Abu Bakr al-Kasani al-Hanafi- may God have mercy on him- said: "As for the principle of apostasy, it is carrying out the word of kufr on the tongue after the presence of faith, so apostasy is an expression of going back on faith" (Bada'i al-Sana'i- 7/134).

And some say: the kufr of the Muslim, as a group of the 'ulama have defined it, among them the Maliki jurists.

Abu al-Abbas al-Sawi al-Maliki- may God have mercy on him- said: "Apostasy is the kufr of the Muslim in an open sense of declaration, or words that necessitate kufr, or doing something that includes kufr"- (al-Sharh al-Saghir- 6/144).

حکم الشريعة في طوائف الشيعة

وبعضهم يقول: قطع الإسلام، كما يعبر فقهاء الشافعية.

قال شمس الدين الشربيني الشافعي - رَحِمَهُ اللهُ -: "الردة هي قطع الإسلام بنية، أو فعل سواء قاله استهزاء، أو عناداً، أو اعتقاداً". ١.١. هـ (معنى النجاشي ١٣٣/٤).

وبعضهم يقول: الرجوع عن الإسلام، كما يعبر فقهاء الحنابلة.

قال الإمام ابن قدامة الحنبلي - رَحِمَهُ اللهُ -: "المرتدُّ: هو الراجِعُ عن دين الإسلام إلى الكُفْرِ". ١.١. هـ (الغني ٣/٩).

فأصحاب المذاهب الأربعة متفقون في معنى الردة وإن اختلفت ألفاظهم، فكلهم عرفوها بأنها رجوع عن الإسلام، وهذا هو ظاهر القرآن، قال الله تعالى:

﴿ وَلَا يَزَالُونَ يَقْتُلُونَكُمْ حَتَّى تَرُدُّوكُمْ عَنْ دِينِكُمْ وَإِنْ اسْتَفْتَلَعُوا مِنْكُمْ دِينَكُمْ عَنْ دِينِهِمْ فَبَسُّوا بِكُمْ فَمَنْ كَفَرَ فَأُولَئِكَ حَبِطَتْ أَعْمَلُهُمْ فِي الدُّنْيَا وَالْآخِرَةِ وَأُولَئِكَ أَصْحَابُ النَّارِ هُمْ فِيهَا خَالِدُونَ ﴾ [٢: ٢١٧]

وقال الله تعالى: ﴿ يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا مَنْ يَرْتَدَّ مِنْكُمْ عَنْ دِينِهِ فَسَوْفَ يَأْتِي اللَّهَ بِقَوْمٍ يُحِبُّهُمْ وَيُحِبُّونَهُ أَذِلَّةٍ عَلَى الْمُؤْمِنِينَ أَمْزَجَ عَلَى الْكٰفِرِينَ لِيُتَّهَدُوا فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ وَلَا يَخَافُوكُمْ لِآيِهِمْ ذَلِكَ فَضْلُ اللَّهِ يُؤْتِيهِ مَنْ يَشَاءُ وَاللَّهُ وَاسِعٌ عَلِيمٌ ﴾ [٥: ٥٤]



And some of them say: cutting off Islam, as the Shafi'i jurists define it.

Shams al-Din al-Sharbini al-Shafi'i- may God have mercy on him- said: "Apostasy is cutting off Islam intentionally, equally whether doing or saying something in mockery, or out of pigheadedness, or creed"- (Mughni al-Muhtaj- 4/133).

And some say: going back on Islam, as the Hanbali jurists define it.

Imam Ibn Qudama al-Hanbali- may God have mercy on him- said: "The apostate is the one who returns from the religion of Islam to kufr"- (al-Mughni 9/3).

Those of the four madhahib are agreed in the meaning of apostasy even if their expressions differ, for all of the have defined it as going back on Islam, and this is the evidence of the Qur'an. God Almighty said: "And they will continue fighting you till they make you turn away from your religion if they can, and whoso among you apostasises from his religion is a kafir, and the deeds of those people have come to naught in this world and the Hereafter, and those people are companions of the fire, in which they will abide forever"- al-Baqara 217 [Qur'an 2:217].

And God Almighty said: "Oh you who believe, whoso among you apostasises from his religion, God will bring a people whom He loves, and they love him, humble to the believers and powerful against the disbelievers, striving in the path of God, and they do not fear the censure of a critic. This is God's grace that He bestows on whoso He wishes. God is all-Encompassing, all-Knowing"- al-Ma'ida 54 [Qur'an 5:54].

فصل

الإسلام الحكمي والإسلام الحقيقي

إن من جاء بعقد الإسلام (لا إله إلا الله)، أو اتسب للإسلام، أو أظهر شيئا من شعائره الظاهرة، حُكِمَ له بالإسلام، وجرت عليه أحكام الإسلام في الدنيا، وهذا الذي يُعرف بـ **(الإسلام الحكمي)**.

فإن كان مؤمنا ظاهرا وباطنا، وأتى بشروط (لا إله إلا الله)، واجتنب نواقضها... إلخ فهو مسلم على الحقيقة، وله أحكام الإسلام في الدنيا والآخرة، وهذا الذي يُعرف بـ **(الإسلام الحقيقي)**.

أما لو كان مرتكبا لناقض من نواقض الإسلام لم نطلع عليه، أو أنه لم يحقق بعض شروط (لا إله إلا الله)، أو أنه يظهر الإسلام ويُظن الكفر، فله **(الإسلام الحكمي)** فقط، وليس الحقيقي.

قال شيخ الإسلام ابن تيمية -رَحِمَهُ اللهُ-: "وبهذا أجابوا عن هذه الحجة، فإنه لما قيل لهم: أجمع المسلمون على أن الكافر إذا أراد أن يسلم يكفي منه بالإقرار بالشهادتين.

قالوا: إنما نجتزئ منه بذلك لإجراء الإسلام عليه.

فإن صاحب الشرع جعل ذلك أمانة لإجراء الأحكام.

Section: Islam in the Legal Sense and the True Islam

The one who bears the bond of Islam- there is no deity but God- or claims affiliation with Islam or shows something from its outward rituals, the ruling for him is Islam, and upon him has come the rulings of Islam in this world, and this is known as "Islam in the Legal Sense."

And if he is outwardly and inwardly a believer, and bears the conditions of there is no deity but God, and avoids its nullifiers etc., he is a Muslim in truth, and for him are the rulings of Islam in this world and the Hereafter, and this is known as "True Islam."

As for the one who should commit one of the nullifiers of Islam we have not reviewed, or if he has not fulfilled some of the conditions of there is no deity but God, or if he outwardly shows Islam and inwardly bears kufr, for him is "Islam in the Legal Sense" only, and not true Islam.

The Sheikh of Islam Ibn Taymiyya (may God have mercy on him) said: "And in this they have replied concerning this proof, for when it is said to them that the Muslims have agreed that the kafir wants to become Muslim, it suffices from him to affirm the two shahadas. They say: 'Indeed we are content with him in that to carry out Islam upon him.' For the One of the Law [God] made it a sign for implementing the rulings.

حکم الشريعة في طوائف الشيعة

ولو كان ذلك إيانا حقيقيا لما قال في حق النسوة المهاجرات: ﴿يَكْفُرُ بِمَا كَفَرُوا لَمَّا آمَنُوا إِنَّا جَاءَكُمْ بِالْمُؤْمِنَاتِ مَهْجِرَاتٍ فَامْتَحِنُوهُنَّ أَنَّهُ أَعْلَمُ بِإِيمَانِهِنَّ﴾ . ا. هـ [درء تعارض العقل والنقل ٤٣٧/٧].

وقال الإمام ابن أبي العز الحنفي - رَحِمَهُ اللهُ -: "وهنا مسائل تكلم فيها الفقهاء كمن صل ولم يتكلم بالشهادتين، أو أتى بغير ذلك من خصائص الإسلام ولم يتكلم بها هل يصير مسلما أم لا؟ والصحيح أنه يصير مسلما بكل ما هو من خصائص الإسلام". ا. هـ [شرح الطحاوية ص ٧٥].

وبذلك تعلم أن كل من انتسب للإسلام وأتى بما يناقضه فهو مرتد، فالطوائف المنتسبة للإسلام كطوائف الشيعة؛ هم مرتدون لا كفار أصليون، ولم نقف على نقل عن إمام من أئمة السلف سمي من انتسب للإسلام - ممن وقع في كفر - كافرا أصليا.



But if that were true faith He would not have said regarding the muhajir women: 'Oh you who believe, if believing muhajir women come to you, examine them. God is all-Knowing of their faith'- (Dir' Ta'arudh al-Aql wa al-Naql- 7/437).

Imam Ibn Abi al-Izz al-Hanafi- may God have mercy on him- said: "And there are issues on which the jurists speak, like the one who prays and does not profess the two shahadas, or bears something besides that from the particulars of Islam but does not profess them.

Is he a Muslim or not? And the truth is that he is a Muslim in all that is from the particulars of Islam" (Sharh al-Tahawia- 75).

Therefore know that anyone who professes affiliation with Islam and bears something that nullifies it is an apostate, so the sects that claim affiliation with Islam like the Shi'a sects are apostates, not original kuffar. And we have not come to know a transmission from one of the predecessor imams that designated the one who has claimed affiliation with Islam and has fallen into disbelief an original kafir.



Section: True Apostasy and Apostasy in the Legal Sense

It must be known that the one who embraces Islam outwardly and inwardly but then commits one of its nullifiers is an apostate in the true sense, because he has cut off Islam or gone back on it. As for the one who bears Islam outwardly then nullifies it, or professes affiliation with Islam then resolves upon himself that he was not Muslim at all, he is an

apostate in the legal sense rather than the true sense, as he is in his true nature an original kafir.

The 'alama Suleiman al-Bajirmi al-Shafi'i (died in 1221 AH) said: "And this is the definition of true apostasy, as for the son of the apostate who was bound into apostasy, he is an apostate in the legal sense because Islam was not cut off from him...Likewise the atheist, even if he cut off Islam outwardly, is not called an apostate in the true sense because there was no Islam in him to cut off, so his apostasy is in the legal sense" (Hashiyat al-Bajirmi 'Ala al-Khatib- 4/237).

Therefore it is known that the Shi'a sects are apostates in the legal sense, even if they have not fulfilled the conditions of the shahada from the outset.

حكم الشريعة في طوائف الشيعة

فصل

الكفر الحقيقي والحكمي

يجب أن يُفَرَّق بين (الكفر الحقيقي)، و(الكفر الحكمي)، كما فُرِّق بين (الإسلام الحقيقي) و(الإسلام الحكمي)، وفُرِّق بين (الردة الحقيقية)، و(الردة الحكمية) فكذلك هنا.

لذا فقد نص الأئمة على أن كل من أظهر الكفر لُجِرَ عليه أحكام الكفار، وبُحِّمَ عليه بالكفر، لكن قد يكون معذوراً باتباع من موانع التكفير لم تقف عليه.

كذا فإننا نحكم على أبناء الكفار بالكفر الحكمي تبعاً لأبائهم مع أن النص أثبت أنهم يولدون على الفطرة -وهي الإسلام-، عن أبي هريرة، أنه كان يقول: قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ ﷺ: (مَا مِنْ مَوْلُودٍ إِلَّا يُولَدُ عَلَى الْفِطْرَةِ، فَأَبَوَاهُ يُهَيِّدَانِهِ وَيُنْصَرَانِهِ وَيُمَجِّسَانِهِ، كَمَا تُنْتَجُ الْبَيْهَمَةُ بَيْهَمَةَ جَمْعَاءَ، هَلْ تُجْسُونَ فِيهَا مِنْ جَدْعَاءِ؟) ثُمَّ يَقُولُ: أَبُو هُرَيْرَةَ وَأَقْرَبُوا إِنْ شِئْتُمْ: ﴿فَطَرَتِ اللَّهُ آلِي فِطْرَةَ النَّاسِ عَلَيَّهَا لَا تَبْدِيلَ لِخَلْقِ اللَّهِ﴾ الآية. (متفق عليه).

قال شيخ الإسلام ابن تيمية -رحمه الله-: "وما بين ذلك قوله في الحديث الآخر: (كل مولود يولد على الفطرة حتى يعرب عنه لسانه، فإما شاكراً وإما كفوراً).

Section: Kufr in the True and Legal Sense

One must distinguish between true kufr and kufr in the legal sense, just as a distinction is made between true Islam and Islam in the legal sense, as well as there being a distinction between true apostasy and apostasy in the legal sense. Likewise here.

For the Imams stipulated that all who show kufr have the rulings of kufr upon them, and is judged in kufr, but he may be excused in one of the impediments to takfir we have not come to know.

So we judge the children of the disbelievers with kufr in the legal sense following their parents, even as the text has established that they are born in fitra- i.e. Islam- on the authority of Abu Huraira, who said: "The Messenger of God (SAWS) said: 'It is not that the one who is born should be born except in fitra, so it is the child's parents that make him a Jew, Christian and Majusi, just as the animal delivers a whole animal. Do you perceive it as mutilated?' Then Abu Huraira said: 'Recite if you will- 'The fitra of God on which He has created the people, there is no replacement for God's creation' - the aya' [Qur'an 30:30]" - (agreed upon).

The Sheikh of Islam Ibn Taymiyya (may God have mercy on him) said: "And there is that which clarifies the Almighty's words in the other hadith: Every child is born on fitra until his tongue can utter it, whether thankful or ungrateful.

حكم الشريعة في طوائف الشيعة

فجعل على الفطرة إلى أن يعقل ويميز، فحينئذ يثبت له أحد الأمرين، ولو كان كافراً في الباطن بكفر الأبوين، لكان ذلك من حين يولد، قبل أن يعرب عنه لسانه.

وكذلك قوله في الحديث الآخر الصحيح، حديث عياض بن حمار، عن النبي ﷺ فيما يرويه عن ربه: (إني خلقت عبادي حنفاء فاجتالتهم الشياطين، وحرمت عليهم ما أحللت لهم، وأمرتهم أن يشركوا بي ما لم أنزل به سلطاناً).

صريح في أنهم خلقوا على الحنيفية، وأن الشياطين اجتالتهم وحرمت عليهم الحلال وأمرتهم بالشرك، فلو كان الطفل يصير كافراً في نفس الأمر من حين يولد، لكونه يشع أبويه في الدين قبل أن يعلمه أحد الكفر ويلقنه إياه، لم يكن الشياطين من الذين غيروهم عن الحنيفية وأمروهم بالشرك، بل كانوا مشركين من حين ولدوا تبعاً لأبائهم.

ومنشأ الاشتباه في هذه المسألة اشتباه أحكام الكفر في الدنيا بأحكام الكفر في الآخرة، فإن أولاد الكفار لما كانوا يجري عليهم أحكام الكفر في أمور الدنيا، مثل ثبوت الولاية عليهم لأبائهم، وحضانة آبائهم لهم، وتمكين آبائهم من تعليمهم وتأديبهم، والموارثة بينهم وبين آبائهم، واسترقاقهم إذا كان آبائهم محاربين، وغير ذلك - صار يظن من يظن أنهم كفار في نفس الأمر، كالذي تكلم بالكفر وعمل به^١. [درء تعارض العقل والنقل ٤٣٢/٨].



So He has put the child on fitra until he can comprehend and can make distinctions, when one of the two matters can be established for him, and if he inwardly disbelieves in the kufir of his parents, that would be from the time of birth, before his tongue could utter it. Likewise the Almighty's words in the other authentic hadith of Ayad bin Hamar, from the Prophet (SAWS) in talking about his Lord: 'I created My servants as hunafa' [monotheists], so the Shayateen [evil ones] have caused them to deviate and have forbidden upon them what I allowed for them, and ordered them to associate as partners with Me what I did not bring down as authority.'

It is clear they [men] have been created in the hanif state, and the Shayateen have caused them to deviate, forbidden upon them what is permitted, and ordered them to commit shirk, so if the child were to become a disbeliever in the same state from the time of his birth, for the fact that he follows his parents in the religion before someone teaches him disbelief and instils him with it, the Shayateen were not the ones who deviated them from

the Hanif state and ordered them to commit shirk, but rather they were mushrikeen from the time of their birth following their parents.

And the source of misgiving in this issue is the fact that the rulings of kufr in this world are confused with the rulings of kufr in the Hereafter, for the children of the kuffar, since they have been dealt with by the rulings of kufr in the matters of this world, like the establishment of guardianship upon them for their parents, and their parents' nurturing for them, and the fact that their parents can teach them and educate them, and inheritance between them and their parents, and their enslavement if their parents were among those waging war, and things besides that- thus has come about the opinion of the one who thinks that they are kuffar in the same state, as the one who professes kufr and acts on it" - (Dir' Ta'arudh al-Aql wa al-Naql- 8/432).

حكم الشريعة في طوائف الشيعة

فصل

الإسلام العام والإسلام الخاص

قد يُطلق لفظ (الإسلام) في الشرع ويراد به المعنى العام، وهو إسلام الوجه لله، وطاعته، وعبادته وحده، والبراءة من الشرك، والإيمان بالنبوت، والمبدأ، والمعاد... إلخ وهذا هو دين جميع الأنبياء.

قال شيخ الإسلام ابن تيمية - رَحِمَهُ اللهُ -: "كان الأنبياء جميعهم مبعوثين بدين الإسلام فهو الدين الذي لا يقبل الله غيره لا من الأولين ولا من الآخرين". ١. هـ [المعجزة ص ١١٥، ١١٦].

وقد يُطلق لفظ (الإسلام) ويراد به المعنى الخاص، وهو الدين الذي بعث به محمد صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم عقيدة وشريعة وأخلاقاً.

قال الإمام البيهقي رَحِمَهُ اللهُ: "دين الإسلام هو اتباع القرآن". ١. هـ [تفسير البرقي ١٣/١].

وقال الإمام البربهاري رَحِمَهُ اللهُ: "اعلموا أن الإسلام هو السنة". ١. هـ [شرح السنة ص ١٣٣].

قال الله تعالى: ﴿ وَأُبْرئتُ لِأَن أَكُونَ أَوَّلَ الْمَسْلُومِينَ ﴾ [٣٢] قال السدي: يعني من أمته ﷺ. ١. هـ [انظر: تفسير ابن كثير ٨٣/٦].

وقال الإمام الشوكاني رَحِمَهُ اللهُ: "أي: من هذه الأمة". ١. هـ [فتح القدير ٤/٤٥٤].

Section: General Islam and Particular Islam

One may use the term Islam in the law with the general meaning, which is Islam facing towards God, obeying Him, worshipping Him alone, disavowing shirk, belief in the prophets, the principle, the resurrection etc. And this is the religion of all the prophets.

The Sheikh of Islam Ibn Taymiyya (may God have mercy on him) said: "All the Prophets were sent with the religion of Islam for it is the religion besides which God does not accept, not from the first nor from the last" - ('al-Abudiya 115-6).

And the term Islam may be used in the particular sense: the religion with which Muhammad (SAWS and on his family) was sent in doctrine, Shari'a and ethics.

Imam al-Baghawi (may God have mercy on him) said: "The religion of Islam is following the Qur'an" - (Tafsir al-Baghawi- 1/13).

Imam al-Barbahari (may God have mercy on him) said: "Know that Islam is the Sunna" - (Sharh al-Sunna: 133).

God Almighty said: "And I have been ordered to be the first of the Muslims." Al-Siddi said: "Meaning from the Ummah of SAWS" (see: Tafsir Ibn Kathir 6/83).

And Imam al-Shawkani (may God have mercy on him) said: "i.e. From this Ummah" (Fath al-Qadir 3/454).

حکم الشريعة في طوائف الشيعة

وبذلك تعلم أن الكفار الذين كانوا قبل بعثة خاتم الأنبياء صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم هم كفار أصليون، لا يُقال بأنهم مرتدون، ولا يلزمنا ذلك، بحجة أن أصلهم الإسلام إذ أنهم من ذرية آدم ونوح -عليهما السلام- كما صنع الإمام الكاساني -رحمه الله في كلامه عن أحفاد المرتدين- [انظر: بدائع الصنائع 7/139].
فالردة في اصطلاح العلماء إنما تُطلق على ما يخرج عن الإسلام بالمعنى الخاص لا بالمعنى العام.



Thus, know that the kuffar who were before the sending of the seal of the Prophets (SAWS and on his family) are original kuffar. It is not said that they are apostates, and we are not bound to that on the grounds that their origin is the Islam as they are from the offspring of Adam and Noah- peace be upon them- as Imam al-Kasani- may God have mercy on him- formulated in his discussion of the descendants of the apostates (see Bada'i al-Sana'i 7/139). So apostasy in the technical term of the 'ulama is rather applied to the one who leaves Islam in the particular sense, not the general sense.

فصل حكم أبناء المرتدين

لم يرد نص صريح من الكتاب أو السنة في حكم أبناء المرتدين، لذا فقد اختلف الأئمة فيهم على أقوال.

ولعل أقوالهم تتجه بتقسيم ردة الآباء إلى ثلاثة أقسام؛

القسم الأول: أن يرد الأبوان بارتكابها لناقض من نواقض الإسلام يختص بها كسب لله تعالى أو مناصرة للكفار على المسلمين، ونحو ذلك، فأبناؤهم مسلمون على الأصل؛ إذ أنهم متسبون للإسلام، والظن الراجح أن ينشأ أبناؤهم على الإسلام.

عن أبي هريرة رضي الله عنه قال: قال النبي ﷺ: «ما من مؤلود إلا يؤلد على القبطرة، فأبواؤه يهوداؤه أو نصراؤه، أو مجسانيه، كما تنتج البهيمة بهيمة جمعاء، هل تحسون فيها من جدعاء»، ثم يقول أبو هريرة رضي الله عنه: «فطرت الله التي فطر الناس عليها» (متن عليه).

لذا قال الإمام النووي رحمته الله عن من طرأت على أبويه ردة: "أما ولد المرتد، فإن كان منفصلاً، أو انعقد قبل الردة، فمسلم، حتى لو ارتدت حامل، لم يحكم بردة الولد، فإن بلغ وأعرب بالكفر، كان مرتداً بنفسه". اهـ (روضة الطالبيين ٧٧/١٠).

وإنما قال بذلك لغلبة الظن الراجح.

Section: Ruling on the children of the apostates

There has not come a clear stipulation from the Book and Sunna regarding the ruling on the children of the apostates, therefore the Imams have differed in their pronouncements.

Perhaps their pronouncements in distinguishing the apostasy of the parents come in three types:

1. The fact that the parents apostasise in their committing one of the nullifiers of Islam concerns them, like blasphemy against God Almighty or supporting the kuffar over the Muslims, and the like, so their children are Muslims in principle if they claim affiliation with Islam, and the predominant opinion is that their children are established on Islam.

On the authority of Abu Huraira (may God be pleased with him): he said: "the Prophet (SAWS) said: 'It is not that the one who is born should be born except in fitra, so it is the child's parents that make him a Jew, Christian and Majusi, just as the animal bears an

animal whole. Do you perceive it as mutilated?' Then Abu Huraira (may God be pleased with him) said: "The fitra of God on which He has created the people," (agreed upon).

So Imam al-Nawawi (may God have mercy on him) said regarding the one whose parents have become apostates: "As for the apostate's son, if he is separated, or bound before the apostasy, he is a Muslim; even if a pregnant mother apostasises, the child is not judged in apostasy, but if he comes of age and expresses kufr, he is an apostate himself" - (Rawdhat al-Talibeen: 10/77).

And what he said in that is for the most likely thought.

حکم الشريعة في طوائف الشيعة

القسم الثاني: أن يرتد الأبوان بارتكابها لناقض من نواقض الإسلام مع اتخاذ مذهبها وطريقة، فأبناؤهم مرتدون، لغلبة الظن في تنشئة أبنائهم على ذلك.

قال الإمام القرابي -رحمته الله-: "قال مالك: وكل ما وُلد للمرتد بعد رده لم يحكم المرتد...". ١. هـ [الذخيرة: ١٢/٤٢].

وقال الإمام الكاساني -رحمته الله- في أبناء المرتدين: "وإن كان مولوداً في الردة بأن ارتد الزوجان ولا ولد لهما، ثم حلت المرأة من زوجها بعد ردتها، وهما مرتدان على حالهما، فهذا الولد بمنزلة أبويه له حكم الردة، حتى لو مات لا يصل عليه؛ لأن المرتد لا يربث أحداً". ١. هـ [بدائع الصانع: ٧/١٣٩]. وخالف في الأحفاد!

القسم الثالث: أن يرتد الأبوان بانتقالهم إلى دين جديد كاليهودية أو النصرانية، فأبناؤهم كفار أصليون.

قال الإمام الزركشي -رحمته الله-: "ومفهوم كلام الخرفي أن أولادهم الذين ولدوا بعد الردة لو امتنعوا من الإسلام لم يقتلوا، وتحت هذا صورتان (إحداهما) اختاروا كفراً لا يقر أهله عليه بالجزية، فهنا لا ريب في قتلهم.

(الثانية) اختاروا كفراً يقر أهله عليه بالجزية، فهنا روايتان، حكاهما أبو البركات، وأبو محمد في المقنع (إحداهما) وهو ظاهر كلام الخرفي، واختيار القاضي في روايته، يقرون بالجزية، لأنهم ولدوا بين كافرين، ولم يسبق لهم حكم الإسلام، فجاز إقرارهم بالجزية كأولاد الحريين...". ١. هـ [شرح الزركشي على مختصر الخرفي: ٦/٢٥٨].

2. That the parents who apostasise by their committing one of the nullifiers of Islam with the adoption of it as a madhhab and path, so their children are apostates, for it is most likely that the children are raised on that.

Imam al-Qarafi (may God have mercy on him) said: "Malik said: All born to an apostate after his apostasy has the ruling of the apostate"- (al-Dhakira 12/42).

Imam al-Kasani (may God have mercy on him) said on the children of the apostates: "If he is born in apostasy by the fact that the spouses apostasised when they didn't have a child, and then the wife became pregnant from her husband after her apostasy, and the two are apostates in their state, so this child in the care of his parents has for him the ruling of apostasy, even if he dies, he is not to be prayed for, because the apostate is not the heir of anyone" (Bada'i al-Sana'i- 7/139). But he disagreed on descendants!

3. That the parents apostasise by their conversion to a new religion like Judaism or Christianity, so their children are original kuffar.

Imam al-Zarkashi (may God have mercy on him) said: "And the understanding of al-Kharqi's words is that their children who were born after the apostasy, even if they refrain from Islam, are not automatically to be killed, but in this regard are two conceptions. (One of the two) is that they have chosen kufr in which its people are not established with jizya, so here there is no doubt in killing them. (The second) is that they have chosen kufr in which its people are established with jizya, and here are two reports: one is reported by Abu al-Barakat, and Abu Muhammad in al-Muqni', and it is the literal meaning of al-Kharqi's words, and the judge's choice in his two reports: they are established in jizya, because they were born among kafirs, and the ruling of Islam did not apply to them previously, so he allowed for them to be established in jizya as the children of those at war..." (Sharh al-Zarkashi on the Mukhtasir al-Kharqi 6/258).

حکم الشریعة فی طوائف الشيعة

ويوضح هذا التقسيم ويبيته أن الأئمة الذين حكموا بأن أولاد المرتدين كفار أصليون، لم يحكموا على طوائف الشيعة بالكفر الأصلي نتيجة التوالد والتسلسل على الكفر على مر العصور.



This distinction makes clear and clarifies that the imams who judged that the children of apostates are original kuffar did not rule on the Shi'a sects that they adhere to original kufr as a result of successive birth and succession on kufr with the passing of eras.

فصل

حقيقة ردة طوائف الشيعة

إن طوائف الشيعة تنسب للإسلام وتنطق بـ (لا إله إلا الله)، وتقيم الصلاة وتؤتي الزكاة وتصوم رمضان وتحج البيت.

غير أنها ترتكب نواقض عديدة للإسلام هي من أصولهم، ولا يكون المرؤ منهم إلا إذا قال بها.

فهم مرتدون حكما وإن قيل أنهم لم يؤمنوا قط حقيقة، فعند البخاري عن عكرمة، قال: أن علياً رضي الله عنه، برنادقة فأخرفهم، فبلغ ذلك ابن عباس، فقال: لو كنت أنا لم أخرفهم، لينهي رسول الله ﷺ: (لا تعذبوا بعذاب الله) ولقتلتهم، ليقول رسول الله ﷺ: (من بدّل دينه فاقتلوه).

وعند النسائي عن أنس، أن علياً، أن بناسي من الرطّ يعبدون وتنا فأخرفهم، قال ابن عباس: إنما قال رسول الله ﷺ: (من بدّل دينه فاقتلوه).

وعند أبي يعلى عن أنس أن علياً أن بناسي من الرطّ وجدوهم يعبدون وتنا فخرقهم فبلغ ابن عباس فقال: إنما قال رسول الله ﷺ: (من بدّل دينه فاقتلوه).

فمع أن السلف قد وجدوا عند هؤلاء أو ثانياً تعبد، وحكموا عليهم بالزندقة، إلا أنهم أنزلوا عليهم أحكام المرتدين لا الكفار الأصليين، إذ أنهم يتسبون للإسلام.

Section: Truth of the apostasy of the Shi'a sects

The Shi'a sects claim affiliation with Islam, profess that there is no deity but God, establish prayer, give zakat, fast in Ramadan and perform the Hajj.

But they commit numerous nullifiers of Islam that are from their principles, and man will not be one of them except when he professes them.

So they are apostates in ruling even if it is said that they have not believed at all, for in al-Bukhari from Ikrima, who said: "Some heretics were brought to Ali- may God be pleased with him- so he burnt them, so that reached Ibn Abbas, who said: 'Had I been in his place, I would not have burnt them, for the Messenger of God (SAWS) forbade it- 'Do not punish with the punishment of God.' I would have killed them per the words of the Messenger of God (SAWS): 'Whoso changes his religion, kill him.'"

And in al-Nisa'i from Anas: that Ali was brought people of al-Zutt who were worshipping idols, so he burnt them, and the news reached Ibn Abbas, who said: 'Indeed the Messenger of God (SAWS) said: 'Whoso changes his religion, kill him.'"

And in Abu Ya'ala from Anas: that Ali was brought people of al-Zutt whom they found worshipping idols, so he burnt them, and the news reached Ibn Abbas, who said: 'Indeed the Messenger of God (SAWS) said: 'Whoso changes his religion, kill him.'"

So despite the fact that the predecessors found among these people idols being worshipped, and ruled on them as heretics, they brought on them the rulings of the apostates, not original kuffar, as they claimed affiliation with Islam.

حکم الشریعة فی طوائف الشیعة

وقال الإمام البخاري رحمه الله في صحيحه: "... فقال أبو بكر: والله لأقاتلن من فرق بين ما جمع رسول الله ﷺ ثم تابعه بعد عمر فلم يلتفت أبو بكر إلى مشورة إذ كان عنده حكم رسول الله ﷺ في الذين فرقوا بين الصلاة والزكاة وأزادوا تبديل الدين وأحكامه، وقال النبي ﷺ: (من بدل دينه فاقتلوه)".

وعليه؛ فإن هذه الطوائف هي طوائف ردة؛ مبدلة لكثير من أصول الإسلام ورسومه.

والمستببون لها مرتدون أبناء مرتدين، كما تقدم.

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Imam al-Bukhari- may God have mercy on him- said in his authentic collection: "...So Abu Bakr said: By God I should certainly fight the one who has caused separation between what the Messenger of God (SAWS) brought together, then later Omar followed

him and Abu Bakr did not consider consultation as there was with him the ruling of the Messenger of God (SAWS) on those who caused separation between prayer and zakat and wanted to change the religion and its rulings, and the Prophet (SAWS) said: 'Whoso changes his religion, kill him.'

Thus, these sects are sects of apostasy, exchanging many of the principles of Islam and its designs. And those affiliated with them are apostates, children of apostates, as presented.

حكم الشريعة في طوائف الشيعة

فصل

بعض أقوال العلماء في حكم الرافضة

لقد تكلم العلماء -رحمهم الله- عن الرافضة، فبينوا حكمهم، ووضحوا أمرهم.

قال الإمام طلحة بن مصرف -رحمه الله-: "الرافضة لا تنكح نسائهم ولا توكل ذبائحهم، لأنهم أهل ردة". هـ. ١. [الإبانة الصغرى ص ١٦٦].

وعن الإمام أحمد بن يونس -رحمه الله- قال: "إنا لا نأكل ذبيحة رجل رافضي، فإنه عندي مُرْتَدٌ". هـ. ١. [شرح أصول اعتقاد أهل السنة والجماعة، الألبانكي ١٥٤٦/٨].

ونقله عنه شيخ الإسلام ابن تيمية -رحمه الله- في الصارم المسلول ص ٥٧٠، فقال: "لو أن يهودياً ذبح شاة، وذبح رافضي لأكلت ذبيحة اليهودي، ولم أكل ذبيحة الرافضي لأنه مرتد عن الإسلام". هـ. ١.

وقال الإمام عبد الرحمن بن مهدي -رحمه الله-: "ما فتئت رافضياً إلا وجدته زنديقاً". هـ. ١. [شرح أصول اعتقاد أهل السنة والجماعة ١٣٤٣/٧].

وقال الإمام محمد بن يوسف الضريابي -رحمه الله-: "ما أرى الرافضة والجهمية إلا زنادقة". هـ. ١. [شرح أصول اعتقاد أهل السنة والجماعة ١٥٤٥/٨].

وقال شيخ الإسلام ابن تيمية -رحمه الله-: "وَقَدْ تَكُونُ الرَّذَّةُ عَنْ بَعْضِ الدِّينِ، كَحَالِ أَهْلِ الْبِدْعِ الرَّافِضِيَّةِ وَعَبَائِدِهِمْ. وَاللَّهُ تَعَالَى يُقِيمُ قَوْمًا يُحِبُّهُمْ وَيُحْيِيونَهُ،

Section: some of the sayings of the 'ulama on the ruling on the Rafidites

The 'ulama- may God have mercy on them- spoke about the Rafidites, and made clear the ruling on them and clarified their status.

Imam Talha bin Masraf (may God have mercy on him) said: "The women of the Rafidites are not to be married and the meat of the animals they slaughter not to be eaten, because they are a people of apostasy" (al-Ibana al-Sughra 161).

And from Imam Ahmad bin Yunis (may God have mercy on him) who said: "We do not eat the meat of the animal slaughtered by a Rafidite man, as he is in my eyes an apostate" (Sharh Usul 'Itiqad Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama'at, al-Lalika'i 8/1546).

And transmitted from him by the Sheikh of Islam Ibn Taymiyya (may God have mercy on him) in al-Sarim al-Maslul 570, who said: "Were a Jew to slaughter sheep, and were a Rafidite to do it, I would eat the meat of the Jew, and I have not eaten the meat of the Rafidite because he is an apostate from Islam."

حكم الشيعة في طوائف الشيعة

وَيُجَاهِدُونَ مَنِ ارْتَدَّ عَنِ الدِّينِ، أَوْ عَنِ بَعْضِهِ، كَمَا يُقِيمُ مَنْ يُجَاهِدُ الرَّافِضَةَ الْمُرْتَدِّينَ
عَنِ الدِّينِ، أَوْ عَنِ بَعْضِهِ، فِي كُلِّ زَمَانٍ.

وَاللَّهُ سُبْحَانَهُ الْمُسْتَوْجِبُ أَنْ يُعَلِّمَنَا مِنَ الَّذِينَ يُحِبُّهُمْ وَيُحِبُّونَهُ، الَّذِينَ يُجَاهِدُونَ
الْمُرْتَدِّينَ وَأَتْبَاعَ الْمُرْتَدِّينَ، وَلَا يَخَافُونَ لَوْمَةَ لَائِمٍ". ١. هـ [منهاج السنة ٧/٢٢٢].

وقال ابو حامد المقدسي -رَحِمَهُ اللهُ- بعد ان ذكر جملة من عقائد
الرافضة: "لا يخفى على كل ذي بصيرة وفهم من المسلمين، أن أكثر ما قدمناه في
الباب، قبله من عقائد هذه الطائفة الرافضة على اختلاف أصنافها كفر صريح،
وعناد مع جهل قبيح، لا يتوقف الواقف مع تكفيرهم، والحكم عليهم بالمروق
من دين الإسلام وضلالهم". ١. هـ [رسالة في الرد على الرافضة لأبي حامد المقدسي ص ٢٠٠].

وقال الشيخ المجدد محمد بن عبد الوهاب -رَحِمَهُ اللهُ-: "فهؤلاء الإمامية
خارجون عن السنة، بل عن الملة". ١. هـ [رسالة في الرد على الرافضة للشيخ محمد ص ٣٩].

وقال الشيخ سليمان بن سحمان -رَحِمَهُ اللهُ-: "من المعلوم أن الرافضة
الإمامية عند جميع أهل السنة والجماعة ليسوا من أهل الملة الإسلامية والطريقة
المحمدية، بل هم خارجون عن جملتهم". ١. هـ [المجيب الواضحة للإسلامة ص ٧٧].



Imam Abd al-Rahman bin Mahdi (may God have mercy on him) said: "I have not looked into a Rafidite and did not find him to be a heretic" (Sharh Usul 'Itiqad Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama'at 7/1343).

Imam Muhammad bin Yusuf al-Faryabi (may God have mercy on him) said: "I only see the Rafidites and Jahmis as heretics" (Sharh Usul 'Itiqad Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama'at 8/1545).

The Sheikh of Islam Ibn Taymiyya (may God have mercy on him) said: "And there may be apostasy from some of the religion, as is the state of the people of Rafidite innovations and others besides them, and God Almighty will establish a people He loves and they love Him, and will wage jihad against the one who apostasises from the religion or some of it, as He will establish the one who wages jihad against the Rafidite apostates from the religion, or from some of it, in every age. And God- Exalted is He- is the One responsible for making us among those he Loves and they love Him, who will wage jihad on the apostates and the followers of the apostates, and they do not fear the censure of the critic" (Manhaj al-Sunna 7/222).

Abu Hamid al-Maqdisi (may God have mercy on him) said after he mentioned most of the doctrines of the Rafidites: "It is not hidden to anyone of insight and understanding from the Muslims, that most of what we have presented in the chapter previously regarding the doctrines of this Rafidite sect despite the difference of their types is plain kufr, and pigheadedness with ugly ignorance. The one familiar does not stop with takfir of them, and the ruling on them in deviating from the religion of Islam and their error" - (Risala fi al-Radd 'Ala al-Rafida li-Abi Hamid al-Maqdisi 200).

The revivalist Sheikh Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab (may God have mercy on him) said: "These Imamates go outside the Sunna, but also the path [/faith of Islam]" (Risala fi al-Radd 'Ala al-Rafida li-Sheikh Muhammad 39).

And Sheikh Suleiman bin Sahman- may God have mercy on him- said: "It is known that the Imamate Rafidites among all the Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama'at are not from the people of the Islamic path and way of Muhammad, but rather they are outside of them entirely" (al-Hujjaj al-Wadhiha al-Islamiya 77).

فصل

بعض أقوال العلماء في حكم النصيرية والإسماعيلية والدروز

إن كلام الأئمة رحمهم الله في ردة النصيرية والإسماعيلية والدروز الذين يتسبون للإسلام أصرح من كلامهم في ردة الرافضة.

قال الإمام أبو حامد الغزالي - رَحِمَهُ اللهُ -: "والقول الوجيز أنه يسلك بهم - أي: الباطنية - مسلك المرتدين في النظر في الدم والمال والنكاح والذبيحة ونفوذ الأفضية وقضاء العبادات، أما الأرواح فلا يسلك فيهم مسلك الكافر الأصلي إذ يتميز في الكافر بين أربع خصال المن والغداء والاسترقاق والقتل ولا يتميز في حق المرتد... وإنا الواجب قتلهم وتطهير وجه الأرض منهم". ١٠١ هـ [فتاوى الباطنية ص ١٥٦].

وقال شيخ الإسلام ابن تيمية - رَحِمَهُ اللهُ -: "هؤلاء الدرزية والنصيرية كفارٌ يأنفقي المسلمين لا يحل أكل ذبائحهم ولا نكاح بناتهم؛ بل ولا يقرون بالجزية؛ فإنهم مرتدون عن دين الإسلام ليسوا مسلمين؛ ولا يهود ولا نصارى لا يقرون بوجوب الصلوات الخمس ولا وجوب صوم رمضان ولا وجوب الحج؛ ولا تحريم ما حرم الله ورسوله من الميتة والخمر وغيرهما. وإن أظهروا الشهادة مع هذه العقائد فهم كفارٌ يأنفقي المسلمين". ١٠١ هـ [مجموع الفتاوى ١٦١/٣٥].

وقال العلامة ابن عابدين - رَحِمَهُ اللهُ -: "مطلَبُ حُكْمِ الدُّرُوزِ وَالنِّسَارِيَّةِ وَالنُّصَيْرِيَّةِ وَالإِسْمَاعِيلِيَّةِ [أَنِّيَّة] يُعْلَمُ بِمَا هُنَا حُكْمُ الدُّرُوزِ وَالنِّسَارِيَّةِ فَإِنَّهُمْ فِي الْبِلَادِ الشَّامِيَّةِ يُظْهِرُونَ الْإِسْلَامَ وَالصُّومَ وَالصَّلَاةَ مَعَ أَنَّهُمْ يَتَعَبَّدُونَ تَنَاسُخَ الْأَرْوَاحِ

Section: Some of the words of the 'ulama on the ruling on the Nusayris, Ismailis and Druze

The words of the Imams- may God have mercy on them- on the apostasy of the Nusayris, Ismailis and Druze who claim affiliation with Islam is clearer than their words on the apostasy of the Rafidites.

Imam Abu Hamid al-Ghazali- may God have mercy on him- said: "And the summary pronouncement is that there passes in them- that is, the Batiniya- the way of the apostates in view, blood, wealth, marriage, meat of the animals they slaughter, the authority of judgements and the extirpation of the acts of worship. As for their lives, the way of the original kafir does not go through them as a distinction is made in the kafir between four characteristics- bestowal, ransom, enslavement and killing- and the distinction is not made with regards to the apostate...and it is obligatory to kill them and cleanse the face of the earth from them"- (Fada'ih al-Batiniya 156).

And the Sheikh of Islam Ibn Taymiyya (may God have mercy on him) said: "These Druze and Nusayris are kuffar by the agreement of the Muslims: it is not allowed to eat the meat of the animals they slaughter or marry their women, or even for them to be established on jizya, for they are apostates from the religion of Islam, not Muslims, Jews or Christians. They do not establish the obligation of he give prayers or the obligation of fasting in Ramadan or the obligation of the Hajj, or forbid what God and His Messenger forbade from forbidden meat, wine and other things, even if they outwardly the two shahadas with these doctrines, they are kuffar by agreement of the Muslims" (Majmu' al-Fatawa 35/161).

The 'Alama ibn Abidin- may God have mercy on him- said: "Concerning the ruling of the Druze and the Tayamina, the Nusayris and Ismailis [note]. It is known from what is here the ruling of the Druze and Tayamina, for they are in the land of the Levant showing Islam outwardly with fasting and prayer despite the fact that they believe in the transmigration of souls...[cont.]

حكم الشيعة في طوائف الشيعة

وَجِلَّ الْحُمْرِ وَالزُّرْنَاءُ وَأَنَّ الْأَلُوَهِيَّةَ تَظْهَرُ فِي شَخْصٍ بَعْدَ شَخْصٍ وَيَتَخَدُّونَ الْحُمْرَ وَالصُّومَ وَالصَّلَاةَ وَالْحَجَّ، وَيَقُولُونَ الْمُسَمَّى بِهِ غَيْرَ الْمَعْنَى الْمُرَادِ وَيَتَكَلَّمُونَ فِي جَنَابِ نَبِيِّنا - ﷺ - كَلِمَاتٍ فَظِيحَةً. وَلِلْعَلَامَةِ الْمُحَقِّقِيِّ عَبْدِ الرَّحْمَنِ الْعِمَادِيِّ فِيهِمْ فَتَوَى مُطَوَّلَةً، وَذَكَرَ فِيهَا أَنَّهُمْ يَتَّجِلُونَ عَقَائِدَ النُّصَيْرِيَّةِ وَالْإِسْمَاعِيلِيَّةِ الَّذِينَ يَلْقَبُونَ بِالْقَرَامِطِيَّةِ وَالْبَاطِنِيَّةِ الَّذِينَ ذَكَرَهُمْ صَاحِبُ الْمَوَاقِفِ. وَنَقَلَ عَنْ عُلَمَاءِ الْمَذَاهِبِ الْأَرْبَعَةِ أَنَّهُ لَا يَحِلُّ إِقْرَانُهُمْ فِي دِيَارِ الْإِسْلَامِ بِحِزْبِيَّةٍ وَلَا غَيْرِهَا، وَلَا يَحِلُّ مُنَاكَحَتُهُمْ وَلَا ذَبَابَتُهُمْ، وَفِيهِمْ فَتَوَى فِي الْحِزْبِيَّةِ أَيْضًا فَرَّاجِعَهَا.

تَطَلَّبَ جَمَلَةٌ مَنْ لَا تُقْبَلُ تَوْبَتُهُ وَالْحَاصِلُ أَنَّهُمْ يَصُدِّقُ عَلَيْهِمْ اسْمُ الزُّنُودِيِّ وَالْمُنَافِقِيِّ وَالْمُلْحِدِ... ١.٠ هـ [رد المحتار على الدر المختار ٤/٢٤٤].

وقال الشيخ عبد الرحمن بن حسن بن محمد بن عبد الوهاب رَحِمَهُ اللهُ: "وأول من ظهر عنه دعوة النبوة، من المتشبهين إلى الإسلام: المختار بن أبي عبيد، وكان من الشيعة. فعلم أن أعظم الناس ردة، هم في الشيعة أكثر منهم في سائر الطوائف؛ ولهذا لا يعرف أسوأ ردة من ردة الغالية، كالنصيرية، ومن ردة الإسماعيلية الباطنية، ونحوهم، انتهى.

ومن المعلوم: أن كثيرا من هؤلاء جهال، يظنون أنهم على الحق، ومع ذلك حكم شيخ الإسلام بسوء ردتهم ١.٠ هـ [الدر السنية ١١/٤٨٢].



the permissibility of wine and fornication, and that divinity appears in person after person, and they disavow the congregation, fasting, prayer and Hajj, and they say the attribute in name as something besides the desired meaning, and they speak hideous words about our honoured Prophet (SAWS). And the 'alama Abd al-Rahman al-Amadi verifying their case has an elaborate fatwa, in which he mentioned that they plagiarise the doctrines of the Nusayris and Ismailis who are called by the names of Qarmatians and Batinis whom the one of positions mentioned. And he transmitted from the 'ulama of the four madhahib that it is not allowed for them to be established in the abode of Islam with jizya or anything besides that, and it is not allowed to marry them or eat the meat of the animals they slaughter, and against them is a fatwa in benevolence as well so consult. Concerning the clause 'the one whose repentance should not be accepted,' in short the attribute of heretic, hypocrite and deviant applies to them..." (Radd al-Muhtar 'Ala al-Dir al-Mukhtar 4/244).

Sheikh Abd al-Rahman bin Hassan bin Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab (may God have mercy on him) said: "And the first about whom the claim to prophethood appeared from those who claim affiliation to Islam: al-Mukhtar bin Abi Obeid, and he was from the Shi'a, so it has been known that the greatest people in apostasy are among the Shi'a, more than those in the other sects, and in this regard no worse apostasy is known than the apostasy of the ghulat, like the Nusayris, and the apostasy of the Batini Ismailis, and others besides them. Period. And it is known that many of these people are ignorant thinking they are on the way of truth, and despite that the Sheikh of Islam [Ibn Taymiyya] ruled on the evil of their apostasy" (al-Dorar al-Sunniya 11/482).

حكم الشريعة في طوائف الشيعة

فصل

تبني الدولة الإسلامية القول بردة طوائف الشيعة

لقد تبنت الدولة الإسلامية ما نبناه أئمة الإسلام قديما وحديثا في حكم طوائف الشيعة، ولم تخرج عن أقوالهم بقول جديد.

فنص شيوخها ومؤسساتها وجهاتها الشرعية على ردة الرافضة.

فالشيوخ ابو مصعب الزرقاوي - رَحِمَهُ اللهُ - صرح بذلك كما في سلسلته التي بعنوان "هل اتاك حديث الرافضية؟"، ومن جملة ما قال فيهم بعد أن سرد اعتقادهم: "إنه لا يمكن أن يكون للمسلمين نصر ولا غلبة على المخاريج الكفار من اليهود والنصارى إلا بعد القضاء على من دوتهم من العملاء المرتدين، وعلى رأسهم الرافضة، تماما كما رصد لنا التاريخ كيف أن بيت المقدس الذي سقط بيد الصليبيين بمعاونة الرافضة العبيدين لم يستعد إلا على يد صلاح الدين، مع أن نور الدين محموداً كان أشد على الصليبيين من صلاح الدين، ولكن قدر الله تعالى أن يكون النصر وتحرير بيت المقدس على يد صلاح الدين، ولكن متى؟ بعد أن حازت الرافضة العبيدين بعدة سنوات، وقضى على دولتهم تماما وأسقطها، ثم بعد ذلك نقرع للصليبيين حتى تم له النصر عليهم، واستعاد بيت المقدس الذي ظل سنوات تحت قبضتهم بسبب أهل الخيانة الرافض.

فهذا درس مهم جداً يقدمه لنا التاريخ لا يجب التغافل عنه أبداً...

Section: the Islamic State's Adoption of the pronouncement of the apostasy of the Shi'a sects

The Islamic State has adopted what the Imams of Islam of old and modern times adopted in the ruling on the Shi'a sects, and has not departed from their sayings with a new pronouncement.

For its sheikhs, founders, and Shari'i elements noted the apostasy of the Rafidites.

For Sheikh Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi (may God have mercy on him) made that clear in his series entitled 'Have you heard of the Rafidites?' And from what he said about them after he elaborated their doctrine: "The Muslims cannot be victorious or overcome the kuffar who wage war from the Jews and Christians except after annihilating those besides them from the apostate collaborators, at the head of whom are the Rafidites, just as history has observed for us how Bayt al-Maqdis [Jerusalem] that fell at the hands of Crusaders with the help of the Obeidi Rafidites was not recovered except at the hands of 'Salah al-Din,' even as 'Nur al-Din Mahmud' was stronger against the Crusaders than 'Salah al-Din', but God Almighty determined that the victory and liberation of Bayt al-Maqdis should be at the hands of 'Salah al-Din', but when? After he waged war on the Obeidi Rafidites for a number of years, and totally destroyed their state and brought it down, then after that he was freed up to take on the Crusaders until the victory over them came about for him, and he recovered Bayt al-Maqdis that remained for years under their grip because of the Rafidite people of betrayal. So this is a very important lesson that history offers us that can never be ignored.

حکم الشريعة في طوائف الشيعة

لَنْ يَكُونَ لَنَا نَصْرٌ قَطُّ، عَلَى الْكُفَّارِ الْأَصْلِيِّينَ إِلَّا بَعْدَ قِتَالِ الْكُفَّارِ الْمُرْتَدِّينَ مَعَ الْكُفَّارِ الْأَصْلِيِّينَ، وَمَا الْفَتْوحَاتُ الْإِسْلَامِيَّةُ الَّتِي تَمَّتْ فِي عَهْدِ الرَّاشِدِيِّينَ إِلَّا بَعْدَ تَطْهِيرِ جَزِيرَةِ الْعَرَبِ مِنَ الْمُرْتَدِّينَ، وَلِذَلِكَ أَبْغَضَ مَا يُبْغِضُهُ الرَّافِضَةُ هُوَ "صَلَاحُ الدِّينِ"، فَهُمْ يُطِيقُونَ الْمَوْتَ وَلَا يُطِيقُونَهُ". ١. هـ

وصكنا أمير المؤمنين أبو عمر البغدادي - رَحِمَهُ اللهُ - كما قال في توضيح عقيدة الدولة الإسلامية، ثانياً: الرافضة طائفة شرك وردة، وهم مع ذلك ممنعون عن تطبيق كثير من شعائر الإسلام الظاهرة". ١. هـ [تريفة: قل إن على عبنة من ربها].

وقال في شريط (الدين النصيحة)، "فالتحالف مع الرافضة النصيرية في سوريا بدعوى تحرير فلسطين هو خيانة كبرى، فإن صلاح الدين لم يدخل القدس فاتحاً حتى قضى على دولة الرافضة العبيدية في مصر والشام، والنصيرية أخطر معتقداً وأكثر حقداً. يقول شيخ الإسلام ابن تيمية - رَحِمَهُ اللهُ -: (والنصيرية كفار باتفاق المسلمين لا يحل أكل ذبائحهم ولا نكاح نسائهم بل ولا يقرون بالجزية فإنهم مرتدون عن دين الإسلام ليسوا مسلمين ولا يهود ولا نصارى). ١. هـ [مجموعه الفتاوى: ٣٥-١٦١]. ١. هـ

وصكنا أمير المؤمنين أبو بكر البغدادي - حفظه الله واعزه -، حيث قال في شريط (ولو فكره الكافرون)، "شدوا على الروافض الحوتة، فإنهم كفار مرتدون". ١. هـ



Victory will never arise for us over the original kuffar except after fighting the apostate kuffar with the original kuffar, and the Islamic conquests that were fulfilled in the era of the Rashideen were not so except after cleansing the Arabian Peninsula of the apostates, and therefore the one the Rafidites detest most is 'Salah al-Din,' for they tolerate death but do not tolerate him."

And similarly the Amir al-Mu'mineen Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (may God have mercy on him) as he said in clarifying the creed of the Islamic State: "Secondly: The Rafidites are a sect of shirk and apostasy, and they are with that refusing to apply many of the outward rituals of Islam" - (recording: Qul Innani 'Ala Bayyinat min Rabbi).

And he said in the recording of "Religion is advice": "So the alliance with the Nusayri Rafidites in Syria on the grounds of liberating Palestine is a very great betrayal, for indeed Salah al-Din did not enter al-Quds in conquest except after destroying the Obeidi Rafidite state in Egypt and al-Sham, and the Nusayris are the most evil in creed and greatest in

hatred. The Sheikh of Islam Ibn Taymiyya (may God have mercy on him) said: 'And the Nusayris are kuffar by the agreement of the Muslims, it is not allowed to eat the meat of the animals they slaughter, marry their women, and they are also not established on jizya, for they are apostates from the religion of Islam and they are not Muslims, Jews or Christians' (Majmu'at al-Fatawa 35-161).

And likewise the Amir al-Mu'mineen Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi- may God protect him and strengthen him- when he spoke in the recording 'And even if the kafirs hate': "Be strong against the Houthi Rafidites, for they are apostate kuffar."

حکم الشريعة في طوائف الشيعة

فصل

ضعف القول بأصالة كفر طوائف الشيعة

إن القول بأن طوائف الشيعة كفار أصليون ضعيف مرجوح من وجوه عديدة، منها:

أولاً: القول بأن طوائف الشيعة كفار أصليون بدعة محدثة:

إن إعمال قواعد أهل العلم وتأصيلاتهم ينبغي أن لا يكون بمعزل عن فقههم وتنزيلاتهم، فإن هذه الطوائف موجودة منذ القرون الأولى في تاريخ الإسلام، ولم نقف على أي أثر معتبر لإمام من أئمة الإسلام ينص على أنهم كفار أصليون!

فالقول بأن هؤلاء الطوائف كفار أصليون تقدم بين يدي العلماء الذين مضوا، الفقهاء الذين قضوا، وما أجل ما روي عن إمام أهل السنة أحمد بن حنبل - رَجَمَهُ اللهُ - أنه قال: "لا تقولن بقول ليس لك فيه إمام". ١٠١هـ.

وسئل أبو حفص الحداد عن البدعة فقال: "التَّعَدِّي فِي الْأَحْكَامِ، وَالتَّهَاوُنُ فِي السُّنَنِ، وَاتِّبَاعُ الْأَرَائِ وَالْأَهْوَاءِ، وَتَرْكُ الْإِتِّبَاعِ وَالْإِقْتِدَاءِ". ١٠١هـ [الاعتصام للشاطبي ١/١٦٢].

ثانياً: القول بأن طوائف الشيعة كفار أصليون خلاف للإجماع:

لقد انقضت القرون الأولى من تاريخ الإسلام ولم يحكم عالم واحد بأن هذه الطوائف كفار أصليون، بل حكم عدد منهم -دون مخالف تعلمه- بأنهم كفار مرتدون.

Section: The weakness of pronouncing the Shi'a sects to be original kuffar

Pronouncing the Shi'a sects to be original kuffar is implausible in multiple ways, among them:

1. Pronouncing the Shi'a sects to be original kuffar is a modern innovation:

The works of the foundations of the Ahl al-'Ilm and their bases require that one must not be isolated from their jurisprudence and deductions, for these sects have been present since the first centuries of the history of Islam, and we have not come to know any considered trace for one of the Imams of Islam stipulating that they are original kuffar.

For the pronouncement that these sects are original kuffar came after the 'ulama who passed, the jurists who judged, and the most beautiful expression is what has been narrated from the Imam of the Ahl al-Sunna Ahmad bin Hanbal- may God have mercy on him- that he said: "Do not say something for which you have no Imam."

And Abu Hafs al-Haddad was asked about innovation, and said: "Attacking the rulings, and disregarding the Sunnas, following opinions and whims, and abandoning following and emulation" (al-'Itisam lil-Shatibi 1/162).

2. Saying that the Shi'a sects are original kuffar contravenes the consensus.

The first centuries of Islam's history passed and not one 'alim ruled that these sects are original kuffar, but rather many of them- without disagreement we know of- ruled that they are apostate kuffar.

حكم الشيعة في طوائف الشيعة

فالتصيرورة إلى القول بأنهم كفار أصليون مخالفة لإجماع الأمة، قال الله تعالى:

﴿ وَمَنْ يُشَاقِقِ الرَّسُولَ مِنْ بَعْدِ مَا تَبَيَّنَ لَهُ الْهُدَىٰ وَيَتَّبِعْ غَيْرَ سَبِيلِ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ نُوَلِّهِ مَا تَوَلَّىٰ وَنُصَلِّهِ. إِنَّهُمْ وَمَسَاكِنُهُمْ مَصِيرًا ﴾ [نساء: ١١٥]

وجاء في الحديث المتواتر عنه عليه السلام أنه قال: (لا تزال طائفة من أممي ظاهرين على الحق، لا يضرهم من خذلهم حتى يأتي أمر الله، وهم كذلك) (خرجه مسلم).

قال الإمام النووي -رحمَهُ اللهُ- في شرح الحديث: "وفيه دليل لكون الإجماع حجة، وهو أصح ما يستدل به له من الحديث، وأما حديث: (لا تجتمع أممي على ضلالة) فضعيف". ١. هـ [شرح صحيح مسلم ١٣/٦٧].

ثالثاً: ذكر بعض لوازم القول بأن طوائف الشيعة كفار أصليون:

إن القول بأن طوائف الشيعة كفار أصليون له لوازم باطللة كثيرة، منها:

- ١- عدم اجبارهم على الإسلام بالسيوف.
 - ٢- جواز معاهدتهم وأخذ الجزية منهم.
 - ٣- جواز استرقاق رجالهم.
 - ٤- جواز مفاداة أسراهم والمن عليهم اختياراً.
 - ٥- حرمة قتل من أسلم منهم بعد القدرة عليه.
 - ٦- اعتبار الشهادتين أو ما يقوم مقامهما في دخولهم الإسلام.
 - ٧- تكفير من توقف عن تكفير الواحد منهم بإطلاق.
- وغير ذلك من اللوازم التي يضطر القائل بكفرهم أصالة أن يقول بها، أو أن يتكورها فيلحق قولاً جديداً، وقد ذم عدد من أهل العلم هذا النوع من التلفيق.

So the outcome of saying that they are original kuffar is a contravention of the Ummah's consensus. God Almighty said: "Whoever opposes the Messenger after the guidance is made clear to him, and follows a path besides that of the believers, We will grant him what he has assumed and drive him to hellfire. And evil it is as a destination" (Nisa' 115) [Qur'an 4:115].

And there has come in the mutawatar [multiple chains of transmission] hadith from SAWS that he said: "A sect of my Ummah will remain open on the truth, and the one who forsakes them will not harm them until the decree of God should come, and they are so" (brought out by Muslim).

Imam al-Nawawi (may God have mercy on him) said in explaining the hadith: "In it is evidence that consensus is a proof, and it is the surest thing to be inferred from the hadith, and as for hadith- 'My Ummah does not gather on error', it is weak" - (Sharh Sahih Muslim 13/67).

3. Some of the inferences of saying that the Shi'a sects are original kuffar:

Saying that the Shi'a sects are original kuffar has many false inferences, among them:

1. The lack of compelling them to Islam by the sword.
2. The permissibility of concluding a pact with them and taking jizya from them.
3. The permissibility of enslaving their men.
4. The permissibility of ransom for their captives and bestowal of magnanimity on them by choice.
5. The impermissibility of killing the one who accepts Islam among them after gaining power over them.
6. Considering the two shahadas or the equivalent as their entry into Islam.
7. Takfir of the one who refrains from takfir of one of them absolutely.

And other inferences that the one who pronounces their kufr to be original must say, or he must condemn them and fabricate a new pronouncement, and many of the Ahl al-'Ilm condemned this type of fabrication.

حُكْمُ الشَّرِيعَةِ فِي طَوَائِفِ الشَّيْبَةِ

قَالَ الشَّيْخُ ابْنُ مَلَّا فَرُوكَ - رَحِمَهُ اللهُ -: "قَدْ اسْتَفَاضَ عِنْدَ فَضْلَاءِ الْعَصْرِ مَنَعَ التَّلْفِيْقَ فِي التَّقْلِيْدِ". ١. هـ [القول السديد في بعض مسائل الاجتهاد والتقليد ١/٧٩].



Sheikh Ibn Mulla Farukh (may God have mercy on him) said: "There has spread among the virtuous of the era the prohibition on fabrication in taqlid"- (al-Qawl al-Sadid fi Ba'adh Masa'il al-Ijtihad wa al-Taqlid"- 1/79).

حکم الشريعة في طوائف الشيعة

خاتمة - نسال الله حسن الخاتمة

لم نجهد خلال هذه الرسالة في بيان عقائد طوائف الشيعة، والوقوف على
أصوبهم، ومناقشتها والرد عليها.

بل اكتفينا ببيان الحكم على تلك الطوائف باختصار غير مخل، مع مراعاتنا
فيها الاتباع والافتداء، لا الإحداث والابتداء.

لنحسم بذلك مادة النقاش في بعض أوساط الشباب، ونقف وإياهم على
تأصيل المسألة وتعميدها، دون التأثير بالعواطف الجياشة في انحراف الحكم عليها.

فتسأل الله أن يبارك في هذا الجهد وينميه، ليلا مس شغاف القلوب والأفئدة.

وآخر دعوانا أن الحمد لله رب العالمين، وصلى الله وسلم على أشرف الأنبياء

والمرسلين.



Conclusion: We ask God for the good conclusion

We have not endeavoured during the course of this treatise to make clear the doctrines of the Shi'a sects and come upon their principles, discuss them and respond to them, but rather we have been content to make clear the ruling on those sects in a summary that is not weak, with our concern in it for following and emulation, not innovation and beginning anew.

Let us thus conclude this subject of discussion among some of the youth, and let us and them stand on making the issue a matter of principle and foundation, without being influenced by the agitated emotions in distorting the ruling on the matter.

So we ask God to bless this effort and make it grow, in order for it to touch the bounds of hearts and minds.

Ismailis and Druze p. 22

Section: Some of the words of the sheikhs of the Islamic State in ruling on the Shi'a sects p. 24

Section: The falsehood of saying that the Shi'a sects are original kuffar p. 26

Section: Conclusion- we ask God for good conclusion p. 29

[\[i\]](#) It is not concealed that the Druze exist in two types: one claiming affiliation with Islam, and they are the ones meant in this treatise, and another not claiming affiliation with Islam in principle, such people being original kuffar without distinction.

[\[ii\]](#) The meaning of "the Shi'a sects" in this book: they are the Rafidites, Nusayris, Ismailis and Druze. As for the Zaydi Shi'a, who are followers of Zayd bin Ali Zayn al-Abidin, they are not included in our discussion.

The Islamic State: Baqiya?

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

Bicom

May 16, 2017



The Arabic word *baqiya* ("remaining") is one of the most common adjectives associated with the Islamic State, dating back to its earliest incarnation that claimed to be a state: namely, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). Once ISI officially expanded into Syria under the name of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and began seriously controlling and administering territory, the additional claim of "expanding" was soon tagged on to the organisation's unofficial slogan, thus *baqiya wa tatamaddad*. Indeed, with the capture of Mosul and other major towns and cities in Iraq and Syria, the claim to be remaining and expanding was not without merit, especially following the declaration of the Caliphate and spread of the Islamic State franchise into multiple other countries throughout the region.

Today, we no longer speak of the Islamic State as expanding, but rather debate whether it will survive as it comes under increasing pressure on the main fronts in Iraq and Syria but also abroad: thus, in Libya, which was often assumed to be the "fallback" option for the Islamic State, the organisation's affiliates no longer control any towns in the country.

Given that the Islamic State is now contracting, will any of it ultimately remain? Some of the Islamic State's messaging has been devoted to this very topic, and predictably argues against the idea that loss of territory means the end of the Caliphate project. For example, in Tel Afar in northern Iraq, an Islamic State publication entitled "Caliphate will not vanish" was distributed as the Coalition campaign to retake Mosul began. The work argues that "many have forgotten that the Islamic State is not a state of land and

geographic spaces, but rather the goal from it is to spread true Islam and restore jihad to the Ummah [global Muslim community] after decades of humiliation and degradation".

The piece goes on to quote a familiar line from the last recorded speech by Islamic State spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani in May 2016, in which he drew attention to the precedent of ISI's losses and the retreat into the "desert" in the 2007-2009 period.

"Defeat," argued Adnani, "is the loss of the will and desire to fight. You will be victorious, America, and the mujahideen will be defeated only if you can remove the Qur'an from the hearts of the mujahideen".

This messaging contrasts strongly with the recruitment drives and propaganda from the peak of the Islamic State's power in 2014-2015, where the statehood model was proudly displayed and foreigners were urged to migrate to this supposed state and help build it. Now, however, entry for would-be foreign recruits into the Islamic State core in Iraq and Syria is practically much more difficult, especially as the Islamic State no longer controls territory on the border with Turkey. Besides, the Islamic State's territorial losses and the undermining of its administrative systems damage the organisation's credibility as a state project, which was supposed to be its key advantage over rival jihadi groups. One thing we can therefore be sure of is that the streaming of thousands of foreign recruits into the Islamic State's ranks is over.

Nonetheless, presumptions that the Islamic State will vanish with territorial defeat are naïve. While Adnani's reference to the desert may seem vague, there are certainly large desert spaces in the border areas between Iraq and Syria (e.g. the Anbar-Deir az-Zor areas) where the Islamic State's remaining core leadership can operate and manoeuvre even if it loses all towns under its control. Prospects of the Coalition or others clearing out and securing these vast spaces remain very remote, and they thus constitute the true "fallback" for the Islamic State.

As far as the nature of operations is concerned, we already have models for what "post-Islamic State" looks like, which suggests the organisation will not die with loss of territory. In Iraq's eastern province of Diyala, for instance, the Islamic State has not controlled any towns for more than two years, yet there are constant reports of sleeper cells and security incidents like IED attacks, car bombings and attacks on security positions, with some areas having to be cleared out multiple times. In this case, there is no doubt that the Islamic State partly plays on sectarian fault lines in the province, undermining the Iranian-backed Badr-led security order.

Beyond Diyala, reports are emerging of the "return" of the Islamic State to areas where the organisation had lost territorial control such as Tikrit. Many of the problems here stem from general plagues in Iraq's present-day order that transcend sectarian boundaries, such as poor management of security checkpoints that allow would-be Islamic State bombers to pass through as well as widespread corruption, which might, for instance, allow real Islamic State operatives to escape from detention through bribing the local security forces. Though the Islamic State has recruited people from all over the world, personnel records recovered in Iraq show the organisation within that country remains thoroughly local in its manpower base, allowing personnel to blend into the population.

Likewise, in Syria, the Islamic State has demonstrated a capacity to conduct operations deep inside the territories of its enemies, whether in the Syrian coastal regions controlled by the Assad regime, Turkish-backed rebel-held areas in north Aleppo countryside, and Kurdish-held territories spanning much of the northeast of the country (with the latter two areas constituting places from which the Islamic State lost territory). Many of the reasons for the persistence of these operations overlap with the problems in Iraq: sectarian and ethnic tensions, vast manoeuvring space, control of territories for extended periods of time that allowed for recruitment from local populations, proliferation of militia factions and the like.

In sum, there is little to suggest the Islamic State will completely die out with territorial loss. In Iraq and parts of eastern Syria in particular, the Islamic State remains the only real expression of Sunni insurgency, having destroyed its rivals nearly three years ago. It is hard to see those rivals reviving themselves and filling the Islamic State's place. Not only will the Islamic State remain in Iraq and Syria, it is also likely to persist as an international franchise even with loss of core territory. In several parts of the world, such as southeast Asia, the Islamic State has already moved beyond the insistence on territorial control and statehood, dropping the notion of claiming new "provinces". In short, the Islamic State is indeed *baqiya*.

Myths, militias, and the future of Syria

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

[Aswaat \(King's College London\)](#)

April 12, 2017



NB: Text here differs slightly from what was published, as no final copy for review was referred to the author before publication.

As the Syrian civil war enters its seventh year, it is increasingly clear that analysts will have to pay greater attention to the internal dynamics of the Bashar al-Assad regime, which now has a clear edge over the Syrian opposition following the conquest of Aleppo in December 2016.

That advantage is certain to be consolidated as the remaining insurgent strongholds in the wider Damascus area, most notably East Ghouta, are cleared out, having been weakened significantly by infighting and siege warfare.

No analysis of the regime and its ascendancy is complete without a look at militiafication, a phenomenon that can most broadly be traced to manpower shortages. Damascus has struggled to bolster the ranks of its army in the face of draft avoidance and defections, especially by Sunni servicemen. Consequently, the Syrian regime has had to enlist the support of both local and foreign groups to compensate for its army's shortcomings. Local

formations in particular represent the most understudied aspect of the Syrian war, the result of misconception and poor analysis.

Arguably, the most common misconception is that the regime side has fragmented into a chaotic array of militias, not unlike the opposition, marking the virtual collapse of the Syrian state. Complementing this myth is the inexplicable tendency of analysts to simply list the names and number of armed formations involved in Syria without situating these in a coherent politico-military context.

Besides the fact that this approach fails to take into account key distinctions between the militias (force size and capabilities, for one), the question also arises of how far one goes in classifying larger entities as collections of separate groups. For instance, one of the most well-known militia networks is Colonel Suheil al-Hassan's Tiger Forces. The network is home to multiple contingents, all with separate names and leaders. When creating an infographic or citing statistics, does one list these formations as separate or as a single force? In addition, the Tiger Forces network is itself affiliated with the air intelligence branch of the regime. Should we put together the Tiger Forces and numerous other air intelligence branch affiliate militias under one moniker in an infographic or list?

At best, misleading representations of the militias supporting the Assad regime misinform readers, and, at worst, they deceive them. Their detrimental impact on popular understanding of the Syrian conflict is compounded as they are distributed across social media: for an example, look to an infographic promoted by analyst Charles Lister, which asserted that most of the militias on the side of the regime were foreign in origin. It contained multiple mistakes, basic ones at that, with some Syrian militias classified as foreign and some foreign groups said to be involved in Syria – all without any factual basis.

These glaring errors did not stop the image from being widely distributed, with prominent rebel group Ahrar al-Sham citing it to support its propaganda, which holds that less than 10% of the forces on the regime side are actually Syrian in origin.

The rise of these militias deserves much more nuanced consideration, in no small part because of the problems militiafication has created for the regime. For one, on many occasions militias have been able to act with impunity and take the law into their own hands, with the weakened Syrian state unable to rein in such excesses. In the predominantly Druze province of Suwayda', located in southern Syria, internal security has been largely delegated to militias – some ideologically loyal to Assad, others lacking that ideological loyalty but still working within the framework of the regime's continued existence. As a result, reports of kidnappings in Suwayda' have grown more and more frequent.

Other problems include the tendency of many militias to engage in systematic looting upon retaking areas from insurgents, as seen in Aleppo and Homs. The regime's ability to restrain such transgressive behaviour has been dubious, to say the least. Reliance on militias has also complicated the regime's war effort, with the existence of multiple chains of command and occasional infighting, posing severe obstacles to achieving unity of command and tactical coordination on the battlefield. The establishment of the Fifth

Legion (also known as V Corps) in November 2016, a unit backed by Russia and Iran, appears to have been intended in part to address this problem in part by uniting commanders from a range of militias to lead assault units.

Taking these points into account allows for deconstruction of the myths obscuring the role of militias on the regime side. Their presence on the battlefield does not mean the Syrian state has collapsed. It has kept sectors such as education intact, and continues to pay salaries to those in areas not under regime control. Although militias on the side of the regime have engaged in non-military activities, they cannot be said to offer a political alternative that threaten the regime's existence. The same cannot be said for opposition formations in territories like Idlib province, where factions compete over who has the most popular judiciary and can best provide social services.

Militias fighting in support of the regime have accepted that the foundations of the Syrian state— and Assad's rule itself – are to be preserved. Among them, even groups that are ideologically and ideationally at odds with the regime, most notably the Beirut-based Syrian Social Nationalist Party, do not envision Syria's political future without Assad. Instead, they have sought to achieve more limited political goals, whether in targeting specific local communities or seeking to become the new middlemen through the parliamentary elections.

Militias may in fact undertake political initiatives to help solidify the regime's political standing. A good case in point is Liwa al-Baqir, a militia that consists of Shi'ified Bekara tribesmen from the Aleppo area and has received training from Iran and Hezbollah. Having lost hundreds of fighters since its formation, Liwa al-Baqir successfully promoted an officially independent candidate in the parliamentary elections of April 2016. Working with the Iranians, Liwa al-Baqir also helped bring about reconciliation between Bekara tribal chief Nawwaf al-Bashir and the regime.

In short, the militias can be seen as reinforcing the notion that Assad's position as president of Syria is non-negotiable, perhaps the main stumbling block to negotiations and the long-touted idea of a political transition to a post-Assad Syria.

Finally, it is important to acknowledge the continuities reflected in militiafication. Competition between different factions and government existed in Syria well before the onset of the civil war. Similarly, some of the more well-known militia commanders, such as Mihrac Ural of the Muqawama Suriya and Muhammad Jaber of Suqur al-Sahara', were already prominent businessmen before the civil war.

As the regime continues to gain ground in Syria, analysis of that country's conflict must remain grounded in reality. Promotion of myths that benefit one side or the other is not simply an analytical error. It risks the adoption of harmful and counter-productive policies towards the Syrian conflict, in which one more wrong move could prove the last.

Further Response to Roy Gutman: Balancing the Picture

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

[Syria Comment](#)

February 13, 2017



In [his reply to my comments on his recent piece for The Nation](#), Roy Gutman takes exception to my supposed challenge to his "professional integrity." I should thus begin by emphasizing that I did not intend my piece to be calling professional integrity into doubt: opinions and definitions may differ, but for me doubts about professional integrity would only be an issue if I were accusing him of outright invention, deliberate and malicious manipulation of evidence or something similar. It is not my contention that he engages in any of these things, and such accusations must always be carefully considered before being put forward. Rather, a bias for a particular side, while problematic, need not have malevolent intent behind it. Bias can arise innocently and unconsciously. It can be driven, for example, by honest empathy and anger about the sufferings of civilians at the hands of a particular group or side.

Gutman proceeds to complain that my assertions regarding his bias read like an attempt to "discredit the entire content" of his article. Such a reading of my response fails to take into account my prefatory point that Gutman raises some valid points for discussion. The fact that I talked about these points on a general level- e.g. in noting there are serious issues to be raised about displacement of Arab populations by the YPG- is not the same as not engaging with them at all. I even provided a link to a report by a human rights monitor to give examples of specific cases.

On the broader issue regarding the inference that I am supposedly attempting to discredit the entire content of the article, I should also add a clarification regarding the Seymour Hersh comparison: the point is not to claim that Gutman and Hersh are exactly equivalent (for one thing, as Gutman correctly points out, Hersh based his claims about the 2013 chemical weapons attack on anonymous former intelligence officials): rather, the point is that winning a Pulitzer Prize does not make one's reporting impervious to questioning. As it happens I don't believe Hersh is maliciously motivated in his biases either. But again, the idea is not to say that none of Gutman's claims merits being taken seriously.

So, in response to Gutman's questions about whether abuses and war crimes have been committed by the YPG, the answer is yes, and that should not come as a surprise to anyone. There is regrettably little or no accountability on the ground in Syria for abuses and war crimes committed by all sides, and a comprehensive reckoning is unlikely to occur for the foreseeable future.

Thus, I do not have a problem with whether Gutman reports on bad aspects of the YPG, and the PYD party with which it is affiliated. I was taking specific issue with uncritical relaying of more dubious narratives that reflect lines promoted by Turkey and the Syrian opposition. In the case of his article for The Nation, I was touching in particular on the supposed IS-YPG collusion pattern.

In this context, I should note that Gutman is upset about my reference to a 2012 article he wrote for McClatchy on the testimony of a claimed PKK defector, yet he does not address the specific problem I raised. It is certainly true that "obtaining the debriefing was an

example of journalistic enterprise," as Gutman says. But journalists cannot simply relay debriefings and intelligence reports without appropriate critical scrutiny, as we have seen happen all too often in recent times with cases like U.S. intelligence reports in the run-up to the Iraq War, and even more recently the raw intelligence dossier on the alleged Trump-Russia connections and supposed dirt the Russians have on Trump that can be used to blackmail him.

In a similar vein, the debriefing Gutman reported on has sensational allegations regarding PKK approaches towards religion. As I have already pointed out, the association of Zoroastrianism with fire worship is a calumny against the Zoroastrian religion. To relay the allegations without critical comment is irresponsible, considering the historical persecutions of Zoroastrians by Muslims and that a common Islamist militant talking point against the PKK and "Kurdish militias" is that they are heretics and apostates. Undoubtedly there are some PKK and YPG members who could not care for religious belief and/or are completely secular, but what evidence is there besides the testimony of this debriefing that the PKK and its sister affiliates promote Zoroastrianism and teach fire worship?* It was the fact that these claims were relayed by Gutman without appropriate consideration that made me see a reflection of bias at work (again, I should stress, not necessarily malicious in intent).

Turning more specifically to the contents of his article for *The Nation*, Gutman takes issue with my account of the fighting over the Tel Hamis area. In his response, he offers an account from a certain Abu Ahmad who says the YPG waited three days before entering without firing a bullet. Again, there is no problem in offering this account *per se*, but it also has to have the caveat analytical note that it is ultimately second hand, and an effort should be made to try to obtain other accounts for comparison (e.g. testimonies of YPG fighters, open source data from the time).

As for what I wrote about Tel Hamis, on a technical note, I will begin by pointing out that Gutman is off the mark regarding some of the death notices I initially cited. Two of the death notices are for fighters killed in February 2015 prior to the 27th of that month: the [Australian](#), and if he reads the original posts more closely, Hussein Masoud's brother. Regarding my own wording, by 'extended campaigns,' I meant bouts of fighting that took place over multiple months in the wider area. One can criticise me for geographic imprecision, but it is important to remember in speaking of Tel Hamis that we mean not just the town/village by that name but also the wider area (cf. references in Arabic *tomantaqat Tel Hamis* and *rif Tel Hamis*). Of course, not every day meant intense clashes and battles. Indeed, in the Syrian civil war, much of what goes on in terms of engagements between various sides can appropriately be described as *ribat* (frontline maintenance etc.). On a given day there might be no fighting at all: a mere gunshot or two and/or firing mortar rounds. Then a flare up may occur. In relation to the Tel Hamis area, one example of a flare up occurred in September 2014, as the YPG launched an offensive that [claimed the capture of multiple villages](#). During this flare up [multiple YPG fighters were pronounced to be 'martyrs'](#). Here is [another example of clashes reported in late December 2014](#) in the Tel Hamis area, with at least four YPG fighters reported to have been killed at that time.

It may well be that when Tel Hamis as a town/village finally fell to the YPG in February 2015, there was no grand or major battle to accompany it. However, to overlook all that happened in the time between IS solely becoming responsible for that wider frontline against the YPG after it destroyed the rebel factions in Hasakah province and the YPG capture in February 2015 is painting a highly misleading picture. It is also highly misleading to overlook the prior rebel-IS cooperation against the YPG on that front, which resulted in [many YPG fighters being killed in late 2013/early 2014](#). Thus it can be seen how the fighting between IS and the YPG in the Tel Hamis area reflects continuity. Likewise we must note the reports of fighting and casualties in the wider area that occurred following February 2015. I thus stand by my original 'travesty of the truth' comment, having elaborated more fully here what I meant.

A somewhat similar case for what would constitute a misleading picture would be to note that the village of Dabiq fell out of IS hands without a grand final battle despite the village's symbolic importance to IS, while overlooking the long war of attrition that occurred between the rebels and IS prior to that, also featuring episodes of *ribat* and calm juxtaposed with flare ups. Or again, note the case of Jarabulus I mentioned in my previous piece.

Can casualty figures and losses be exaggerated in reports? Of course. Yet the narrative of Gutman's sources paints a very implausible picture that is designed to promote a line of some kind of IS-YPG collusion. To buy into it would mean supposing all those clashes etc. that occurred in the wider area over multiple months were a mere farce/fabrication. Thus, here we have an encapsulation of the job of journalists and analysts: weigh up the contrary accounts and try to come to a judgement that accounts for the various lines of evidence available. In the specific case of the Tel Hamis area village of [Husseiniya](#) mentioned by Gutman, who also points out that Amnesty International cited residents as saying that no clashes occurred in the withdrawal from that village, it is perfectly possible to accept that testimony, and the subsequent destruction of property by the YPG, without supposing a conspiracy of some kind as pushed by Gutman's sources.

To bolster the collusion narrative, Gutman had cited in his original piece a certain Mudar al-Assad as saying that there are hundreds of examples of the YPG-IS pattern of the latter taking a village from rebels and then turning it over to the YPG without a fight. It would be interesting to see specific naming of those hundreds of cases, if that is really the case.

I draw the line here in this discussion. I stand by my initial assessment while reaffirming that I am not questioning Gutman's professional integrity. Similarly I reject notions of supposed anti-Kurdish prejudice on Gutman's part and other personal attacks on him. However, a serious debate about the YPG and its relationship with the U.S. must be based on reasoned consideration of the evidence, taking into account the benefits the partnership has brought in blunting IS while also noting the human rights abuses and the PKK connections and understanding why there are Turkish concerns. Looking forward, seemingly intractable land disputes similar to those we observe in Iraq between the Kurdish and Arab actors will mar the Syrian landscape for a long time even if IS were completely removed. There will be no easy resolution.

 *- (**Appendix note: PKK and Zoroastrianism**): While it is important to note the lack of evidence for the PKK promoting the Kurds' religion as Zoroastrianism and teaching fire worship, there is an interesting strand of thought within Abdullah Ocalan's writings that idealizes Zoroaster as a figure who promoted equality and care for nature, thus trying to link him to Kurdish ethnic and cultural heritage. This contrasts with a depiction of Islam as a vehicle of Arabism. On the other hand, Ocalan also wants to praise certain aspects of Islam, equating the rise of the religion historically with bringing about feudal system that constitutes an improvement over the supposed ancient slave civilization, while presenting Muhammad as a figure embodying revolution that becomes corrupted. These arguments, as Matthew Barber points out to me, partly reflect Ocalan's views of history according to his Marxist ideology and political worldview as well as a desire not to be too offensive to the pious sensibilities of fellow Kurds.

In any event though, Ocalan is ultimately an atheist, and does not promote the idea that Kurds should practise the Zoroastrian religion and formally identify as Zoroastrians, let alone engage in fire worship, though some Kurds who do identify as Zoroastrians seem to be partly influenced by Ocalan's idealization of Zoroaster. The kinds of nuances in Ocalan's views and their impacts are obscured by silly polemic as conveyed by that supposed PKK defector.

The Archivist: Unseen Islamic State Training Camp Contract

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

[Jihadology](#)

February 4, 2017



The management of training camps for the Islamic State (IS) falls under an administrative body called *Idarat al-Mu'askarat* ("Camps Administration"). This [body will naturally be linked to the *Diwan al-Jund*](#) ("Department of Soldiers"), one of a series of *diwans* drawn up and established for the declaration of the Caliphate.

Some details of the functioning of the training camps exist in testimony outside of internal documentary evidence. For example, [Omar Fawaz](#), a pro-IS activist based in Mosul who abandoned media work, distinguished in postings he put in 2015 between training camp courses for the *muhajireen* (i.e. foreign fighters), which according to him can last 90 days or more, and training camp courses for the *ansar* (i.e. local Syrians and Iraqis) that last 30-50 days. He also noted distinctions as regards the ages of recruits: those between the ages of 5 and 15 are classed as *ashbal* ("cubs") while those aged 15 and above are classed as adults.

Training camp routines in their current form appear to consist of combinations of sessions of physical training, combat training and Shari'i study. Some of the internal textbooks used to teach training camp recruits about Islam have come to public light, most notably the *Muqarrar fi al-Tawheed* ("Course in Tawheed"), which I have translated

in full [here](#). These books are issued by the *Diwan al-'Iftaa wa al-Buhuth* (a *diwan* that issues fatwas and investigates religious matters, publishing studies and pamphlets).

The document that is the focus of this piece and was obtained amid the current Turkish-backed Euphrates Shield rebel push on the IS stronghold of al-Bab in north Aleppo countryside helps shed some further light on the functioning of the training camps. Note that the document- a contract for agreement to enter a training camp- dates from the time before the declaration of the Caliphate, and thus has the label of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham. The document is also useful in this context in illustrating the existence of the *Idarat al-Mu'askarat* prior to the establishment of the Caliphate, illustrating that the foundations of present IS administration as we know it did not spring out of nowhere, but rather the groundwork was laid in significant part by real control of territory in Syria over the course of 2013 and the first half of 2014.

Of more specific note are some of the terms of the contract. For example, a recruit must have a writtentazkiya (vouching for someone) from the amir of the area in order to enter the training camp. It is important to point out here that *tazkiya* exists on multiple levels within IS. The concept is foremost associated with the initial recruitment of someone into the ranks of IS. In the fighter files that were leaked last year to multiple media outlets, the files notably take the form of questionnaires under the title of *Bayanat Mujahid* ("Statements [/Data] of a Mujahid"). These files- which date in considerable part from the pre-Caliphate era and came under a bureaucratic department known as the "General Administration for the Borders" (the [predecessor body to the Hijra Committee](#) that partly deals with new arrivals to IS territory)-[include the question of whether someone has tazkiya](#). In contrast, the *tazkiya* that we see in this training camp contract can be thought of as an example of what we might call internal *tazkiya*. On the basis of other internal documents (namely, Abu al-Faruq al-Masri's [dissenting work al-Manhaj al-Sayasi wa al-Tandhimi lil-Dawlat al-Islamiya](#)), this concept also exists in other areas of IS administration such as the Hisba and Zakat departments, where recruiting new personnel should involve *tazkiya* from persons who have competencies in the same fields of expertise/vocation as these recruits.

Another term of interest is the requirement for the recruit after *tazkiya* to undergo a Shari'i course for a month before being accepted into the camp. This does not necessarily mean that there is no Shari'i study in the camp itself. However, it is notable from later specimens I have of *Bayanat Mujahid* forms that a distinction is made between a *Dawra Shari'ia* ("Shari'i course") and a *Dawra 'Askariya* ("military course"). These documents clearly follow the Caliphate declaration and come under the label of personnel data and human resources. Observe a sample document below (Figure 1)- also obtained amid the offensive on al-Bab- featuring part of a *Bayanat Mujahid* form from Aleppo province (*Wilayat Halab*) for one Abu Obeida al-Shami. In the section entitled "joining and courses," we see he had a Shari'i course in Manbij lasting 20 days, and a military course in al-Bab for 10 days. The former has an entry for the amir of the Shari'i course, while the latter has an entry for the amir of the camp.

Figure 1: Part of the *Bayanat Mujahid* form for Abu Obeida al-Shami

In total, the *Dawra Shari'ia* and *Dawra 'Askariya* entries in these forms I have from the al-Bab area mostly seem to add up to around 30 days or slightly more. Perhaps when Omar Fawaz wrote of the training camp course times for local fighters, he was adding these entries together. From the contract, the total time of the Shari'i course and time in the camp add up to 3 months (a month of the Shari'i course and 2 months in the camp), which equates to training camp times for the *muhajireen* as per Omar Fawaz's testimony. In this case though the signatory is a local fighter, as borne out in his *Ansari'kunya*. Could it be that the contract reflects an earlier set of circumstances in which there was a greater influx of *muhajireen*? Are the contract conditions localized for Aleppo province? A degree of speculation comes in here on account of insufficient quantities of documentary evidence.

Finally, note the reference to *ijazat* in the contract, with the stipulation that *ijazat* are not to be granted during the time one is in the camp. *Ijazat* are leave permits granted to personnel for a variety of reasons (e.g. to see one's family) and they are among the most common IS documents that turn up when left behind by retreating IS forces. For samples of these leave permits, see [my raw archives of IS documents](#).

Below is the training camp contract, with full translation and explanatory notes in square brackets.

Ameen Tammam

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

بِأَمْرِ الشَّامِ



14

شروط الدخول للمعسكر

بإلا بتزكية خطية من أمير المنطقة وهو مسؤول عنها.

أخ المزكى الخضوع لدورة شرعية مغلقة مدتها شهر بعد التزكية
بكر بدونها.

ت طول فترة المعسكر والتي مدتها شهرين .

لأت في المعسكر وعلى كل أخ تسليم هاتفه عند دخول للمعسكر .

الأخلاق الإسلامية والنظام الداخلي للمعسكر .

ه الشروط يخضع الأخ لمحكمة شرعية .

ط المذكورة وأنا موافق عليها وأي مخالفة مني أتحمّل المسؤولية .

Figure 2: Training camp contract

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham

Wilayat Halab [Aleppo province]

Idarat al-Mu'askarat

Date: 25 Rabi' al-Awal 1435 AH [appears to be an error: confusion with handwritten CE date at end of contract]

Conditions to enter the camp

1. The trainee is only to be accepted with written tazkiya from the amir of the area and he is responsible for it.
2. The brother given tazkiya must be subjected to an indoor Shari'i course for a month after tazkiya. He cannot be accepted in the camp without it.
3. There are no ijazat during the time one is in the camp, whose period is 2 months.
4. There are no connections in the camp and every brother must hand over his phone on entering the camp.
5. Observe Islamic ethics and the internal system for the camp.
6. Any violation of these conditions will mean the brother is subjected to a Shari'i court.

I have read the above conditions and agree to them. I bear responsibility for any violation on my part.

Name: Abu al-Obeida al-Ansari

Signature: Abu al-Obeida

Date: 25 March 2014 CE

The Archivist: Unseen Islamic State Regulations for the Mosul Operations

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

[Jihadology](#)

December 31, 2016



The unseen documents displayed and translated below were obtained in the north Aleppo countryside from a refugee who is originally from the Tel Afar area and had resided in Mosul. Since the launching of the military campaign by Iraqi forces whose main goal is to retake Mosul, thousands of Iraqi Sunni Turkmen from the Tel Afar area have fled to the

north Aleppo countryside, partly in fear of the primarily Shi'a Popular Mobilization (Hashd Sha'abi) units that are leading the drive to retake Tel Afar. The Hashd Sha'abi focus on Tel Afar is hardly surprising given that many Iraqi Shi'a Turkmen previously resided in Tel Afar and are eager to reclaim their homes taken from them by the Islamic State in its conquests of the summer of 2014.

The route to the north Aleppo countryside is long and arduous involving smuggling through the desert regions, but may offer the best hope of getting to Turkey, where the Iraqi Turkmen have linguistic and cultural affinities. Turkey is still maintaining a tight border with Syria though, and no entry to Turkey has occurred yet. Perhaps Turkey wishes to keep them in the north Aleppo countryside- where a [special camp exists for these refugees to the east of Azaz town](#)– as part of its wider "Euphrates Shield" proxy project.

The documents date to 20 Muharram 1438 AH (c. [21 October 2016 CE](#), going by the [Islamic State's calendar](#)), around the beginning of the launching of the present campaign by Iraqi forces. The documents concern regulations put in place in light of the military operations. Many of these regulations are of course not surprising. For example, regulation no. 6 (note that the numbering is slightly erroneous in the documents) is clearly intended to avert potential targets for coalition airstrikes near hospitals, assets the Islamic State considers vital in particular for treatment of fighters. The military operations and state of emergency also provide no excuse for violating Islamic State regulations on Islamic morality.

Even so, the regulations and themes in these documents show a reality quite different from Islamic State propaganda on the Mosul operations that has partly focused on displaying the apparent normality of life in Mosul despite the military campaign to retake the city (e.g. see some examples collected by ICSR colleague Charlie Winter [here](#)). Particular concerns focus on price hikes in commodities as the city was likely expected to come under some sort of siege, as well as concern about people fleeing Islamic State territory, something that has been a thorn in the Islamic State's side as it dents the proclaimed Caliphate's image of being the true protector and home of Muslims.

Finally, some interesting side points emerge in these documents. In particular, the subject of whether the Islamic State's currency, much hyped in propaganda, has actually been functioning on the ground has long been a matter of interest. These documents show that the Islamic State's currency is now in circulation, though its use is strictly to be confined to the borders of Islamic State territory.



الإسلامية
بنيوية

ديوان القضاء والشرطة الإسلامية في الموصل

٢٠-١٤٣٨هـ

الأخوة رعايا الدولة الإسلامية حفظكم الله

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم والصلاة والسلام على من بُعثت بالسيف رحمة للعالمين وبعد :

فإن المسلم هو حصن الدين مجاهداً كان أم عاقياً، مباحياً أو مناصراً للخلافة الإسلامية.

وكل المسلمين الفاضلين في أرض الخلافة لهم مال للمجاهدين وعليهم ما عليهم من الخليفة حتى أخرجلي فيهم وأقصاه.

لا يجهلن أحدكم حجم التامر الصليبي بكافة أشكاله على الدولة الإسلامية شرقها وغربها من حلب الى الموصل، فلقد اجتمعت مثل الكفر تحت راية واحدة وغاية واحدة وهي ان يُنكسوا الراية وينزعوا القرآن ويحطموا الحدود ويزرعوا الفساد كي لاتقوم للإسلام قائمة أخرى.

كلأ والله خابوا وخسروا وموعدهم جهنم في الدنيا والآخرة، قاله لا يخلف وعده وهو الذي نصر محمداً في رسالته، فكيف لا ينصر أمة محمد.

إن من أسباب النصر على العدو هو تنظيم البيت الداخلي للأمة في حال الحروب والأهوال، فالتشتت والهوان والضياع سبب من أسباب خسارة المسلمين إذ تفرقوا وتناحروا وانتشرت بينهم الضغينة والأناية وحبُّ الذات وكراهية الأخ المسلم.

وعليه فإن إخوانكم في الدولة الإسلامية قد بدؤوا بحملة تهدف للوصول الى شوارع ومساجد وأسواق مدينة الموصل تدعوا النامس للتخلي بالإيمان والصبر ومواجهة النفس والعدو وتحصين القلب قبل الأسوار.

وإن كان لابد من تنظيم امور المدينة حتى تستقر جبهاتها فقد قام جهاز الشرطة الإسلامية في مدينة الموصل بتعميم أمور رئيسية على عوام المسلمين التقيد بها دون الإخلال، لأن ذلك

Islamic State Wilayat Ninawa

Diwan al-Qada and the Islamic police in Mosul

20 Muharram 1438 AH

Brothers who are citizens of the Islamic State may God protect you:

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful, and prayers and peace be upon the one sent with the sword as a mercy to the worlds. As for what follows:

The Muslim is the fortress of the religion, whether a mujahid or ordinary citizen, whether under allegiance or supporting the Islamic Caliphate, and all the Muslims dwelling in the land of the Caliphate have what the mujahideen have, and upon them is what is upon them from the Caliph until the last and final man among them.

Not one of you will be unaware of the size of the Crusader conspiracy in all its forms against the Islamic State, east and west, from Aleppo to Mosul. For the paths of kufr have gathered under one banner and one objective: to lower the banner, tear out the Qur'an, smash the hudud, and sow corruption so that no other foundation can arise for Islam.

But no, by God, they have failed, lost and their appointment is Hellfire in this world and the Hereafter, for God will not go back on His promise and it is He who gave victory to Muhammad in his message, so how can He not support the Ummah of Muhammad?

Indeed among the reasons for victory over the enemy is organizing the internal house for the Ummah in the event of wars and hardships, for dispersion, degradation and waste are one of the reasons for the loss of the Muslims when they divide, fight each other, and malice, egotism, narcissism and hatred of the Muslim brother spread among them.

Therefore, your brothers in the Islamic State have begun a campaign aiming to reach the streets, mosques and markets of Mosul city calling on the people to keep to the faith, patience, confronting the self and the enemy, and fortifying the heart before the enclosures.

As it is necessary to organize matters of the city so that its fronts should be stable, the Islamic police apparatus in the city of Mosul has undertaken to notify the Muslim populace of principal matters to be adhered to without violation, because that is a cause of chaos and bringing out hypocrisy in the chests of the believers.

لا إله إلا الله

الله
رسول
محمد

السلامة
التي لا تزلزل

أولاً:

يمنع استخدام أجهزة الهاتف قرب الحواجز العسكرية والأمنية ومقرات الدولة الحربية والمدنية تحت طائلة المحاسبة الشرعية.

ثانياً:

يمنع المرور في النقاط العسكرية وجهات القتال حول المدينة باستثناء من لديه رخصة من جهاز الأمن العام.

رابعاً:

يمنع تشغيل أضواء الغاز "زينون" خلال الطوارئ.

خامساً:

يمنع الإخلال بالأفن العام مثل إطلاق الرصاص في الحفلات والتشبييع والمشاجرات تحت طائلة المحاسبة الشرعية مع عدم التهاون في الحكم نظراً للمصلحة العامة.

سادساً:

1. It is forbidden to use phone apparatuses near military and security checkpoints and war and civil bases of the Dawla under penalty of Shari'i reckoning.
2. It is forbidden to pass into military points and fighting fronts around the city except the one who has licensing from the public security apparatus.
4. It is forbidden to operate xenon gas lights during emergencies.
5. It is forbidden to disturb public security like firing gunshots during celebrations, funerals and quarrels under penalty of Shari'i reckoning with no leniency in ruling in view of the public interest.
6. It is forbidden to park and gather in front of the hospitals, intentionally or unintentionally, under penalty of Shari'i inquiry.



Agman
Tammam

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
وَبَشِّرِ الصَّالِحِينَ

سابعاً :

يمنع اقتناء السلاح الثقيل الذي يتجاوز عيار مقدوفه ٧,٦٢.

ثامناً :

يمنع الإخلال باللباس الشرعي واستغلال حالات الطوارئ وكذلك التدخين وفعل المنكرات تحت طائلة مضاعفة العقوبة الشرعية التي تقضي بالتزام المسلم أوامر دينه وأخلاقه والالتزام بشكل أكبر خلال المحن.

تاسعاً :

كل من يضبط وهو يغش المسلمين في مآكلهم ومشربهم وغير ذلك أو يضاعف سعراً ويحتكر سلعة يتعرض للمحاكمة الشرعية التي يمكن أن تصل لمصادرة البضائع أو المحال التي تؤدي المسلمين.

عاشراً :

7. It is forbidden to purchase [/acquire] heavy weaponry whose caliber exceeds 7.62
8. It is forbidden to breach Shari'i dress and exploit states of emergency, as well as smoke and do condemned acts under penalty of doubling the Shari'i penalty that requires the Muslim to comply with the commands of his religion and his code of conduct, and comply even more during tribulation.
9. All caught swindling the Muslims in their food, drink and other things or doubling price and hoarding commodities will be exposed to Shari'i trial that may lead to confiscating the goods or shop that harms the Muslims.
10. All are forbidden to depart the borders of the wilaya to seek refuge. Exempted from that are critical cases like leaving for medical treatment and something besides that.

لا إله إلا الله

محمد
رسول
الله

الإسلامية
بنيوية

ولو وقف المسلمون وقفة رجل واحد لما استطاع عليهم عدوهم بشئ، ولما تمكنت دول الكفر من حشد عدتها وإعلامها في حرب الدولة بحجة الدفاع عن الحريات والمدنيين، فأفساد أولئك بعمُ الديار الإسلامية جمعاء ويفتت من عزيمة أهل الإسلام ويضعف شوكتهم. وغير ذلك فمن يُخرج مسلماً من أرض الإسلام إلى ديار الكفر "لاجئاً" فذاك أشدُّ عقوبة عند الله وإفساداً لدينه ودنياه ممن خرج بذات نفسه.

قال تعالى :

(إن الذين توفاهم الملائكة ظالمي أنفسهم قالوا فيم كنتم قالوا كنا مستضعفين في الأرض قالوا ألم تكن أرض الله واسعة فتهاجروا فيها فأولئك مأواهم جهنم وساءت مصيراً إلا المستضعفين من الرجال والنساء والولدان لا يستطيعون حيلة ولا يهتدون سبيلاً فألئك عسى الله أن يعفو عنهم وكان الله عفواً غفوراً) (النساء : ٩٧-٩٩)

فإن كنت ترى هذا في مأواه جهنم، فمابالك بمن أخرج المسلمين من أرضهم !!

If the Muslims were to stand together as one man, their enemy would not be able to accomplish anything against them, and the states of kufr would not be able to mobilise their numbers and media in the war against the Dawla on the grounds of defending freedoms and civilians.

For the corruption sowed by these people is spreading through the entire Islamic abode, weakening the determination of the people of Islam and weakening their might. Besides that, whoever gets out a Muslim from the land of Islam to the abode of kufr 'as a refugee': that entails the strongest punishment with God and corrupting his religion, and his world is as of the one who has gone out by himself.

The Almighty has said:

"Those taken in death by the angels wronging themselves. They said: 'In what state were you?' They said: 'We were oppressed in the land.' They said: 'Was not the earth of God wide enough for you to migrate in it?' For these people, their place of refuge is Hellfire, and evil it is as a destination. But the oppressed from the men, women and children who cannot devise a way and are not guided, perhaps God will forgive them, and indeed God is forgiving, merciful" (al-Nisa 98-99) [Qur'an 4:98-99].

So if you consider such a person in whose refuge is Hellfire, what are you to think of the one who has got the Muslims out of their land!!

لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ

محمد
رسول الله

Alman

Alman

الإسلامية
مؤيدون

فولئك لاعهد لهم ولا رحمة لهم في شرع الله ويحاكمون حكم المفسدين في الأرض لأنهم زرعوا الفساد في أرض الله، قال تعالى :

(وَمِنَ النَّاسِ مَن يَقُولُ آمَنَّا بِاللَّهِ وَيَالْيَوْمَ الْآخِرِ وَمَا هُمْ بِمُؤْمِنِينَ (٨) يُخَادِعُونَ اللَّهَ وَالَّذِينَ آمَنُوا وَمَا يُخْدَعُونَ إِلَّا أَنفُسُهُمْ وَمَا يَشْعُرُونَ (٩) فِي قُلُوبِهِمْ مَرَضٌ فَزَادَهُمُ اللَّهُ مَرَضًا وَلَهُمْ عَذَابٌ أَلِيمٌ بِمَا كَانُوا يَكْذِبُونَ (١٠) وَإِذَا قِيلَ لَهُمْ لَا تُفْسِدُوا فِي الْأَرْضِ قَالُوا إِنَّمَا نَحْنُ مُصْلِحُونَ (١١) أَلَا إِنَّهُمْ هُمُ الْمُفْسِدُونَ وَلَكِن لَّا يَشْعُرُونَ (١٢) وَإِذَا قِيلَ لَهُمْ آمِنُوا كَمَا آمَنَ النَّاسُ قَالُوا أَنُؤْمِنُ كَمَا آمَنَ السُّفَهَاءُ أَلَا إِنَّهُمْ هُمُ السُّفَهَاءُ وَلَكِن لَّا يَعْلَمُونَ (١٣) وَإِذَا لُقُوا بِالَّذِينَ آمَنُوا قَالُوا آمَنَّا وَإِذَا خَلَوْا إِلَى شِيَابِئِهِمْ قَالُوا إِنَّا مَعَكُمْ إِنَّمَا نَحْنُ مُسْتَهْزِئُونَ (١٤) اللَّهُ يَسْتَهْزِئُ بِهِمْ وَيَمُدُّهُمْ فِي طُغْيَانِهِمْ يَعْمَهُونَ (١٥) أُولَئِكَ الَّذِينَ اشْتَرُوا الضَّلَالَةَ بِالْهُدَى فَمَا رَبِحَت تِّجَارَتُهُمْ وَمَا كَانُوا مُهْتَدِينَ (١٦) مَثَلُهُمْ كَمَثَلِ الَّذِي اسْتَوْفَدَ نَارًا فَلَمَّا أَضَاءَتْ مَا حَوْلَهُ ذَهَبَ اللَّهُ بِنُورِهِمْ وَتَرَكَهُمْ فِي ظُلُمَاتٍ لَا يُبْصِرُونَ (١٧) صُمٌّ بُكْمٌ عُمْيٌ فَهُمْ لَا يَرْجِعُونَ (١٨)

(البقرة)


For to these people no obligation or mercy is due in the law of God, and they will be tried per the ruling on those who sow corruption in the land because they have planted corruption on God's earth. The Almighty has said:

"And among the people are those who say: 'We believe in God and the Last Day.' But they do not really believe. They seek to deceive God and those who believe, but they only deceive themselves, and they do not realize it. In their hearts is a disease, and God has increased their disease. For them is a painful torment in what they have disbelieved. And if it is said to them: 'Do not sow corruption in the land.' They say: 'But we are doers of good.' But indeed they are sowers of corruption but do not realize. And when it is said to them: 'Believe as the people have believed.' They said: 'Are we to believe as the fools have believed?' But they are the fools but they do not know. And when they meet those who have believed, they say: 'We believe.' But when they are alone with their evil ones, they say: 'We are with you. We were only jesting.' God will mock them and prolong them in their transgression while they wander blindly. They are those who have purchased error with guidance, but their transaction has not profited them and they were not guided. They are as one who has kindled a fire, but when it illuminated what was around him, Go took away their fire and left them in darkness they could not see. Deaf, dumb and blind. They will not return." (al-Baqara) [Qur'an 2:9-18].

لا إله إلا الله

محمد رسول الله

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



Tammam

وعليه فإننا بصدد التنويه الى أنه كل من يضبط وهو يحاول إخراج المسلمين من ديارهم الى ديار الكفر بطرق غير شرعية يُحال أمره الى ديوان الأمن العام الذي يأخذ بحقه العقوبة الشرعية المستحقة.

لماذا ذلك ؟

لأن الذي يعمل على اخراج المسلمين من ديارهم يزرع الشقاق والتردد في نفوس المسلمين ويخوّر عزائمهم ويمحق بركتهم وجمعهم، وإنّ هذا هو استغلال للمسلم وترهيب له. فمن يرى غيره قد فرّ الى بلاد الكفر خوفاً من مواجهة تخور عزائمهم ويفقد صبره ويهون دينه. ثمّ إن " المهريين " الذين يمتنون ذلك حرفة يستغلون المسلمين في أموالهم فيأخذون منهم قدر ما استطاعوا أو يرمونهم وسط الصحارى والاعداء يلاقون مصيرهم، ويستغلون ضعف العائلات إذ خرجت بنسائها وأطفالها.

Therefore with regards to the warning, we make clear that all caught trying to get the Muslims out of their abode to the abode of kufr through non-Shari'i means will have their case referred to the Diwan al-Amn al-Aam that will take the deserved Shari'i punishment against them.

Why so?

Because the one who works to get the Muslims out of their abode is sowing disunity and doubt in the minds of the Muslims, making their willpower grow weak, destroying their blessing and their gathering, and indeed this is exploiting the Muslim and terrorizing him. For the one who sees another who has fled to the land of kufr out of fear of confrontation, his willpower is weakened, his endurance is lost and his faith becomes contemptible [/of little importance].

Then it is that 'smugglers' who specialize in that as an occupation are exploiting the Muslims in their wealth, taking from them whatever sum they can or throwing them in the idle of the desert and enemy, meeting their fate, and they exploit the weakness of the families when they take out their women and children.

لا إله إلا الله

رسول الله
محمد

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

المعاملات التجارية :

- كل من يضبطُ بديل لاشبهه فيهم على قيامه بغش أو زيادة سعر البضائع أو احتكارها بحال الى المحكمة الشرعية المختصة والتي أنشأها الخوة حديثاً في الموصل ردعاً لضعاف النفوس ومنعاً لجشع الفاسدين.
- وبحال ثبت عليه أي تهمة مما ذكر فتصادر أمواله التي يغش المسلمين فيها أو يمنعها عنهم.
- يحدد بيت المال أسعار العملات الأجنبية والذهب بحال انقطاع سوق المدينة عن خارجه، ويأخذ التجار نفس الأسعار من الموظف المختص.
- كما يمنع احتكار الذهب والفضة والمعادن الثمينة والأوراق المالية المختلفة بحال الطلب، كما يتقيد الأخوة من عوام المسلمين بعملة الدولة الإسلامية حسب توفرها في السوق.
- يمنع إخراج العملة الخاصة بالدولة الإسلامية خارج حدود الدولة ومن اضطر للخروج مأذوناً به بإحضار بيت المال لتبديل ما ملك منها.

- يمنع إخراج البضائع التجارية "الضرورية" من مواد غذائية ومواد تدفئة ومعدات

صناعية من أوعية وأثاث الزناجير ومواد البناء وغير ذلك من البضائع التي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنها

Business dealings

- All caught with evidence in which there is no doubt that they have engaged in swindling or increased the price of goods or hoarded them will be referred to the special Shari'i court that has been newly set up by the brothers in Mosul to deter weakening of lives and prevent the greed of the corrupt. And in the event any accusation is proved against him from what has been mentioned, his wealth in which he swindles the Muslims or keeps from them will be confiscated.
- The Bayt al-Mal will define prices of foreign currencies and gold in the event the city market is cut off from its exterior, and the merchants will adopt the announcements of prices from the specified official.
- It is also forbidden to hoard gold, silver, precious metals and different financial documents in the event of demand, and the brothers from the Muslim populace must be bound by the Islamic State currency according to its availability in the market.
- It is forbidden to take the Islamic State's special currency outside of the borders of the Dawla and whoever must go out with permission granted must go to the Bayt al-Mal to exchange what he has from it.
- It is forbidden to take out goods of 'necessity' from foodstuffs, heating goods, manufacturing and agricultural equipment, household furniture and building materials outside the borders of the wilaya under penalty of confiscation for the Bayt al-Mal.

لا إله إلا الله

رسول الله
محمد

الإسلامية
السنوية

- يمنع إخراج المركبات والآليات الشاحنة والدراجات النارية خارج حدود الولاية إلا بإذن من الحسبة الإسلامية.

- يمنع إخراج المحروقات أو احتكارها أو بيعها بسعر غير محدد من قبل الدولة الإسلامية تحت طائلة المصادرة

١٤٣٨-١٤٢٠ هـ

ولاية نينوى

انقرى

- It is forbidden to take out vehicles, trucks and motorcycles outside the borders of the wilaya except by permission from the Islamic Hisba.
- It is forbidden to take out, hoard or sell fuels at a price not specified by the Islamic State under penalty of confiscation.

20 Muharram 1438 AH
Wilayat Ninawa
End of document.

Governance in Islamic State Provinces Beyond Iraq and Syria

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
[Washington Institute for Near East Policy](#)
November 2016



Following is a prepared statement delivered for a Washington Institute for Near East Policy conference on the Islamic State beyond Iraq and Syria in June 2016:

THAT THE ISLAMIC STATE presents itself as a state project should by now be a familiar notion, and within the "central" provinces (wilayat) of IS in Iraq and Syria, the project has achieved its most sophisticated stage in the realization of a governance system foremost embodied by diwans ("departments"), responsible for various aspects of administration, which emerged following the announcement of the Caliphate on June 29, 2014. The Diwan al-Taalim, for instance, is responsible for the education system, managing schools and devising the curriculum to be taught. It also oversees the provision of public services, such as water supplies and road maintenance, while the Diwan al-Hisba takes on a variety of other interesting functions, including the enforcement of Islamic morality in public, consumer protection, and even the granting of permits for people to leave IS territory temporarily.

The functions of diwans may overlap at times; thus, regulation of Internet use may fall to both the Diwan al-Hisba and Diwan al-Amn. That said, not every bureaucratic body is known as a diwan. The Hijra Committee, for example, oversees the arrival of new migrants to IS—even providing financial assistance for those who cannot meet expenses but know someone within IS who can vouch for them—as well as managing IS border crossings, such as in the northern Aleppo countryside village of Dabiq, through which businessmen and drivers can visit IS territory for a limited time. Dabiq is better known for being featured in apocalyptic Islamic State propaganda as a showdown site between IS and the West, and has an IS magazine named for it.

The existence of the IS administrative bodies is hardly unprecedented, at least on paper. The first incarnation of IS's predecessors who claimed to be a state—the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), declared in October 2006—had two cabinets of government ministries, the first announced in 2007 and the second in 2009. These cabinets included some ministries

overlapping with the present-day diwans, such as ministries for oil, health, and public security. In practice, however, these ISI ministries amounted to little in terms of governance, even though documentary evidence emerging from the period shows a developed internal bureaucracy and criminal organization adept at generating revenue within areas of operation, as well as limited dependence on foreign donors. Indeed, the limitations in governance were acknowledged by ISI itself, in a treatise the group published by Sharia Committees head Abu Othman al-Tamimi, titled "Informing the People about the Birth of the Islamic State of Iraq," which invoked the precedent of the Prophet, whose enemies far exceeded him in knowledge and capabilities when he set up his first state entity following the hijra to Medina.

As part of its claim to be the Caliphate, demanding the allegiance of the world's Muslims and desiring the conquest of the entire world, IS has sought to expand beyond Iraq and Syria, giving an impression of territorial control. This impression is most apparent in the declaration of official affiliates in the form of new wilayat, deriving from declarations of allegiance to IS from the areas in question. The Middle East and North Africa region was the target of the first major wave of IS expansion announced in November 2014, with wilayat declared in Sinai, Libya, Algeria, Bilad al-Haramayn (Saudi Arabia), and Yemen. As the sites of official provinces of IS, one might expect these areas to display signs of IS governance, mimicking the system in Iraq and Syria. In fact, the picture suggests realization of IS governance in these provinces is limited; the most successful initiative so far has been in Libya, but, even there, IS's fortunes have varied over time.

Generally speaking, a significant obstacle to the realization of IS governance in the provinces beyond Iraq and Syria has been the lack of real and contiguous territorial control. For comparison, note that IS governance in Iraq and Syria gradually became more complex. With the development in Syria of a network of strongholds and contiguous territory over the first half of 2014, centered on the city of Raqqa, and then with the seizure of Mosul and other cities in Iraq in June 2014, the territory came to span the borders and served as an important basis for the caliphate declaration. In at least two of the IS provinces, however—the Algeria province (Wilayat al-Jazair) and Bilad al-Haramayn (Wilayat Nejd, Wilayat al-Hejaz, and Wilayat al-Bahrain)—one cannot seriously speak of any real territorial control, and it is doubtful the original motivation behind accepting allegiance pledges to form these provinces could be seen as achieving territorial control and implementing governance. Rather, the Algeria province primarily seems to have symbolic value as a renowned historic arena of jihad, besides presenting a chance to poach affiliates of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Only very sporadic reports emerge of IS activity in Algeria, mostly relating to attacks on the Algerian army. The importance of Bilad al-Haramayn, of course, lies in its being home to the two holiest sites in Islam at Mecca and Medina. While IS has carried out a number of attacks in Saudi Arabia and expanded the scope of operations into Kuwait, claiming a suicide bombing there targeting Shiites, this points only to the existence of terrorist cells, not territorial control or governance.

A more developed case, though not approaching a meaningful level of governance comparable to Iraq and Syria, is that of IS Sinai, which evolved from the pledge of allegiance of Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (Supporters of the Holy House). The Sinai affiliate has been able to conduct a number of hardhitting attacks targeting the Egyptian security

forces, and it placed the bomb that downed a Russian airliner taking off from the Sharm al-Sheikh resort. The Sinai affiliate controls no major strongholds or significant contiguous territory in the peninsula, however. Documentary evidence mainly points to its distributing statements to the local population, such as warnings against cooperation with the Sisi regime or such-and-such individual on the grounds that he works with the regime, rather than administrative documents such as one sees from Iraq and Syria. Meanwhile, the Sinai media wing mostly advertises military operations and executions of spies, only occasionally featuring governance in what might be deemed proto-hisba activity, with the Hisba Department and Islamic police confiscating and destroying illicit goods like cigarettes and drugs. A more recent photo series also featured a medical clinic, but the exact location was not given, and it seems probable it is a facility set up to provide treatment for the Sinai affiliate's own fighters.

The situation in Yemen arguably provided an ideal environment for the growth of IS, with the chaotic conditions of a civil war and Sunni-Shiite sectarian tensions culminating in the takeover of the capital, Sana, by the Zaidi Shiite Ansar Allah (Houthi) movement, which is supported by Iran. In addition, one could read an October 2014 statement by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) as sympathetic to IS in its denunciation of the idea that the latter was a movement of khawarij (Kharijites, referring to a sect in early Islamic history renowned for extremism) and its call for solidarity in the face of the coalition alliance against IS. This statement might have led IS to believe it could win over elements within AQAP to develop affiliates in Yemen. For at least three months after the official declaration of Yemen as part of the IS provinces, however, there was no evidence of IS activity there; then statements began to be distributed in the name of various IS provinces within Yemen, primarily making clear the intent to target Houthis with mass attacks. This was also a theme in the IS nashid (hymn), "Oh Son of Yemen."

The evidence for IS governance in Yemen is limited, and it appears the fortunes of the IS affiliates in this regard were likely hurt considerably by internal dissent that came to light in December 2015, when dozens of members, including several high-ranking officials, rejected the overall wali appointed by IS over Yemen. This ultimately led to an intervention by the IS Distant Provinces Administration, which expelled from the ranks those perceived to be the ringleaders of the conspiracy, with a further statement expelling those who persisted in their dissent. How many abandoned their dissent is not clear. As with the Sinai affiliate, the advertised material mainly points to military operations—which have also targeted the Persian Gulf-led coalition forces, particularly in the southern port city of Aden. From Aden, documentary evidence also points to attempts by IS members to impose Islamic law, but the evidence is poorly crafted and amateurish. Also as in the Sinai, a photo series emerged of a medical clinic, supposedly under the Diwan alSiha, but this clinic actually appears to be meant for the treatment of IS fighters. Thus, IS administrative structures that exist in Yemen mainly seem directed toward internal management of the ranks, rather than governance over the population.

The remaining case to consider is that of Libya, which has seen much more successful IS governance develop than the other affiliates in the Middle East and North Africa. Originally, IS governance in Libya was concentrated in the city of Darnah in eastern Libya, which, to be sure, was never controlled entirely by IS. This administration developed out of a pledge of allegiance to IS by a local jihadist group called Majlis Shura

Shabab al-Islam, which moved quickly in October 2014 to set up institutions in Darnah mimicking the IS bureaucratic system in Iraq and Syria, such as an Islamic court and Diwan al-Hisba, under the moniker of "Cyrenaica province." A Diwan al-Taalim branch also emerged in the area, and documentary evidence attests to the existence of a Diwan al-Dawa wa al-Masajid (responsible for religious outreach and control of the affairs of mosques). This presence in Darnah city was destroyed, however, in June 2015 by the Mujahedin Shura Council of Darnah and Its Suburbs, which is linked to al-Qaeda; and since then, IS has been unable to reclaim a foothold in the city.

Further out to the west, IS has been able to consolidate territory on the Mediterranean coastline based around the city of Sirte, which, unlike Darnah, is a true stronghold of IS, falling under its Wilayat Tarabulus (Tripoli province), while the easternmost towns on that stretch of territory are defined as part of Cyrenaica province. In part, the dominance of IS in the Sirte area originated in the defection to it of local Libya Ansar al-Sharia networks that had already been involved heavily in governance, going as far back as June 2013.

Considerable documentary evidence points to a sophisticated governance system in the Sirte area along the lines of what is observed in Syria and Iraq, including a functioning judiciary (Diwan al-Qada wa al-Mazalim) that deals with matters ranging from marriage contracts to real estate; an Islamic police force; a Dawa and Masajid branch responsible for outreach to the population and control of the affairs of the mosques; repentance programs and sharia sessions as part of a cooptation of local personnel structures; conciliation initiatives; and the introduction of the zakat taxation system (falling under the Diwan al-Zakat wa al-Sadaqat). The Sirte area, therefore, represents the most developed IS governance project outside of Iraq and Syria; it is thus hardly surprising that Adnani mentioned the city alongside Mosul and Raqqa in a speech released in late May 2016 that partly attempted to hit back at the coalition's claims of progress against IS on account of territorial losses. Indeed, IS control of the Sirte area is coming into doubt in the face of rival local forces beginning to direct their efforts against it.

Elsewhere in Libya, IS has found itself a military combatant in Benghazi against forces loyal to Khalifa al-Haftar, while a more covert presence was maintained in Sabratha, to the west of Tripoli city, as part of the running of a suspected training camp for militants, only to be targeted by U.S. airstrikes in February 2016. Meanwhile, the Fezzan province that represents Libya's third major region has shown no sign of governance projects, and, as with Algeria province, information has been very sporadic.

In short, IS's ability to realize governance (tamkin) has been very limited thus far in the wider region beyond Iraq and Syria—an observation that has implications for IS's credibility on the global stage, particularly in appealing for support from the wider jihadist movement. Since IS puts such great emphasis on being a state, the lack of success in replicating elsewhere its administration in Iraq and Syria may hurt its appeal in the long run. This absence of effective governing initiatives may also have affected the central leadership's calculations in terms of willingness to declare new wilayat. Although operations have been officially claimed in both Somalia and Tunisia, for instance, IS notably has not declared a province in either of these places, perhaps because the central leadership realizes a failure to show its development as a state rather than just a terrorist

threat will make the declaration of new provinces seem like little more than cheap propaganda ploys.

Dissent in the Islamic State: Abu al-Faruq al-Masri's 'Message on the Manhaj'

by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

[Combating Terrorism Center \(West Point\)](#)

October 31, 2016



No one can reasonably expect any jihadist organization to be a total monolith in outlook among members, and the Islamic State is no exception. The idea of dissent in the Islamic State is foremost associated with the issue of *takfir* (declaring people to be non-Muslims, even those who self-identify as Muslim). Indeed, the group's application of this idea has been publicized both in propaganda as well as in leaked material. However, the Islamic State's championing of *takfir* is not without its criticisms. Some critics are extreme, even going so far as to proclaim *takfir* on Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Others are less virulent in their response and are reluctant to fight people they see as fellow Sunni Muslims, especially other jihadis in groups like Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (previously known as Jabhat al-Nusra). This reluctance to fight flows in part from their hesitancy to accept the doctrine of *takfir* as espoused by the Islamic State.

However, criticisms of the Islamic State are not just made by those who differ with its interpretation of *takfir*. Indeed, there exists a more subtle kind of dissent that focuses on critiquing strategy, tactics, and conduct. In many cases, those offering these types of critiques continue to identify with the Islamic State project ideologically. One brief example of this comes not from Iraq and Syria, but rather Yemen, where a large number of officials and soldiers denounced the *wali* (governor) that the Islamic State had appointed over the Yemeni provinces.[1]

In December 2015, the dissenters argued that the conduct of Islamic State leadership in Yemen had fallen short on multiple counts, including expulsion of soldiers who raised a case against a military official, poor battle planning in the Hadhramaut area, and mistreatment of the *ansar* [native supporters]. Ultimately, the dissenters made clear that they still had a pledge of allegiance to al-Baghdadi but disavowed the overall *wali*. The Islamic State's central leadership made clear that this rejection was unacceptable and amounted to breaking allegiance with the Islamic State. In the end, the Islamic State moved to expel those who persisted in dissent, and it is clear that the group suffered setbacks in Yemen as a result.

Returning to Iraq and Syria, there are also clear examples of this type of dissent. The work presented here was written by Abu al-Faruq al-Masri, an elderly member of the Islamic State. As discussed above, it is not a critique not of the caliphate project *per se*, but rather of the strategies and conduct pursued by the group. As is typical of the writing style of many Islamic State members, al-Masri uses standard Arabic. For context, al-Masri has been based in Raqqa, the de facto Syrian capital of the Islamic State, and appears to have

had access to the highest-ranking personnel in the group. Indeed, he appears to have presented advice on strategy to the *Majlis al-Shura* (consultation council) of the Islamic State, which directly advises al-Baghdadi. This work, titled 'Message on the Manhaj' ('Manhaj' referring to the direction/program), was originally delivered as a private lesson to his followers. Approximately six months ago, al-Masri disappeared, with a high likelihood that he was arrested by the Islamic State's security apparatus.

As mentioned in the work itself, al-Masri had previously been imprisoned after coming into conflict with the Islamic State leadership in Raqqa, and a previous book he had issued on the political and organizational program of the Islamic State was banned by the Islamic State authorities in Raqqa. This small book—obtained from a source in Raqqa via a well-connected intermediary within one of the rebel groups (who has previously given this author hundreds of documents)—is not in widespread circulation as it is banned by the Islamic State. In the previous work on the political and organizational program of the Islamic State (also obtained via the well-connected intermediary), al-Masri had also mentioned his role in forming a council that played a part in organizing the *Hisba* (Islamic morality enforcement) and *Zakat* bureaucracies in a number of Islamic State provinces, as well as suggesting a program for organizing the provinces outside of Iraq and Syria that was reviewed by the Delegated Committee (a committee in the Islamic State that issues general directives on governance).

The exact identity of a figure by the name of Sowlani (clearly a play on the name of Jabhat al-Nusra leader Abu Muhammad al-Jowlani, whom al-Masri despised) whose name is mentioned more than once in the Message on the Manhaj is not certain, but he is apparently a senior Islamic State official in Raqqa.

Taking a step back from the different points raised in the book, al-Masri's criticisms of the direction of the Islamic State can be summarized as follows:

- The choice of Raqqa as the de facto center of the Islamic State in Syria was a mistake. Aleppo would have been far better.
- It was a mistake to accept openly all those allegiance pledges to create new *wilayat* (provinces) for the Islamic State, as not all areas have the circumstances present in Iraq, Syria, and Libya that make them ripe for development in the Islamic State's state-building project.
- Jabhat al-Nusra should have been destroyed earlier. It would have helped win over most of the rebels to the cause of the Islamic State.
- Trying to take on the whole world runs counter to the Prophet's precedent in strategies and alliances, and it effectively dooms the Islamic State project in its infancy. Consequently, the group is needlessly losing soldiers in battles.
- The principles of *Wala* and *Bara* (terms that translate to 'loyalty and disavowal,' e.g. being loyal to Islam and Muslims and disavowing disbelievers and their doctrines) do not translate to absolute obedience to an emir; rather, obedience depends on whether the emir's orders are within the framework of what God has commanded.

At the same time, al-Masri follows some key components of the Islamic State's ideological orthodoxy, such as attacking the idea of a need for a popular support base to implement Islamic law. The concept in Arabic is known as *al-hadhina al-sha'abiya* (lit. 'the popular nursemaid,' also translated as 'hearts and minds'). Among Islamist movements in the Syrian civil war, the idea has most notably become associated with Ahrar al-Sham, a movement also attacked by al-Masri. Indeed, Ahrar al-Sham's deputy, Ali al-Omar, explicitly pointed to the need for *al-hadhina al-sha'abiya* in a lecture he gave that was broadcast in late May 2016.[2] The idea is also associated to a lesser extent with al-Qa'ida and its affiliates, who have increasingly sought to brand themselves as a more reasonable jihadist alternative to the Islamic State.

Al-Masri also follows Islamic State orthodoxy with his insistence on *takfir* against the rebel factions, and he notes the problems regarding many fighters who are unwilling to take on these factions, particularly when they appear to be of similar dress and orientation (i.e. Islamist in some way). Thus, his critique actually corroborates the trend noted above of reluctance to engage in *takfir*.

Turning to al-Masri's criticisms of the path that the Islamic State has taken, one may wonder how subsequent events either support or refute his criticism. Certainly there is much to be said in support of his argument regarding the issue of international expansion of the Islamic State. Since the group presents itself as a realized state and caliphate, it has sought to boost its global appeal through the declaration of multiple provinces, following the acceptance of allegiance pledges in a number of places around the world. However, in terms of realizing actual governance and an administration along the lines of what has arisen in Iraq and Syria, only the Libyan provinces have shown signs of success. But even these have been rather limited and short-term, limited signs, as these initiatives have now come into serious doubt as militias have largely dismantled the Islamic State's control over the strip of coastline centered on the city of Sirte. Al-Masri at least seems to realize that if the so-called 'distant provinces' of the Islamic State cannot realize a state-like existence, then the credibility of the Islamic State project on the global stage comes into doubt. Indeed, one should note that in most of the areas where the Islamic State has expanded with claims of operations—such as Bangladesh, Somalia, and the Philippines—no new *wilayat* have been announced. This is likely because the Islamic State now realizes that simply announcing new provinces in every area where operations are claimed will ring hollow if those new *wilayat* fail to demonstrate some sustainable progress in governance. Even given this reluctance to announce new provinces, the group has engaging in renaming several areas, referring to Bangladesh as 'Bengal' and the Philippines area as 'East Asia.'

Perhaps less realistic is al-Masri's idea of forming alliances based on the Prophetic precedent. As the work "Principles in the Administration of the Islamic State" makes clear, in theory the Islamic State could pursue diplomatic relations and treaties with other states in accordance with Shari'i politics, but in practice the conditions stipulated by the writer in the treatise are too rigid to strike any meaningful accord.[3] In addition, there is no getting around the fact that the Islamic State will never be granted recognition from the international community (despite some pundits advocating this line in an attempt to sound original), and that a number of the group's actions necessitated by their ideology—such as the genocide against the Yezidi people—have inevitably drawn the world's

hostility. Nonetheless, one can still see al-Masri's critique as a more sober view that contrasts with the face that the Islamic State presented of trying to take on the coalition—against all realistic odds—in engagements such as the Kobani campaign that ultimately cost the group dearly in terms of manpower.

More in the realm of speculation is al-Masri's contention that Jabhat al-Nusra should have been destroyed earlier. It is possible to understand the author's reasoning in so far as the al-Qa'ida affiliate became an integral part of the Syrian insurgency and received widespread acclaim as an effective fighting force against the regime. But could not the insurgency have rallied around another powerful group like Ahrar al-Sham instead? In 2013, as what was then ISIS was establishing itself as a real presence on the ground in Syria, in most places it was one of many factions and rather thinly spread across the north of the country. It seems unlikely that the group could have taken out Jabhat al-Nusra in all places where the latter had a presence and destroyed it and al-Qa'ida with a decisive blow.

In sum, as the Islamic State continues to bleed territory and the Mosul campaign rages on, many of the critiques pointed out by al-Masri seem to ring even more true and worthy of consideration. Understanding the critiques of this once Islamic State insider are important not only to understand the group's current struggles but what it may see as the lessons learned from those struggles.

Below is the full text of 'Message on the Manhaj' with translation.



Message on the Manhaj
1437 AH
Abu al-Faruq al-Masri

عن رأي في الدولة الإسلامية

قلت هي واجب والله وركن لإقامة الدين، فلا تقام صلاة ولا صيام ولا زكاة ولا طهارة إلا بها.

والدولة الإسلامية هي حصن المسلم وعزه ومجده وهي هدف الإنسان وواجبه حين خلق.

قال تعالى (وَمَا خَلَقْتُ الْجِنَّ وَالْإِنْسَ إِلَّا لِيَعْبُدُونِ (٥٦) مَا أُرِيدُ مِنْهُمْ مِنْ رِزْقٍ وَمَا أُرِيدُ أَنْ يُطْعَمُوا) الذاريات.

وارد في مقامي هذا ومنبري على مدعي الجهاد الذين ساروا خلف الحاضنة الشعبية ضاربين بعرض الحائط نصوص الدين التي نصت بالصريح اللامشكوك فيه على ضرورة إقامة الدين بالقوة

قال تعالى (الَّذِينَ إِنْ مَكَّنَّاهُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ أَقَامُوا الصَّلَاةَ وَآتَوُا الزَّكَاةَ وَأَمَرُوا بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَنَهَوْا عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ ۗ وَاللَّهُ عَلِيمٌ بِالْأُمُورِ) الحج.

هي القاعدة اخصها بالذكر، والتي اضاعت مجدها بصيبة الجهاد الذين هادنوا وكنموا واليوم لظموا.

هم اليوم في الفئة الضالة التي ما وجدت ضالتها في الإرجاء.

Concerning my opinion about the Islamic State

I have said it: [the Islamic State] is, by God, an obligation and also a pillar for the establishment of the religion, for prayers, fasting, *zakat*, and purification can only be established through it.

And the Islamic State is the Muslim's fortress, his might, his glory, and it is the aim of man and his obligation when he is created.

The Almighty has said: "And I did not create Jinn and men except that they should worship Me. I do not desire sustenance from them and I do not desire that they nourish Me"- al-Dhariyat [Qur'an 51:56-7]

And I respond in this place and pulpit of mine to the advocates of jihad who have gone behind the concept of hearts and minds, minimizing the precepts of the religion that have prescribed clearly without doubt the necessity of establishing the religion by force.

The Almighty has said: "Those whom We have enabled in the land have established prayers, given *zakat*, and commanded what is right and forbidden what is wrong. And to God belongs the outcome of affairs."- al-Hajj [Qur'an 22:41]

It is al-Qa'ida in particular I mean, which has squandered its glory in the youth of jihad who compromised, engaged in concealment, and today have struck their heads in lamentation.

Today they are in the camp of error that has not found its objective in *irja'* [excessive pragmatism/moderation].

عن رأيي في مسير الدولة الإسلامية

خالفت في كتابي السابق المنهج السياسي والتنظيمي للدولة ، كتاب أشرف على منعه ذو السلطة الذي شابه الطاغوت في ولاية الرقة .

بينتُ فيه أن الدولة التي لامركز لها لاقوة لها، وأن الانتقال من حرب العصابات والكرّ والفرّ إلى حرب الدولة لدول الكفر يتطلب بادئ الأمر تنظيم الولايات لا شرذمتها .

فبدايةً أغفل الجنذ مركز الدولة التي قامت ومركزها غير آمن وغير مستقر، وهو الأمر الذي يشكل حلقة الضعف الأبدى في تشكيل هيكلية الولايات .

وكان هذا قد أدى لضعف مركزية الولايات الأخرى التي اتكلت في بادئ الأمر على مراكز ثقل جيرانها كما في الرقة .

فاقترحتُ مع إعلان الدولة الإسلامية في بلاد الشام أن يكون مركزها حلب، حلب السنية التي لا يخلطها إلا مكون صغير من أهل الكتاب، وفيهم الثقل لبشري الكبير من الذين لم ينخرطوا بعد في تنظيم وما خلطت عقاندهم خبث الخبيثين .

Concerning my opinion on the course of the Islamic State

I offered a dissenting view in my previous book—*The Political and Organizational Manhaj for the State*—a book whose banning was supervised by the authorities who resembled the *thaghut* in Wilayat al-Raqqa.

I made clear in it that the state that has no center has no force, and that moving from the war of the gangs and fight-or-flight [i.e. insurgency/guerrilla warfare] to the war of the state versus the states of *kufir* requires in the first instance organization of the provinces, not their mere grouping.

For from the beginning, the soldiers have paid no attention to the center of the state that has arisen and its center has been unsecure and unstable, and it is the issue that forms the first ring of weakness in the formation of the structure of the provinces.

And indeed this has led to the weakness of the centralization of the other provinces that depended in the first instance on the centers of gravity of their neighbors as in Raqqa.

For I suggested with the announcement of the Islamic State in Bilad al-Sham that its center should be Aleppo, Sunni Aleppo that is only mixed with a small component of the People of the Book. And within them is a big population from those who had not yet affiliated with an organization and whose doctrines had not been mixed with the evil of the evil ones.

رسالة من الحج

كما أن حلب مدينة صناعية تجارية تتميز بموقعها العسكري الذي يسهل الامتداد إلى باقي المناطق وتكون صلة الوصل القوية لمراكز الولايات الأخرى فيما لو أعلنت كمركز للخلافة.

وكان أن اقترح الصولاني الرقة، وكان بداية الخطأ كما أوضحت لهم وكما تجاهلو نصيحتي.

ثم إن مراكز الولايات البعيدة التي قبلت بيعاتها وهي في مخاض الجهاد قد حملت فوق طاقاتها، وكنت قد نصحت مجلس الشورى بعقد البيعة سراً، ولكن سامح الله ذلك المسير الذي لم يبر بهدى النبي، فرسول الله كان له الكثير من صحابته في مكة قد أسلموا وأنزوا إسلامهم وكان في ذلك كل الخير.

فما كل الولايات لها ظروف العراق والشام وليبيا من الأرض الخصبة والبيئة الحاضنة ومساحات المناورة الكبيرة.

In addition, Aleppo is an industrial city of business distinguished in its military position that facilitates the extension to the rest of the areas and could serve as a powerful link to the centers of the other provinces if announced as centers for the caliphate.

But it was Sowlani who suggested Raqqa, and it was the beginning of error as I made clear to them as they neglected my advice.

Then it was that the centers of the distant provinces whose allegiance pledges had been accepted as they were in the labor pains of jihad had been brought above their potential. And I had advised the Majlis Shura to take their allegiance pledge secretly, but God forgive that course that did not go with the guidance of the Prophet, for the Messenger of God had a lot of his companions in Mecca who accepted Islam and kept their Islam secret, and all the best was in that.

For not all the *wilayat* have the circumstances of Iraq, al-Sham, and Libya from productive land, nursemaid environment, and great maneuvering spaces.

عن رأيي في قتلهم

فقلت والله أرى في قتال القاعدة أشد القتال هو الأولى ، فلو زالت القاعدة قبل سنتين وزال بأسها لمالت إليكم قلوب كثير من الفصائل والمكونات التي تعتقد في القاعدة ثلثة المجاهدين، وهم لا يدركون أن الجولاني " أخزاه الله " هو صبي في الجهاد لم يخبر تجارب من قبله ولم يعرف كيف وصل بنا الجهاد إلى بناء الدولة.

فلو هلكت القاعدة لهلكت معها بيئة الكثير من الضالين ولما تزعج أحد عن الانضمام للدولة.

وما كان ذلك إلا بردة الجولاني عن بيعة الخليفة، والتي شق بها الصف الأول، وفتح باب النحر في الجسد.

وكانت ردة الجولاني في أخطر مفاصل تخصصه الأمة، في حبكة التأسيس ووضع القواعد، فخذلت " قاعدة الجهاد " قاعدة الإسلام!

وظن كثير من المجاهدين أن في ردة الجولاني قولاً حازماً لأمير القاعدة الظواهري، وما كان لترضى عنهم أمريكا بعد طول جهاد إلا بقولي لظواهري منهج الإرجاء وهوان النفس والحسابات الدولية التي سنّها البيت لأبيض في أمريكا.

My opinion concerning fighting them

For I said: by God, I see in fighting al-Qa'ida the strongest fight as the first one, for if al-Qa'ida had vanished two years ago and its strength had vanished, the hearts of many of the factions and components would have leaned towards you: the ones that believe there to be in al-Qa'ida the troop of the mujahideen, even as they do not realize that Jowlani- may God degrade him- is a youth in jihad who has not had the experiences of those before him and did not realize how jihad reached the building of the state through us.

Had al-Qa'ida been destroyed, with it would have been destroyed the evidence foundation of many of those in error and no one would have hesitated to join the state.

For that happen solely because of the apostasy of Jowlani from the allegiance pledge to the caliph, by which also the first rank [the leadership] was split, and the door of slaughter in the body was opened.

And Jowlani's apostasy was in the most dangerous labor pains that the Ummah experienced, in the web of establishment and placing of foundations, so Qa'idat al-Jihad has abandoned the base of Islam!

And many of the mujahideen thought that in the apostasy of Jowlani there was a decisive word for the emir of al-Qa'ida al-Zawahiri, but it was not for America to be pleased with them after the length of jihad except by Zawahiri's assuming the *manhaj* of *irja'*, the degradation of the soul and the international accounts that the White House in America has set.

عن رأي في قتالهم

مرتدي (الجيش الحر ومن والاهم) فقلت : والله أقاتل رؤوسهم وأقطعها
خير لي من أن أصارع باقي الجسد طوال سنين.

فلو اجتثوا رؤوس الضلال لصلح أكثرهم ولهدى الله من هدى وفر منهم من
فر.

كما أن في قتالهم مضرة للدولة عسكرياً وداخلياً، فإن طول القتال سيجعل من
قتالهم للدولة ثأراً، وتسفك فيه دماء كثيرة، وهم أصحاب الأرض - وإن
الأرض لله - فلو قصرت قتال الدولة لهم لغابت ملك كثيرة وشرايع.

وقد تَوَزَّع عن قتال الفصائل الكثير من جنود الدولة حينما أشبه عليهم ألوانهم
ورايات بعضهم ولحاهم وقصر ثوبهم.

ورأس الفتنة فيهم أشرار الشام من ادعوا أنهم أحرارها ولونوا رايتهم وألحنوا
قولهم فغوت قلوب الكثير فيهم، ولو أنهم أجموا للجم الكثير.

Concerning my opinion on fighting them

On the apostates (of the Free Army, and whoso is loyal to them), so I said: "By God, I will fight their heads and cut them off: that is better for me than fighting the rest of the body over years."

For if they had torn out the heads of error, most of them would have been corrected and God would have guided the one who is guided and the one who flees would have fled from them.

It is also that in fighting them is harm to the state militarily and internally, for the length of the fight will give rise to vengeance for their fight against the state, and in it much blood will be spilt, as they are owners of the land—and indeed the land belongs to God—but if the state's fight against them had been short, many doctrines and rituals would have returned.

Many of the soldiers of the state have refrained from fighting the factions whenever there appeared to them the similarity of their colors, the banners of some of them, their beards, and the shortness of their dress.

And the head of *fitna* among them is Ashrar al-Sham [a common Islamic State play on Ahrar al-Sham: lit. 'the evil ones of al-Sham'] who have claimed that they are its *Ahrar*, have painted their banner, struck up their words as a melody, and thus the hearts of many have become seduced in them, and if they were subdued, the multitude would be subdued.

عن رأي في السياسة الشرعية

فوالله ما هادنتُ في عقيدتي سرّاً ولا علانيةً، وما رضيتُ لحق أن يُكتم أو يُسرّ قوله.

ولكم في رسول الله أسوةٌ حسنةٌ حينما أعمى ملوك العرب عن خطّطه ومسيره.

فقد فنّد رسول الله دعوى قريش يوم الحديبية حينما جاء بالمواسي والرحل إلى بيت الله معتمراً.

فجعلت قريشٌ تُنادي في العرب والتعجب أن أتاكم محمدٌ وصحبه ليسبوا ألّهتكم ويُحقرُوا بيت الله، وحين قدموا رأوا من رسول الله خلافت قريش ودعوتها.

وهكذا عزّل النبي قريشاً عن باقي العرب، وبدا مشروع الدولة الإسلامية يزدهرُ بفكر محمدٍ صلى الله عليه وسلم.

إن إعلان العداة للعالم هو تضييقٌ ووَإذ مشروع الخلافة في مهده، وهو السياسة اللاشرعية والتي تُخالف ما مناسه النبي للدولة النبوية.

فالدولة النبوية لها حليفها من غير المسلمين ولها طرقٌ تعتمد عليها بحال غلبة عداها عليها.

Concerning my opinion on Shari'i politics

By God I have not compromised in my creed secretly or openly, and I have not been content for truth to be suppressed or its words kept hidden.

And for you in the Messenger of God is a good example as the kings of the Arabs have become blind to his projects and course.

For the Messenger of God refuted the case of Quraish on the Day of Hudaibiya when he brought cattle and baggage to the House of God while performing the 'Umra.

So Quraish began calling to the Arabs and non-Arabs that "Muhammad and his companions have come to you to commit blasphemy against your deities and violate the House of God," and when they came, they saw from the Messenger of God the opposite of the Quraish and their case.

And thus the Prophet isolated the Quraish from the rest of the Arabs, and the project of the Islamic State began flourishing with the thought of Muhammad (SAWS).

Indeed the announcement of enmity to the world is strangulation and burying alive for the project of the caliphate in its cradle, and it is the non-Shari'i politics that violates what the Prophet established for the Nabawi state [state of the Prophet].

For the Nabawi state had its ally from the non-Muslims and means to rely on in the event that the enemy overcame it.

وهو الأمر الذي حَبَسَنِي الصولاني فيه بقوة ظلمه.

ووالله ما أقول الحق في هذا اليوم إلا لحرصني على جنود الدولة الذين ما رأيت مثلهم ولا مثل تأخيهم وإن السجن اليوم أحب إلي من أن أراهم يُزَهَقُونَ في معارك استنزاف وحروب يمكن الالتفات عليها وقطف ثمارها عن جُنُب.

وإني ما أرى هذه المعارك إلا محرقة لجنود الدولة وإلهائهم عن رأس الكفر أمريكا وعن الشيطان الأكبر إسرائيل.

وإني أشهد الله أنني خالفكم في طريقكم هذا عن حرص وتجارب دفعنا من دعاءنا ثمناً لكسبها.

وإني لا أخاف إلا الله في كتابي هذا أن أكون قد نزلت لساني أو أخطأت التقدير.

وما سوى ذلك فهو منهجنا الذي دُفنا فيه مرارة الحياة الدنيا.

وَلْيَبْلُغَنَّ كتابي هذا ما شاء الله أن يبلغ رغم ما قد ظلمت من قبله.

And it is the matter for which Sowlani detained me by the force of his oppression.

And by God I do not speak the truth in this day except out of my desire to protect the soldiers of the state the likes of whose might and fraternity I have not seen. Indeed, prison is more beloved to me than seeing them destroyed in battles of attrition and wars that can be circumvented and whose fruits can be picked from their impurities [i.e. there are other ways to win a battle].

I do not see in these battles anything except burning [i.e. annihilation/needless sacrifice] for the soldiers of the state and being distracted from the head of disbelief—America—and from the Great Satan Israel.

And I bear witness to God that I have disagreed with you in this path of yours out of concern and experiences for whose acquisition we have paid a price from our blood.

And I do not fear anyone except God in this book of mine that I may be the one whose tongue has been contemptible or I may have erred in judgment.

And anything besides that, it is our *manhaj* in which we have experienced the bitterness of the worldly life.

And let this book of mine reach what God wills that it should reach despite the wrong I have experienced previously.

فصل في الولاء والبراء

الولاء والبراء لله سبحانه : أن يتبرأ الإنسان من كل ما تبرأ الله منه
قال تعالى في محكم التنزيل : {قد كانت لكم أسوة حسنة في إبراهيم والذين
معه إذ قالوا لقومهم إنا برءاء منكم ومما تعبدون من دون الله كفرنا بكم وبدا
بيننا وبينكم العداوة والبغضاء أبداً}.

{وأذان من الله ورسوله إلى الناس يوم الحج الأكبر أن الله بريء من
المشركين ورسوله}.

والولاء والبراء ليس لشيخ كما فعل الصوفي الذي أضل الناس بقوله :
" من لا شيخ له فالشيطان شيخه " وهو بذلك أعطى الولاء لنفسه ولوليه.

وبذلك دخل فيما بعد بالشرك حينما قدس شيخه وإمامه كما فعل المتصوفون
المبتدعون في زماننا هذا ومن قبله.

والولاء والبراء ليس للأمير، فلأمير حق الطاعة فيما أمر الله وليس الولاء
له والبراء من عدوه الذي ربما يكون عدواً لنفسه فقط وليس عدواً للدين.

فإن كان كما يقول بعض الشرعيين أن الولاء للأمير هو ولاية الله، فقد ضلوا
ضلالاً بعيداً.

Section on Wala and Bara

Wala and Bara to God the Exalted: that man should disavow all that God has disavowed.

God Almighty has said in the ruling of revelation: "There was for you a good example in Ibrahim and those with him when they said to their people: 'We disavow you and what you worship besides God: we have rejected you and enmity and hatred have arisen between us and you forever.'"

"And the call to prayer from God and His Messenger to the people on the day of al-Hajj al-Akbar is that God and His Messenger disavow the idolaters."

Wala and Bara are not to a sheikh as the Sufi has done, having misled the people with his saying: "The one who has no sheikh, Satan is his sheikh" - and so he has given loyalty to himself and his wali.

And thus he has subsequently entered into idolatry when he has sanctified his sheikh and imam as the adherents of Sufis, practitioners of *bid'a*, have done in this time of ours and before.

And Wala and Bara are not to the emir, for the emir has the right of obedience in what God has ordered. And Wala is not to him and Bara from his enemy who may perhaps be an enemy to himself only and not an enemy to the religion.

For if, as some of the Shari'i officials say, it is that Wala to the emir is Wala to God, they have committed a grave error.

وهو بداية الانحراف الذي أودى بالمتصوفة للشرك، فطاعة الأمير تختلف
عن الولاء له ،

وتكون الطاعة في ما أمر الله، ولا يساق الجند في أمر من الأمير فيما يخالف
شرع الله.

والإخل في عقيدته شرك هو لا يدركه، والولاء والبراء لله ورسوله هو أن
تسير في أوامر الله وتكفر من عداه وأشرك به، ولا مجال للعقل البشري أن
يقس في الولاء والبراء شيئا، فهي نصوص قطعية الدلالة هنا أن تكفر
بالتطاغوت وتوالي من والى الله.

أما في بيعة الإمام والأمير فهي بيعة على مبادئ بحال خالفها فالمسلم حل
من بيعته.

أعلن بيعتي لأمير المؤمنين الخليفة الشيخ عبد الله إبراهيم بن عواد بن
إبراهيم القرشي الهاشمي الحسيني فأقول بابتك على السمع والطاعة في
المنشط والمكره والعسر واليسر وأثره على أن لا أنزع الأمر أهله إلا أن
أرى كفرا بواحا عندي من الله فيه برهان) فهي بيعة مشروطة ومحدودة
بباطل الشرع

And it is the beginning of the deviation toward idolatry that ruined the adherents of Sufism, for obedience to the emir is different from Wala to him.

And obedience is to be in what God has ordered, and the soldiers should not be bound to an order from the emir in what contravenes the law of God.

Otherwise, idolatry enters into his creed and he does not realize it. Wala and Bara to God and His Messenger means that you follow the orders of God and declare *takfir* on the one hostile to Him and associating partners with Him, and there is no room for the human mind to make any relative judgements in Wala and Bara, for they are precepts made clear here with definitive evidence: that you should declare *takfir* on *taghut* and be loyal to the one loyal to God.

As for the pledge of allegiance to the Imam and emir, it is a pledge of allegiance on the basis of principles: if they are violated, the Muslim is free from his pledge of allegiance.

I announce my pledge of allegiance to the Amir al-Mu'mineen, the caliph, the sheikh, the servant of God Ibrahim bin Awwad bin Ibrahim al-Qurashi al-Hashimi al-Husseini, for I say: I have pledged allegiance to you on hearing and obedience, will and compulsion, adversity and ease, and thus I must not conflict with the one in authority unless I see clear disbelief in my eyes, with proof on it being from God. So it is a conditional pledge of allegiance defined in the framework of the law.



ختاماً في هذه الرسالة القصيرة التي أوجزت فيها واختصرت قدر
المستطاع، أقول لجندي الخلافة:

أنت اللبنة التي أسست لهذا المشروع الكبير والذي أكرمنا الله بتحقيقه.
ولكن هذه سئة الله لا تعاطل ولا تخالف، فإن ظلمت أو جهلت أو سكت لسئة
الله لا مكارمة فيها.

فهدي النبي ليس ظاهر الشرع فقط بل هو جوهر التوحيد الخالص الذي
لا يخالطه شرك ولا مجاملة.

وإن الدولة حفظها الله لا تدوم في خطأ تستمر به، فجنذ النبي قد هزموا في
أخذ يوم خالفوا أمراً ميدانياً.

فكان الخطأ في جنذ النبي له عواقبه، فكيف بخطأ منا نحن؟

لقد أوجزت في رسالتي هذه تخفيفاً من عبا الطباعة والنشر التي حوربت
بها، وكان أن ارتأيت اختصار الكلام هو أسهل للمتلقى منه.

Conclusion

In conclusion to this short message in which I have been concise and summarized as far as I can, I say to the soldier of the caliphate:

You are the brick that has been laid for this great project that God ennobled us to realize, but this is the Sunna of God that is not to be temporized or violated. So if you commit wrong, are ignorant or silent, the Sunna of God has no *mukarama* in it [i.e. you cannot automatically expect help from God].

For the guidance of the Prophet is not only the appearance of the Shari'ah [law], but also the core of pure Tawheed that is not contaminated with idolatry or flattery [i.e. saying one thing and meaning another].

And indeed the state—may God protect it—will not last in an error it persists in, for the soldiers of the Prophet were defeated at Uhud on the day they violated an order in the field.

So the error in the Prophet's soldiers had its consequences, so how much more so is it true for an error on our part?

I have been concise in this message of mine to reduce the burden of printing and publication I have contended with, and it was that I calculated that summarizing the talk is easiest for the one who receives it.

رسالة التوب

وأختم بحديث النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم :

(إذا حكم الحاكم فاجتهد ثم أصاب فله أجران وإذا حكم فاجتهد ثم أخطأ فله أجر).

فلعلنا قد أصبنا أجرين فيما رزقنا الله من النصيحة، ولا أجذ ألد ولا أطيب من فهم إخواني في الدولة لما وفقني الله به.

فهو خيرُ الجهاد من بعد غزوةٍ يغزوها المسلمُ في سبيل الله.

سبحانك اللهم وبحمدك، لا إله إلا أنت أستغفرك وأتوب إليك.

أبو الفاروق المصري

جزا الله عنى خيراً أبو سُميَّة التونسي في التنقيح وأمور أخرى.

١٤٣٧ للهجرة.

And I conclude with a *hadith* of the Prophet (SAWS):

"When a judge issues a judgement and uses his skill and judges correctly, he will have double the reward, but when he judges and uses his skill and makes an error, his reward is single."

So perhaps we may come upon two rewards in what God has provided us from advice, and I do not find anything more gratifying or finer than the understanding of my brothers in the state for that by which God has granted me success.

For it is the best jihad after a raid that the Muslim undertakes in the path of God.

Exalted are you, oh God, and praise be to you. There is no deity except You. I seek Your forgiveness and I repent to You.

Abu al-Faruq al-Masri

May God reward best on my behalf Abu Sumayya al-Tunisi in reviewing and other matters.

1437 AH

Citations

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[3] For more discussion of "Principles in the Administration of the Islamic State," see Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, "'Principles in the Administration of the Islamic State' - Full text and translation," 2016. Available at <http://www.aymennjawad.org/18215/principles-in-the-administration-of-the-islamic>.

The ISIS Papers

A COMPILATION OF STATEMENTS OF THE
SALAFI SCHOLARS REGARDING ISIS/ISIL
[THE SO-CALLED "ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SHAM"]

SalafiManhaj.com



SCHOLARS

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]

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The ISIS Papers A Compilation of the Statements of the Salafi Scholars on ISIS/ISIL

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This document is produced by the Majority Staff of the House Homeland Security Committee.

KEY TAKEAWAYS



ISIS is fueling an unprecedented tempo for law enforcement authorities combatting the homegrown Islamist extremist threat.

The vast majority of the 900 active homegrown extremist investigations involve links to ISIS. Authorities have already arrested nearly 60 individuals this year in ISIS-related cases.

ISIS's global expansion has unleashed a wave of violence around the world

–

including against Western targets.

From July through September this year, ISIS-affiliated groups launched around 12 attacks every day killing more than 30 people worldwide

. ISIS's calls for attacks are resonating with

its supporters in the West. ISIS has directed or inspired 62 plots to attack Western targets, including 18 inside the United States.

Al Qaeda and its affiliates are regenerating their terror networks and capitalizing on power vacuums.

Al Qaeda is exploiting the diminished American troop presence and weak local security forces in Afghanistan in order to rebuild its sanctuary. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has captured additional territory in Yemen amidst the ongoing war there.

Foreign fighters converging on the battlefields in Syria and Iraq pose a continuing threat to the United States and our allies.

A French fighter

returnee reportedly described Syria as a “factory of jihadists” trained to launch external attacks in the near future. [A recent House Homeland Security Committee \(HSC\) bipartisan task force](#) found that security weaknesses overseas are enabling fighters to travel more freely.

The massive refugee flows out of Syria remain vulnerable to terrorists seeking to exploit the crisis to infiltrate the West.

American national security officials [cautioned](#)

– during a House Homeland Security Committee hearing on October 21 that our limited intelligence picture of the conflict zone in Syria has the potential to undermine the integrity of the U.S. refugee resettlement screening process.

Guantanamo Bay detainees transferred overseas continue to pose a threat to U.S. national security interests.

Nearly one in three detainees released from the facility have rejoined or are suspected of having rejoined Islamist terror groups. The Obama Administration transferred two more detainees out of Guantanamo in October.

The world's

leading state sponsor of Islamist terror, Iran, continues to sow instability and is poised to gain additional resources in the coming months as a result of sanctions relief.

Iran has ramped up its military involvement in Syria in conjunction with its proxies, the Assad regime, and Russia. The Obama Administration is preparing to provide Iran with additional sanctions relief under the terms of the nuclear agreement, meanwhile, the Iranian parliament [vowed](#) that the “martyr

- nurturing nation of Iran” will continue chanting “Death to America.”

HOME GROWN ISLAMIST EXTREMISM

ISIS is fueling an unprecedented tempo for law enforcement authorities combatting the homegrown Islamist extremist threat

• By the numbers

Since September 11, 2001, there have been 127 U.S. terrorist cases involving homegrown violent jihadists. Over 80 percent of these cases

— which include plotted attacks and attempts to join foreign terrorist organizations

— have occurred or been disrupted since 2009.

1

Authorities have arrested or charged at least 55 individuals in the United States this year

— 71 since 2014

— in ISIS-related cases. The cases involve individuals: plotting attacks; attempting to travel to

1

This figure is based on open-source data compiled by the Congressional Research Service and the Majority Staff of the Homeland Security Committee.

join ISIS overseas; sending money, equipment and weapons to terrorists; falsifying statements to federal authorities; and failing to report a felony.

2

FBI Director James Comey said on October 23 that law enforcement authorities have around [900](#) active homegrown extremist cases, the overwhelming majority of which are related to ISIS. Assistant Attorney General for National Security John Carlin [said](#) on September 28 that law enforcement authorities have open investigations of suspected ISIS supporters in all 50 states. Recent Developments

The threat to U.S. service members and government personnel persists, [due](#) in large part to ISIS’s

call for its supporters in the United States and the West to attack soldiers, law enforcement members, intelligence community employees, and other government officials.

□

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Jeh Johnson [told](#) a House Homeland Security Committee (HSC) hearing on October 21 that the July 2015 terror attack on service members in Chattanooga, Tennessee, appears to have been inspired by al Qaeda or ISIS.

TERROR ATTACK PLOTS AGAINST THE WEST

ISIS's global expansion has unleashed a wave of violence around the world

–

including against Western targets

•

By the numbers

□

Since early 2014, there have been 62 ISIS-linked plots to attack Western targets, including 18 inside in the United States.

3

□

There have been more than twice as many ISIS-linked attack plots against Western targets in 2015 (42) than in 2014 (20).

4

Recent Developments

□

[October 28](#)

: The head of the U.K.'s domestic security agency (MI5) Andrew Parker warned that ISIS is plotting mass-casualty attacks inside Britain. He added that the Islamist terror threat is “on a scale and at a tempo that I have not seen before in my career.” The U.K. has disrupted six terror attack plots in the last year.

□

[October 25](#): U.S. Embassy Dhaka reissued a security message strongly encouraging American citizens in Bangladesh to take additional security precautions in the wake of recent attacks there.

2

This figure is based on open-source data compiled by the Majority Staff of the Homeland Security Committee.

3

This figure is based on open-source data compiled by the Majority Staff of the Homeland Security Committee. Of the 15 attack plots in the United States, three of them have had more direct connections to ISIS (two plots involving hit lists released by ISIS's “hacking division” and the Garland, Texas, attack in which one of the perpetrators was reportedly [connected](#) via online communications to ISIS operative Junaid Hussain).

4

This figure is based on open-source data compiled by the Majority Staff of the Homeland Security Committee.

U.S. government personnel and their families are already restricted from attending large gatherings and traveling through most public places.

□

October 15: A senior DHS official told an audience of American energy firms that ISIS is attempting to launch cyber attacks against power companies. An FBI cyber division official noted that while ISIS currently has “low capability” in cyber warfare

‘the concern is that they’ll buy that capability.’”

□

October 15: Malaysian authorities arrested a Kosovar citizen, Ardit Ferizi, who hacked into the network of an American company, stole personally identifiable information (PII) of U.S. military and government personnel, and shared the PII with ISIS operative Junaid Hussain, who was killed in an August 2015 [airstrike](#). The PII was distributed through social media platforms by ISIS in order to encourage its supporters in the United States to attack the individuals.

□

ISIS is leveraging social media and encrypted technologies for operational planning against the U.S. homeland. As FBI Director Comey has [explained](#):

“ISI[S]

operators in Syria [are] recruiting and

tasking dozens of troubled Americans to kill people, a process that increasingly takes part through mobile messaging apps that are end-to-end encrypted, communications that may not be intercepted, despite judicial orders under the Fourth Amendment.

”

□

ISIS aggressively exploits social media in order to recruit fighters, disseminate propaganda, and trigger attacks in the West. It has attracted around **21,000** English-language followers on Twitter.

“There’s hundreds, maybe thousands” of ISIS followers in the United States,

FBI Assistant Director Michael Steinbach [testified](#) at a June 2015 HSC hearing.

□

ISIS [released](#) nearly 900 official videos between January 2014 and October 2015

–

approximately 120 of which targeted Western audiences

–

according to George Washington University researcher Javier Lesaca. An estimated 27 percent of its videos were released in English. The most common themes across the videos were depictions of its battles, interviews with foreign fighters, its governing capacity, and executions. Nearly 20 percent of the videos employed imagery popular in Western culture, including references to video games and television shows.

FOREIGN FIGHTERS

Foreign fighters, undeterred by U.S. and allied military operations, continue to pour into the jihadist breeding grounds in Syria and Iraq. These fighters pose immediate and long-term terror threats to their home countries and the United States.

By the numbers

□

Nearly [30,000 fighters](#) from over 100 countries have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join extremists

—

the largest convergence of Islamist terrorists in world history. The rate of fighters flowing into the conflict zone

—

[1,000](#) per month

—

has remained constant as of September 2015.

□

Approximately [4,500](#) Western fighters have traveled to Syria and Iraq,

5

but the figure is likely higher. Europol has [estimated](#) the number of EU citizens fighting in the conflict zone to be as high as 5,000.

□

Approximately [250 Americans](#) have traveled

—

or attempted to travel

—

to Syria to fight. [Several dozen](#) were believed to be fighting with ISIS earlier this year. As of March 2015, around [40 American fighters](#) who traveled to Syria have returned to the United States. FBI Director Comey told the HSC on October 21 that the rate at which Americans are trying to join Islamist extremist groups like ISIS [has](#) decreased, but he cautioned that this assessment could be skewed due to a lack of information.

□

An estimated [550](#) Western women have traveled to the conflict zone. A British woman, Sally Jones, is “

[actively](#) working to incite attacks and recruit new members,

”

[particularly](#) women. Another British woman, Aqsa Mahmood, [serves](#) as a recruiter of Western women and member of an all-female police unit based in Raqqa, Syria (al-Khansaa Brigade).

□

In addition to fighters joining Sunni extremist groups like ISIS and Jabhat al Nusra in Syria,

an estimated [20,000](#)

Shi'a fighters, including from Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi militias,

are fighting alongside the Bashar al Assad regime under Iranian direction. Recent Developments

□

A French citizen who returned to France from Syria said the war zone had become “a factory of jihadists trained to hit France and Europe in the very near future,”

[according](#) to a report from

France's Justice Ministry.

□

October 14: German authorities arrested a suspected ISIS recruiter and military equipment supplier in Berlin. The individual, Murad Atajev, was identified as a Russian national from Dagestan who is a preacher at a Russian-speaking Berlin mosque. He operates pro-ISIS social media accounts and is believed to be linked to a Berlin-based network recruiting Turkish and Russian fighters for ISIS.

FOREIGN JIHADIST NETWORKS & SAFE HAVENS

Islamist terror groups from ISIS to al Qaeda are exploiting power vacuums and putting down deeper roots across the Middle East and North Africa.

By the numbers

□

ISIS now has a direct presence, affiliates, or groups pledging support in at least 19 countries or territories, including Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Lebanon, Nigeria, the Palestinian territories (Gaza), Pakistan, Philippines, Russia (North Caucasus region), Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen.

6

5

National Counterterrorism Center Deputy Director John Mulligan, testimony before the House Homeland Security Committee, June 3, 2015.

6

Data compiled by the Majority Staff of the Homeland Security Committee.

□

ISIS controls at least 12 cities and towns in Iraq, including the provincial capital of Anbar province, Ramadi, and the second-largest city in the country, Mosul. It controls at least 13 cities and towns in Syria, including the northern city of Raqqa and Abu Kamal, a city near the Euphrates River along the border with Iraq.

7

ISIS also holds roughly [70 miles](#) of territory along Syria's border with Turkey.

□

ISIS controls energy resources in its territory and makes approximately [\\$500 million](#) from annual oil sales, according to Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing Daniel Glaser. A recent non-governmental assessment estimated that ISIS [produces](#) up to 40,000 barrels of crude oil every day and sells that quantity for nearly \$1.5 million. It also [generates](#) income through taxation, extortion, bank looting, kidnapping for ransom, human trafficking, stolen antiquities sales, and external donations.

□

ISIS-linked groups launched 1,086 attacks across the world between July and September 2015, [according](#) to a study by IHS Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Center. The study concluded that ISIS's "...capacity to wage a territorial

-focused insurgency in conjunction with a punitive campaign of terrorist attacks remains undiminished despite an increasingly broad spectrum of armed opposition.”

Recent Developments

□

ISIS Safe Haven in Syria and Iraq

○

ISIS has largely maintained its territory in northern and central Syria over the last month while attempting to make advances on multiple fronts. It exploited the bombing campaign by Russia against Syrian rebel forces by [seizing](#) villages north of Aleppo on October 9. It is currently [attempting](#) to sever an Assad regime supply line southeast of Aleppo.

○

Despite public statements, ISIS has not been a primary [target](#) for Russian airstrikes that commenced on September 30. Russia’s indiscriminate attacks will likely “unify the Syrian opposition with the jihadists against the Russians and Assad,” according to an [assessment](#) by non-government analysts.

○

ISIS has maintained control of [Ramadi](#), the capital of Iraq’s largely Sunni-populated Anbar province along the Syrian border, after seizing it in May 2015. Iraqi Security Forces have maneuvered [toward](#) Ramadi and secured some territory surrounding it while clearing improvised explosive devices emplaced by ISIS along the approaches to the city. The ISF are “consolidating and reorganizing” in advance of an attempt to retake Ramadi. A force consisting of Iraqi counterterrorism troops, federal police, and Shi’a militias are simultaneously attempting to [clear](#) the city of Baiji and a key oil refinery complex. ISIS has maintained its primary stronghold in Iraq, Mosul, despite ongoing targeted airstrikes [against](#) its personnel and military assets there.

○

Tikrit, Iraq, and surrounding areas that have been largely cleared of ISIS networks remain insecure given the destabilizing actions of Shi’a militia fighters. “

Abusive

[Shi’a extremist]

7

These figures are derived from assessments of territorial control conducted by the Institute for the Study of War research organization.

militias and their commanders acting with impunity undermine the campaign against ISIS and put all civilians at greater risk

,” according to a

September 2015 [study](#).

□

Emerging ISIS Safe Havens and Affiliates

○

ISIS has established a significant presence in Libya. Its affiliated militants have maintained and consolidated their control over Sirte, which sits along Libya's Mediterranean coastline. ISIS fighters continue to pose a threat to Libya's [oil](#) infrastructure.

○

Libya has become a key training ground for Tunisian militants joining ISIS, some of whom have left Syria to [relocate](#) to Libya. An estimated [3,000 fighters](#) in Libya are aligned with ISIS. In late 2014, a Libyan ISIS facilitator who had been trained by al Qaeda in Iraq founder Abu Musab al Zarqawi [set up](#) an ISIS outpost in Libya. ISIS reportedly began funneling [money and military trainers](#) to fighters in Libya earlier in 2015.

○

ISIS continues to assert its presence in Yemen through its local affiliate, which claimed responsibility for a series of suicide [bombings](#) on October 6, 2015, targeting both the Saudi-led coalition and the Iranian-backed al Houthi rebels. ISIS's Yemeni affiliate has been fundraising and recruiting fighters since 2014, including [under](#) the leadership of Saudi national Nasir Muhammad Awad al Ghidani al Harbi.

○

ISIS's affiliate in Afghanistan and Pakistan ("Khorasan") has continued to broaden its reach and increase its operating tempo. It has between 1,000 and 3,000 [members](#) in Afghanistan. The affiliate consists primarily of Afghan and Pakistani Taliban defectors and is [led](#) by former Tehrik-e Taliban commander Hafiz Saeed Khan. Khan has appointed representatives for Kunar and Nangarhar provinces in Afghanistan and sought to [establish](#) training camps in western Afghanistan. ISIS-Khorasan reportedly [operates](#) out of the Tirah valley region in Pakistan's western tribal areas.

○

ISIS's affiliate in the Caucasus [called](#) for its supporters to "wage jihad in the Caucasus

;

ISIS

leader al Baghdadi formally accepted a pledge of allegiance from followers in Russia's North [Caucasus](#) region in July 2015. Rustam Aselderov, a former al Qaeda-affiliated commander, is the [head](#) of this group and pledged his allegiance to ISIS leader al Baghdadi in December 2014. As many as [2,500](#) fighters from this region have joined extremists in Syria and Iraq.

○

ISIS's established affiliate in the Egyptian Sinai [controls](#) territory in the northeast part of the peninsula. The group has attacked Egyptian security forces, Western targets, and most [recently](#) government-aligned tribal militias.

○

ISIS has been attempting to exploit the recent spate of Palestinian terror attacks in Israel. It [released](#) a video of a Hebrew-speaking member threatening attacks against Jews. An ISIS-aligned group based in the Gaza Strip, the Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade, [claimed](#) credit for rocket attacks on Israel on October 4.

○

ISIS-aligned militants have escalated their operations inside Bangladesh. In late September 2015, ISIS supporters [claimed](#) credit for the killing of an Italian aid worker in Dhaka. They also took responsibility for the shooting [death](#) of a Japanese citizen in northern Bangladesh. Social media

accounts [affiliated](#)

with ISIS also claimed credit for the October 24 bombing of Shi'a worshippers in Dhaka.

○

ISIS [gained](#) a pledge of allegiance from Somali cleric Abdul Qadir Mumin. Mumin was a member of al Shabaab, the Somalia-based al Qaeda affiliate that has reportedly been trying to [crack](#) down against potential defectors in its ranks. An unconfirmed [estimate](#) from Somali government sources indicates that less than 10 percent of al Shabaab's membership would switch their allegiance from al Qaeda to ISIS.

□

Al Qaeda Safe Havens and Affiliates

○

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Director Nicholas Rasmussen [told](#) the HSC on October 21: "...I'm still not ready to declare core al-Qaeda as having been defeated in the classical sense of the word where the capability has been removed."

○

AQAP has been [expanding](#) into the Yemeni port city of Aden. Recent [efforts](#) to expel AQAP militants from the city have failed. NCTC Director Rasmussen [warned](#) in September 2015 that the ongoing war in Yemen, and the diminished U.S. presence there, "significantly complicates our ability to conduct counterterrorism operations in Yemen."

AQAP

remains "more capable of carrying out larger-scale attacks against the homeland" than ISIS, [according](#) to Director Rasmussen.

○

Al Qaeda [remains](#) a threat in Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan where it is working to reconstitute its networks and attack capabilities. It [built](#) a sizable sanctuary in southern Afghanistan where it established two training camps over territory covering almost 31 square miles. Al Qaeda had been [operating](#) the camps for nearly one year before U.S. and Afghan forces targeted and dismantled them in early October. The camps were built to [facilitate](#)

“

weapons training (small arms to advanced explosive training, indirect fire), chemistry to produce advanced explosives, and higher level sniper training.”

○

The al Qaeda-aligned Afghan Taliban has waged an offensive campaign to seize territory in Afghanistan, particularly in the northern city of Kunduz and the southern city of Helmand. Commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan General John Campbell described the recent performance of local Afghan security forces as “uneven and inconsistent” and assessed that “they do not possess the necessary combat power and numbers to protect every part of the country” from the Taliban and other insurgent groups.

○

Al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra (JN) maintains a significant presence in northern Syria and has threatened areas surrounding the capital, Damascus. Two Islamist militant groups, Ahrar al Sham and the Islamic Union of Jund al Sham, announced they had joined forces with JN in the eastern suburbs of Damascus on October 22. JN has been a prominent force in an anti-Assad regime coalition supported by Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.

○

The Khorasan Group is a network of veteran al Qaeda operatives in Syria that has been plotting attacks against American and allied targets. An October 15 airstrike eliminated the group’s most senior leader in Syria, Saudi national Sanafi al Nasr.

○

Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri reiterated the group’s long-term goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate in a new audio recording. He also called on Muslims to “liberate” Jerusalem, to attack America and its allies, and to unite in order to counter the U.S., Europe, Russia, and Iran and its proxies.

GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEES

Detainees released from Guantanamo Bay continue to return to the fight. The Obama Administration has continued to transfer extremists out of Guantanamo and has vowed to close the facility.

□

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s (ODNI)

most recent [assessment](#) of recidivism among former Guantanamo Bay detainees concludes that 30 percent of detainees released have resumed or are suspected of having returned to jihadist activity. The September 2015 assessment concluded that 11 more detainees were believed to have returned to the battlefield since the previous [report](#) issued in March 2015.

□

The Obama Administration [released](#) Guantanamo Bay detainee Ahmed Ould Abdel Aziz, who [reportedly](#) said he would join ISIS's ranks. Aziz, who was captured in 2002 at a suspected al Qaeda safe house in Karachi, Pakistan, was transferred to the Mauritanian government on October 29. Shaker Aamer was [transferred](#) to the U.K. on October 30. There are now 112 detainees left at the facility.

□

The Department of Defense is [preparing](#) recommendations for the transfer of Guantanamo detainees to prisons inside the United States as part of a push to close the facility. It recently completed assessments of two prisons in Colorado.

TERRORISTS' EXPLOITATION OF REFUGEE FLOWS

Islamist terrorists have [infiltrated the West in the past](#) through refugee programs and groups like ISIS may seek to exploit the current refugee flows.

The Obama Administration's proposal to resettle

Syrian refugees in the U.S. would have minimal impact on the refugee crisis but a potentially major impact on our homeland security.

□

The Obama administration has [proposed](#) resettling at least 10,000 more Syrian refugees in the U.S. this coming fiscal year, in addition to more than 1,800 already resettled since 2011.

□

Senior U.S. officials have repeatedly [testified](#) that we lack the on-the-ground intelligence in Syria needed to confidently vet individuals and identify security risks in the process of screening Syrian refugees for resettlement. NCTC Director Rasmussen [reinforced](#) those concerns to the HSC on October 21 when he said that the intelligence picture in Syria "isn't what we'd like it to be."

□

FBI Director Comey [told](#) the HSC on October 21: "...

if someone has not made a ripple in the pond in Syria in a way that would get their identity or their interests reflected in our databases, we can

query our databases until the cows come home but nothing will show up because we have no record of that person... You can only query what you have collected." DHS Secretary Johnson added: "It is true that we are not going to know a whole lot about the Syrians that come forth in this process."

THE IRANIAN TERROR THREAT

The nuclear agreement with Iran will provide hundreds of billions of dollars in economic relief to a regime that continues to support terrorists and undermine American national security interests.

□

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement with Iran was formally [adopted](#) on October 18 when President Obama [directed](#) relevant government agencies to prepare to loosen economic sanctions on Iran. The sanctions relief measures will be implemented after the International Atomic Energy Agency verifies that Iran has completed a series of changes to its nuclear program agreed to under the JCPOA.

□

A number of Iranian banks are expected to be [reconnected](#) to the global financial system through the Society for the Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) after Iran meets its initial JCPOA obligations. As a result of this reintegration,

Iran “will be

[poised](#) to more easily move

funds to terrorists’ coffers, foment conflict around the region, and possibly even procure equipment for a clandestine weapons program.

”

□

The commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Qassem Suleimani is [overseeing](#) a ground offensive to retake Aleppo with a force consisting of pro-Assad

Syrian fighters, Iranian military personnel and volunteers, Lebanese Hezbollah operatives, and Shi’a militias, including those who have been [redeployed](#) from Iraq to Syria.

□

Kata’ib Hezbollah, an Iraqi Shi’a militia designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S., claimed it deployed approximately [1,000](#) of its “special forces” who had fought against American forces in Iraq to Aleppo.

□

Iran’s military escalation in Syria will further fuel the war and raises the longer term [prospect](#) of

“battle hardened Iranian forces willing to fight in the open across borders.”

Iran [has](#) upwards of 1,000 military personnel in Iraq and up to 2,000 more in Syria.

□

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah [vowed](#) to continue fighting Israel and threatened to confront U.S. interests in the Middle East during an October 23 speech. Nasrallah revealed on October 18 that Hezbollah’s Syrian

[footprint](#)

was “larger than ever before –

qualitatively, quantitatively, and in

[terms of] equipment, because we are in a critical and definitive battle.”

□

Bahrain's Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmad al Khalifa [said](#) on October 13 that Iran's IRGC has trained 85 Bahrain-based terrorists in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon.

Abdelhamid Abaaoud

Childhood;

Abaaoud's father was born in Morocco but reportedly moved to Belgium in 1975, Abaaoud lived on Future Street in Molenbeek, a small, predominantly Muslim neighborhood in Belgium with many Moroccan residents, which has recently acquired the unflattering nickname "[jihadi capital of Europe](#)."

The country of 11 million people has sent, in per capita terms, more foreign fighters to Syria than any other European nation. Youth unemployment in Belgium is very high, and, as Hind Fraihi, a journalist who went undercover to study radicals in Molenbeek, These young people don't have a job or a future, so they are very easy to indoctrinate if you give them a big story, a big collective story, a story of our society, a dream, an aspiration, an idealism. Abaaoud's father, Omar

—
who moved to Belgium from Morocco about 40 years ago

—
owned a clothing store, and the young Abaaoud, who loved soccer, had the chance to go to one of the best schools in Brussels, the Catholic-run Collège Saint-Pierre d'Uccle.


However, he only went there for a year, according to the New York Times

, and soon started to hang out with a group of friends that often got in trouble. Two of his friends were [Ibrahim and Salah Abdeslam](#). Ibrahim blew himself up at the Comptoir Voltaire café; Salah [is the target of a massive manhunt](#). First Arrests; Abaaoud was first arrested for theft in 2006. In December 2010, Abaaoud and Ibrahim Abdeslam were sent to prison after they tried to break into a parking garage. Omar Abaaoud believes that his son was radicalized there. The pair were released a month later. The move to Syria;

In late 2013 or early 2014, Abaaoud moved to Syria and was quickly on the radar of those tracking ISIS militants. He appeared in a gruesome video around February, in which he drove a pickup truck dragging corpses behind it. "Before we towed jet skis, motorcycles, quad bikes, big trailers filled with presents for the holidays in Morocco," he said smiling. "Now, thank God, we're towing those who are fighting us, those who are fighting Islam." In another video, he [explained](#) his reasons for going to Syria.

"All my life

I have seen the blood of Muslims flow. I pray that God breaks the backs of those who oppose him [and] exterminates them." In 2014, Abaaoud's 13-year-old brother, Younes, went to Syria. It was the last straw for his family. At the time, [according to AFP](#), his father told local reporters, "Why in the name of God, would he want to kill innocent Belgians? Our family owes everything to this country. Abdelhamid has brought shame on our family. Our lives have been destroyed ... I never want to see him again." His parents left Belgium and returned to Morocco, where Abaaoud was born. In July 2015, Abaaoud was sentenced to 20 years in prison by a court in Belgium for recruiting terrorists. The accused obviously never appeared to defend himself and was tried in absentia.



Rise of ISIS: A Threat We Can't Ignore

by Jay Sekulow, Jordan Sekulow, and Robert W Ash

144 Pages

Summary

THE DEFINITIVE BOOK ON ISIS

Jay Sekulow, one of America's most influential attorneys, closely examines the rise of the terrorist groups ISIS and Hamas, explains their objectives and capabilities and how, if left undefeated, their existence could unleash a genocide of historic proportions.

Recently, the world has been shaken by gruesome photos and videos that have introduced us to the now infamous terrorist group known as ISIS. The world's wealthiest and most powerful jihadists, ISIS originated within Al Qaeda with the goal of creating an Islamic state across Iraq and Syria and unrelenting jihad on Christians. Separate from ISIS, the terrorist group Hamas has waged an equally brutal war against Israel. Both groups, if left undefeated, have the potential to unleash a catastrophic genocide.

Rise of ISIS gives a better understanding of the modern face of terror, and provides an overview of the laws of war and war crimes. These laws differentiate between the guilty and innocent, and explain why the US military and the Israeli Defense Forces are often limited in their defensive measures.

The authors' firsthand experience, including multiple appearances before the Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court at The Hague, along with direct contact battling jihadists during operation Iraqi Freedom lends insight into this important geopolitical issue.

A must-have for anyone who wants to better understand the conflict that exists in the middle east, this well-researched and fully annotated volume is invaluable in revealing how this new brand of terrorism poses a very real threat to Americans and the world at large. It also serves as a guide to what we as individuals—and as a nation—can do to stop this escalating violence, prevent jihad, and protect Israel and America from this imminent threat.

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[Additional Information about Rise of ISIS](#)